J
B
Goetz:—The
appeal
of
Beatrice
M
Guest
was
heard
at
Toronto,
Ontario,
on
March
21,
1979
and
is
from
a
reassessment
in
respect
of
her
1974
taxation
year.
The
reassessment
is
based
upon
the
fact
that
a
bonus
of
$4,500
on
a
mortgage
loan
made
by
the
appellant
in
1970
should
have
been
included
as
income
in
her
1974
tax
return.
The
appeal
also
relates
to
the
interest
income
on
the
loan
in
the
sum
of
$1,621.47.
A
penalty
has
been
assessed
in
the
sum
of
$198.44
for
failing
to
report
such
amount.
The
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
sections
2,
3,
9
and
subsection
248(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
and
amendments
thereto.
The
appellant
is
a
widow
and
a
retired
school
teacher.
Her
husband
passed
away
in
1970,
leaving
her
proceeds
from
various
insurance
policies.
The
appellant’s
son
was
a
practising
barrister
and
solicitor
and
both
he
and
the
appellant
were
concerned
with
proper
investments
of
the
proceeds
of
insurance
resulting
from
the
appellant’s
husband’s
death.
The
son
introduced
her
to
one
of
his
clients
for
the
purpose
of
her
advancing
to
that
client
the
sum
of
$20,000.
It
was
agreed
that
this
was
a
safe
investment
and
mortgage
was
taken
on
certain
lake
property
which
was
unseen
by
the
appellant,
but
its
value
was
assured
to
her
by
her
son.
Relying
on
her
son’s
advice
and
not
having
sought
out
the
borrower,
she
did,
in
March
1970,
advance
the
sum
of
$20,000
to
this
client
on
the
security
of
a
mortgage
in
face
value
of
$24,500
based
on
the
borrower’s
lake
front
property
and
which
mortgage
bore
interest
at
the
rate
of
8%
with
a
maturity
date
in
1974.
After
1972
she
made
certain
small
loans
to
members
of
her
family
and
in
1973
an
$8,000
loan
to
a
person
unrelated
as
well
as
another
loan
of
some
$4,000
to
another
person
not
related.
These
loans
as
far
as
the
evidence
goes
are
all
the
mortgage
transactions
ever
engaged
in
by
the
appellant.
The
initial
loan
in
the
sum
of
$20,000
was
paid
off
in
1974
by
the
mortgagee.
The
bonus
of
$4,500
paid
to
her
in
1974
was
not
included
in
her
income
tax
return.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
included
it
in
his
assessment
of
her
1974
tax
return
as
being
income.
Hence
this
appeal.
The
issue
to
be
determined
in
this
matter
is
whether
or
not
the
sum
of
$4,500
was
a
capital
accretion
or
whether
it
was
income.
In
other
words,
was
the
transaction
an
investment
or
a
trading
transaction?
The
Minister’s
assessment
with
respect
to
the
bonus
of
$4,500
can
only
stand
if
indeed
the
transaction
was
a
trading
transaction.
In
deciding
this
it
is
incumbent
upon
the
Board
to
determine
whether
it
is
such,
depending
on
the
facts
and
surrounding
circumstances.
I
have
carefully
considered
the
decision
of
Cameron,
J
in
A
Cohen
v
MNR,
[1957]
CTC
251;
57
DTC
1183,
and
that
of
Thorson,
P
in
MNR
v
L
W
Spencer,
[1961]
CTC
109;
61
DTC
1079.
These
cases
are
not
on
all
fours
with
the
case
before
this
Board.
But,
in
the
Cohen
case,
the
appellant
purchased
a
number
of
mortgages
at
a
discount
and
the
discount
was
consistent
with
the
apparent
element
of
risk
involved.
No
attempt
was
made
to
sell
the
mortgages
and
all
were
held
until
maturity.
The
Court
held
that
the
profit
realized
by
the
appellant
from
these
various
mortgage
transactions
was
a
mere
enhancement
in
value
at
maturity
and
therefore
a
capital
receipt.
It
was
further
stated
that
the
taxpayer
was
not
engaged
in
the
business
of
money
lending.
In
the
Spencer
case
the
Exchequer
Court
differentiated
the
facts
in
that
case
from
those
in
the
Cohen
case
by
holding
that
the
lawyer
who
had
purchased
a
large
number
of
second
mortgages
at
a
discount
was
not
making
ordinary
investments
but
that
he
was
primarily
interested
in
the
speculative
nature
of
the
transaction.
In
that
instant
case
the
appellant
did
not
seek
out
the
borrower,
she
was
husbanding
the
proceeds
of
her
husband’s
insurance
policies
by
making
what
she
was
advised
by
her
son
as
being
a
worthwhile
investment,
as
it
proved
to
be.
Under
the
surrounding
circumstances
it
had
none
of
the
earmarks
of
a
speculative
venture.
There
was
little
risk
involved.
Although
the
appellant
did,
in
subsequent
years,
make
loans
to
members
of
her
family,
I
hold
no
significance
to
such
transactions.
Further,
small
loans
made
in
1973
and
1974,
in
my
view,
do
not,
in
any
way,
colour
the
transaction
she
made
in
March
1970
as
being
any
more
than
a
worthwhile
and
safe
investment.
On
the
facts,
I
find
that
the
appellant
was
not
engaged
in
an
adventure
or
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade
and
that
the
profits
realized
were
made
on
an
ordinary
investment
by
an
enhancement
in
its
value
at
maturity
and
therefore
was
a
Capital
accretion.
The
appeal
is
therefore
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
This
brings
me
to
another
matter,
namely,
the
amount
of
$1,621.47
as
interest
income
on
the
loan
which
was
not
declared
on
the
1974
return
of
the
appellant.
A
penalty
of
$198.44
was
levied.
The
appellant’s
1974
return
was
prepared
by
her
son,
which
I
can
readily
appreciate
she
would
simply
sign,
having
regard
to
the
complexity
of
the
income
tax
return
form.
It
is
only
natural,
under
the
circumstances,
to
assume
that
the
appellant
in
no
way
came
under
the
provisions
of
subsection
163(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
reads
as
follows:
Every
person
who,
knowingly,
or
under
circumstances
amounting
to
gross
negligence
in
the
carrying
out
of
any
duty
or
obligation
imposed
by
or
under
this
Act,
has
made,
or
has
participated
in,
assented
to
or
acquiesced
in
the
making
of,
a
statement
or
omission
in
a
return,
certificate,
statement
or
answer
filed
or
made
as
required
by
or
under
this
Act
or
a
regulation,
as
a
result
of
which
the
tax
that
would
have
been
payable
by
him
for
a
taxation
year
if
the
tax
had
been
assessed
on
the
basis
of
the
information
provided
in
the
return,
certificate,
statement
or
answer
is
less
than
the
tax
payable
by
him
for
the
year,
is
liable
to
a
panalty
of
25%
of
the
amount
by
which
the
tax
that
would
so
have
been
payable
is
less
than
the
tax
payable
by
him
for
the
year.
Having
regard
to
the
manner
in
which
the
appellant
gave
evidence
and
her
obviously
total
reliance
upon
the
judgment
and
expertise
of
her
son,
I
cannot
in
any
way
assume
that
she
knowingly
or
under
any
circumstances
was
grossly
negligent
in
not
including
the
interest
income
in
the
sum
of
$1,621.47
when
signing
the
return.
Mr
Christopher
Guest,
her
son,
in
preparing
the
appellant’s
objection,
admitted
that
the
omission
of
this
sum
in
her
tax
return
was
an
error
on
his
part.
That
brings
us
to
the
point
as
to
whether
a
penalty
should
be
levied
with
respect
to
the
failure
to
disclose
the
said
interest
income.
In
that
regard
I
refer
to
a
statement
of
my
brother
Member
of
the
Board,
Mr
M
Bonner
in
H
Brouwer
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2219
at
2223;
79
DTC
235,
at
p
238.
Under
subsection
163(3)
the
burden
with
respect
to
penalties
is
on
the
respondent.
All
I
have
before
me
is
a
case
of
simple
failure,
in
unexplained
circumstances,
to
report
amount
of
income,
the
nature
of
which
is
not
disclosed
by
the
evidence.
That
failure,
without
more,
is
not
a
sufficient
factor
on
which
to
uphold
the
penalty.
In
the
present
case
the
omission
was
not
a
serious
one
and
I
therefore
rule
that
no
penalty
should
by
levied
with
respect
to
the
non-disclosure
of
the
loan
interest.
I
therefore
order
that
the
matter
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
in
order
to
delete
the
penalty
levied
on
the
undeclared
amount
of
$1,621.47
received
by
the
appellant
as
loan
interest
during
the
1974
taxation
year
and
to
reassess
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed.