The
Associate
Chief
Justice:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
which
allowed
the
defendant’s
appeal
from
an
assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
year
1973.
The
issue
is
whether
the
defendant
is
entitled,
in
computing
his
income,
to
deduct
an
amount
of
$504
for
the
cost
of
meals
claimed
as
part
of
his
expenses
for
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment.
Under
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
(h)
where
the
taxpayer,
in
the
year,
(i)
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
in
different
places,
he
may,
subject
to
the
other
limitations
of
the
paragraph,
deduct
.
.
.
amounts
expended
by
him
in
the
year
for
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment;
It
is
under
this
paragraph
that
the
defendant
claims
the
deduction.
But
under
subsection
8(4)
8.(4)
An
amount
expended
in
respect
of
a
meal
consumed
by
an
officer
or
employee
shall
not
be
included
in
computing
the
amount
of
a
deduction
under
paragraph
(1)(f)
or
(h)
unless
the
meal
was
consumed
during
a
period
while
he
was
required
by
his
duties
to
be
away,
for
a
period
or
not
less
than
twelve
hours,
from
the
municipality
where
the
employer’s
establishment
to
which
he
ordinarily
reported
for
work
was
located
and
away
from
the
metropolitan
area,
if
there
is
one,
where
it
was
located.
The
defendant
resides
in
Toronto.
For
some
25
years,
including
1973,
he
was
employed
by
the
Ontario
Jockey
Club
which
has
its
head
office
in
Toronto
and
operates
six
racetracks
including
the
Greenwood
and
Woodbine
tracks
in
Toronto
and
a
racetrack
at
Fort
Erie
about
100
miles
from
Toronto.
In
1973
the
defendant
was
employed
during
the
thoroughbred
racing
season
from
March
21
to
December
1
as
a
money
room
division
head
and
at
times
as
a
money
room
captain,
all
in
connection
with
the
pari
mutuel
operations
of
the
Club.
He
was
assigned
to
work
at
differing
times
during
the
year
at
the
Greenwood,
Woodbine
and
Fort
Erie
racetracks.
He
worked
at
Fort
Erie
at
two
race
meetings
during
the
year,
the
first
from
April
15
to
May
13
and
the
second
from
July
18
to
September
1.
While
at
Fort
Erie
he
lived
at
a
motel.
He
received
no
allowance
or
reimbursement
from
his
employer
in
respect
of
his
transportation
expenses
to
or
from
Fort
Erie
or
for
his
expenses
while
there.
His
claim
for
a
deduction
under
paragraph
8(1)(h)
in
respect
of
his
transportation
and
motel
expenses
was
not
challenged
but
the
amount
claimed
for
expenses
for
meals
totalling
$504
was
disallowed
under
subsection
8(4).
That
his
expenses
for
meals
amounted
to
$504
is
not
in
dispute.
The
defendant
was
a
member
of
a
union
of
employees
of
the
Club.
At
the
beginning
of
the
thoroughbred
racing
season
he
would
find
out
where
he
was
to
work
first
from
an
assignment
list
which
would
be
posted
at
the
union
office.
Assignment
lists
for
the
subsequent
race
meetings
would
be
posted
at
the
racetrack
where
a
race
meeting
was
in
progress.
At
the
beginning
of
a
season,
the
defendant
would
not
necessarily
expect
to
be
working
outside
Toronto
during
the
year
but
it
was
a
definite
possibility
that
he
would
be
assigned
to
go
to
Fort
Erie.
On
one
occasion
prior
to
1973,
he
had
volunteered
to
go
there
when
the
Club
was
short-handed
and
he
was
sent
there
each
year
afterwards
except
one
year
when
his
father
was
ill
and
he
did
not
wish
to
go.
In
1973
his
first
assignment
was
at
the
Greenwood
track
and
most
of
his
employment
during
the
racing
season
was
at
the
Greenwood
and
Woodbine
tracks.
The
defendant’s
position
was
that,
as
he
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
his
employment
in
different
places,
the
amount
here
in
question
was
deductible
as
part
of
his
travelling
expenses
under
paragraph
8(1)(h)
and
the
deduction
was
not
prohibited
by
subsection
8(4)
as
the
racetrack
at
Fort
Erie
was
not
the
establishment
of
his
employer
“to
which
he
ordinarily
reported
for
work”
within
the
meaning
of
the
subsection.
The
meanings
given
in
the
Shorter
Oxford
Dictionary
for
the
word
“ordinarily”
are:
1.
In
conformity
with
rule;
as
a
matter
of
regular
occurrence.
2.
In
most
cases;
usually,
commonly.
3.
To
the
usual
extent.
4.
As
is
normal
or
usual.
In
the
French
language
version
of
the
Act,
the
corresponding
expression
used
in
paragraph
8(1)(h)
is
“d’une
manière
habituelle”
and
in
subsection
8(4)
the
word
is
“habituellement”.
The
meanings
of
“habituellement”
as
given
in
Dictionnaire
Quillet
de
la
Langue
Française
are:
“d’habitude,
par
habitude;
d’ordinaire.”
The
contrary
is
given
as:
“rarement,
exceptionnellement.”
The
meaning
given
for
“habituel,
elle”
is:
“passé
à
l’état
d’habitude;
coutumier.”
It
is
contrasted
with:
“rare,
exceptionnel,
inaccoutumé,
désuet.”
“Normal”
is
suggested
as
a
synonym.
In
paragraph
8(1)(h)
the
word
“ordinarily”
modifies
“required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
him
employment
etc”,
and
it
appears
to
me
to
be
equivalent
to
“normally”
as
opposed
to
“rarely”
or
“exceptionally”.
The
meaning
“in
most
cases”
does
not
fit.
That
of
“as
a
matter
of
regular
occurrence”
does.
In
the
view
I
have
of
the
facts,
it
was
a
matter
of
regular
occurrence,
normal
and
not
exceptional
for
the
defendant
to
carry
out
his
duties
during
the
racing
season
as
required
by
his
employer
at
at
least
two,
if
not
three,
different
places,
that
is
to
say,
at
Toronto
and
at
Fort
Erie
or
at
the
Greenwood,
Woodbine
and
Fort
Erie
racetracks.
I
conclude,
therefore,
that
the
defendant’s
situation
fell
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
and
that
he
was
entitled
to
a
deduction
in
respect
of
his
expenses
of
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment.
Moreover
such
expenses
would,
I
think,
ordinarily
include,
but
for
the
effect
of
subsection
8(4),
the
cost
of
his
meals
while
at
Fort
Erie
in
the
course
of
his
duties.
In
subsection
8(4),
the
word
“ordinarily”
is
part
of
the
phrase
“where
the
employer’s
establishment
to
which
he
ordinarily
reported
for
work
was
located’’.
In
this
context
it
modifies
the
expression
“reported
for
work”
and
has
the
effect
of
narrowing
what
the
phrase
would
include
if
the
word
were
not
there.
The
expression
“reported
for
work”
itself
refers,
I
think,
to
the
daily
attendance
by
an
employee
for
work.
To
give
the
word
“ordinarily”
its
meaning,
it
appears
to
me
to
be
necessary
to
conceive
of
and
identify
the
establishment
of
the
employer
to
which
the
employee
“as
a
matter
of
regular
occurrence”,
“usually”
or
“normally”
reported
for
work.
When
this
has
been
done,
the
wording
of
the
subsection
makes
it
necessary
to
go
a
step
further
and
ascertain
the
municipality
in
which
that
establishment
is
located.
In
the
present
case
there
were,
in
my
view,
not
one
but
three
establishments
of
the
Jockey
Club
to
which
the
defendant
in
the
course
of
the
racing
season
usually,
normally
and
as
a
matter
of
regular
occurrence
reported
for
work,
that
is
to
say,
the
Woodbine,
Greenwood
and
Fort
Erie
racetracks,
depending,
in
each
case,
on
the
race
meetings
being
held
and
the
track
to
which
the
defendant
was
assigned.
On
the
facts
I
am
unable
to
see
any
valid
basis
for
distinguishing,
for
present
purposes,
any
one
of
the
three
tracks
from
the
others
and
I
am
unable
to
reach
the
conclusion
that
any
one
of
them
alone
was
or
that
any
two
of
them
together
were
the
establishment
where
the
defendant
ordinarily
reported
for
work
to
the
exclusion
of
the
other
or
others.
Under
subsections
3(1)
and
26(7)
of
the
Interpretation
Act,
RSC
1970,
c
I-23,
unless
a
contrary
intention
appears,
words
in
the
singular
include
the
plural
and
words
in
the
plural
include
the
singular.
In
subsection
8(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
I
do
not
think
a
contrary
intention
appears
and
so
it
is
necessary,
in
my
opinion,
in
applying
it
to
the
present
situation
to
read
both
the
word
“municipality”
and
the
word
“establishment”
as
including
the
plural.
The
Fort
Erie,
Woodbine
and
Greenwood
racetracks
were
all
establishments
of
the
Jockey
Club
to
which
the
defendant
ordinarily
reported
to
work.
All
three,
therefore,
fall
within
the
meaning
of
“establishment
to
which
he
ordinarily
reported
for
work”
in
subsection
8(4).
It
follows,
in
my
opinion,
that
the
municipality
in
which
the
Fort
Erie
track
is
located
and
that
or
those
in
which
the
Woodbine
and
Greenwood
tracks
are
located
fall,
as
well,
within
the
meaning
of
“municipality”
in
the
subsection.
Subsection
8(4)
accordingly
applies
to
bar
the
defendant’s
right
to
the
deduction
in
question.
The
appeal
will
be
allowed
and
the
assessment
will
be
restored.
Under
subsection
178(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
will
be
ordered
to
pay
all
reasonable
and
proper
costs
of
the
defendant
in
connection
with
the
appeal.