Guy
Tremblay
[TRANSLATION]:—This
case
was
heard
in
Montreal,
Quebec
on
May
10,
1978.
1.
Issue
The
issue
is
whether
the
respondent
was
justified
in
refusing
to
allow
the
deduction
of
$4,009
in
1974
and
$4,964
in
1975
for
automobile
expenses
in
computing
the
income
of
the
appellant,
a
travelling
salesman
paid
solely
on
a
salary
basis.
The
appellant
received
a
car
allowance
of
$2,600
a
year.
In
addition,
his
employer
paid
for
his
ordinary
gasoline
and
oil
expenses
upon
presentation
of
receipts.
Regular
maintenance,
repairs
and
insurance
were
the
appellant’s
responsibility.
2.
Burden
of
Proof
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessments
are
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
derives
not
from
one
particular
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
but
from
a
number
of
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
R
RWS
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
3.
Facts
3.1
During
1974
and
1975
the
appellant
was
employed
by
Frank
Mariano
et
Cie
Inc,
a
company
that
sells
sports
equipment.
3.2
He
worked
as
a
salesman.
His
territory
covered
almost
the
entire
province,
with
the
exception
of
Metropolitan
Montreal
and
vicinity,
extending
to
the
North
shore
and
including
the
Saguenay
Lac
St-Jean
area
and
the
Gaspé
peninsula.
3.3
He
was
paid
solely
on
a
salary
basis.
3.4
He
also
received
an
automobile
expense
allowance
of
$50
a
week,
or
$2,600
a
year.
In
addition,
the
company
paid
his
ordinary
gasoline
and
oil
expenses
upon
presentation
of
the
receipts.
The
other
expenses
(regular
maintenance
expenses,
repairs,
insurance,
and
so
on)
were
the
appellant’s
responsibility.
3.5
The
expenses
not
paid
by
the
employer,
which
were
not
disputed
by
the
respondent,
amounted
to
$5,346
(including
depreciation
of
$2,804)
in
1974
and
$6,619
(including
depreciation
of
$3,049)
in
1975.
After
subtracting
25%
for
personal
use,
the
appellant
claimed
a
deduction
of
$4,009
in
1974
and
$4,964
in
1975.
3.6
The
25%
personal
use
consisted,
inter
alia,
of
about
20
trips
in
the
Laurentians
over
the
year
and
travel
from
home
to
the
employer’s
office.
3.7
The
appellant
maintained
that
he
travelled
about
50,000
miles
in
1974
and
45,000
miles
in
1975.
3.8
In
his
notices
of
reassessment
dated
February
25,1977
the
respondent
added
to
the
appellant’s
income
the
sum
of
$4,009
claimed
as
expense.
For
1975
he
added
the
sum
of
$2,364,
that
is,
$4,964-$2,600.
The
appellant
had
already
included
the
automobile
allowance
of
$2,600
in
his
income
in
1975,
something
he
had
not
done
in
1974.
3.9
Notices
of
objection
were
filed
on
May
10,
1977;
the
respondent
replied
on
September
12,1977,
confirming
the
notices
of
reassessment
of
February
25,
1977.
3.10
An
appeal
was
filed
with
the
Tax
Review
Board
on
December
1,
1977.
4.
Act,
Case
Law
and
Comments
4.1
The
main
provisions
concerned
in
this
case
are
subparagraph
6(1
)(b)(v),
paragraph
8(1
)(h),
subsection
8(2)
and
section
67
of
the
new
Act.
They
read
as
follows:
6(1)(b)
Personal
or
living
expenses.—all
amounts
received
by
him
in
the
year
as
an
allowance
for
personal
or
living
expenses
or
as
an
allowance
for
any
other
purpose,
except
(v)
reasonable
allowances
for
travelling
expenses
received
by
an
employee
from
his
employer
in
respect
of
a
period
when
he
was
employed
in
connection
with
the
selling
of
property
or
negotiating
of
contracts
for
his
employer.
8(1)(h)
Travelling
expenses.—where
the
taxpayer,
in
the
year,
(i)
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
in
different
places,
(ii)
under
the
contract
of
employment
was
required
to
pay
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment,
and
(iii)
was
not
in
receipt
of
an
allowance
for
travelling
expenses
that
was,
by
virtue
of
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(v),
(vi)
or
(vii),
not
included
in
computing
his
income
and
did
not
claim
any
dedcution
for
the
year
under
paragraph
(e),
(f)
or
(9),
amounts
expended
by
him
in
the
year
for
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment.
8(2)
General
limitation.
Except
as
permitted
by
this
section,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment.
67.
General
limitation
re
expenses.
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
an
outlay
or
expense
in
respect
of
which
any
amount
is
otherwise
deductible
under
this
Act,
except
to
the
extent
that
the
outlay
or
expense
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
4.2
The
respondent
cited
the
following
11
cases:
1.
Henri
Gingras
v
MNR,
[1963]
CTC
194;
63
DTC
1142;
2.
William
C
Aitken
v
MNR,
[1961]
Tax
ABC
152;
61
DTC
172;
3.
Anthony
Cekota
v
MNR,
36
Tax
ABC
279;
64
DTC
654;
4.
Rosaire
Cossette
v
MNR,
13
Tax
ABC
170;
55
DTC
365;
5.
Donald
Campbell
Davey
v
MNR,
27
Tax
ABC
306;
61
DTC
531;
6.
Roger
Guay
v
MNR,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
1201;
70
DTC
1781;
7.
Stanley
Karp
v
MNR,
[1968]
Tax
ABC
1018;
68
DTC
742;
8.
Edgar
Raymond
v
MNR,
[1971]
Tax
ABC
79;
71
DTC
47;
9.
No
534
v
MNR,
19
Tax
ABC
388;
58
DTC
403;
10.
F
Joan
Meier
v
MNR,
[1967]
Tax
ABC
324;
67
DTC
224;
11.
Eric
O
Claus
v
MNR,
40
Tax
ABC
395;
66
DTC
248.
4.3
Comments
For
the
appellant
(an
employee
paid
solely
on
a
salary
basis)
to
be
able
to
deduct
the
sums
claimed,
he
must
satisfy
the
three
conditions
in
paragraph
8(1
)(h).
He
must
satisfy
all
these
conditions,
not
only
one
or
two.
The
evidence
showed
that
the
first
condition,
set
out
in
subparagraph
(i),
was
Satisfied.
The
appellant
did
in
fact
carry
on
his
employment
duties
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business.
Has
the
second
condition
(set
out
in
subparagraph
(ii)
been
satisfied?
In
short,
was
the
appellant
required,
under
his
contract
of
employment,
to
pay
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment?
Does
the
fact
that
his
employer
paid
him
$50
a
week
as
an
allowance
plus
ordinary
gasoline
and
oil
expenses
mean
that
the
employee
was
not
required
to
pay
his
own
expenses?
Certain
decisions
seem
to
support
this
position:
Eric
O
Claus
v
MNR,
40
Tax
ABC
395;
66
DTC
248;
F
Joan
Meier
v
MNR,
[1967]
Tax
ABC
324;
67
DTC
224.
Does
the
fact
that
the
employer
did
not
pay
all
the
appellant’s
travelling
expenses
(as
the
evidence
established—see
paragraph
3.4)
alter
the
situation
in
any
way?
The
Board
is
of
the
view
that
as
soon
as
the
taxpayer
is
required
to
pay
part
of
the
expenses
(regular
maintenance,
repairs
and
insurance,
as
in
the
present
case),
he
satisfies
the
condition
in
subparagraph
(ii).
The
Act
does
not
say
he
must
pay
all
travelling
expenses.
Has
the
third
condition,
set
out
in
subparagraph
(iii),
been
satisfied?
In
short,
was
the
appellant
in
receipt
of
a
travelling
allowance
that
was
not
included
in
his
income
by
virtue
of
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(v)?
It
is
clear
from
the
evidence
that
the
appellant
received
a
sum
for
travelling
expenses
from
his
employer
(see
paragraph
3.4
of
the
facts).
Does
this
amount
satisfy
the
conditions
in
subparagraph
6(1
)(b)(v),
in
other
words,
did
it
constitute
“reasonable
allowances
for
travelling
expenses?
What
does
the
word
“reasonable”
mean?
In
the
context
of
subsection
6(1),
the
word
“reasonable”means
chiefly
that
the
expenses
paid
by
the
employer
must
not
be
excessive;
the
respondent
could
then
reduce
the
non-
taxable
portion,
in
other
words,
the
reasonable
portion,
and
tax
the
excess,
that
is,
the
unreasonable
portion.
Can
the
word
“reasonable”
have
a
different
meaning
when
one
is
referring
to
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(v)
but
in
the
context
of
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
(and
also
8(1)(f))?
The
Board
is
of
the
view
that
the
word
“reasonable
means
“the
happpy
medium”
inter
alia,
and
that
the
excess
or
unreasonable
portion
may
be
in
either
direction,
in
other
words,
either
unreasoanbly
high
(allowing
the
Department
of
Revenue
to
reduce
the
expenses)
or
unreasonably
low
(allowing
the
taxpayer
to
adjust
the
amount
given
so
that
it
corresponds
to
the
expenses
actually
incurred).
The
Income
Tax
Act
does
not
exist
only
for
the
administrator,
the
Department
of
Revenue,
but
also
for
those
administered,
the
taxpayers.
Was
the
amount
received
in
the
present
case
reasonable?
According
to
the
evidence
(paragraphs
3.5,
3.6
and
3.7
of
the
facts),
the
appellant
incurred
expenses
in
addition
to
gasoline
and
oil,
which
were
paid
by
the
employer,
and
received
allowances
(not
including
the
amounts
paid
for
oil
and
gasoline)
as
follows:
|
Expenses
|
Claimed
(75%)
|
Allowances
|
1974
|
$5,346
|
$4,009
|
$2,600
|
1975
|
$6,619
|
$4,964
|
$2,600
|
These
figures
were
accepted
by
the
respondent.
|
|
The
Board
is
of
the
view
that
automobile
expenses
do
not
consist
only
in
gasoline
and
oil
but
also
in
repairs,
insurance
payments,
depreciation,
and
so
on.
According
to
the
evidence
there
is
thus
a
difference
of
$1,409
in
1974
and
$2,364
in
1975
between
the
actual
expenses
claimed
and
the
allowance.
The
Board,
which
must
decide
on
the
evidence,
is
of
the
view
that
the
allowance
was
not
reasonable
and
that
the
expenses
claimed
should
be
allowed
and
the
allowance
received
included
in
the
appellant’s
income,
having
regard
to
the
facts
set
out
in
paragraph
3.8.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
above
reasons
for
judgment.
Appeal
allowed.