Cattanach,
J:—The
plaintiff
by
its
action
herein
seeks
a
declaration
that
a
consumption
tax
exacted
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
(presided
over
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
and
his
lawful
deputy,
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Customs
and
Excise,
who,
as
his
title
indicates,
is
charged
with
the
control,
regulation,
management
and
supervision
of
taxes
imposed
by
the
Excise
Tax
Act)
from
the
plaintiff
by
virtue
of
paragraph
27(1)(b)
of
that
Act
was
improperly
exacted
and
should
be
refunded.
Paragraph
27(1)(b)
reads:
(1)
There
shall
be
imposed,
levied
and
collected
a
consumption
or
sales
tax
of
twelve
per
cent
on
the
sale
price
of
all
goods
(b)
imported
into
Canada,
payable
by
the
importer
or
transferee
who
takes
the
goods
out
of
bond
for
consumption
at
the
time
when
the
goods
are
imported
or
taken
out
of
warehouse
for
consumption;
Prior
to
trial
the
parties
agreed
upon
a
statement
of
facts
which
reads:
1.
The
plaintiff
is
a
body
corporate
and
politic
duly
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
the
Dominion
of
Canada.
2.
On
or
about
December
8,
1978,
the
plaintiff
imported
into
Canada
from
the
United
States
of
America
certain
couplings
of
iron
or
steel
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“the
goods
in
question”).
3.
The
goods
in
question
entered
into
Canada
in
bond
and
were
placed
in
customs
warehouse
in
Ottawa.
4.
The
goods
in
question
were
entered
at
the
Port
of
Ottawa
under
entry
number
017040.
A
copy
of
the
entry
form
is
Schedule
1
hereto
and
copies
of
the
related
invoices
are
Schedule
2
hereto.
5.
On
or
about
December
18,
1978,
the
plaintiff
took
the
goods
in
question
out
of
the
customs
warehouse.
6.
On
or
about
December
19,
1979,
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
claimed
and
the
plaintiff
paid
consumption
or
sales
tax
in
the
amount
of
$63.77
as
shown
on
Schedule
1
hereto.
7.
The
goods
in
question
were
imported
and
were
taken
out
of
the
customs
warehouse
for
the
purpose
of
resale
within
Canada
at
a
later
date.
8.
On
or
about
February
28,
1979,
the
plaintiff
claimed
from
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
a
refund
of
the
sum
of
$63.77
paid
as
consumption
or
sales
tax
in
respect
of
the
goods
in
question.
A
copy
of
the
plaintiff’s
claim
for
refund
dated
February
28,
1979,
is
Schedule
3
hereto.
9.
On
or
about
March
15,1979,
the
said
claim
for
refund
was
refused.
A
copy
of
the
letter
from
the
refund
officer
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
the
plaintiff
is
Schedule
4
hereto.
I
have
not
considered
it
necessary
to
reproduce
the
schedules
annexed
to
the
statement
of
agreed
facts
because
they
are
merely
documents
supportive
of
the
agreed
facts
with
the
exception
of
schedule
4.
However
it
is
abundantly
clear
from
paragraph
2
of
the
statement
of
claim
that
application
for
a
refund
of
the
tax
exacted
was
made
by
the
plaintiff
and
that
the
application
was
refused
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
on
the
ground
that
the
plaintiff
was
not
a
licensed
wholesaler
which
allegations
are
admitted
in
paragraph
2
of
the
statement
of
defence
even
though
no
letter
from
an
officer
of
the
Department
of
Natonal
Revenue
was
written
and
sent
to
the
plaintiff.
In
fact
I
would
proffer
the
gratuitous
suggestion
that
the
relevant
facts
were
settled
by
the
pleadings
as
was
the
issue
arising
from
those
facts
so
that
the
statement
of
agreed
facts
was
superfluous
other
than
to
set
forth
the
facts
alleged
and
admitted
in
the
pleadings
in
a
summary
and
convenient
form.
Neither
do
I
think
that
oral
testimony
was
required
but
I
permitted
it
to
be
given
because
in
the
joint
application
for
trial
it
was
agreed
between
the
solicitors
for
the
parties
that
there
would
be
one
witness
for
the
plaintiff.
That
witness,
the
president
of
the
corporate
plaintiff,
merely
testified
that
the
couplings
imported
by
it
were
not
put
to
the
use
by
the
plaintiff
for
the
purposes
for
which
the
couplings
were
designed.
That
was
the
limitation
placed
upon
the
evidence
permitted
to
be
given
in
light
of
the
admissions
made
in
the
pleadings.
As
alleged
in
the
pleadings
the
goods
in
question
were
placed
in
the
plaintiff’s
premises
against
the
eventuality
of
a
prospective
purchaser
buying
a
coupling
for
a
use
to
which
the
purchaser
had
for
that
device.
The
issue
between
the
parties
is
whether
the
consumption
or
sales
tax
imposed
by
the
section
on
the
sale
price
of
the
goods
imported
into
Canada
by
the
plaintiff
is
payable
by
the
plaintiff
when
the
plaintiff
took
the
goods
out
of
bond
from
the
warehouse
in
which
they
had
been
placed.
This
in
turn,
narrows
the
issue
still
further.
It
is
simply
whether
the
plaintiff
took
the
goods
out
of
bond
“for
consumption”.
The
matter
falls
for
determination
on
the
meaning
to
be
ascribed
to
the
simple
phrase
“for
consumption”
in
the
context
it
is
used
in
the
section.
Counsel
for
the
plaintiff
contends
that
the
goods
when
removed
by
the
plaintiff
were
not
removed
for
consumption
but
for
resale.
On
the
other
hand
counsel
for
the
defendant
contends
that
despite
the
fact
that
the
plaintiff
removed
the
goods
for
resale
they
were
nevertheless
removed
“for
consumption”
within
the
meaning
that
must
be
given
to
that
phrase
in
the
context
it
is
used
in
the
section.
Statutes
must
be
interpreted
according
to
well
recognized
rules
of
interpretation
but
the
great
difficulty
in
all
cases
is
applying
rules
of
interpretation
to
the
particular
case.
The
task
of
construction
is
not
an
easy
one
and
that
task
is
not
made
less
difficult
when
the
will
of
the
legislature
is
ill-expressed.
However
a
court
must,
in
each
case,
apply
the
admitted
rules
of
interpretation
to
the
case
in
hand,
not
deviating
from
the
literal
sense
of
the
words
used
without
sufficient
reason,
or
more
than
is
justified,
yet
not
adhering
slavishly
to
them
where
to
do
so
would
obviously
defeat
the
intention
which
may
be
collected
from
the
whole
Statute.
Paragraph
27(1)(b)
clearly
provides
that
a
consumption
or
sales
tax
shall
be
imposed
and
collected
on
the
sale
price
of
goods
imported
into
Canada.
That
tax
shall
be
paid
by
the
importer
(excepting
in
the
case
of
a
transferee
which
is
not
applicable
on
the
facts
in
this
action).
The
next
question
is
when
that
tax
shall
be
payable
by
the
importer.
I
would
expect
that
if
the
goods
were
not
placed
in
bond
or
warehouse
then
the
tax
would
be
payable
at
the
time
of
importation
by
the
importer.
That
was
not
the
case
in
this
instance.
The
plaintiff
imported
the
goods
into
Canada
on
December
8,
1978
but
did
not
take
actual
possession
of
them
on
that
date.
Paragraph
3
of
the
statement
of
agreed
facts
recites
that
the
goods
in
question
entered
Canada
in
bond
and
were
placed
in
a
customs
warehouse
in
Ottawa,
Ontario,
no
doubt
the
port
of
entry.
I
am
not
certain
from
these
admitted
facts
that
the
goods
were
imported
into
Canada
for
warehouse
but
I
expect
a
combination
to
be
the
case.
The
goods
were
imported
in
bond
for
warehouse.
Certainly
they
were
not
imported
for
exportation.
The
agreed
statement
of
facts,
in
paragraph
5,
states
that
the
plaintiff
took
the
goods
“out
of
the
customs
warehouse’’
on
December
18,1979,
that
is
ten
days
after
entry.
The
plaintiff
paid
the
tax
demanded
by
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
on
December
19,
1979
(see
paragraph
6
of
the
agreed
facts).
Therefore
the
plaintiff
took
the
goods
“out
of
bond”
or
“out
of
warehouse”
on
December
18,
1978.
I
do
not
think
it
material
which
was
the
case
or
if
the
cases
were
coincidental.
What
is
material
is
that
the
tax
is
payable
by
the
importer
by
virtue
of
paragraph
27(1)(b)
at
the
time
that
the
importer
“takes
the
goods
out
of
bond
for
consumption
at
the
time
the
goods
are
imported”
or
“taken
out
of
warehouse
for
consumption”.
In
either
instance
the
goods
to
attract
excise
tax
must
be
taken
out
of
bond
or
warehouse
by
the
importer
“for
consumption”.
That
is
the
time
the
tax
is
payable
by
the
importer.
Thus
the
meaning
of
the
phrase
“for
consumption”
as
used
in
the
context
of
paragraph
27(1
)(b)
is
critical
to
the
determination
of
this
matter.
Basically
the
contention
of
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
is
the
very
simple
and
straightforward
one
that
the
word
“consumption”
is
not
a
technical
word
or
a
word
relating
to
an
art
or
science
and
therefore
must
be
given
its
popular
meaning.
The
etymological
meaning
of
a
word
is
not
necessarily
the
meaning
which
the
context
requires
and
dictionaries
are
only
to
be
resorted
to
for
the
purpose
of
ascertaining
the
uses
of
a
word
in
popular
language.
Subject
to
that
admonition
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
sought
instruction
in
those
books
and
he
particularly
referred
me
to
the
definition
of
the
word
“consumption”
in
Webster’s
New
World
Dictionary
reading:
“Econ
the
using
up
of
goods
or
services,
either
by
consumers
or
in
the
production
of
other
goods”.
Paramount
in
that
dictionary
meaning
is
the
concept
that
the
goods
must
be
“used
up”
or
“consumed”
in
the
sense
that
they
are
used
in
the
use
for
which
the
goods
were
intended.
Thus
rat
poison
would
be
used
up
when
devoured
by
a
rat.
“Used
up”
would
be
the
ultimate
use
of
the
goods.
As
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
has
put
it,
the
wording
of
paragraph
27(1
)(b)
“is
very
clear
in
calling
for
a
consumption
of
the
goods
before
tax
is
payable”.
In
the
example
I
gave
I
do
not
think
that
contention
would
mean
when
a
rat
ate
the
poison
but
rather
when
the
person
wishing
an
end
to
the
rat
laid
out
the
poison.
That
counsel
contends
is
the
plain
meaning.
Assuming
that
to
be
so
the
consumer
would
be
the
person
who
pur-
chased
a
coupling
from
the
plaintiff
(it
being
admitted
and
agreed
that
the
plaintiff
imported
the
goods
for
resale)
and
until
that
happened
there
would
be
no
consumption.
Because
the
section
prescribes
that
the
time
the
tax
is
payable
is
when
the
goods
are
taken
out
for
consumption
that
time
arises
only
when
the
goods
are
so
used.
Assuming
this
to
be
so
it
would
be
a
practical
impossibility
for
the
Department
to
collect
the
tax
at
the
time
it
is
so
contended
that
the
tax
is
payable.
Regardless
of
this
result
counsel
for
the
plaintiff
reinterated
for
me
a
cardinal
rule
of
legal
interpretation
that
where
the
language
of
a
statute
is
clear
and
explicit
that
language
must
be
given
effect
to
whatever
may
be
the
consequences
for
in
that
case
the
words
of
the
Statute
speak
the
intention
of
the
legislature.
But
there
is
also
the
rule
applicable
to
statutes
that
the
plainest
words
may
be
controlled
by
a
reference
to
the
context,
but
then,
as
has
been
often
said,
you
must
have
a
context
even
more
plain,
or
at
least
as
plain
(it
comes
to
the
same
thing)
as
the
word
to
be
controlled.
All
statutes
are
to
be
construed
so
as
to
give
effect
to
the
intention
of
the
statute.
When
the
main
object
of
a
statute
is
clear
it
is
a
very
serious
matter
to
reduce
it
to
a
nullity
as
a
result
of
an
ill
expression
and
of
course
the
intention
of
a
statute
is
to
be
gleaned
from
reading
it
as
a
whole.
In
this
instance
neither
paragraph
27(1
)(b)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
nor
the
Excise
Tax
Act
is
to
be
read
in
isolation.
section
58
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
provides
that
where
an
excise
tax
is
payable
upon
the
importation
of
any
article
into
Canada
the
Customs
Act
is
applicable
in
the
same
way
and
to
the
same
extent
as
if
the
excise
tax
were
a
customs
tax.
Thus
the
Excise
Tax
Act
and
the
Customs
Act
must
be
taken
and
construed
together
as
one
system
and
as
explanatory
of
each
other.
Bearing
that
in
mind
subsection
80(1)
of
the
Customs
Act
provides:
All
warehoused
goods
shall
be
finally
cleared,
either
for
exportation
or
home
consumption,
within
two
years
from
the
date
of
the
first
entry
and
warehousing
thereof.
All
warehoused
goods
are
imported
either
for
exportation
or
home
consumption.
These
two
purposes,
exportation
or
home
consumption,
are
exhaustive.
The
plaintiff
did
not
import
the
goods
for
exportation.
Therefore
it
imported
them
for
home
consumption
and
it
is
in
that
sense
that
the
phrase
“for
consumption”
must
be
read
in
paragraph
27(1)(b)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act.
When
the
plaintiff
took
the
goods
out
of
the
customs
warehouse
on
December
18,
1978
it
took
them
out
for
“home
consumption”.
What
then
does
“home
consumption”
mean?
In
my
view
these
words
mean
that
the
goods
are
taken
out
to
be
used
for
the
purpose
for
which
the
importer
imported
the
goods
into
Canada.
If
I
recall
a
contention
by
counsel
for
the
defendant
correctly
it
was
that
the
goods
were
“taken
out
for
consumption”
when
introduced
into
the
channels
of
trade.
That
would
bs
so
in
the
case
of
the
plaintiff
but
not
necessarily
in
the
case
of
all
importers.
By
way
of
example
a
person
might
import
a
quantity
of
novelty
wares
for
distribution
as
Christmas
gifts.
This
would
not
be
introduced
into
the
channels
of
trade
and
it
is
for
that
reason
that
the
use
must
be
for
the
purpose
for
which
the
importer
imported
the
goods.
That
to
me
is
a
significant
qualification
which
must
be
present.
In
this
instance
it
is
admitted
that
the
goods
were
imported
for
resale
and
they
were
taken
out
for
resale.
That
being
so
when
the
plaintiff
took
the
goods
in
bond
out
of
the
customs
warehouse
it
took
them
out
“for
consumption”
within
the
meaning
of
that
phrase
within
the
context
in
which
it
is
used.
For
the
foregoing
reasons
the
plaintiff’s
action
is
dismissed
but
in
the
circumstances
peculiar
to
this
action
without
costs
to
the
defendant.
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