John
B
Goetz:—This
appeal
was
heard
at
Halifax,
Nova
Scotia,
on
July
25,
1979,
and
is
against
reassessments
made
by
the
Minister
dated
December
21,
1978,
relating
to
the
appellant’s
income
tax
liability
for
his
1974,
1975
and
1976
taxation
years.
In
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent
relied
inter
alia,
on
paragraphs
18(1
)(a),
(b)
and
(h),
20(1)(c)
and
section
67
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
At
the
beginning
of
the
hearing
counsel
for
the
respondent
explained
to
the
Board
that
the
appellant
had
been
reassessed
with
respect
to
automobile
expenses
for
the
taxation
years
1974
and
1975
but
not
for
the
taxation
year
1976.
The
only
issue
involved
in
the
reassessment
for
the
1976
taxation
year
was
carrying
charges,
which
was
subsequently
allowed.
There
being
no
issue
to
be
determined
for
the
1976
taxation
year,
the
appeal
for
that
year
is
hereby
quashed.
Facts
The
appellant
was
self-employed
as
a
life
insurance
underwriter,
working
in
Lake
Major
and
Dartmouth
in
Halifax
County.
The
appellant
directed
his
evidence
mainly
to
the
use
of
his
automobile
as
related
to
both
business
and
personal
use.
In
his
notice
of
appeal
he
claimed
that
personal
use
for
the
1974
and
1975
taxation
years
was
10%
to
12%.
In
cross-examination,
counsel
for
the
respondent
filed
mileage
logs
for
the
1974
and
1975
taxation
years
which
show
personal
mileage
and
also,
of
course,
mileage
relating
to
his
business
as
an
insurance
underwriter.
His
logs
would
appear
to
have
shown
that
for
1974
and
1975,
the
appellant
only
used
his
car
for
personal
use
of
2.5%
of
his
total
mileage
for
1974
and
4.3%
for
1975.
The
Board
was
not
impressed
with
the
credibility
of
the
appellant
and
particularly
as
it
relates
to
the
village
of
Tatamagouche
wherein
he
stated
that
he
only
visited
Tatamagouche
twice
a
year,
namely,
when
he
took
his
wife
out
to
that
location
where
they
have
a
summer
home
and
a
small
farm.
The
appellant
has
lived
in
Tatamagouche
for
many
years,
and
admitted
in
cross-
examination
for
half
of
the
gasoline
purchase
was
in
Tatamagouche.
Such
evidence
did
not
tie
in
with
his
original
statement
that
he
only
visited
Tatamagouche
to
take
his
wife
out
and
to
bring
her
back
from
their
summer
cottage.
His
personal
mileage
logs
did
not
show
two
personal
trips
to
Tatamagouche.
The
other
area
in
which
the
Board
was
not
impressed
with
the
evidence
of
the
appellant
was
when
he
was
questioned
about
a
trip
to
Winnipeg,
in
1974,
which
lasted
two
weeks.
He
stated
that
the
purpose
of
the
visit
was
to
attend
at
a
convention
of
Mutual
Life
Assurance
Company
and
that
he
took
his
wife
with
him.
He
later
admitted
that
he
had
personal
friends
in
Winnipeg
and
was
visiting
them
there,
doing
business
with
personal
clients
in
Winnipeg
where
he
was
not
licensed
to
operate,
and
the
same
applied
to
his
evidence
with
respect
to
servicing
clients
and
customers
in
Moncton,
New
Brunswick.
It
was
only
under
pressure
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
that
the
initial
impression
given
by
the
appellant
with
respect
to
his
attendance
at
a
convention
in
Winnipeg
in
1974
was
not
merely
to
attend
a
convention
of
his
company,
but
was
rather
a
pleasure
trip.
The
respondent
called
a
tax
auditor
from
Halifax
as
a
witness,
who
met
with
the
appellant
particularly
with
respect
to
his
mileage
logs.
His
answers
apparently
did
not
satisfy
the
auditor
and
it
was
decided,
in
light
of
discussions
with
the
appellant,
that
30%
of
the
total
mileage
travelled
by
him
in
each
taxation
year
was
for
personal
use.
In
1975
the
personal
use
was
reduced
to
25%
in
that
there
was
no
trip
to
Winnipeg.
The
appellant
cannot
have
kept
a
proper
business
mileage
log
and
eventually
it
appeared,
after
a
fair
amount
of
evidence
had
been
adduced,
that
the
appellant
tried
to
say
that
he
saw
a
large
number
of
clients
in
Tatamagouche
whereas
initially
he
had
stated
that
he
had
only
visited
the
Tatamagouche
area
twice
a
year.
I
feel
that
his
“record”
of
automobile
expenses
was
not
accurate.
On
the
whole
I
am
totally
dissatisfied
with
the
evidence
of
the
appellant
in
that
he
was
evasive
and
attempted
to
obfuscate
areas
directly
related
to
the
basis
of
his
appeal.
In
that
I
am
unable
to
give
any
credibility
to
his
evidence,
I
feel
that
the
evidence
adduced
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
in
cross-examination
and
the
evidence
of
the
tax
auditor
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
clearly
indicate
that
he
was
properly
assessed
and
I
therefore
dismiss
the
appeal.
Decision
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed
in
respect
of
the
1974
and
1975
taxation
years
and
quashed
in
respect
of
the
1976
taxation
year.
Appeal
dismissed.
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