Guy
Tremblay
[TRANSLATION]:—This
case
was
heard
at
Quebec
City,
Quebec
on
April
20,
1979.
1.
Point
at
Issue
The
question
is
whether
the
respondent
was
correct
in
imposing
a
penalty
of
25%
as
provided
in
subsection
163(2)
of
the
new
Income
Tax
Act,
because
the
appellant
“knowingly,
or
under
circumstances
amounting
to
gross
negligence”
made
an
omission
in
his
income
for
1976
amounting
to
$4,265.
According
to
the
appellant,
this
was
an
oversight
because
he
did
not
receive
the
T4.
2.
Burden
of
Proof
The
respondent
has
the
burden
of
proof
under
subsection
163(3)
of
the
new
Act.
By
that
section,
the
Minister
has
the
burden
of
“establishing
the
facts
justifying
the
assessment
of
the
penalty”.
3.
Facts
3.01
In
1976
the
appellant
was
working
full
time
for
Laiterie
Cite
Ltée.
During
the
year
he
earned
the
sum
of
$12,194.63
from
this
employer.
3.02
During
the
same
period,
he
worked
part
time
for
Provifruit
Inc,
three
or
four
evenings
a
week
for
four
or
five
hours
each
evening.
He
stopped
working
on
this
job
in
November
1976.
3.03
When
the
time
to
make
his
tax
return
(the
exact
time
is
not
indicated
in
the
evidence
but
it
was
probably
around
the
end
of
March),
the
appellant
took
an
envelope
into
which
his
wife
had
put
all
the
documents
relating
to
tax
(T4,
TP4,
T1,
TP1,
receipts
and
so
on)
and
took
it
to
his
brother,
who
would
be
making
up
his
tax
return.
Several
days
later,
he
went
to
see
his
brother
and
was
told
where
to
sign
his
tax
return.
The
tax
return
was
then
posted.
3.04
The
Department
of
National
Revenue
investigators
checked
the
T4s
issued
by
Provifruit
Inc
and
found
that
the
appellant
had
omitted
to
include
income
entered
on
this
T4,
namely
$4,265.
3.05
The
appellant,
however,
maintained
that
at
the
time
he
had
not
received
the
T4
from
Provifruit
Inc,
simply
because
it
has
been
sent
to
his
former
residence,
that
is
5090
5E
Avenue
Est,
Apartment
5,
Quebec
City,
Quebec,
as
appears
from
the
address
shown
on
the
T4
(Exhibit
1-1).
The
appellant
moved
from
this
residence
in
February
1976
and
went
to
live
in
a
family
residence
at
9165
Avenue
Pradier,
Charlesbourg,
Quebec.
The
same
old
address
was
shown
on
the
T4
issued
by
Laiterie
Cité
Ltée,
but
the
T4
which
was
issued
in
February
or
March
1977
in
the
appellant’s
pay
envelope.
As
the
appellant
did
not
receive
the
T4
at
his
residence
he
forgot
the
income
from
Provifruit
Inc.
3.06
In
1976
the
appellant
claimed
a
rebate
of
$109,
whereas
in
1975
he
had
had
to
pay
a
substantial
amount.
4.
Act—
Case
Law—Comments
4.1
Act
The
principal
section
concerned
in
the
case
at
bar
is
subsection
163(2)
of
the
new
Act.
This
section
reads
as
follows:
Statements
or
omissions
in
return.
Every
person
who,
knowingly,
or
under
circumstances
amounting
to
gross
negligence
in
the
carrying
out
of
any
duty
or
obligation
imposed
by
or
under
this
Act,
has
made,
or
has
participated
in,
assented
to
or
acquiesced
in
the
making
of,
a
statement
or
omission
in
a
return,
certificate,
statement
or
answer
filed
or
made
as
required
by
or
under
this
Act
or
a
regulation,
as
a
result
of
which
the
tax
that
would
have
been
payable
by
him
for
a
taxation
year
if
the
tax
had
been
assessed
on
the
basis
of
the
information
provided
in
the
return,
certificate,
statement
or
answer
is
less
than
the
tax
payable
by
him
for
the
year,
is
liable
to
a
penalty
of
25%
of
the
amount
by
which
the
tax
that
would
so
have
been
payable
is
less
than
the
tax
payable
by
him
for
the
year.
4.2
Case
Law
The
case
law
cited
by
the
respondent
is
as
follows:
1.
Yves
Cloutier
v
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
[1978]
CTC
702;
78
DTC
6486;
2.
Antal
Susztek
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2959;
78
DTC
1690.
4.3
Comments
The
essence
of
the
problem
is
to
decide
whether
the
appellant
“knowingly,
or
under
circumstances
amounting
to
gross
negligence”
made
an
omission
of
$4,265
earned
from
Provifruit
Inc.
(A)
Did
the
appellant
act
knowingly?
The
evidence
before
the
Board
is
mainly
the
appellant’s
testimony.
According
to
him,
it
was
an
oversight
explained
by
his
not
receiving
the
T4,
as
a
result
of
his
change
of
address.
Did
the
appellant
lie
in
alleging
an
oversight?
The
Board
saw
no
clear
contradiction
in
the
testimony.
The
Board
cannot
in
any
way
assume
that
the
appellant
is
a
liar.
If
the
appellant
had
Still
been
employed
by
Provifruit
Inc
at
the
end
of
March
and
in
early
April
1976,
his
oversight
would
then
have
been
more
difficult
to
explain;
but
at
that
time
the
appellant
had
left
his
employer
for
over
4
months,
namely
in
November
1975.
The
oversight
may
thus
be
more
readily
understood.
The
Board
therefore
cannot
conclude
on
the
basis
of
the
evidence
that
the
appellant
made
the
omission
knowingly.
(B)
Did
the
appellant
commit
gross
negligence?
Counsel
for
the
respondent
submitted
that
by
omitting
to
include
$4,265,
that
is
over
23%
of
his
income,
the
appellant
committed
gross
negligence.
The
Board
has
many
times
cited
the
percentage
of
unreported
income
as
a
reason
for
upholding
the
penalty
provided
for
in
subsection
163(2).
These
have
primarily
been
cases
of
unreported
business
income.
The
unreported
amount
entailed
a
vast
number
of
omissions
during
the
year
as
a
result
of
not
entering
daily
sales
in
accounting
records.
Substantial
amounts
were
involved,
and
there
was
often
no
accounting
record
at
all.
In
the
case
at
bar,
there
was
only
one
oversight,
not
a
vast
number
of
them.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
further
submitted
that
the
appellant
could
not
have
failed
to
notice
that
when
he
filed
his
tax
return
for
1976,
he
received
a
rebate
of
$109,
while
in
1975
he
had
had
to
pay
additional
tax
of
$422.73.
An
argument
of
this
kind
has
already
been
used
in
Cloutier
v
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
(supra).
The
appellant
had
omitted
to
include
income
of
$180,000.
The
Court
stated
that
this
could
not
be
an
error
of
judgment
or
mere
ordinary
negligence.
It
must
be
remembered
that
if
the
Crown
(which
had
the
burden
of
proof)
had
proved
that
for
five
years
the
appellant
had
always
paid
additional
tax,
it
might
then
seem
strange
that
he
did
not
ask
why
he
was
receiving
a
rebate.
Even
then,
would
that
be
gross
negligence?
The
appellant
is
a
salaried
employee
24
or
25
years
old,
and
he
is
definitely
not
an
experienced
businessman
such
as
Mr
Cloutier
was
in
the
aforementioned
case,
or
Mr
Antal
Susztek
in
the
other
case
cited
above,
where
he
had
omitted
$16,000
of
interest
in
four
years.
There
continues
to
be
a
strong
doubt
in
my
mind,
and
because
of
the
burden
of
proof,
which
rests
with
the
respondent,
this
doubt
must
work
in
the
appellant’s
favour.
4.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
re-assessment
in
accordance
with
the
foregoing
reasons
for
judgment.
Appeal
allowed.