Watson
DJ.
T.C.:
These
appeals
relate
to
the
Appellant,
Tatiana
Semerikov’s
1992
and
1994
taxation
years
and
to
the
Appellant,
Feoktist
Semerikov’s
1992,
1993
and
1994
taxation
years.
They
are
husband
and
wife.
The
appeals
were
heard
on
common
evidence
in
Edmonton,
Alberta
on
June
3,
1999
under
the
informal
procedure.
In
reassessing
Feoktist
Semerikov
for
these
years,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
“Minister”)
revised
his
taxable
income
as
follows:
Taxation
|
Increase
(Decrease)
|
Revised
Taxable
|
Year
|
In
Taxable
Income
|
Income
|
1992
|
|
$
38,411
|
$
57,494
|
1993
|
(
|
656)
|
11,744
|
1994
|
|
81,071
|
94,657
|
Total
|
|
$118,826
|
$163,895
|
In
reassessing
Tatiana
Semerikov,
the
Minister
advised
her
that
she
was
in
receipt
of
a
Child
Tax
Benefit
(“CTB”)
overpayment
in
the
amount
of
$2,149.75
for
the
base
taxation
year
1992
and
$3,004.92
for
the
base
taxation
year
1994
because
of
the
revised
family
net
income.
The
reassessment
in
relation
to
Feoktist
was
made
applying
the
“net
worth”
method
under
section
152(7)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Act”).
It
provides:
The
Minister
is
not
bound
by
a
return
or
information
supplied
by
or
on
behalf
of
a
taxpayer
and,
in
making
an
assessment,
may,
notwithstanding
a
return
or
information
so
supplied
or
if
no
return
has
been
filed,
assess
the
tax
payable
under
this
Part.
In
so
reassessing
Feoktist,
the
Minister
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
in
the
1992,
1993,
and
1994
taxation
years,
the
Appellant
owned
and
operated
a
farm
in
the
vicinity
of
Plamondon,
Alberta;
(b)
the
1992,
1993,
and
1994
taxation
years,
the
Appellant
owned
a
50%
share
of
Trak
Reforestation
Inc.
(“Trak”);
(c)
the
1992,
1993,
and
1994
taxation
years,
the
Appellant
earned
business
income
from
a
logging
operation;
(d)
in
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years,
the
Appellant
received
benefits
from
Trak
in
the
amounts
of
$8,027.00
and
$2,000.00
respectively
(the
“Benefits”);
(e)
the
Benefits
were
made
up
of
amounts
reimbursed
by
Trak
for
travel
and
automobile
expenses
that
were
deducted
by
Trak
and
by
the
Appellant
against
his
business
income
from
the
logging
operation;
(f)
in
reporting
income
for
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years,
the
Appellant
failed
to
report
the
Benefits;
(g)
the
income
of
the
Appellant,
from
all
sources,
for
the
1992
and
1994
taxation
years
was
understated
by
the
amounts
of
$31,384.67
and
$81,071.37
respectively;
(h)
the
understated
amounts
referred
to
in
subparagraph
6(g)
herein
were
determined
by
the
net
worth
method
(a
copy
of
the
Statement
of
Personal
Net
Worth
is
attached
as
Schedule
“A”);
(i)
as
a
result
of
the
net
worth
determination
method
referred
to
above,
the
Appellant’s
income
for
the
1993
taxation
year
was
reduced
by
$656.43,
as
shown
in
the
attached
Schedule
A;
and,
(j)
as
a
result
of
the
net
worth
determination
method
referred
to
above,
the
Appellant’s
income
for
the
1992
and
1994
taxation
years
was
increased
by
$39,411.67
and
$81,071.37
respectively,
as
shown
in
the
attached
Schedule
A.
At
the
hearing
of
the
appeals,
the
agent
for
the
Appellants
admitted
paragraphs
(a)
to
(c)
and
(h)
to
(j)
and
denied
paragraphs
(d)
to
(g).
The
issues
to
be
decided
are:
(a)
whether
Feoktist’s
income
from
all
sources
for
the
1992
and
1994
taxation
years
was
understated
by
the
amounts
of
$31,384.67
and
$81,071.37,
as
calculated
by
the
net
worth
method;
(b)
whether
Feoktist
received
the
Benefits
in
his
capacity
as
a
shareholder
of
Trak
or,
alternatively,
in
his
capacity
as
an
employee
of
Trak
in
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years;
and
(c)
whether
Tatiana
is
entitled
to
Child
Tax
Benefit
payments
in
excess
of
the
amount
allowed
by
the
Minister
for
the
1992
and
1994
taxation
years.
The
Appellants
have
the
onus
of
establishing
on
a
balance
of
probabilities
that
the
Minister’s
reassessments
were
ill-founded
in
fact
and
in
daw;
they
must
adduce
sufficient
or
reliable
evidence
justifying
a
conclusion
that
they
have,
on
a
balance
of
probabilities,
shown
an
error
on
the
part
of
the
Minister.
Bowman,
J.
of
this
Court,
in
the
case
of
Ramey
v.
R.
(1993),
93
D.T.C.
791
(T.C.C.),
at
page
793,
stated
as
follows:
The
net
worth
method
of
estimating
income
is
an
unsatisfactory
and
imprecise
way
of
determining
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
the
year.
It
is
a
blunt
instrument
of
which
the
Minister
must
avail
himself
as
a
last
resort.
A
net
worth
assessment
involves
a
comparison
of
a
taxpayer’s
net
worth,
i.e.,
the
cost
of
his
assets
less
his
liabilities,
at
the
beginning
of
a
year,
with
his
net
worth
at
the
end
of
the
year.
To
the
difference
so
determined
there
are
added
his
expenditures
in
the
year.
The
resulting
figure
is
assumed
to
be
his
income
unless
the
taxpayer
establishes
the
contrary.
Such
assessments
may
be
inaccurate
within
a
range
of
indeterminate
magnitude
but
unless
they
are
shown
to
be
wrong
they
stand.
It
is
almost
impossible
to
challenge
such
assessments
piecemeal.
The
only
truly
effective
way
of
disputing
them
is
by
means
of
a
complete
reconstruction
of
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
year.
In
the
case
of
Zalzalah
v.
R.
(1994),
95
D.T.C.
5498
(Fed.
T.D.),
Heald,
D.
J.
states
at
page
5499:
The
plaintiff
frankly
acknowledged
that
he
did
not
keep
any
books
or
records
during
the
taxation
years
here
under
review.
This
matter
was
also
raised
in
the
proceedings
before
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
where
Lamarre
Proulx,
TCJ
stated
The
Minister
cannot
and
should
not
allow
business
deductions
that
cannot
be
proven
by
documentary
evidence.
That
would
bring
the
administration
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
the
sphere
of
arbitrariness.
I
agree
with
that
view
of
the
matter.
Likewise,
in
the
case
of
Holotnak
v.
The
Queen,
Cullen,
J.
considered
the
requirements
of
section
230
and
stated
as
follows:
Section
230
of
the
Act
requires
taxpayers
to
keep
adequate
books
and
records.
“Adequate”
is
not
defined
but
it
would
seem
that
these
records
should
support
whatever
the
taxpayer
is
claiming
for
tax
purposes.
The
onus
of
proof
that
the
expenses
were
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
is
on
the
taxpayer
(Wellington
Hotel
Holdings
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
73
D.T.C.
5391).
Specifically,
with
regard
to
assessments,
the
onus
is
on
the
taxpayer
to
prove
that
the
Minister’s
assumptions
and
assessments
are
wrong
(Strayer,
J.
in
Schwarz
v.
The
Queen,
87
D.T.C.
5274)
quoting
from
Johnston
v.
M.N.R.,
[3
DTC
1182]
[1948]
S.C.R.
486).
The
Schwarz
case
(supra)
also
involved
a
situation
where
the
plaintiff’s
purchases
were
not
supported
by
vouchers.
As
Strayer,
J.
points
out,
the
onus
is
on
the
taxpayer
to
prove
wrong
the
M.N.R.’s
reassessment
as
the
taxpayer
is
in
a
better
position
to
prove
what
actually
happened.
Feoktist
had
two
sources
of
income
in
the
years
at
issue
as
follows:
the
small
family
owned
enterprise,
Trak,
co-owned
by
himself
and
Dimitri
Scherbakov,
his
brother-in-law,
which
operated
on
a
seasonal
basis
from
May
to
November
and
a
logging
operation
from
November
to
April
carried
on
by
himself
alone.
Feoktist
is
unable
to
read
English,
so
he
left
all
the
accounts,
records
and
books
with
his
two
accountants;
there
were
two
separate
accountants,
one
looking
after
the
Trak
operation,
the
other
his
logging
and
personal
accounts.
He
signed
his
income
tax
returns
but
was
unable
to
read
them
before
doing
so.
In
the
operation
of
Trak,
both
he
and
his
brother-in-law
used
personal
funds
when
in
need,
for
the
purposes
of
Trak’s
expenses,
especially
during
the
periods
in
the
bush,
looking
after
Trak’s
10
to
20
employees.
As
he
explained
in
his
testimony,
he
and
Dimitri
Scherbakov
worked
as
“partners”.
In
late
1995
or
early
1996,
when
the
Appellants
were
audited
by
Revenue
Canada,
he
referred
the
auditors
to
his
two
accountants.
At
the
hearing
there
was
no
evidence
from
the
two
accountants,
books,
ledgers
or
other
supporting
documentation
provided
by
the
Appellants.
The
only
witness
was
Feoktist,
one
of
the
Appellants;
he
relied
on
his
memory
for
the
details
of
what
went
on
during
the
years
1992,
1993
and
1994
and
understandably
his
testimony
was
mostly
vague
and
incomplete
rather
than
reliable.
Taking
into
consideration
all
of
the
circumstances,
including
the
testimony
of
the
Appellant
and
the
Revenue
Canada
auditor,
the
admissions
and
documentary
evidence
provided
by
the
Respondent,
in
the
light
of
the
well-
established
case
law,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
Appellants
have
failed
in
their
onus
of
establishing
on
a
balance
of
probabilities
that
the
Minister
was
ill-
founded
in
fact
and
in
law
in
his
reassessments.
Accordingly,
the
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.