The
Chairman
[TRANSLATION]:—This
is
an
appeal
by
Marcel
H
Roy
against
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
1974
taxation
year.
Issue
The
point
at
issue
is
an
assessment
in
which
the
respondent
added
$3,139.33
to
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
1974
taxation
year,
pursuant
to
the
issue
of
a
T3
form
by
the
respondent
as
the
result
of
an
audit
of
Estate
J
Horace
Brabant,
of
which
the
appellant
was
the
residuary
legatee,
as
well
as
executor.
The
$3,139.33
was
claimed
by
the
said
estate
as
expenses
in
1974,
but
was
disallowed
as
such
by
the
respondent,
who.
considered
it
to
be
income
of
the
estate
and
added
it
to
the
appellant’s
personal
income
for
that
year.
The
appellant
objected
to
this
assessment
and
filed
an
appeal
with
the
Board.
Facts
The
facts
are
relatively
simple,
and
there
is
no
disagreement
between
the
parties.
In
1969
Mr
J
Horace
Brabant
died,
leaving
in
his
estate
certain
properties,
including
a
building
with
four
apartments
and
two
garages,
and
a
semi-commercial
building
with
four
stores
and
twelve
apartments.
The
said
properties
continued
to
produce
income
for
the
estate
after
Mr
Brabant’s
death.
The
appellant,
Mr
Marcel
H
Roy,
was
appointed
residuary
legatee
and
executor
of
the
estate
in
a
will
dated
October
27,
1964
(Exhibit
A-3).
In
his
capacity
as
executor,
the
appellant
filed
a
T3-1974(F)
form
as
well
as
a
trust
information
return
and
income
tax
return
(Exhibit
I-1-4).
Following
the
filing
of
this
return,
the
appellant
received
the
following
letter
(Exhibit
I-2)
from
the
Chief,
Audit:
[Translation]
|
|
July
16,
1975
|
|
Mr
Marcel
H
Roy
|
M
Ste-Marie
|
5701
des
Chênes
Ave
|
Section
61
|
Montreal,
Quebec
|
Room
520
|
H1T
2R1
|
Tel:
283-6384
|
Dear
Sir:
|
|
Re:
Estate
J
Horace
Brabant
|
|
13-1974
return
|
|
Upon
examination
of
the
above-mentioned
return.
it
was
noted
that
interest
on
bank
loans
used
to
pay
part
of
the
estate
taxes
was
deducted
from
income.
Please
note
that
interest
thus
paid
is
not
deductible
under
ss
60(d),
20(1)(c),
or
any
other
provision
of
the
Act.
Enclosed
are
revised
copies
of
your
T3
Supp
form,
in
which
“other
income’’
has
been
revised
to
$3,139.33.
the
interest
on
bank
loans
used
to
pay
estate
taxes.
Your
1974
income
tax
return
will
be
revised
accordingly.
Yours
truly,
(Signed)
M
Ste-Marie
Encl
for
the
Chief,
Audit
The
statement
of
trust
income
allocations
was
in
fact
revised
and
$3,139.33
was
added
to
the
income
of
the
beneficiary,
Mr
Marcel
H
Roy.
The
basic
issue
in
the
case
at
bar
therefore
concerns
interest
in
the
amount
of
$3,139.33
paid
on
a
bank
loan
taken
out
by
the
estate
and
endorsed
by
the
appellant
both
in
his
capacity
as
executor
and
personally.
The
question
is
whether
the
estate
obtained
the
loan
to
pay
estate
taxes,
as
maintained
by
the
respondent,
in
which
case
the
interest
on
the
loan
is
not
deductible,
or
whether
the
loan
was
obtained
to
enable
the
executor
to
pursue
the
normal
financial
operations
of
the
estate,
as
maintained
by
the
appellant.
Before
deciding
on
this
question,
however,
I
would
like
to
examine
another
point
tn
this
matter.
The
reassessment
shows
that
the
respondent
disallowed
the
deduction
of
interest
paid
by
the
estate.
Consequently,
the
estate
was
left
with
a
balance
of
$3,139.33
in
income
for
1974.
This
income
was
added
to
the
appellant’s
personal
income
for
the
1974
taxation
year,
since
he
was
the
beneficiary.
The
question
is
whether
the
$3,139.33
was
income
or
a
final
asset
of
the
estate
that
could
be
enjoyed
by
the
beneficiary,
or
perhaps
even
simply
a
stage
in
the
executor’s
administration
of
the
estate
so
it
could
be
finally
settled.
The
reason
for
subsections
104(1)
and
(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
is
easy
to
understand.
Subsections
104(1)
and
(2)
read
as
follows:
104.
(1)
Reference
to
trust
or
estate—In
this
Act,
a
reference
to
a
trust
or
estate
(in
this
subdivision
referred
to
as
a.
“trust”)
shall
be
read
as
a
reference
to
the
trustee
or
the
executor,
administrator,
heir
or
other
legal
representative
having
ownership
or
control
of
the
trust
property.
(2)
Taxed
as
individual.—k
trust
shall,
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
and
without
affecting
the
liability
of
the
trustee
or
legal
representative
for
his
own
income
tax.
be
deemed
to
be
in
respect
of
the
trust
property
an
individual;
but
where
there
is
more
than
one
trust
and
(a)
substantially
all
of
the
property
of
the
various
trusts
has
been
received
from
one
person,
and
(b)
the
various
trusts
are
conditioned
so
that
the
income
thereof
accrues
or
will
ultimately
accrue
to
the
same
beneficiary,
or
group
or
class
of
beneficiaries,
such
of
the
trustees
as
the
Minister
may
designate
shall,
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
be
deemed
to
be
in
respect
of
all
the
trusts
an
individual
whose
property
is
the
property
of
all
the
trusts
and
whose
income
is
the
income
of
all
the
trusts.
Applying
this
section
to
the
case
at
bar,
it
will
be
seen
that
Estate
Brabant
also
refers
to
the
executor,
having
ownership
or
control
of
the
property
in
the
estate,
but
it
is
the
estate
which
is
“deemed
to
be
in
respect
of
the
trust
property
an
individual”.
It
should
be
noted
that
although
this
section
speaks
of
legal
representatives
of
a
trust
or
estate,
it
Woes
not
mention
“beneficiaries”.
The
appellant,
in
his
capacity
of
executor,
paid
the
estate’s
debts
out
of
the
estate’s
assets
and
income
for
a
period
of
three
years.
He
administered
the
properties
and
collected
the
rent.
He
paid
off
about
15
specific
legacies,
including
a
debt
of
$10,000
to
the
widow
of
the
deceased
six
months
after
his
death,
in
accordance
with
the
latter’s
marriage
contract.
He
also
paid
the
property
taxes
and
filed
income
tax
returns
for
Estate
Brabant
in
the
amount
of
$8,000
in
1971,
$14,000
in
1972,
and
$12,000
in
1973.
In
1972
the
estate
was
assessed
for
$156,191.85
in
federal
and
provincial
estate
taxes.
On
April
17,
1974
the
estate
taxes
were
paid,
except
for
approximately
$14,000,
which
was
subsequently
paid
off
by
the
sale
of
the
deceased’s
residence.
The
estate
has
not
been
divided
in
any
way
except
for
the
payment
of
legacies.
The
two
properties
forming
the
core
of
Estate
Brabant
cannot
be
transferred
to
the
residuary
legatee
until
the
last
heir,
is
deceased.
The
appellant’s
testimony
revealed
that
one
of
the
two
heirs
is
still
living.
lt
seems
apparent
that
the
payment
of
$3,139.33
in
interest,
whether
deductible
or
not,
was
made
for
the
estate
in
the
course
of
administering
its
assets.
Since
the
respondent
disallowed
the
deduction
of
the
interest
on
loans,
the
estate
might
be
(and
l'am
not
deciding
here
whether
the
$3,139.33
is
deductible)
taxed
on
the
$3,139.33,
which
was
added
to
its
income,
and
the
estate
might
have
to
pay
the
taxes,
through
its
legal
representative
who,
in
the
case
at
bar,
is
the
appellant,
in
his
capacity
of
executor.
In
my
opinion,
there
is
a
big
difference
between
the
role
of
the
estate’s
legal
representative,
the
executor,
and
that
of
the
beneficiary,
even
when
it
is
the
same
person.
Since
the
estate
was
still
not
settled
in
April
1974,
the
estate
taxes
were
still
not
completely
paid,
the
estate’s
assets
had
still
not
been
divided,
the
transfer
of
the
properties
to
the
name
of
the
residuary
legatee
had
still
not
been
made,
and
the
executor
was
still
administering
the
estate
s
assets,
the
estate
should
have
been
taxed
for
the
income
of
$3,139.33
(if
the
interest
was
not
legally
deductible)
and
the
taxes
should
have
been
paid
out
of
the
estate’s
assets,
through
the
appellant,
in
his
role
of
executor.
This,
in
my
opinion,
is
the
scope
of
subsections
104(1)
and
(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
An
estate’s
income
is
definitely
taxable
once
it
has
been
transferred
to
the
beneficiary,
but
first
the
estate
must
have
been
settled,
the
division
made
and
all
the
estate’s
debts
paid.
This
was
not
the
case
in
the
matter
before
the
Board.
In
his
arguments
regarding
this
matter,
counsel
for
the
respondent
stated:
Mr
Chairman.
I
wish
to
take
the
following
position
in
this
matter.
The
loan
was
taken
out
in
the
name,
of
Estate
J
Horace
Brabant.
Mr
Roy
was
a
party
to
the
loan
as
endorser
as
well
as
executor
and
residuary
legatee,
although
he
did
not
incur
any
legal
obligations.
Even
assuming
the
deduction
had
been
allowed,
Mr
Roy
would
still
have
had
to
incur
the
expenditure.
The.
expenditure
was
made
by
the
estate.
Mr
Chairman.
The
appeal
before
this
Court
this
morning
is
that
of
Mr
Roy
only.
I
cannot
see
how
the
Board
could
allow
Mr
Roy
to
claim
an
expense,
to
deduct
an
expense,
which
may
be
claimed
by
the
estate.
Perhaps
we
should
re-examine
the
facts
in
this
case.
The
Estate
claimed
$3,
139.33
in
expenses,
leaving
a
net
and
residual
income
of
zero.
The
Department
performed
an
audit
and
disallowed
the
expenses.
It
then
issued
a
T3
form
and.
Mr
Roy
was
taxed
as
the
residuary
legatee.
Mr
Roy-is
now,
appealing
the
inclusion
of
this
amount
in
his
income.
Mr
Chairman.
I
respectfully
submit
that
unless
Mr
Roy
can
prove
that
he
is
not
the
residuary
legatee.
he
has
no
reason
for
appealing
the
refusal
of
this
deduction
in
the
estate
s
assessment.
The
evidence
shows
that
Mr
Roy
is
indeed
the
residuary
legatee
of
the
Estate
Brabant,
but
the
confusion
which
has
arisen
between
Mr
Roy’s
role
as
executor
in
the
administration
of
the
estate
and
his
role
as
residuary
legatee
prior
to
the
settlement
of
the
estate
has,
in
my
opinion,
given
risen
to
the
exact
contradictory
conclusions
that
subsections
104(1)
and
(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
were
trying
to
avoid.
Since
this
appeal
deals
with
Mr
Roy’s
personal
assessment
and
not
that
of
Mr
Roy
as
executor
of
the
estate
he
administered,
I
must
conclude
that
the
respondent
erred
or
at
least
was
premature
in
sending.
Mr
Roy,
as
residuary
legatee,
a
tax
assessment
for
1974
in
which
income
which
may
have
been
earned
by
the
estate
in
1974,
through
Mr
Roy
who
managed
its
assets,
was
added
to
his
personal
income.
The
estate
itself
should
have
been
taxed,
through
the
executor,
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Since,
in
the
circumstances,
the
assessment
of
the
appellant
as
residuary
legatee
before
the
estate
was
settled
was
incorrect
in
fact
and
in
law,
I
shall
not
decide
whether
interest
in
the
amount
of
$3,139.33
paid
by
the
estate
in
1974
for
loans
is
deductible
from
the
estate’s
income
for
the
taxation
year
1974.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
assessment
vacated.
Appeal
allowed.