Urie,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
wherein
the
appeal
of
the
appellant
from
a
reassessment
for
income
tax
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
was
allowed
and
the
re-assessment
was
referred
back
to
the
Minister
on
the
basis
that
the
value
of
common
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
Halifax
Parking
Limited
owned
by
the
appellant
was
$625
per
share
as
at
December
31,
1971.
The
appellant
called
as
witnesses
three
experts
and
the
respondent
called
one.
Two
of
the
appellant’s
witnesses
proposed
methods
of
evaluation.
None
of
them
were
wholly
accepted
by
the
learned
Trial
Judge.
He
appeared
to
find
that
the
estimates
of
value
found
by
each
was
based
to
a
certain
extent
on
the
testimony
of
the
other
experts
and
that
“the
overoptimism
at
each
stage
appears
to
compound
itself.”
In
his
use
of
the
term
“over-optimism”
he
had
reference
to
the
projections
of
earnings
of
Halifax
Parking
Limited
made
by
the
appellant’s
experts
which
clearly
he
considered
to
have
been
in
each
case
exaggerated.
Insofar
as
the
testimony
of
the
respondent’s
expert
is
concerned,
since
he
took
the
position
that
the
shares
in
question
had
virtually
no
value,
his
testimony
was
held
to
be
equally
valueless.
That
he
found
that
the
testimony
of
the
experts
was
of
little
assistance
to
him
is
found
in
the
concluding
paragraph
of
his
Reasons
for
Judgment
where
he
stated
that
“both
parties
took,
and
maintained
throughout,
extreme
positions
which
were
entirely
disassociated
from
reality’’.
As
a
result,
the
learned
Trial
Judge
did
not
adopt
any
of
the
methods
of
valuation
proposed.
We
did
not
understand
that
the
appellant
challenged
any
of
his
findings
of
fact.
The
sole
attack
upon
his
judgment
was
on
the
method
he
used
to
evaluate
the
shares
after
having
analyzed
and
rejected
the
evidence
of
the
experts.
It
was
appellant’s
contention
that
since
the
Trial
Judge
accepted
the
evidence
of
the
witness
Thompson
in
respect
of
the
rate
of
return
which
an
investor
might
expect
in
investing
in
the
shares
of
Halifax
Parking
Limited,
as
well
as
the
earnings
multiple
proposed
by
him
and
did
not
reject
any
of
the
elements
upon
which
the
valuation
was
based,
he
was
bound
to
accept
his
estimate
of
value
in
the
sum
of
$4,796
per
share.
It
may
be
noteworthy
that
that
was
the
highest
value
proposed.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
maintained
this
position
throughout
the
appeal.
In
his
prayer
for
relief
in
his
Memorandum
of
Fact
and
Law
the
appellant
seeks
an
order
that
the
reassessment
of
the
appellant’s
1974
income
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
on
the
basis
that
the
shares
in
issue
were
worth
$4,796
each
as
proposed
by
Thompson.
He
seeks
no
other
order.
As
noted
earlier,
the
Trial
Judge
did,
in
fact,
refuse
to
accept
the
valuations
of
the
experts,
including
Thompson,
and
made
his
own
calculations
to
arrive
at
a
valuation
of
$625
per
share
as
at
December
31,1971.
It
is
trite
to
say
that
the
Trial
Judge
is
the
trier
of
fact
and
he
is
thus
entitled
to
accept
or
reject,
in
whole
or
in
part,
any
of
the
evidence
adduced
before
him.
In
this
case
he
accepted
some
of
the
evidence
but
he
rejected
in
all
cases
the
methods,
at
least
in
part,
whereby
the
experts
arrived
at
their
valuations.
He
was
entitled
to
do
so
and
unless
it
can
be
said
that
thereafter
he
proceeded
on
a
wrong
principle
or
that
he
made
a
palpable
error
in
reaching
his
own
conclusions
as
to
value,
we
ought
not
to
interfere
with
his
findings.
We
have
not
been
persuaded
by
the
arguments
of
counsel
that
he
proceeded
on
a
wrong
principle
or
made
any
such
error.
Certainly
he
appears
to
have
adopted
parts
of
the
methods
used
by
the
witnesses
in
making
their
calculations
but
in
using
only
parts
and
not
the
whole
of
their
respective
methods
we
do
not
believe
that
he
erred
in
law.
Certainly,
without
the
advantage
of
having
seen
and
heard
the
witnesses,
we
are
not
in
the
position
to
say
that
he
wrongly
rejected
the
evidence
of
any
one,
including
Thompson,
nor
could
we,
accepting
his
findings
of
what
may
be
described
as
exaggerated
views
of
the
earnings
potential
of
Halifax
Parking
Limited
by
the
witnesses,
substitute
our
view
of
value
for
his.
In
any
event
that
is
not
what
the
appellant
seeks
since
he
has
requested
only
that
the
Thompson
valuation
be
that
which
is
accepted—nothing
more,
nothing
less.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
raised
the
question
as
to
the
disposition
of
costs
made
by
the
Trial
Judge.
He
awarded
no
costs
since
there
was
divided
success.
Since
this
was
an
exercise
of
a
discretion
open
to
him,
we
will
not
interfere
with
it.
Accordingly,
for
ail
of
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
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