A
W
Prociuk:—The
appellant
appeals
from
the
respondent’s
reassessment
of
his
income
for
the
taxation
year
1972
wherein
his
portion
of
the
net
profit
realized
on
the
sale
of
some
land
in
which
the
appellant
held
a
25%
interest
was
treated
as
income.
The
appellant’s
ground
of
appeal
is
that
it
was
a
capital
accretion,
and,
further,
that
the
fair
market
value
of
the
land
on
Valuation
Day
was
at
least
equal
to
the
sale
price
and
therefore
there
was
no
capital
gain.
The
appellant
is
63
years
of
age
and
for
the
past
43
years
was
and
still
is
a
life
insurance
underwriter
with
London
Life
Insurance
Company.
Over
90%
of
his
income
is
derived
from
the
sale
of
life
insurance
policies.
He
had
lived
for
many
years
at
465
Clarence
Avenue,
in
London,
Ontario,
and
is
familiar
with
that
part
of
the
City.
He
became
acquainted
with
two
American
real
estate
developers
and
builders,
Elliott
N
Yarmon
and
S
Joseph
Tankoos.
Some
13
years
ago
Yarmon
approached
the
appellant
and
asked
him
if
he
would
join
him
and
Tankoos
in
the
acquisition
of
some
land
in
the
200
block
on
Queens
Avenue
with
the
intention
of
erecting
an
office
building
thereon.
The
appellant
agreed.
A
company
was
incorporated
in
Ontario
with
the
appellant
holding
25%
of
the
issued
and
outstanding
common
stock
therein.
The
land
was
purchased,
the
office
building
constructed,
known
as
201
Queens
Avenue
Limited,
and
the
company
derived
rental
income
therefrom.
The
appellant
was
the
resident
overseer
or
supervisor
of
that
project.
Bell
Canada
owned
some
land
to
the
south
of
this
building,
known
as
435
Clarence
Avenue.
In
the
summer
of
1968
it
became
known
that
Bell
Canada
wished
to
sell
its
said
land.
The
appellant,
Yarmon
and
Tankoos
considered
the
possibility
of
acquiring
this
land
and
erecting
thereon
a
multistorey
parking
garage
with
shops
on
the
ground
level
as
that
appeared
to
be
the
best
use
of
that
property
for
their
purpose.
They
were
also
concerned
that
if
they
didn’t
buy
the
land,
someone
else
would,
likely
resulting
in
use
of
same
to
the
detriment
and
devaluation
of
their
office
building.
They
had
the
land
appraised
privately
and
the
appellant
states
they
were
satisfied
that
that
piece
was
worth
at
least
$200,000.
They
were
successful
in
purchasing
same,
using
their
company
for
that
purpose,
for
$120,000,
on
September
27,
1968.
In
1969
they
had
the
land
appraised
again
by
a
real
estate
appraiser
who
told
them
that
it
was
worth
close
to
$300,000.
The
company
engaged
the
services
of
Parking
Design
and
Development
Ltd,
of
Willowdale,
Ontario
to
conduct
a
feasibility
study
in
respect
of
the
proposal
of
a
multi-storey
carpark
with
shops
on
this
land.
The
report
being
some
8
pages
of
detailed
study,
dated
March
24,
1969,
filed
as
Exhibit
A-1,
was
most
encouraging
to
the
appellant
and
particularly
so
to
the
other
two
majority
shareholders.
An
architect
had
been
engaged
by
Yarmon
and
Tankoos
in
the
summer
of
1968
when
negotiations
for
the
purchase
of
the
land
were
still
going.
The
architect,
Mr
S
D
F
Reszetnik,
prepared
the
preliminary
sketches
of
the
contemplated
project
(Exhibit
A-2).
The
report
(Exhibit
A-1)
concludes,
inter
alia,
(1)
“that
the
subject
site
on
Clarence
Street
would
be
an
excellent
location
for
an
approximately
320
stall
multi-storey
carpark,
and
(2)
that
such
parking
structure
would
be
economically
viable”.
To
finance
the
project,
Yarmon
and
Tankoos,
through
their
company,
entered
into
a
sale-lease-back
agreement
with
Standard
Life
Assurance
Company,
in
September
of
1968,
which
agreement
was
extended
and
somewhat
revised
in
September
of
1969
(see
Exhibit
A-3).
The
appellant
went
along
with
everything
that
the
majority
shareholders
decided.
Also
in
September
of
1969
the
Municipal
Council
of
the
City
of
London,
Ontario
gave
tentative
approval
to
some
further
changes
in
the
erection
of
this
combined
parking-retail
store
complex
subject
to
its
approval
of
a
detailed
report
to
be
submitted
by
the
company
(see
Exhibit
A-4).
While
all
these
negotiations
and
preparations
were
going
on,
the
land
was
used
for
off-street
parking.
The
cost
of
construction
was
reviewed
again
in
1970
and
it
was
decided
to
build
a
smaller
building.
This
decision
was
not
proceeded
with
because
Yarmon
and
Tankoos
became
engaged
in
building
elsewhere
and
the
appellant
could
do
nothing
about
it.
In
1971
by
majority
decision
the
land
was
transferred
for
the
sum
of
$145,000
from
the
company
to
its.
three
shareholders
personally
to
each
his
respective
undivided
share.
The
appellant
stated
that
this
Came
about
at
the
instance
of
Tankoos
who
was
apparently
able
to
get
some
tax
advantage
in
the
United
States.
Tankoos
died
later
on
in
1971.
Yarmon
was
heavily
involved
and
preoccupied
in
his
other
businesses
elsewhere
in
Canada
and
in
the
United
States.
In
February
of
1972
Yarmon,
the
appellant
states,
advised
him
that
he
received
an
offer
for
the
sale
of
this
land
in
the
sum
of
$225,000,
which
he
(Yarmon)
was
prepared
to
accept.
The
appellant
states
that
he
had
no
choice
but
to
agree.
He
was
in
no
position
to
buy
his
partners
out.
The
land
was
being
bought
on
behalf
of
Canada
Trust
and
it
did
not
appear
that
this
sale
would
in
any
way
result
in
depreciation
of
the
building
owned
by
201
Queens
Avenue
Limited.
The
sale
was
completed
on
March
1,
1972.
The
appellant’s
share
of
the
net
profit
was
$19,513.22.
The
respondent
submits
that
at
the
time
of
the
acquisition
of
the
said
property
and
at
all
material
times
thereafter,
the
appellant
intended
to
trade
in,
deal
in
or
otherwise
turn
the
said
property
to
account
for
profit
and
that
the
said
profit
was
properly
included
in
the
appellant’s
income
by
virtue
of
sections
3,
9
and
subsection
248(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63.
With
great
deference
to
counsel
for
the
respondent,
I
am
unable
to
arrive
at
the
same
conclusion.
There
is
no
evidence
from
which
it
could
be
inferred
that
the
appellant’s
intention
was
as
alleged
above.
On
the
contrary,
the
evidence
is
strong
that
from
the
very
outset
his
interest
was
that
of
investment
with
the
two
people
whom
he
knew
and
with
whom
he
had
been
in
business
(Queens
Avenue
building)
for
several
years.
The
land
was
next
door
to
the
land
and
building
in
which
he
had
a
proprietary
interest.
If
the
original
intention
or
the
secondary
one
was
to
turn
the
asset
to
account
at
the
first
available
opportunity,
I
fail
to
see
why
this
could
not
have
been
done
much
earlier.
It
also
would
appear
incongruous
that
so
much
time,
expense
and
effort
would
be
expanded
on
plans
and
agreements
for
construction
when
none
of
this
in
any
way
added
to
the
appreciation
of
the
value
of
the
land
directly
or
indirectly.
I
am
satisfied
that
the
appellant
has
amply
discharged
the
onus
the
Act
has
placed
on
him
and
is
entitled
to
succeed.
The
appeal
accordingly
is
allowed
and
the
whole
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
on
that
basis.
Appeal
allowed.