The
Assistant
Chairman:—This
case
came
up
for
hearing
before
me
at
Calgary,
on
April
9,
1979.
The
parties
agreed
on
most
of
the
facts
of
the
case
and
the
argument
was
confined
solely
to
an
interpretation
of
some
subsections
of
section
146
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
after
tax
reform.
Originally
the
issue
was
whether
or
not
the
appellant,
Mr
Valdes,
was
entitled
to
a
married
exemption.
He
contended
that
he
was
so
entitled
as
his
wife
had
no
income
in
the
1976
taxation
year.
The
Minister
disagreed,
contending
that
she
had
income
in
that
year
inasmuch
as
she
had
received
a
benefit
from
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
in
the
1976
taxation
year
and,
since
the
amount
of
that
benefit
was
income,
her
income
was
above
that
which
would
permit
Mr
Valdes
to
have
any
married
exemption,
and
so
disallowed
the
married
exemption
in
totality.
The
facts
and
the
background
which
gave
rise
to
this
matter
were
as
follows:
before
February
28,
1976,
Mr
Valdes
paid
into
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan,
in
the
name
of
his
wife,
a
substantial
sum
and
he
claimed
the
amount
so
paid
as
a
deduction
from
his
income
in
the
1975
taxation
year
(This
amount
was
allowed
as
a
deduction
by
the
Minister
when
the
appellant
filed
his
1975
income
tax
return.);
and,
on
or
about
May
18,
1976,
the
registered
retirement
savings
plan
was
redeemed
by
Mrs
Valdes
and
she
was
paid
an
amount
in
excess
of
the
amount
which
would
wipe
out
the
marital
exemption
to
which
her
husband
would
otherwise
be
entitled
if
the
amount
so
paid
were
income.
Mr
Valdes
acted
on
his
own
behalf
and
centered
his
case
entirely
on
subsection
146(15),
which
subsection
reads
as
follows:
Notwithstanding
anything
in
this
section,
where
an
amount
is
received
in
a
taxation
year
as
a
benefit
under
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
that
was
not,
at
the
end
of
the
year
in
which
the
plan
was
entered
into,
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan,
such
part,
if
any,
of
the
amount
so
received
as
may
be
perscribed
shall
be
deemed,
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
to
have
been
received
in
the
taxation
year
otherwise
than
as
a
benefit
or
other
payment
under
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan.
He
felt
that
once
his
wife
took
the
money
out
of
that
registered
retirement
savings
plan
on
or
about
May
18,
1976,
that
at
the
end
of
that
year
(1976)
that
registered
retirement
savings
plan
was
not
in
existence;
it
was
not
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan.
Consequently,
the
amount
was
not
a
benefit.
Mr
Valdes,
on
being
queried
as
to
the
interpretation
of
that
subsection,
could
not
point
out
what
amount,
if
any,
had
been
prescribed
by
a
regulation
made
pursuant
to
that
subsection.
He
stated
that
to
his
knowledge
there
was
no
such
regulation.
Mr
Ruskin,
on
behalf
of
the
Crown,
took
the
position
that
any
benefit
received
from
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
was
income
to
the
recipient
in
the
year
of
receipt.
In
this
respect
he
referred
to
subsection
(8)
of
section
146
which
reads
as
follows:
There
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
all
amounts
received
by
him
in
the
year
as
a
benefit
out
of
or
under
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan.
Mr
Ruskin
then
turned
to
paragraph
146(1)(b)
and
quoted
same
as
follows:
“benefit”
includes
any
amount
received
out
of
or
under
a
retirement
savings
plan
otherwise
than
as
a
premium
and
without
restricting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing
includes
any
amount
paid
to
an
annuitant
under
the
plan
(iii)
resulting
from
the
termination
of
the
plan.
It
was
his
submission
that
the
amount
which
Mrs
Valdes
received
in
1976
was
received
by
her
as
a
benefit
as
it
was
as
a
result
of
the
termination
of
the
plan,
and
consequently
it
was
a
benefit
and
was
income
to
her
pursuant
to
subsection
(8)
of
section
146.
Mr
Ruskin
submitted
that
subsection
(15)
of
section
146
had
no
application
whatsoever
in
this
appeal.
He
stated
that
that
subsection
had
no
application
on
two
grounds:
(a)
that
for
that
subsection
to
be
operative
in
the
year
in
which
the
payment
was
made,
the
plan
must
not
be
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
accepted
by
the
Minister;
and
(b)
that,
assuming
it
was
so
registered
later,
to
be
exempt
when
it
was
paid
out
there
would
have
to
be
a
regulation.
His
submission
was
that
that
subsection
was
designed
to
assist
persons
who
paid
money
into
a
retirement
savings
plan
which
was
not
registered
and
accepted
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
one
year,
but
it
was
so
registered
by
the
Minister
and
accepted
as
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
in
the
next
year
or
at
some
later
time.
In
that
way
the
amount
paid
out
at
a
later
date
would
not
be
subject
to
double
taxation;
namely,
if
it
were
not
a
deduction
when
the
premium
was
paid
in,
then
it
would
not
be
income
to
the
recipient
when
paid
out
if,
of
course,
there
were
a
regulation
to
so
exempt
it.
His
suggestion
was
the
regulation
presumably
would
exempt
an
amount
equal
to
the
amount
paid
into
the
plan
if
the
plan
was
not
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan.
Consequently,
it
was
his
submission
that
that
subsection
has
no
application
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
Mr
Ruskin
also
pointed
out
that,
to
his
knowledge
and
from
his
search,
he
could
find
no
regulation
made
pursuant
to
subsection
146(15).
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
submission
made
to
this
Board
by
Mr
Ruskin
is
correct;
namely,
that
the
amount
that
Mrs
Valdes
received
was
a
benefit
pursuant
to
paragraph
146(1
)(b)
and
subsection
146(8)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
after
tax
reform,
and
so
is
income
to
her.
I
am
of
the
view
that
subsection
146(15)
has
no
application
to
the
circumstances
of
this
case.
Judgment
will
go
accordingly.
Appeal
dismissed.