Stone J.A.:
These are applications for judicial review of three separate judgments of the Tax Court of Canada dismissing the appeal of each of the applicants from determinations of the Minister of National Revenue that none of the applicants were in “insurable employment” during two periods of employment in the years 1991-1994 because their employments were “excepted” within subsection 3(2) of the Unemployment Insurance Act.^ The Tax Court also found that the “Appellants and the Payor would not have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm’s length.”
The trust of the applicants’ argument is that the Tax Court based its decision on erroneous findings of fact that were made in a perverse or Capricious manner without regard to the material before it, and that there was also a denial of natural justice or procedural fairness arising from the manner in which the hearing was conducted. In any event, it is contended that the Tax Court erred in finding that it was reasonable to conclude that similar contracts of employment would not have been entered into if the parties had been dealing at arm’s length. We are not persuaded that any of these attacks are valid.
nature and importance of the work performed, it is reasonable to conclude that they would have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm’s length.
The relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act are found in s. 251 which reads in part:
251.
(1) For the purposes of this Act;
(a) related person shall be deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length; and
(b) it is a question of fact whether persons not related to each other were at a particular time dealing with each other at arm’s length.
(2) For the purpose of this Act, “related persons”, or persons related to each other, are
(a) individuals connected by blood relationship, marriage or adoption;
(b) a corporation and
(i) a person who controls the corporation, if it is controlled by one person,
(ii) a person who is a member of a related group that controls
the corporation, or
(iii) any person related to a person described in subparagraph (i) or (11)...
A close examination of the entire record suggest that the applicants’ evidence painted a somewhat confusing picture for the Tax Court. Counsel agreed that this was so. Of paramount importance was whether Samuel Koblinsky, who was found to have controlled the Payor during the first periods of employment, continue to do so during the second periods of employment. It is manifest that the finding that control of the Payor did not change during the second period of employment was based on the judge’s overall assessment of the evidence including, in particular, the credibility of the witnesses. We are not satisfied from our review of the complete record that the judgments under review were based on any erroneous finding of fact that was made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material before the Tax Court.
Nor are we persuaded that the applicants were denied natural justice or procedural fairness before that Court. They each elected not to be represented by a lawyer, but rather by Samuel Koblinsky. In our view, they were afforded an ample opportunity at the hearing to adduce any evidence that was relevant to their appeals. We cannot agree that the Tax Court refused to hear such evidence.
Finally, having regard to the particular record in these matters we are not convinced that Tax Court erred in finding that it was reasonable to conclude that the applicants and the Payor would have entered into substantially similar contracts of employment if they had been dealing with each other at arm’s length.
Each of the section 28 applications will therefore be dismissed.
Application dismissed.
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