Roland
St-Onge:—The
appeal
of
John
A
Carruthers
came
before
me
on
September
13
and
14,
1979,
at
the
City
of
London,
Ontario.
The
issue
is
the
valuation
of
some
6722
common
shares
held
in
Griffith
Saddlery
and
Leather
Limited
and
sold
by
the
appellant
in
his
1976
taxation
year.
The
figures
with
respect
to
each
position
of
the
parties
are
well
spelled
out
in
the
notice
of
appeal
in
subparagraphs
1(b),
(c)
and
(d)
and
in
the
reply
which
read
as
follows:
1.(b)
With
respect
to
the
disposition
in
1976
of
capital
property
(being
shares
of
a
non-public
Ontario
corporation)
by
the
appellant
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Taxation
(“Minister”)
in
the
1976
assessment
adjusted
the
taxable
capital
gain
of
the
appellant
on
such
disposition
for
1976
upwards
by
$63,791.77.
(c)
The
upward
adjustment
referred
to
in
the
immediately
preceding
paragraph
hereof
was
calculated
as
follows:
Gross
proceeds
of
disposition
|
$158,950.00
|
Less
Minister’s
appraisal
|
8,032.79
|
Less
outlays
and
expenses
|
1,791.68
|
Capital
gain
|
$149,125.53
|
Taxable
capital
gain
(
/2
of
$149,125.53)
|
$
74,562.76
|
Taxable
capital
gain
reported
|
10,770.99
|
Adjustment
|
$
63,791.77
|
(d)
The
appellant’s
position
as
to
the
disposition
of
his
capital
property
in
1976
and
the
amount
of
taxable
capital
gain
is
as
follows:
Gross
proceeds
of
disposition
|
$158,950.00
|
Less
Valuation
Day
value
of
appellant’s
|
|
Capital
property
as
per
appellant’s
appraisal
|
135,616.35
|
Gross
gain
|
23,333.65
|
Less
outlays
and
expenses
|
1,791.68
|
Capital
gain
(gross)
|
$
21,541.97
|
Taxable
capital
gain
(1/2
of
$21,541.97)
|
$
10,770.99
|
The
respondent
reassessed
the
appellant
on
a
taxable
capital
gain
of
$74,562.76
on
the
following
assumptions
of
facts:
2.(b)
on
Valuation
Day,
December
22,
1971,
Griffith
Saddlery
and
Leather
Limited
(“Griffith”),
a
private
company
manufacturing
and
distributing
equestrian
equipment,
had
14,004
shares
outstanding
owned
as
follows:
The
appellant
|
3,361
|
Emma
Carruthers
(wife
of
the
appellant)
|
3,361
|
E
T
Griffith
|
6,722
|
G
N
Griffith
(nephew
of
E
T
Griffith)
|
560
|
Total
|
14,004
|
(c)
the
Carruthers
(the
appellant
and
Emma
Carruthers)
and
the
Griffiths
(Mr
E
T
Griffith
and
Mr
GN
N
Griffith)
are
not
related
persons;
(d)
in
accordance
with
an
agreement
dated
November
1,
1967,
the
appellant
and
Mrs
E
Carruthers
each
purchased
2,101
common
shares
of
Griffith
for
$5,021.39
($2.39
per
share);
(e)
by
virtue
of
an
agreement
dated
October
20,1969
the
appellant
and
Mrs
Emma
Carruthers
were
granted
options
to
acquire
1,260
common
shares
each
of
Griffith
from
Mr
ET
T
Griffith
for
$3,001.40
($2,39
per
share)
and
these
options
could
be
exercised
at
any
time
prior
to
the
“Termination
Date”
which
was
defined
in
clause
1
of
those
agreements
to
mean
the
first
of
the
following
dates
or
events
to
occur:
(a)
the
thirty-first
day
of
March,
1979;
(b)
the
120th
day
next
following
the
date
of
death
of
Griffith;
(c)
the
date
on
which
the
appellant
ceased
to
be
employed
by
the
Company
as
a
result
of
his
death,
discharge
with
or
without
cause
or
voluntary
leaving.
(f)
on
October
20,
1969,
both
the
appellant
and
Mrs
E
Carruthers
gave
Mr
E
T
Griffith
an
option
over
the
2,101
common
shares
that
each
held
at
that
time
in
addition
to
all
other
common
shares
which
each
acquired
thereafter
by
virtue
of
agreement
of
said
date
and
under
those
agreements
the
said
options
could
be
exercised
at
any
time
within
the
120
day
period
next
following
the
earliest
of
the
following
dates
to
occur,
namely:
(a)
the
date
on
which
the
appellant
ceases
to
be
employed
by
the
Company
as
a
result
of
his
discharge
with
or
without
cause
or
voluntary
leaving;
or
(b)
the
date
of
death
of
the
appellant;
or
(c)
the
date
of
any
assignment
in
bankruptcy
or
receiving
order
against
the
said
appellant.
and,
the
said
options
were
to
be
exercised
at
a
price
of
$2.39
per
common
share
plus
an
amount
equal
to
30%
of
the
book
value
of
the
common
share
as
at
March
31st,
1971
if
the
said
option
were
exercised
between
April
1,
1971
and
March
31,
1972;
and,
under
each
of
those
options
it
was
provided
that:
The
provisions
of
this
agreement
shall
be
binding
upon
any
transferee
of
any
of
the
shares
covered
by
this
agreement
and
no
transfers
of
such
shares
shall
be
made
or
recorded
unless
a
transferee
has
entered
into
an
agreement
with
Mr
E
T
Griffith,
his
heirs,
administrators
and
assigns
to
be
bound
by
the
provisions
of
this
agreement.
(g)
on
December
22,
1970,
Mr
GN
N
Griffith
bought
560
common
shares
from
Mr
Colin
Morrison
who
was
an
original
shareholder
in
Griffith,
subject
to
Mr
G
N
Griffith
entering
into
an
option
agreement
with
respect
to
those
560
shares
with
the
appellant
and
Mrs
E
Carruthers;
further,
Mr
G
N
Griffith
did
enter
into
such
an
option
agreement
covering
said
560
shares
but
that
option
could
only
be
exercised
at
any
time
within
either
of
the
following
periods:
(a)
the
120
day
period
next
following
the
date
of
the
death
of
Mr
E
T
Griffith,
or
(b)
the
120
day
period
ending
the
31st
day
of
March,
1979,
but
only
if
(i)
the
appellant
is
an
employee
of
the
Company
at
the
date
such
option
is
exercised,
and
(ii)
(irrelevant);
(h)
on
January
21,
1971,
the
appellant
and
Mrs
E
Carruthers
exercised
their
options
granted
on
October
20,1969
in
respect
of
2,520
common
shares
of
Griffith
held
by
Mr
ET
T
Griffith
and
received
those
shares
at
$2.39
per
share
(a
total
amount
of
$3,011.40
each);
(i)
on
January
21,
1971,
two
further
agreements
were
entered
into
between
Mrs
E
Carruthers
and
the
appellant
with
Mr
E
T
Griffith
which
provided
that
the
option
granted
by
the
Carruthers
(the
appellant
and
Mrs
E
Carruthers)
to
Mr
E
T
Griffith
on
October
20,
1969
would
be
void
if:
(a)
the
appellant
exercised
the
option
to
purchase
560
common
shares
owned
by
Mr
GN
N
Griffith
as
outlined
in
paragraph
(g)
above;
(b)
the
appellant
purchased
6,722
common
shares
owned
by
Mr
E
T
Griffith,
if
Mr
E
T
Griffith’s
heir
so
requested;
(j)
on
Valuation
Day
the
appellant
was
a
Director,
Vice-President
and
General
Manager
of
Griffith;
(k)
on
Valuation
Day,
the
shareholders’
equity
of
Griffith
was
$322,065.73
of
which
$20,000
related
to
preferred
equity;
(l)
the
fair
market
value
of
each
share
of
Griffith
held
by
the
appellant
at
Valuation
Day
was
$2.39.
At
the
hearing,
counsel
for
the
appellant
filed
two
appraisal
reports,
one
prepared
by
Mr
P
W
Bowman
of
Price
Waterhouse
&
Co
and
the
other
by
Mr
R
Carlin,
business
evaluator
with
Revenue
Canada.
In
order
to
value
the
shares
on
V-Day,
Mr
Bowman
used
the
price-earning
ratios
of
eight
to
nine
times
the
representative
current
earnings
of
$66,000,
which
would
indicate
a
range
of
capitalized
earnings
of
$528,000
to
$594,000
but,
after
an
adjustment
for
future
tax
benefits
of
$32,000,
the
total
amount
was
a
minimum
of
$560,000
to
a
maximum
of
$626,000,
and
the
value
of
the
shares
was
fixed
in
a
range
of
$40
to
$44.70
per
share.
On
the
other
hand,
Mr
Carlin
utilized
the
comparable
sales
and
valued
the
shares
at
$8,032.79
or
$2.39
per
share.
On
November
1,
1967,
the
appellant
purchased
from
Mr
E
T
Griffith
4204
common
shares
for
$5,021.39
or
$2.39
per
share
and
some
22
months
later,
on
October
20,1969,
ws
granted
an
option
by
the
said
Mr
Griffith
to
acquire
2520
shares
for
$6,022.80
(2,520
x
$2.39
per
share).
On
the
same
day,
October
7:0,
1969,
the
appellant
gave
an
option
to
Mr
Griffith
over
the
4202
common
shares
at
a
price
of
$2.39
per
share
plus
an
amount
equal
to
30%
of
the
book
value
of
the
common
shares
as
at
March
31,
1972
if
the
options
were
exercised
before
that
date.
On
December
22,
1970,
Mr
G
N
Griffith
bought
560
common
shares
from
Mr
Colin
Morrison
at
$2.00
a
share,
subject
to
an
option
with
the
appellant.
On
January
21,1971,
the
appellant
exercised
his
option
dated
October
20,
1969
and
acquired
2520
shares
at
$2.39
per
share
but
on
the
same
day,
he
agreed
that
the
option
he
had
granted
to
Mr
E
T
Griffith
to
buy
the
appellant’s
4202
shares
would
be
void
if
the
latter
exercised
his
option
to
purchase
560
shares
owned
by
Mr
GN
N
Griffith
or
if
he
purchased
6722
shares
owned
by
Mr
E
T
Griffith
in
the
event
that
the
latter’s
heirs
so
requested.
At
the
hearing,
the
respondent’s
appraiser,
called
as
a
witness
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
explained
that,
in
his
opinion,
the
two
most
important
sales
to
determine
a
value
of
$2.39
per
share
were
as
follows:
(1)
the
January
21,
1971
transaction
between
the
appellant
and
Mr
E
T
Griffith
at
$2.39
a
share
because
the
parties
were
dealing
at
arm’s
length
and
had
declared
that
this
price
was
the
fair
market
value;
(2)
the
December
21,
1970
transaction
because
Mr
Morrison
held
a
key
block
of
560
shares
which
were
sold
to
Mr
G
N
Griffith
for
$2
a
share.
However,
this
sale
was
subject
to
an
option
agreement
by
which
Mr
G
N
Griffith
would
be
bound
by
the
option
agreement
to
purchase
in
favour
of
the
appellant
John
A
Carruthers
and
dated
October
20,
1969.
Mr
Carlin
also
testified
that
he
did
not
take
into
consideration
the
December
1972
transaction
by
which
Mr
E
T
Griffith
sold
shares
to
Mr
G
N
Griffith
at
$8.63
per
share
because
it
was
hindsight
information
subsequent
to
V-Day
and
represented
control
of
the
company.
The
witness
did
not
consider
the
1976
transaction
by
which
the
appellant
sold
his
shares
to
Mr
GN
N
Griffith
for
$47.29
each
because
the
said
transaction
was
too
remote.
He
also
explained
that,
according
to
the
option
agreement
dated
October
20,
1969,
the
appellant
John
A
Carruthers
could
not
force
Mr
E
T
Griffith
to
purchase
the
shares
but
the
latter
could
discharge
Mr
Carruthers
without
cause;
that
Messrs
Morrison
and
Carruthers
could
not
exercise
their
option
on
V-Day
and
obtain
the
book
value
of
some
$21
a
share
because
Mr
ET
Griffith
was
still
alive;
that
Mr
E
T
Griffith
could
purchase
the
appellant’s
shares
at
$7.45
but
the
appellant
could
not
from
Mr
ET
T
Griffith,
and
that
a
third
party
would
pay
less
than
$7.45
for
the
appellant’s
shares
because
of
the
risk
involved,
namely
there
was
no
return
on
the
investment.
Mr
Carlin
disagreed
with
Mr
Bowman’s
report
because
the
latter
used
the
earning
method
to
appraise
a
minority
interest
when
he
should
have
utilized
the
comparable
sales
method;
he
did
not
take
into
account
the
relationship
between
the
shareholders
who
were
in
disagreement;
he
did
not
discount
(to
a
fair
degree)
the
minority
shareholding
nor
did
he
take
into
consideration
the
fact
that
no
one
was
in
control
of
the
company
even
if
Mr
E
T
Griffith
had
the
de
jure
control
with
his
200
preferred
voting
shares.
Mr
Carlin
terminated
his
testimony
by
saying
that
only
one
option
was
exercisable
on
V-Day
namely
Mr
E
T
Griffith
could
discharge
the
appellant
without
cause
but
the
former
was
afraid
of
a
lawsuit
for
wrongful
dismissal.
Mr
D
Aldridge,
Mr
Carlin’s
supervisor,
also
called
as
a
witness
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
testified
and
corroborated
Mr
Carlin’s
report.
In
his
opinion,
the
best
indication
to
appraise
the
appellant’s
shares
were
the
two
main
transactions
of
(1)
December
22,
1970
and
(2)
January
21,
1971.
He
also
explained
that,
according
to
the
option
agreements,
if
$2.39
a
share
was
not
the
right
amount
for
the
appellant’s
shares,
$7.45
would
be
the
top
value;
that
on
V-Day,
Mr
E
T
Griffith
could
acquire
the
appellant’s
shares
at
$7.45;
that
on
that
date
the
appellant
was
not
in
a
position
to
acquire
the
Griffith
shares
or
control;
that
the
book
value
of
$21
a
share
on
V-Day
was
irrelevant
for
appraising
purposes
because
it
was
too
close
to
the
liquidation
value
and
Mr
E
T
Griffith
was
not
in
a
position
to
liquidate
his
company.
Mr
Aldridge
was
critical
of
the
Price
Waterhouse
&
Co’s
report
because
the
latter
did
not
give
adequate
weight
to
the
option
agreements
especially
as
in
the
case
at
bar
of
a
private
company;
and
also
because
it
appraised
the
company
instead
of
shares
which
were
very
restricted.
Referring
to
the
definition
of
fair
market
value
and
more
particularly
to
the
words
“unrestricted
market”,
he
explained
that
the
appellant
was
before
a
restricted
market
because
the
buyer
of
the
appellant’s
shares
would
have
to
replace
Mr
John
A
Carruthers
as
key
man
of
the
company.
Mr
R
Clayton,
who
was
five
years
in
the
Hamilton
office
as
appraiser,
was
also
a
witness
for
the
appellant
and
testified
that
because
the
earning
and
the
liquidation
methods
could
not
apply,
he
utilized
the
comparable
sales
to
arrive
at
a
price
of
$11
a
share;
that
although
Mr
John
A
Carruthers
was
a
minority
shareholder,
he
was
responsible
for
the
earnings
of
the
company
and
should
obtain
the
full
benefit
of
his
efforts;
that
the
earnings
method
could
not
be
used
because
it
gave
a
higher
value
than
the
liquidation
method
and
was
not
the
proper
one
to
appraise
a
non-public
company,
especially
when
the
marketability
of
the
shares
was
so
restricted;
that
the
liquidation
method
could
not
be
utilized
because
none
of
the
shareholders
had
liquidation
control;
that
he
gave
a
higher
value
to
the
minority
shares
because
Mr
John
A
Carruthers
was
remunerated
two
ways:
by
a
salary
and
an
increase
of
his
equity
in
the
company.
He
did
not
approve
the
Price
Waterhouse
&
Co
report
because
it
was
the
evaluation
of
a
company
instead
of
minority
shares;
it
would
not
give
enough
weight
on
the
non-marketability
of
the
minority
shares;
it
should
have
given
a
discount
of
50%
instead
of
5%
to
10%
for
the
minority
interest
in
the
company
and
tax
consideration
should
not
have
been
considered
to
arrive
at
a
value.
He
did
increase
the
value
of
the
minority
shares
from
$7.45
to
$11
because
he
tried
to
envisage
a
purchaser
who
would
be
ready
to
take
a
chance.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
claimed
that
the
respondent’s
experts
in
their
appraisal
of
the
shares
made
too
numerous
errors
to
really
rely
on
them.
First,
Messrs
Aldridge
and
Carlin
wrongly
placed
a
great
reliance
on
the
1971
agreement
because
there
was
no
price
bargaining
in
1971
but
in
1969
only.
Then,
Mr
Aldridge
made
a
second
error
by
claiming
that
the
shares
of
the
company
could
not
be
transferred
without
Mr
Griffith’s
consent
when,
in
fact,
they
could,
provided
however
that
the
transferee
entered
into
an
agreement
to
be
bound
by
the
shares
held.
Thirdly,
Mr
Carlin
put
a
value
of
$2.39
a
share,
Mr
Aldridge
up
to
$7.45
a
share,
Mr
Clayton
$11
a
share,
Price
Waterhouse
$40
a
share
and
there
is
another
value
of
$21
a
share.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
then
argued
his
three
major
points:
(1)
the
company
under
the
Company’s
Act
of
Ontario
(section
217)
could
have
been
wound
up
by
Mr
Carruthers
upon
application
to
the
Courts
because
there
was
a
breakdown
in
the
relationship
between
the
two
minority
sharesholders;
(2)
the
Board,
for
the
purpose
of
determining
fair
market
value
on
V-Day,
should
ignore
the
various
agreements;
(3)
if
Mr
Carruthers
was
able
to
discharge
all
the
assumptions
of
facts
made
by
the
assessor,
then
the
onus
shifts
to
the
respondent
and
if
he
does
not
meet
the
onus,
the
appeal
should
be
allowed
in
full.
In
arguing
his
three
major
points,
he
referred
the
Board,
among
other
cases,
to
the
following
ones:
R
W
S
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
48
DTC
1182;
MNR
v
Pillsbury
Holdings
Limited,
[1964]
CTC
294;
64
DTC
5184;
N
C
Brewster
v
The
Queen,
[1976]
CTC
107;
76
DTC
6046;
D
Tobias
v
The
Queen,
[1978]
CTC
113;
78
DTC
6028.
On
the
other
hand,
counsel
for
the
respondent
stated
that
the
valuation
of
$2.39
a
share
was
correct
and
alternatively,
the
maximum
value
for
the
shares
should
be
$7.45;
that
the
respondent
proved
his
point
since
all
his
witnesses
were
called
by
the
appellant
to
establish
different
values
and
that
no
one
from
Price
Waterhouse
&
Co
was
called
to
prove
the
appellant’s
own
appraisal
report
and
that
a
valuation
report
has
very
little
effect
if
the
person
who
prepared
it
is
not
subject
to
cross-examination.
He
then
argued
that
both
Mr
Carlin
and
Mr
Aldridge
relied
on
the
January
21,
1971
agreement
because
the
parties
were
dealing
at
arm’s
length
and
agreed
that
$2.39
was
the
fair
market
value
of
a
share.
The
experts
also
relied
on
the
sale
by
Mr
Morrison
to
Mr
GN
N
Griffith
on
December
22,1970,
at
$2.00
a
share.
At
to
Mr
Clayton,
counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
although
Mr
Clayton
said
that
the
January
1971
sale
was
not
an
indication
of
fair
market
value
at
V-Day,
he
did
not
ignore
the
sales
and
said
that
they
were
representative
of
fair
market
value
at
an
earlier
date.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
also
argued
that
the
appraisor’s
report
on
which
the
appellant
relies
does
not
even
mention
the
sale
of
shares
and,
in
his
opinion,
this
is
a
critical
deficiency;
that
although
Mr
Aldridge
changed
his
mind
and
said
that
Mr
Carruthers
could
transfer
his
shares
freely,
there
was
a
Stipulation
in
the
company’s
charter
to
the
effect
that
no
shares
shall
be
transferred
without
the
consent
of
the
majority
of
directors
of
the
company
expressed
by
the
Resolution
passed
by
the
Board
of
Directors.
Thus,
there
was
no
complete
freedom.
Furthermore,
according
to
the
October
20,
1969
agreement,
where
it
lays
out
a
formula
price,
it
states
that
Mr
Griffith
could
buy
Mr
Carruthers’
shares
on
the
following
conditions:
(1)
Mr
Carruthers
can
be
discharged
with
or
without
cause;
(2)
In
the
event
of
Mr
Carruthers’
death;
(3)
In
the
event
of
Mr
Carruthers
being
petitioned
into
bankruptcy.
This
means
that
a
purchaser
of
Mr
Carruthers’
shares
at
V-Day
could
purchase
those
shares
subject
to
that
restriction
and
it
he
pays
$20
a
share,
Mr
Griffith
can
discharge
Mr
Carruthers
the
following
day
and
purchase
those
shares
for
$7.45
each,
causing
the
third
party
a
significant
loss.
Then,
referring
to
the
jurisprudence,
he
agreed
that
the
C/R
v
Ethel
Maclean,
Douglas
Crossman
et
al,
[1937]
AC
26,
and
Attorney
General
v
Jameson,
[1905]
2
IR
218,
decisions
are
solely
based
on
the
British
Finance
Act
and
he
preferred
to
rely
on
the
decison
in
George
Edwin
Beament
v
MNR,
[1951]
CTC
184;
51
DTC
489
and
in
The
Estate
of
John
Joseph
West
v
Minister
of
Finance
for
the
Province
of
British
Columbia,
[1976]
CTC
313,
because,
in
order
to
appraise
the
value
of
shares,
we
do
have
to
look
at
the
restrictions
on
the
transfer
of
those
shares.
He
agreed
that
it
is
within
the
court’s
discretion
to
determine
whether
a
wind
up
should
occur
but
the
court
can
also
say
to
a
shareholder:
“Sell
your
shares
and
get
out
of
the
company”.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
terminated
his
argument
by
saying
that
the
bottom
level
at
which
the
shares
must
be
valued
is
not
the
book
value,
as
contended
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
but
the
liquidation
value,
not
at
a
distress
situation,
but
just
the
liquidation
value
at
$9.82
a
share.
However,
Price
Waterhouse
had
not
considered
a
liquidaiton
value
at
all.
After
a
careful
examination
of
the
jurisprudence
cited
to
me,
the
evidence
adduced
and
the
various
options,
the
Board
cannot
consider
the
valuation
of
the
shares
under
review
by
using
the
appraisal
based
on
the
earning
ratio
of
the
company
because
the
Board
is
not
called
to
appraise
the
company
but
the
appellant’s
minority
shares
held
on
V-Day.
Furthermore,
the
appellant’s
appraiser
did
not
even
testify
to
establish
the
veracity
of
his
report.
Neither
is
the
liquidation
method
the
appropriate
one
because
the
possibility
of
liquidation
was
too
remote
due
to
the
fact
that
both
minority
shareholders
had
no
interest
whatsoever
in
liquidating
the
company
on
or
around
V-Day.
To
summarize
the
facts,
on
January
21,
1971,
Mr
Carruthers
exercised
his
option
and
acquired
48%
of
the
shares.
It
was
stipulated
that
if
John
acquired
the
560
shares
from
Mr
G
N
Griffith
or
the
other
6722
shares
from
Mr
E
T
Griffith’s
heirs,
in
other
words,
if
he
took
control
of
the
company,
the
option
granted
to
Mr
E
T
Griffith
to
buy
4202
shares
or
more
from
the
appellant
at
$2.39
a
share
plus
30%
of
the
book
value
as
at
March
31,1972,
the
1969
option
granted
by
Mr
Carruthers
to
Mrs
Griffith
would
be
void.
This
could
mean
that
Mr
Carruthers
himself
considered
his
minority
shares
to
be
valued
at
$7.45
but
if
he
were
to
acquire
the
control
of
the
company,
he
would
not
be
ready
to
pay
the
same
price
to
Mr
E
T
Griffith.
It
shows
that
the
appellant
himself
made
a
distinction
between
the
value
of
minority
and
majority
shares.
However,
it
can
also
be
said
that
the
appellant
had
the
power
de
facto
since
he
was
the
director,
vice-president
and
manager
of
the
company,
in
other
words,
the
key
man
whereas
Mr
Griffith
had
just
the
power
de
jure
and
was
not
the
active
force
behind
the
company.
In
such
a
case,
it
can
be
considered
that
the
appellant
had
more
than
a
pure
minority
interest
in
the
company
and
that
the
top
value
of
$7.45
would
be
more
appropriate
than
$2.39.
Furthermore,
Mr
Aldridge,
the
respondent’s
appraiser
himself
said
that
the
appellant’s
shares
could
have
a
top
value
of
$7.45
and
Mr
Clayton,
the
other
appraiser
of
the
respondent
put
a
value
of
$11
a
share,
consider-
ing
the
possibility
that
the
appellant
could
have
found
a
purchaser
who
would
have
been
ready
to
take
his
place
as
key
man
of
the
company.
It
Is
difficult
to
conceive
that
the
appellant
could
find
such
a
purchaser
close
to
V-Day
and
consequently
this
valuation
should
be
put
aside.
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
the
Board
believes
that
the
best
method
in
the
circumstances
would
be
the
comparable
sales
and
would
accept
the
highest
value
of
Mr
Aldridge
since
the
appellant
had
more
than
a
pure
minority
interest
in
the
company.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
so
that
the
appellant’s
6722
shares
on
V-Day
be
evaluated
at
$7.45
instead
of
$2.39
a
share.
Appeal
allowed.