Pratte,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
ordering
the
appellant
to
pay
the
respondent
the
sum
of
$587,769.63
together
with
the
penalty
prescribed
by
subsection
50(4)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
and
the
costs
of
the
action.
That
sum
of
$587,769.63
is
the
unpaid
balance
of
the
sales
tax
which
the
Trial
Division
held
to
be
payable
in
respect
of
the
importation
by
the
respondent
of
an
aircraft
into
Canada.
In
1973,
the
appellant,
which
already
owned
and
used
four
Boeing
737
aircraft,
imported
into
Canada
another
aircraft
of
the
same
type
which
it
had
purchased
for
the
sum
of
$5,331,683.19.
Sales
tax
in
the
amount
of
$639,801.98
would
normally
have
been
payable
by
the
appellant
on
the
sale
price
of
that
aircraft
pursuant
to
section
27
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
RSC
1970,
c
E-13
(as
amended
in
section
24
of
the
Old
Age
Security
Act,
RSC
1970,
c
0-6,
as
amended).
But
the
appellant
was
entitled
to
a
remission
of
a
portion
of
that
tax
under
the
provisions
of
the
Aircraft
(Combined
Services)
Remission
Order
(PC
1970-356,
as
amended
by
PC
1971-142).
The
appellant
claimed
to
be
entitled,
under
that
Order,
to
the
remission
of
the
sum
of
$601,238.98
and
paid
to
the
respondent
the
sum
of
$38,563
as
representing
the
unremitted
portion
of
the
sales
tax.
According
to
the
respondent’s
interpretation
of
the
Order,
the
amount
of
tax
remitted
to
the
appellant
was
the
sum
of
$13,469.35,
and
the
unremitted
portion
of
the
tax
amounted
to
$626,332.63.
The
respondent
sued
the
appellant
claiming
the
unpaid
balance
of
the
tax
and
the
penalty
prescribed
by
subsection
50(4)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act.
This
is
the
action
that
was
found
to
be
well
founded
by
the
judgment
against
which
this
appeal
is
directed.
The
sole
issue
in
these
proceedings
relates
to
the
interpretation
of
the
Aircraft
(Combined
Services)
Remission
Order*.
That
Order
provides
that,
on
certain
conditions,
the
air
carrier
who
imports
an
aircraft
“for
use
in
combined
international
and
domestic
service”
is
entitled
to
a
remission
of
a
portion
of
the
sales
tax
‘‘equal
to
the
international
percentage
of
the
fleet
of
the
importer
during
the
year
of
importation.”
(subsection
3(2)).
In
order
to
know
the
portion
of
the
tax
that,
under
the
Order,
is
remitted
to
an
importer,
it
is
therefore
necessary
to
calculate
the
“international
usage
percentage
of
the
fleet
of
the
importer’.
That
calculation
cannot
be
made
without
first
determining
what
constitutes
the
importer’s
fleet.
It
is
that
determination
which
is
at
the
source
of
the
dispute
between
the
parties.
The
word
“fleet”
is
defined
as
follows
in
section
2
of
the
Order:
“fleet”
means
all
qualifying
aircraft
that
are
owned
or
leased
by
an
eligible
carrier
and
are
used
in
combined
international
and
domestic
service;
The
sole
issue
between
the
parties
is
whether,
for
the
purposes
of
the
Order,
an
importer’s
fleet
which
provides
both
domestic
and
international
services
is
composed
only
of
its
qualifying
aircraft
which
were
actually
used
in
both
kinds
of
services
or
whether
it
is
composed
of
all
its
qualifying
aircraft
irrespective
of
the
fact
that
some
of
these
aircraft
may
been
used
exclusively
on
international
or
domestic
routes.
If,
as
the
appellant
contends,
the
first
interpretation
were
to
prevail,
it
is
common
ground
that
the
appellant’s
fleet
for
the
year
here
in
question
included
only
one
aircraft
which
flew
both
on
international
and
domestic
flights
and
that
the
appellant
was,
aS
a
consequence,
entitled
to
the
remission
of
the
whole
amount
of
the
tax
that
it
failed
to
pay.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
the
second
interpretation
were
to
be
adopted,
it
is
also
common
ground
that
the
judgment
of
the
Trial
Division
was
well
founded.
The
expression
“combined
international
and
domestic
service”
has
no
technical
meaning.
As
held
by
the
trial
judge,
those
words
are
used
in
the
Order
in
their
usual
sense
which,
I
must
confess,
is
not
too
clear.
According
to
the
appellant,
an
aircraft
is
not
used
in
“combined
international
and
domestic
service”
unless
it
is
used
in
both
international
and
domestic
services.
According
to
the
respondent,
the
air
carrier
which
operates
both
an
international
and
a
domestic
service
must
be
said
to
operate
a
“combined
international
and
domestic
service”
and
all
the
aircraft
that
he
uses
in
either
branch
of
that
combined
service
must
be
held
to
be
used
in
the
combined
service.
In
my
view,
the
learned
trial
judge
was
right
in
adopting
the
respondent’s
interpretation
of
the
Order.
The
word
service
is
used
in
the
singular
in
the
phrase
“combined
international
and
domestic
service”
and,
in
the
French
version
of
the
Order,
the
same
expression
is
translated
by
the
words
“un
service
combine
international
et
national”;
this,
in
my
view,
supports
the
respondent’s
view
and
suggests
that,
for
the
drafter
of
the
Order,
the
international
and
domestic
services
operated
by
an
air
carrier
consituted
only
one
service.
If
that
is
so,
then
it
is
clear
that
an
aircraft
is
used
in
such
a
service
irrespective
of
the
fact
that
it
might
have
been
used
only
in
one
of
its
branches.
The
conclusion
reached
by
the
learned
trail
judge
is
also
supported,
in
my
view,
by
the
absurd
consequences
which
would
flow
from
the
interpretation
proposed
by
the
appellant.
Indeed,
following
that
interpretation,
the
amount
of
sales
tax
payable,
on
the
importation
of
identical
aircraft
by
two
air
carriers
providing
exactly
the
same
services
with
two
identical
fleets,
would
be
different
merely
by
reason
of
the
fact
that
one
of
those
air
carriers
would
have
chosen
to
use
all
his
aircraft
on
both
international
and
domestic
routes
while
the
other
would
have
used
some
of
his
equipment
on
domestic
routes
exclusively.
For
these
reasons,
I
would
dismiss
the
appeal
with
costs.