Marceau J.A.:
These two applications for judicial review were set down for hearing at the same time since they raised the same question with respect to the application of certain provisions of the Income Tax Act and involved the same counsel. The applications challenged two identical decisions of the Tax Court of Canada which had again upheld the Minister of National Reve
nue’s assessment of tax on alimony in the hands of a former spouse with custody of children born within the marriage, where the alimony was paid by the other former spouse for the maintenance of the children following a divorce or separation judgment. Again the issue was whether the fact that the sums received were exclusively for the maintenance of the children deprived the recipient of the discretion that was necessary in order for these payments to be considered as allowances within the meaning of subsection 56(12) of the Act, and consequently should not be included in the custodial former spouse’s income under paragraphs 56( 1 )(/?), (c) or (c. 1) of the Act.
We are all of the view that the argument of counsel for the applicants, which in a nutshell would insert the adjective “absolute” before the word “discretion” in subsection 56(12) of the Act so that the slightest general earmarking of a support payment would mean that it could no longer be characterized as a taxable allowance, is untenable given the context in which the provision is found. Ably though counsel presented it, the argument does not stand up to analysis, as the Judge of the Tax Court of Canada made abundantly clear in his reasons for judgment.
Counsel for the respondent did such a good job of interpreting the Trial Judge’s analysis that we wondered for a moment whether we should examine some of her arguments. However, we came to the conclusion that additional new reasons would on the whole add nothing substantial and might even detract somewhat from the coherence and clarity of the reasons at trial. Therefore, we simply adopt the reasons of the Judge of the Tax Court of Canada.
Both applications for review will accordingly be dismissed.
Application dismissed.
payer, the children of the taxpayer or both the taxpayer and the children of the taxpayer if
(1) the order was made
(A) after February 10, 1988, or
(B) before February 11, 1988 and the taxpayer and the person required to pay the amount jointly elected in writing before the end of the year to have this paragraph and paragraph 60(c.1) apply with respect to all those amounts,
(ii) at the time the amount was received and throughout the remainder of the year, the taxpayer was living apart from the person required to pay the amount, and
111) the person required to pay the amount is a person of the opposite sex who
(A) before the date of the order cohabited
with the taxpayer in a conjugal relationship,
or
(B) is the natural parent of a child of the taxpayer; ....