St-Onge
T.C.J.
(orally):
The
appeals
of
Alain
and
Sylvain
Bouchard
were
heard
on
common
evidence
on
October
29,
1998,
in
the
city
of
Québec
in
the
province
of
Quebec.
The
issue
is
whether
the
respondent
can
claim
$33,469.13
from
the
appellants
under
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
by
reason
of
the
transfer
of
an
assignment
of
an
account
receivable
to
them.
In
the
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal
in
each
case,
the
respondent
alleges
the
following:
[TRANSLATION]
2.
By
notice
of
assessment
no.
02767
sent
to
the
appellant
on
October
3,
1996,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(“the
Minister”)
claimed
$33,469.13
from
the
appellant
under
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(“the
Act”)
in
connection
with
the
transfer
of
an
assignment
of
an
account
receivable
to
the
appellant.
3.
On
or
about
December
11,
1996,
a
notice
of
objection
was
served
against
assessment
no.
02767
of
October
3,
1996.
4.
By
notice
of
reassessment
no.
00916
sent
to
the
appellant
on
December
22,
1997,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(“the
Minister”)
revised
under
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(“the
Act”)
assessment
no.
02767
of
October
3,
1996
by
claiming
from
the
appellant
the
following
amount
in
connection
with
the
transfer
of
an
assignment
of
an
account
receivable
to
the
appellant:
Revised
assessment
of
Oct.
30,
1996
|
19,850.00
|
Interest
from
Oct.
30,
1996
to
Dec.
22,
1997
|
2,030.88
|
Total
amount
of
assessment
|
21,880.88
|
5.
In
making
the
assessment,
the
Minister
considered
the
following
facts,
inter
alia,
to
be
true:
(a)
Francis
Bouchard,
the
appellant’s
father,
had
a
tax
liability
of
$22,691.91
from
the
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
taxation
years;
(b)
On
February
12,
1987,
Francis
Bouchard
and
his
two
sons,
namely
the
appellant
and
Sylvain
Bouchard,
signed
an
agreement
under
which
the
father
transferred
30
of
his
common
shares
in
Garage
Francis
Bouchard
Inc.
to
his
above-mentioned
two
sons
for
a
total
consideration
of
$93,000;
(c)
on
the
same
date,
the
father
then
assigned
the
said
sale
price
of
$93,000
to
his
two
sons,
namely
the
appellant
and
Sylvain
Bouchard,
as
a
gift;
(d)
on
February
12,
1987,
the
father,
Francis
Bouchard
(“the
transferor”),
transferred
an
assignment
of
an
account
receivable
of
$93,000
to
the
appellant
and
his
brother
Sylvain;
(e)
at
all
relevant
times,
the
appellant
and
the
transferor
were
not
at
arm’s
length;
(f)
at
the
time
of
the
transfer,
it
was
specified
that
the
value
of
the
transferred
portion
was
$19,850
for
the
appellant:
(g)
at
the
time
of
the
transfer,
the
fair
market
value
of
the
consideration
given
by
the
appellant
in
respect
of
the
property
was
nil;
(h)
the
total
of
all
amounts
that
the
transferor
was
liable
to
pay
under
the
Act
in
or
in
respect
of
the
taxation
year
in
which
the
property
was
transferred
or
any
preceding
taxation
year
was
$22,691.91;
(i)
Francis
Bouchard
made
an
assignment
of
his
property
on
April
3,
1992.
6.
At
this
point
in
the
proceedings,
the
Minister
is
of
the
view
that
the
total
amount
of
the
assessment
of
December
22,
1997,
should
be
revised
to
$19,850.
B.
Issue
to
be
Decided
7.
The
issue
to
be
decided
is
whether
the
appellant
is
liable
to
pay
$19,850
under
section
160
of
the
Act
in
connection
with
the
transfer
of
property
to
him.
C.
Statutory
Provisions,
Reasons
Relied
on
and
Relief
Sought
8.
He
is
relying,
inter
alia,
on
sections
160
and
251
and
subsection
248(1)
of
the
Act
as
amended
and
applicable.
9.
He
submits
that
the
Minister
is
rightly
claiming
from
the
appellant
an
amount
to
be
paid
and
to
be
revised
to
$19,850,
the
whole
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
section
160
of
the
Act.
At
the
hearing,
the
appellants
admitted
paragraphs
2
to
9
and
all
nine
subparagraphs
and
filed
the
agreement
dated
February
12,
1987.
[TRANSLATION]
Agreement
AGREEMENT
ENTERED
INTO
AT
LA
MALBAIE
on
February
12,
1987.
Present:
Francis
Bouchard
Alain
Bouchard
Sylvain
Bouchard
The
above-mentioned
parties,
being
involved
in
Garage
Francis
Bouchard
Inc.
as
Shareholders
or
employees,
agree
as
follows:
Francis
Bouchard
shall
transfer
to
Alain
Bouchard
and
Sylvain
Bouchard
30
common
shares
of
the
capital
stock
he
holds
in
Garage
Francis
Bouchard
Inc.
for
a
total
consideration
of
$93,000.
The
shares
shall
be
distributed
as
follows:
|
Number
of
|
|
|
Sale
price
|
common
shares
|
Total
|
Alain
Bouchard
|
$3,100
|
15
|
$46,500
|
Sylvain
Bouchard
|
3,100
|
|
46,500
|
|
15
|
|
|
$6,200
|
30
|
$93,000
|
Francis
Bouchard
shall
assign
to
Alain
Bouchard
and
Sylvain
Bouchard
the
amount
of
the
sale
price,
namely
$93,000,
as
a
gift
on
the
date
of
this
agreement.
The
Vendor
and
the
Purchaser
declare
that
they
intend
these
transactions
to
be
at
fair
market
value,
and
to
that
end
they
have
made
an
assessment,
which
they
consider
fair
and
reasonable,
of
the
value
of
the
company’s
shares
being
sold
hereunder.
However,
in
the
event
that
taxes
are
assessed
by
the
competent
authority
or
if
a
presumption
under
a
taxing
statute
applies
on
the
basis
that
the
fair
market
value
of
the
shares
sold
differed
from
that
determined
by
the
parties
when
this
agreement
was
signed,
the
parties
agree
and
undertake
to
adjust
the
sale
price
of
the
shares
accordingly
and
agree
that
such
adjustment
shall
be
effected
by
increasing
or
decreasing
the
value
of
the
common
shares.
It
is
understood
that
a
final
determination
of
the
fair
market
value
of
the
shares
sold
may
be
made
by
the
courts
following
a
challenge
to
the
assessment,
provided,
however,
that
if
there
is
a
difference
between
the
federal
and
provincial
assessments,
the
above-mentioned
adjustment
shall
be
made
on
the
basis
of
the
higher
of
the
amounts
established
following
an
uncontested
assessment
or
by
a
final
judgment,
if
any.
The
parties
now
agree
and
undertake
to
amend
this
agreement,
if
need
be,
to
give
full
effect
to
the
adjustment
of
the
sale
price
provided
for
above
and
undertake
to
sign
any
document
and
take
any
action
that
is
necessary
or
useful
for
that
purpose.
Francis
Bouchard
undertakes
to
take
the
necessary
steps
to
tell
the
company’s
secretary
to
enter
in
the
company’s
records
the
transactions
relating
to
this
agreement.
AND
WE
HAVE
SIGNED
AT
LA
M
ALB
AIE
this
12th
day
of
February
1987.
Counsel
for
the
appellants
summarized
the
facts
by
explaining
that
the
appellants
had
each
received
15
shares
worth
$3,100
each,
for
a
total
of
$93,000.
He
argued
that
it
is
simply
a
matter
of
interpreting
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Tax
liability
re
property
transferred
not
at
arm’s
length.
Section
160(1)(d):
[T]he
transferee
and
transferor
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
a
part
of
the
transferor's
tax
under
this
Part
for
each
taxation
year....
According
to
the
pleadings,
it
is
acknowledged
that
the
father’s
liability
for
the
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
taxation
years
was
$22,691.91.
Counsel
argued
that
the
appellants
are
liable
for
only
a
part
of
the
tax
owed
at
the
time
of
the
transaction,
which
occurred
on
February
12,
1987.
In
their
Notice
of
Appeal
the
appellants
relied
on
the
following
reasons:
[TRANSLATION]
6.
The
reasons
we
intend
to
rely
on
are
as
follows:
Section
160(
1
)(J)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
states
that
the
transferee
and
transferor
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
a
part
of
the
transferor’s
tax
under
this
Part
for
each
taxation
year
in
respect
of
any
income
from,
or
gain
from
the
disposition
of,
the
property
so
transferred
or
property
substituted
therefor.
In
the
situation
we
are
dealing
with,
paragraph
160(1)(d)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
should
be
read
and
understood
in
the
following
sense:
Sylvain
Bouchard
is
liable
for
the
part
of
the
tax
owed
by
his
father,
Francis
Bouchard,
that
results
from
the
transaction
by
which
his
father’s
shares
were
transferred.
In
this
case,
his
father
did
not
have
to
pay
any
taxes
when
he
transferred
the
shares,
as
he
benefited
from
a
capital
gains
exemption.
Therefore,
as
can
be
seen
from
the
Act,
this
statutory
provision
applies
only
in
so
far
as
the
father
does
not
pay
the
taxes
relating
to
the
transfer
of
property
to
his
sons.
Moreover,
section
160(1)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
refers
to
a
limit
on
the
liability
of
the
transferee
and
transferor,
namely
the
amount
of
the
difference
between
the
fair
market
value
and
the
price
paid,
the
limit
being
the
lesser
of
the
amount
of
the
tax
calculated
under
paragraph
160(
!)(</)
or
the
fair
market
value
of
the
property
less
the
price
paid.
Thus,
in
this
case,
since
Francis
Bouchard’s
son
is
an
adult,
sections
74.1
to
75.1
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
do
not
apply
in
the
circumstances;
only
the
disposition
of
the
property
should
be
considered
under
paragraph
160(
1
)(J)
and
in
reading
subparagraph
160(
l
)(e)(ii)
we
should
take
into
account
the
taxation
year
in
which
the
property
was
transferred.
Sylvain
Bouchard
is,
of
course,
not
liable
for
all
the
taxes,
but
only
for
a
part
of
the
taxes
for
the
taxation
year
on
transfer,
and
more
specifically
the
year
in
which
the
transfer
of
the
property
occurred.
Accordingly,
under
paragraph
160(1)(d)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
Revenue
Canada
must
require
the
payment
of
the
tax
payable
by
the
father,
Francis
Bouchard,
when
he
transferred
the
shares
to
his
two
sons.
In
this
situation,
therefore,
since
the
tax
payable
at
the
time
of
the
disposition
was
nil,
no
notice
of
assessment
should
have
been
issued
against
Sylvain
Bouchard.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
the
father’s
liability
on
February
12,
1987,
was
$22,691.91
for
the
1984,
1985,
1986
and
1987
taxation
years
and
that,
at
the
time
of
the
transfer,
it
was
specified
that
the
value
of
the
transferred
portion
was
$19,950
for
each
appellant.
He
then
referred
the
Court
to
the
case
law
in
making
the
following
arguments.
First,
on
the
basis
of
Montreuil
v.
R
(1994),
95
D.T.C.
138
(Eng.)
(T.C.C.):
That
a
simple
transfer
is
sufficient
and
that
it
does
not
have
to
be
proved
that
they
were
trying
to
evade
their
tax
obligations.
Second,
on
the
basis
of
Boisselle
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1988),
89
D.T.C.
279
(Eng.)
(T.C.C.):
There
is
no
time
limit
in
the
case
of
section
160.
The
Minister
can
make
an
assessment
at
any
time.
Third,
on
the
basis
of
Garland
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1988),
88
D.T.C.
1271
(T.C.C.):
Two
things:
(a)
an
assessment
against
the
transferor
is
not
a
precondition
for
section
160
to
apply;
(b)
the
transferor's
bankruptcy
does
not
extinguish
the
transferee's
liability.
The
same
principle
is
set
out
in
Donna
Mae
Heavyside,
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
(A-237-96).
Although
the
Court
asked
counsel
for
the
appellants
what
the
amount
of
a
part
of
the
transferor’s
tax
was,
it
did
not
receive
an
answer.
Based
on
the
evidence,
it
would
seem
that
it
is
$19,850
for
each
appellant.
Counsel
for
the
appellants
did
not
adduce
any
evidence
or
provide
any
case
law
concerning
the
allegations
made
in
paragraph
6
of
the
appellants’
Notice
of
Appeal.
The
burden
was
on
the
appellants
to
refute
the
allegations
in
the
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
and
they
admitted
all
of
them.
Accordingly,
the
Court
finds
that
the
appellants
are
liable
to
pay
$19,850
each
under
section
160
of
the
Act
in
connection
with
the
transfer
of
property
to
them.
The
appeals
are
therefore
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.