Mogan
T
.
C.J.:
The
appeals
of
Air
Rock
Drilling
Co.
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen
(96-1713
(11)G),
Shelva
Jean
Desaulniers
v.
The
Queen
(96-1884
(1T)G)
and
Wallace
Desaulniers
v.
The
Queen
(96-1885(lT)G)
were
heard
together
on
common
evidence.
These
three
appeals
are
from
assessments
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Because
there
are
three
different
Appellants
in
three
separate
proceedings
in
this
Court,
I
shall
for
convenience
refer
to
Air
Rock
Drilling
Co.
Ltd.
as
“Air
Rock”;
refer
to
Shelva
Jean
Desaulniers
as
“Shelva”;
and
refer
to
Wallace
Desaulniers
as
“Wallace”.
Shelva
and
Wallace
are
wife
and
husband.
All
of
the
issued
shares
of
Air
Rock
were
owned
by
554022
Ontario
Ltd.
(referred
to
herein
as
“022”).
All
of
the
issued
shares
of
022
were
for
the
next
two
months
would
be
in
accordance
with
Jim
Grant’s
memo
of
April
16
referred
to
above.
It
appears
that
the
directors
were
content
to
have
CPI
go
into
bankruptcy.
The
last
page
of
Exhibit
R-54
is
the
minutes
of
a
meeting
of
directors
of
CPI
held
on
August
6,
1991
at
which
the
directors
agreed
that
the
only
solution
for
CPI
was
to
make
an
assignment
in
bankruptcy.
There
is
a
significant
time
gap
between
the
meeting
of
directors
on
April
17
and
the
next
meeting
on
August
6,
1991
authorizing
the
bankruptcy.
According
to
Wallace,
that
gap
is
explained
by
the
fact
that
CPI
was
attempting
in
the
intervening
three
and
one-half
months
to
obtain
certain
tax
credits
which
could
be
obtained
only
if
CPI
had
an
operating
status
with
at
least
a
skeleton
staff.
Mr.
Grant
could
not
recall
whether
CPI
had
any
activity
after
April
1991.
I
conclude
that
Mr.
Grant
spent
most
of
his
time
at
the
Entrée
Canada
office
on
Queen
Street
in
Ottawa;
that
he
rarely
visited
the
CPI
plant
at
Kemptville
which
operated
for
more
than
12
months
and
was
only
45
minutes
south
of
Ottawa;
and
that
specific
details
were
not
important
to
him.
He
was
the
chief
executive
officer
and
chairman
of
CPI
but,
in
evidence,
he
could
not
recall
with
precision
any
important
facts
with
respect
to
its
short
operational
life.
The
Respondent
has
admitted
in
the
pleadings
that
each
of
Air
Rock,
Wallace
and
Shelva
was
dealing
at
arm’s
length
with
CPI
at
all
relevant
times;
and
that
CPI
was
a
“small
business
corporation”
within
the
meaning
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
three
Appellants
have
alleged
that
each
was
dealing
at
arm’s
length
with
NPC
and
that
NPC
was
also
a
“small
business
corporation”
within
the
meaning
of
the
Act.
Those
allegations
are
not
admitted
in
the
pleadings
but
I
have
concluded
that
each
Appellant
was
dealing
at
arm’s
length
with
NPC
and
that
NPC
was
a
small
business
corporation.
I
rely
on
the
following
uncontradicted
evidence
of
Wallace:
(i)
he
and
Shelva
were
persuaded
by
Herb
Gee
to
invest
$242,000
personally
in
NPC;
(ii)
the
amounts
paid
are
proved
in
Exhibit
A-39;
(iii)
Wallace
and
Shelva
caused
Air
Rock
to
invest
$202,350
in
NPC;
(iv)
the
investment
in
NPC
was
a
method
of
obtaining
scientific
research
tax
credits
(SRTC)
and
also
an
opportunity
to
participate
in
big
profits
from
the
manufacture
and
sale
of
Polyol;
(v)
Herb
Gee
disappeared
and
Wallace
and
Shelva
were
left
on
their
own
to
locate,
take
possession
of,
and
transport
the
Polyol
equipment
from
Nova
Scotia
to
the
Air
Rock
yard
in
Ontario;
and
(vi)
Wallace
did
not
know
what
happened
to
the
money
which
he
and
Shelva
($242,000)
and
Air
Rock
($202,350)
invested
in
NPC.
If
Wallace
and
Shelva
and
Air
Rock
had
controlled
NPC,
they
would
know
what
happened
to
their
money.
Also,
on
a
balance
of
probabilities,
NPC
was
a
small
business
corporation
used
by
Herb
Gee
(and
perhaps
others)
to
sell
the
idea
of
easy
tax
credits
and
big
profits
to
persons
like
Wallace
and
Shelva.
In
the
mind
of
Herb
Gee,
NPC
may
have
been
the
“Brooklyn
Bridge”
but,
in
the
minds
of
Wallace
and
Shelva,
NPC
was
a
bona
fide
business
venture.
There
is
no
dispute
concerning
the
amounts
of
money
passing
between
any
one
of
the
Appellants
and
either
CPI
or
NPC.
Barbara
Scott
identified
a
schedule
(Exhibit
A-61)
which
summarized
the
amounts
of
money
advanced
to
or
for
NPC
and
CPI
by
Air
Rock.
In
her
mind
and
on
the
books
of
Air
Rock,
she
merged
NPC
and
CPI
as
if
it
were
a
single
Polyol
venture
to
which
Air
Rock
had
advanced
money.
The
amounts
set
out
in
Exhibit
A-
61
may
be
summarized
as
follows:
Fiscal
Period
Amount
Paid
To
Repayment
Net
Investment
May
31,
1988
$
25,000
NPC
$
25,000
May
31,
1989
177,350
NPC
177,350
Subtotal
$202.350
May
31.
1990
272,737
CPI
65,000
207,737
May
31,
1991
289,977
CPI
8,000
281,977
May
31,
1992
167,057
CPI
46,279
120,778
Total
$932,121
$119,279
$812,842
Notes:
1
Research
&
Development
tax
credit
transferred
by
trustee
in
bankruptcy.
CPI
made
an
assignment
in
bankruptcy
at
the
end
of
December
1991.
Upon
or
prior
to
that
assignment,
Air
Rock
used
its
mortgage
to
take
possession
of
the
Kemptville
plant.
Also,
Air
Rock
used
its
security
interest
under
the
Personal
Property
Security
Act
to
take
possession
of
the
Polyol
equipment.
The
value
of
the
Kemptville
plant
and
the
value
of
the
Polyol
equipment
do
not
appear
in
the
column
“repayment”
in
the
above
table
but
those
values
are
a
factor
in
the
reassessments
which
are
under
appeal.
Lastly,
the
amount
of
$242,000
advanced
to
NPC
by
Wallace
and
Shelva
personally
is
in
addition
to
the
amounts
advanced
by
Air
Rock
shown
in
the
above
table.
The
Issues
I
can
now
describe
the
issues
in
these
appeals
in
greater
detail
and
will
consider
Air
Rock
first.
A
“business
investment
loss”
is
defined
in
paragraph
39(1
)(c)
of
the
Act
and,
in
summary,
is
a
capital
loss
resulting
from
an
investment
in
the
shares
of
a
small
business
corporation
or
resulting
from
a
loan
to
such
a
corporation.
An
“allowable
business
investment
loss”
(“ABIL”)
is
defined
in
paragraph
38(c)
as
75%
of
a
business
investment
loss.
Although
an
ABIL
is
a
capital
loss,
it
is
deductible
in
computing
income
under
paragraph
3(d)
of
the
Act.
For
its
fiscal
period
ending
May
31,
1991,
Air
Rock
claimed
a
business
investment
loss
of
$200,000
and
deducted
an
ABIL
of
$150,000.
For
its
fiscal
period
ending
May
31,
1992,
Air
Rock
claimed
a
business
investment
of
$287,842
and
deducted
an
ABIL
of
$215,882.
Those
losses
were
claimed
with
respect
to
the
money
advanced
to
NPC
and
CPI
by
Air
Rock.
Barbara
Scott
described
the
circumstances
in
which
she
caused
Air
Rock
to
claim
the
business
investment
losses
of
$200,000
and
$287,842.
All
of
the
money
advanced
by
Air
Rock
to
NPC
and
CPI
she
debited
to
a
single
Polyol
Venture
account
in
the
books
of
Air
Rock.
Although
Wallace
could
not
provide
Ms.
Scott
with
much
detail
concerning
CPI,
she
was
satisfied
in
November
1991
(just
before
filing
Air
Rock’s
1991
income
tax
return)
that
the
value
of
Air
Rock’s
investment
in
the
Polyol
Venture
was
greatly
overstated
on
the
books
of
Air
Rock.
She
therefore
decided
to
claim
an
arbitrary
amount
of
$200,000
as
a
business
investment
loss.
By
the
time
she
filed
Air
Rock’s
1992
income
tax
return,
CPI
was
already
bankrupt.
She
therefore
computed
the
1992
business
investment
loss
as
follows:
By
notices
of
reassessment
dated
December
19,
1994,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
in
full
the
deduction
of
the
ABILs
for
1991
and
1992
and,
apparently,
a
carryover
of
such
losses
to
1993.
Air
Rock
served
Notices
of
Objection
for
all
three
years.
The
Minister
confirmed
the
reassessments
and
stated
in
the
Notice
of
Confirmation:
Net
Investment
in
Polyol
Venture
|
$812,842
|
Less
Credit
for
mortgage
taken
back
by
Air
|
50,000
|
Rock
|
|
|
$762,842
|
Less
Amount
claimed
in
1991
|
200,000
|
|
$562,842
|
Less
Value
of
Polyol
equipment
|
275,000
|
1992
Business
investment
loss
|
$287,842
|
The
capital
loss
claimed
as
a
deduction
from
income
was
not
in
respect
of
the
disposition
of
a
debt
or
other
right
to
receive
an
amount
that
was
acquired
by
you
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
or
property
or
as
consideration
for
the
disposition
of
capital
property
to
a
person
with
whom
you
were
dealing
at
arms
length
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
40(2)(g)(ii)
of
the
Act;
accordingly,
for
the
purpose
of
section
3
of
the
Act
you
had
no
allowable
capital
loss
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
38(b)
and
therefore
you
had
no
Allowable
Business
Investment
Loss
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
38(c)
of
the
Act.
Air
Rock
has
appealed
with
respect
to
its
taxation
years
1991,
1992
and
1993
and
claims
the
deduction
of
the
ABILs
as
reported
for
1991
and
1992;
and
alternatively,
the
deduction
of
its
full
ABIL
in
its
1992
taxation
year
when
CPI
became
insolvent
and
ceased
operations.
The
issues
with
respect
to
Wallace
and
Shelva
are
more
complex.
In
their
Notices
of
Appeal,
Wallace
and
Shelva
make
the
following
statements
of
fact:
8.
During
1987
and
1988,
Mr.
and
Mrs.
Desaulniers
wrote
cheques
from
their
joint
bank
accounts
to
Vincent
Murphy,
Herbert
Gee
and
National
Polyoil,
all
to
enable
equipment
and
machinery
to
be
purchased
for
the
business
of
National
Polyoil
to
be
conducted.
The
total
amounts
so
paid
by
Mr.
and
Mrs.
Desaulniers
aggregated
$242,000,
which
amounts
were
so
paid
roughly
equally
between
the
two
of
them.
9.
The
business
of
National
Polyoil
never
started
other
than
the
conduct
of
some
preliminary
research
and
development
activity.
As
the
result,
a
combination
of
Mr.
and
Mrs.
Desaulniers
and
Air
Rock,
all
of
whom
had
advanced
funds,
owned
equipment,
technology,
machinery
and
research
and
development
rights
for
a
business
intended
to
be
carried
on
by
National
Polyoils,
but
which
had
not
in
fact
been
so
carried
on.
10.
In
1989,
the
assets
referred
to
in
paragraph
9
were
transferred
by
a
combination
of
Mr.
and
Mrs.
Desaulniers
and
Air
Rock
to
Canadian
Polyols
International
Inc.
(“CPI”)
in
an
arms
length
transaction.
There
was
no
formal
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale.
11.
In
the
books
and
records
of
CPI,
shares
were
issued
to
Mr.
Desaulniers
only
for
the
assets
referred
to
in
paragraphs
9
and
10
above,
and
the
issued
shares
were
shown
on
such
books
as
having
a
value
of
$421,000.
The
above
statements
of
fact
are
admitted
by
the
Respondent
and
form
the
basis
of
the
assessments
against
Wallace
and
Shelva.
By
notices
of
reas
sessment
dated
February
29,
1996,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
made
the
following
decisions
with
respect
to
Wallace
and
Shelva:
(a)
for
the
1990
taxation
year,
the
Minister
added
to
Wallace’s
reported
income
the
amount
of
$196,830
as
a
shareholder
benefit;
and
the
Minister
did
the
same
with
respect
to
Shelva;
(b)
for
the
1991
taxation
year,
the
Minister
allowed
to
Wallace
a
business
investment
loss
of
$310,500
with
a
resulting
loss
carryback
to
1990;
and
the
Minister
did
the
same
with
respect
to
Shelva.
The
Minister
computed
the
1990
shareholder
benefit
as
follows:
(i)
the
Polyol
equipment
was
acquired
by
Air
Rock,
Wallace
and
Shelva
in
1989
as
a
result
of
their
investments
in
NPC
in
the
following
proportions:
Air
Rock
|
$202,350
|
-
|
46%
|
Wallace
|
$121,000
|
-
|
27%
|
Shelva
|
$121,000
|
-
|
27%
|
(ii)
in
exchange
for
the
transfer
of
the
Polyol
equipment,
CPI
issued
610,145
shares
to
Wallace
and
Shelva
in
February
1990
representing
a
value
of
$421,000
at
69¢
per
share;
(111)
Air
Rock
did
not
receive
any
shares
of
CPI
for
its
46%
interest
in
the
Polyol
equipment
and
so
Air
Rock
conferred
a
benefit
on
Wallace
and
Shelva
in
the
amount
of
$193,660
being
46%
of
$421,000;
(iv)
that
benefit
was
allocated
$96,830
to
Wallace
and
$96,830
to
Shelva:
(v)
Air
Rock
paid
$200,000
to
CPI
in
1990
for
which
it
should
have
received
289,855
shares
at
69¢
per
share;
(vi)
those
289,855
shares
were
issued
to
Wallace
and
Shelva
(being
the
remainder
of
the
900,000
shares);
(vii)
Air
Rock
conferred
a
benefit
on
Wallace
and
Shelva
in
the
amount
of
$200,000;
(viii)
that
benefit
was
allocated
$100,000
to
Wallace
and
$100,000
to
Shelva;
(ix)
the
total
1990
shareholder
benefit
to
each
of
Wallace
and
Shelva
was
The
business
investments
loss
which
the
Minister
allowed
to
Wallace
and
Shelva
for
1991
is
dependent
in
part
upon
the
amount
of
the
shareholder
benefit
as
computed
in
paragraph
34
above.
The
Minister
assumed
that
the
900,000
shares
of
CPI
issued
to
Wallace
and
Shelva
had
no
value
at
the
end
of
1991
because
CPI
made
an
assignment
in
bankruptcy
in
Decem-
ber
1991.
Therefore,
the
Minister
determined
the
adjusted
cost
base
(ACB)
of
Wallace’s
450,000
shares
in
CPI
and
the
amount
of
Wallace’s
deemed
loss
under
section
50
of
the
Act
in
the
following
manner:
determined
as
follows:
|
|
Polyol
equipment
(Air
Rock
portion)
|
$
96,830
|
Share
subscription
by
Air
Rock
|
100,000
|
Shareholder
benefit
|
$196,830
|
Polyol
equipment
transfer
(27%
of
$421,000)
|
$113,670
|
Shareholder
benefit
|
$196,830
|
ACB
|
$310,500
|
Proceeds
of
disposition
(section
50)
|
Nil
|
Business
Investment
Loss
(section
39(1
)(c))
|
$310,500
|
ABIL
(75%
under
section
38(c))
for
1991
|
$232,876
|
The
Decision
Concerning
Wallace
and
Shelva
Considering
whether
Wallace
and
Shelva
received
a
shareholder
benefit
in
1990,
I
am
faced
with
some
important
and
undisputed
facts.
First,
the
attempt
to
manufacture
Polyol
in
NPC
and
later
in
CPI
was
a
financial
disaster
from
beginning
to
end.
Wallace
and
Shelva
did
not
recover
any
of
the
$242,000
which
they
personally
advanced
to
NPC
in
1987
and
1988.
Air
Rock
paid
out
cash
in
the
net
amount
of
$812,842
to
NPC
and
CPI
(see
table
in
paragraph
26
above)
and
recovered
no
cash
with
respect
to
that
amount
but
only
the
Kemptville
plant
site
(estimated
value
$200,000)
and
the
Polyol
equipment
(estimated
value
not
more
than
$275,000).
In
other
words,
Wallace
and
Shelva
have
personally
lost
$242,000
and
Air
Rock
has
lost
at
least
$337,000.
Second,
the
CPI
venture
(I
hesitate
to
call
it
a
business
because
it
had
no
sales)
lost
money
from
the
moment
it
commenced
in
the
early
part
of
1990
until
it
closed
down
in
the
spring
or
summer
of
1991.
The
venture
was
kept
alive
in
the
fall
of
1990
only
because
Air
Rock
made
injections
of
cash
in
the
aggregate
amount
of
$176,000
(see
paragraph
17
above).
The
CPI
financial
statements
for
the
year
ending
December
31,
1990
(Exhibit
A-55)
show
nil
revenue,
expenses
of
$889,078,
and
a
deficit
of
$1,003,867.
With
no
revenue
coming
in
and
only
expenses
going
out,
the
deficit
was
growing
month-by-month
through
1990
and
was
depleting
the
shareholders’
capital.
Third,
Wallace
and
Shelva
as
the
indirect
shareholders
of
Air
Rock
did
not
perceive
or
experience
or
enjoy
any
tangible
or
intangible
benefit
from
the
money
($812,842
including
46%
of
the
cost
of
the
Polyol
equipment)
which
Air
Rock
invested
in
NPC
and
CPI
even
if
a
portion
of
that
money
paid
for
CPI
shares
which
were
issued
in
their
names.
Wallace
and
Shelva
did
not
have
the
use
of
a
luxury
yacht
or
condominium
in
a
palm
tree
ha-
ven!
They
could
only
watch
with
dismay
as
CPI
consumed
and
depleted
the
investments
of
all
shareholders.
And
fourth,
the
collapse
of
CPI
was
swift.
On
February
12,
1990,
a
shareholders
agreement
(Exhibit
R-31)
was
signed
among
persons
who
were
investing
more
than
$1,500,000.
Fourteen
months
later
on
April
16,
1991,
Mr.
Grant
was
reporting
to
the
directors
(Exhibit
A-57)
that
CPI
was
insolvent
and
would
likely
become
bankrupt.
Some
obstacles
should
have
been
obvious
from
the
start.
There
was
no
operating
business
transferred
to
CPI,
no
established
manufacturing
process,
no
quality
product
and
no
list
of
loyal
customers.
CPI
was
truly
starting
from
scratch.
Also,
among
the
investors
and
directors,
there
was
no
one
with
a
real
passion
for
the
process
and
the
product,
no
inventor,
no
entrepreneurial
manager
who
had
spent
a
long
time
working
the
process
and
was
determined
to
see
it
succeed.
Mr.
Grant,
the
chief
executive
officer,
was
not
in
regular
attendance
at
the
Kemptville
plant.
If
the
CPI
venture
was
to
succeed,
it
would
do
so
in
the
hands
of
hired
help.
When
a
shareholder
benefit
is
assessed
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
then
appealed
to
this
Court,
the
credibility
of
the
shareholder
is
often
an
important
factor.
Wallace
is
an
intelligent
and
successful
businessman
with
only
limited
(Grade
9)
formal
education.
I
found
him
to
be
a
totally
credible
witness.
His
answers
to
all
questions
were
straight
and
candid
in
the
context
that
he
has
very
limited
knowledge
of
corporate
matters
and
procedures.
I
believe
him
when
he
stated
(i)
that
he
was
not
involved
in
any
way
in
the
record-keeping
of
CPI
(minute
book,
share
register,
financial
statements,
etc.);
(ii)
that
it
was
not
his
idea
to
issue
the
900,000
shares
of
CPI
to
him
and
Shelva
excluding
Air
Rock;
and
(iii)
that
he
thought
the
shareholdings
in
CPI
would
all
be
straightened
out
when
CPI
went
public.
It
is
highly
unlikely
that
Wallace
would
have
understood
that
900,000
shares
of
CPI
were
issued
in
the
names
of
him
and
Shelva
for
a
total
consideration
of
$621,000
but
paid
in
part
by
Air
Rock
($193,660
in
the
value
of
the
Polyol
equipment
plus
$200,000
in
cash).
Similarly,
he
would
not
have
realized
that,
by
the
issue
of
such
shares,
Air
Rock
might
have
conferred
a
benefit
on
him
and
Shelva.
He
was
too
busy
operating
the
well-drilling
business
of
Air
Rock
and
worrying
about
the
survival
of
the
Polyol
enterprise
in
CPI.
The
documents
in
evidence
indicate
that
the
investors
subscribed
for
CPI
shares
at
69^
per
share
in
February
1990.
That
subscription
price
does
not
prove
the
fair
market
value
of
CPI
shares
at
that
time
because
CPI
was
a
private
corporation
and
the
transfer
of
all
its
shares
was
restricted
by
the
shareholders
agreement
(Exhibit
R-31).
In
particular,
the
69¢
subscription
price
does
not
prove
the
fair
market
value
of
shares
issued
to
Wallace
and
Shelva
and
Mr.
Richardson
(Jarco)
because
their
shares
were
subject
to
a
voting
trust
under
Article
13
of
the
shareholders
agreement.
It
appears
that
all
shares
of
the
two
largest
shareholders
(the
Desaulniers
and
Mr.
Richardson)
were
required
to
be
placed
in
a
voting
trust
to
ensure
that
those
shares
would
be
voted
“to
go
public”
at
the
appropriate
time.
I
am
satisfied
that
the
record-keeping
of
CPI
was
sloppy
and
inaccurate.
The
table
in
paragraph
17
above
shows
how
seven
cheques,
all
from
Air
Rock,
were
recorded
as
having
been
deposited
by
“Wally”
or
“W.
Desaulnier”
(name
misspelled).
Mr.
Grant
acknowledged
more
than
once
that
he
used
the
names
Wallace,
Shelva,
Desaulniers
and
Air
Rock
interchangeably.
This
is
borne
out
in
his
minutes
of
directors’
meetings
and
his
letters
(Exhibits
R-43,
A-52
and
A-54).
Details
did
not
seem
important
to
Mr.
Grant.
I
believe
Wallace
when
he
states
that
he
did
not
ask
that
shares
of
CPI
be
issued
to
him
and
Shelva,
excluding
Air
Rock.
I
believe
Ms.
Scott
when
she
states
that
Wallace
told
her
that
the
shareholdings
in
CPI
would
be
straightened
out
when
it
went
public.
Having
regard
to
the
rapid
decline
in
the
fortunes
of
CPI,
I
conclude
that
all
parties
involved
in
its
administration
(directors
and
officers)
were
more
concerned
with
the
day-to-day
survival
of
the
enterprise
than
with
any
corporate
record-keeping.
In
the
midst
of
the
financial
turmoil
surrounding
CPI,
if
Wallace
and
Shelva
had
thought
about
the
large
amounts
of
money
flowing
from
Air
Rock
to
CPI
and
the
issue
of
CPI
shares
in
their
names
alone,
they
would
have
known
that
they
held
a
significant
portion
of
the
CPI
shares
on
behalf
of
Air
Rock.
In
the
business
life
of
CPI,
from
February
1990
to
September
1990
when
Air
Rock
became
the
only
source
of
operating
capital,
Wallace
and
Shelva
did
not
have
time
to
be
concerned
with
the
rather
abstract
idea
of
whether
some
of
the
shares
issued
in
their
names
should
have
been
issued
to
Air
Rock.
In
the
case
of
Chopp
v.
R.
(1995),
95
D.T.C.
527
(T.C.C.),
I
was
required
to
consider
whether
the
taxpayer
had
received
a
shareholder
benefit
as
the
result
of
a
bookkeeping
error.
When
allowing
the
appeal,
I
made
the
following
statement
at
page
532:
…]
think
a
benefit
may
be
conferred
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
15(1)
without
any
intent
or
actual
knowledge
on
the
part
of
the
shareholder
or
the
corporation
if
the
circumstances
are
such
that
the
shareholder
or
corporation
ought
to
have
known
that
a
benefit
was
conferred
and
did
nothing
to
reverse
the
benefit
if
it
was
not
intended.
I
am
thinking
of
relative
amounts.
If
there
is
a
genuine
bookkeeping
error
with
respect
to
a
particular
amount,
and
that
amount
is
truly
significant
relative
to
a
corporation’s
revenue
or
its
expenses
or
a
balance
in
the
shareholder
loan
account,
a
court
may
conclude
that
the
error
should
have
been
caught
by
some
person
among
the
corporate
employees
or
shareholders
or
outside
auditors.
...
Considering
the
rapid
decline
and
final
bankruptcy
of
CPI,
I
cannot
find
any
circumstances
which
would
lead
me
to
conclude
that
Wallace
or
Shelva
or
Air
Rock
ought
to
have
known
that
a
benefit
was
conferred
when
the
900,000
shares
of
CPI
were
issued
in
the
names
of
Wallace
and
Shelva
alone.
The
decision
of
this
Court
in
Chopp
was
upheld
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
(1997),
98
D.T.C.
6014
(Fed.
C.A.).
In
the
extraordinary
circumstances
of
these
appeals,
I
find
that
all
shares
of
CPI
issued
in
the
names
of
Wallace
and
Shelva
were
held
by
them
on
behalf
of
themselves
and
Air
Rock
in
whatever
portions
were
equitable.
They
did
not
receive
any
shareholder
benefit
just
because
900,000
CPI
shares
were
issued
in
their
names
when
more
than
half
of
the
consideration
for
those
shares
came
from
Air
Rock.
And
even
if
they
had
received
such
a
shareholder
benefit,
the
value
of
the
benefit
would
be
minimal
because,
having
regard
to
the
fact
that
CPI
never
at
any
time
had
any
customers
or
an
operating
business,
the
value
of
the
issued
CPI
shares
in
February
1990
was
substantially
less
than
the
subscription
price
of
69¢.
That
subscription
price
was
based
on
the
hopes
and
dreams
of
a
few
investors
but
not
tested
by
the
realities
of
the
market
place.
The
assessment
of
a
shareholder
benefit
under
subsection
246(1)
or
15(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
must
be
based
on
at
least
an
element
of
common
sense.
There
must
be
a
benefit,
tangible
or
intangible,
which
the
shareholder
in
fact
perceived
or
experienced
or
enjoyed
or
which
any
reasonable
person
in
the
shoes
of
the
shareholder
would
perceive
or
experience
or
enjoy.
In
my
opinion,
the
shareholder
benefit
assessed
against
Wallace
and
Shelva
for
1990
was
not
based
on
common
sense.
There
was
no
benefit
which
they,
or
any
reasonable
person
standing
in
their
shoes,
could
perceive
or
experience
or
enjoy
on
February
12,
1990
when
the
900,000
shares
of
CPI
were
issued
in
their
names.
When
the
shareholder
benefit
was
finally
reassessed
in
February,
1996,
it
should
have
been
obvious
to
Revenue
Canada
that
Wallace
and
Shelva
had
not
received
any
financial
advantage
or
personal
enjoyment
upon
the
issue
of
the
CPI
shares
in
their
names;
and
that
all
parties
(Wallace
and
Shelva
and
Air
Rock)
had
suffered
significant
financial
losses.
Wallace
and
Shelva
had
told
Barbara
Scott
in
1990
and
1991
that
the
Air
Rock
investment
in
the
Polyol
Venture
(as
she
recorded
it
in
the
books
and
records
of
Air
Rock)
would
be
straightened
out
and
accurately
recorded
when
CPI
went
public.
CPI
went
bankrupt
instead
of
going
public.
In
the
minds
of
Wallace
and
Shelva,
it
never
became
necessary
to
allocate
the
900,000
shares
of
CPI
as
between
them
and
Air
Rock
even
though
they
knew
that
Air
Rock
had
contributed
the
lion’s
share
of
the
capital
to
CPI.
I
found
Barbara
Scott
to
be
a
totally
credible
witness,
particularly
when
she
said
that
Wallace
could
not
explain
to
her
what
was
happening
to
the
large
amounts
of
money
which
Air
Rock
was
advancing
to
CPI.
Wallace
had
a
blind
faith
in
the
Polyol
process
and
history
proved
that
his
faith
was
not
well-founded.
On
a
theoretical
basis,
it
could
be
said
Wallace
and
Shelva
each
suffered
a
small
business
investment
loss
in
1990
computed
as
follows:
Amounts
advanced
to
NPC
|
$121,000
|
Less:
|
27%
interest
in
Polyol
Equiment
valued
at
|
|
|
$421,000
|
$113,670
|
Loss
on
advances
to
NPC
|
$
|
7,330
|
The
amount
is
not
significant
and
they
looked
on
all
advances
to
NPC
and
CPI
as
one
venture.
Therefore,
I
would
grant
them
a
business
investment
loss
of
$121,000
in
1991
rather
than
allocate
$7,330
of
that
amount
to
1990.
If
Wallace
and
Shelva
and
Revenue
Canada
are
in
agreement,
however,
the
loss
could
be
so
allocated.
I
will
allow
the
appeals
of
Wallace
and
Shelva
for
the
1990
taxation
year
on
the
basis
that
they
did
not
receive
a
shareholder
benefit
from
Air
Rock
or
CPI
in
that
year.
For
the
1991
taxation
year,
I
will
allow
to
each
of
Wallace
and
Shelva
a
business
investment
loss
on
the
basis
that
1991
was
the
year
when
their
original
advances
to
NPC
were
finally
lost.
Wallace
had
a
business
investment
loss
of
$121,000
in
1991.
So
did
Shelva.
The
Decision
Concerning
Air
Rock
When
deciding
to
allow
the
appeals
of
Wallace
and
Shelva,
I
made
a
finding
that
all
shares
of
CPI
issued
in
their
names
were
held
by
them
on
behalf
of
themselves
and
Air
Rock
in
whatever
portions
were
equitable.
As
a
consequence
of
that
finding,
Air
Rock
was
indirectly
but
equitably
a
shareholder
of
CPI.
If
the
Polyol
venture
had
been
successful,
and
if
CPI
had
become
a
public
corporation,
Wallace
and
Shelva
would
have
had
to
owned
by
Wallace
and
Shelva
with
Wallace
owning
153
shares
and
Shelva
owning
152
shares.
Wallace
and
Shelva
reside
at
Jasper,
a
small
rural
community
near
Smiths
Falls,
Ontario.
In
1987
and
1988,
Wallace
and
Shelva
became
interested
in
a
particular
enterprise
owned
by
National
Polyols
Corporation
(“NPC”).
At
various
times,
Wallace
and
Shelva
and
Air
Rock
advanced
money
to
NPC.
Because
the
business
of
NPC
never
started,
other
than
the
conduct
of
some
research
and
development
activity,
certain
equipment
which
had
been
acquired
by
or
for
NPC
was
seized
by
Wallace
in
1989;
brought
to
the
Air
Rock
yard
at
Jasper;
and
later
transferred
to
Canadian
Polyols
International
Inc.
(“CPI”).
Air
Rock
made
further
advances
of
money
to
CPI
to
maintain
the
equipment.
The
parties
agree
that
CPI
was
a
“small
business
corporation”
within
the
meaning
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
Appellants
claim
in
their
pleadings
that
NPC
was
also
a
small
business
corporation
but
that
claim
was
not
admitted
by
the
Respondent.
The
issues
in
these
appeals
are
described
in
greater
detail
below
but,
broadly
speaking,
Air
Rock
deducted
an
allowable
business
investment
loss
(“ABIL”)
in
1991
and
1992
but
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
the
ABIL;
the
Minister
added
to
the
reported
incomes
of
Wallace
and
Shelva
for
1990
a
significant
amount
as
a
shareholder
benefit
under
subsection
246(1)
or
subsection
15(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
and
the
Minister
granted
to
Wallace
and
Shelva
for
1991
a
business
investment
loss.
Air
Rock
claims
an
ABIL
in
1991
and
1992.
Wallace
and
Shelva
claim
that
they
had
no
shareholder
benefit
in
1990;
and
they
dispute
the
amount
of
their
business
investment
loss
in
1991.
Air
Rock
carries
on
the
business
of
drilling
fresh
water
wells
in
Eastern
Ontario
between
Brockville
and
Smiths
Falls
and
from
Ottawa
to
Kingston.
Air
Rock
was
incorporated
in
1972
and
has
been
a
successful
operating
company.
Wallace
is
responsible
for
the
equipment
and
for
field
work
getting
the
drilling
job
completed.
Shelva
is
responsible
for
the
administrative
work
in
the
Air
Rock
office.
Wallace
and
Shelva
were
introduced
to
NPC
through
two
men
named
Herb
Gee
and
Vincent
Murphy.
Wallace
had
met
Herb
Gee
in
the
mid-1980s
through
the
purchase
of
some
mutual
funds
and
later,
around
1987
or
1988,
Herb
Gee
presented
to
Wallace
the
concept
of
investing
in
a
corporation
which
would
be
involved
with
the
production
of
Polyol.
The
corporation
was
NPC.
In
evidence,
Wallace
gave
the
following
brief
non-technical
description
of
Polyol.
The
idea
was
to
take
any
natural
vegetable
oil
(like
canola
oil)
or
allocate
as
between
themselves
and
Air
Rock
the
shares
of
CPI
issued
in
their
names.
Barbara
Scott
recorded
in
the
books
of
Air
Rock
all
advances
to
NPC
and
CPI
as
loans
to
one
entity
which
she
called
the
Polyol
Venture.
Therefore,
at
the
time
of
the
CPI
bankruptcy,
Air
Rock
showed
on
its
books
a
large
loan
receivable
from
CPI.
The
recording
of
that
loan
has
a
bearing
on
whether
Air
Rock
can
claim
a
business
investment
loss
in
1991
or
1992.
The
Respondent
argues
that
Air
Rock
was
not
entitled
to
a
business
investment
loss
because
(i)
Air
Rock
was
not
a
shareholder
of
CPI;
(ii)
the
loans
from
Air
Rock
to
CPI
did
not
bear
interest;
and
(iii)
the
loans
to
CPI
were
not
acquired
by
Air
Rock
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
40(2)(g)(ii)
of
the
Act.
I
have
concluded
that
Air
Rock
was
an
indirect
but
equitable
shareholder
of
CPI.
In
Business
Art
Inc.
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1986),
86
D.T.C.
1842
(T.C.C.),
the
question
was
whether
an
interest-free
loan
from
a
shareholder
was
a
loan
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income.
When
deciding
that
question
in
the
taxpayer’s
favour,
Rip
J.
stated
at
page
1848:
However,
even
if
no
interest
was
chargeable
I
do
not
believe
that
would
be
fatal
to
the
appellant’s
alternate
submission.
The
fact
that
there
may
have
been
no
interest
attached
to
the
debts
in
question
is
not
relevant
in
deciding
whether
they
were
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income.
See
The
Queen
v.
Lalande
and
Watelle.
84
D.T.C.
6159
at
page
6164.
It
is
not
uncommon
for
a
shareholder
to
lend
money
without
interest
and
without
security
to
the
corporation
since
he
anticipates
that
the
loans
will
assist
the
corporation
to
earn
income
and
to
pay
him
income
by
way
of
dividends;
the
loan
is
made
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
property.
Although
the
shareholder
is
a
creditor
of
the
corporation
when
he
advances
money
to
the
corporation
the
shareholder
does
not
see
his
advance
of
money
to
the
corporation
and
his
subscription
for
shares
of
the
corporation
as
separate
investments
in
two
watertight
compartments;
rather
he
sees
his
money
entering
two
compartments
which
open
up
into
a
single
compartment
for
the
use
of
the
corporation.
Purchasing
shares
and
advancing
money
to
a
corporation
are
two
ways
of
making
an
investment
in
the
corporation.
This
is
a
sensible
interpretation.
Similarly
a
shareholder
of
a
corporation
who
may
have
incorporated
a
corporation
for
the
purpose
of
acquiring
product
at
a
low
cost
and
so
reduce
its
own
costs
may
advance
money
without
interest
to
the
corporation
to
enable
the
corporation
to
operate
as
intended;
in
this
example
even
if
the
shareholder
is
not
making
loans
for
the
purpose
of
producing
income
from
its
business,
by
having
reduced
costs,
the
loan
is
being
made
to
earn
income
from
property,
that
is,
to
receive
dividends
on
the
shares
it
owns
in
the
corporation.
It
is
not
unusual
for
a
person
to
invest
in
a
corporation
by
subscribing
for
share
capital
and
lending
money
without
interest;
as
far
as
he
is
concerned
the
shares
and
his
loans
consti-
tute
a
single
investment
and
if
later
on,
he
is
called
on
to
advance
further
funds
without
interest
he
is
only
increasing
his
investment.
I
cannot
subscribe
to
the
theory
that
in
such
an
example
the
non-interest
bearing
loans
were
not
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
property;
if
the
loans
were
not
advanced
the
corporation
may
have
become
bankrupt
and
the
shares
may
have
become
worthless.
Clearly
the
loans
were
made
to
earn
income
from
property,
that
is,
to
place
the
corporation
in
a
position
where
it
will
be
successful
and
pay
dividends.
I
would
apply
the
decision
in
Business
Art
and
conclude
that,
because
Air
Rock
was
an
equitable
shareholder
of
CPI,
the
loans
from
Air
Rock
to
CPI
were
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property.
It
is
important
to
recall
that
Wallace
and
Shelva
and
Air
Rock
were
all
at
arm’s
length
with
CPI.
Having
regard
to
the
fact
that
Wallace
and
Shelva,
through
022,
own
indirectly
all
of
the
shares
of
Air
Rock,
and
were
substantial
shareholders
of
CPI,
I
am
inclined
to
the
view
that
Air
Rock’s
loans
to
CPI
were
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property
even
if
Air
Rock
were
not
a
direct
or
equitable
shareholder
of
CPI.
This
is
the
way
new
businesses
are
financed
in
the
real
world.
Having
concluded
that
Air
Rock’s
loans
to
CPI
were
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
40(2)(g)(ii),
I
find
that
Air
Rock
incurred
a
business
investment
loss
on
the
bankruptcy
of
CPI.
For
the
purpose
of
computing
the
amount
of
the
business
investment
loss,
it
does
not
matter
whether
the
money
flowing
from
Air
Rock
to
CPI
(plus
the
value
of
Air
Rock’s
interest
in
the
Polyol
equipment)
was
consideration
for
shares
or
an
ordinary
loan.
According
to
a
schedule
provided
by
the
Respondent’s
counsel
in
argument,
the
Minister
performed
separation
computations
with
respect
to
Air
Rock’s
advances
to
NPC
and
CPI.
The
Minister
determined
that
Air
Rock
suffered
a
loss
of
$$8,690
in
1989
computed
as
follows:
The
Polyol
equipment
was
not
transferred
to
CPI
until
sometime
between
December
1989
and
February
1990
during
Air
Rock’s
1990
fiscal
period
(ending
May
31).
I
think
that
Air
Rock’s
loss
on
advances
to
NPC
was
$8,690
but
incurred
in
the
company’s
1990
taxation
year.
As
the
1990
taxation
year
is
not
under
appeal,
the
application
of
that
loss
may
be
statute-
barred.
Amounts
advanced
to
NPC
|
$202,350
|
Less:
|
Air
Rock’s
46%
interest
in
Polyol
Equi-
|
|
|
ment
valued
at
$421,000
on
transfer
to
|
|
|
CPI
|
$193,660
|
Loss
on
advances
to
NPC
|
$
|
8,690
|
The
Minister’s
schedule
excludes
from
Air
Rock’s
advances
to
CPI
the
amounts
of
$200,000
plus
$193,660
which
the
Minister
regarded
as
shareholder
benefits.
Having
decided
that
there
were
no
shareholder
benefits,
I
will
compute
Air
Rock’s
business
investment
loss
by
adapting
Exhibit
A-61
and
recognizing
certain
property
recovered
by
Air
Rock
as
follows:
46%
of
value
of
Polyol
equipment
transferred
to
CPI
|
$193,660
|
Net
Advances
in
fiscal
1990
|
207,737
|
Net
Advances
in
fiscal
1991
|
281,977
|
Net
Advances
in
fiscal
1992
|
120,778
|
|
804,152
|
Less:
|
credit
for
mortgage
taken
back
by
Air
Rock
|
50,000
|
|
754,152
|
Less:
|
value
of
Polyol
equiment
|
300,000
|
Business
Investment
Loss
|
$454,152
|
In
the
above
computation,
the
Minister
had
deducted
the
$50,000
mortgage
credit
from
the
net
advances
in
1991
but
I
treat
it
as
a
global
credit.
The
value
of
the
Polyol
equipment
upon
the
bankruptcy
of
CPI
is
more
difficult
to
determine.
Barbara
Scott
said
that
Wallace
had
an
offer
of
$270,000
(US
funds)
from
which
she
deducted
a
commission
of
$50,000
(US
funds)
to
arrive
at
a
value
of
$275,000
(Canadian
funds).
See
paragraph
29
above.
I
would
not
deduct
the
sales
commission
for
valuation
purposes
but
would
simply
estimate
the
value
at
$300,000
(Canadian)
in
the
absence
of
any
expert
evidence
as
to
value.
The
amount
of
$300,000
could
become
the
cost
to
Air
Rock
against
which
a
later
loss
or
gain
would
be
determined
upon
the
disposition
of
the
Polyol
equiment.
In
my
opinion,
Air
Rock
incurred
a
business
investment
loss
of
$454,152
upon
the
bankruptcy
of
CPI.
That
bankruptcy
did
not
occur
until
after
May
31,
1991.
Therefore,
I
conclude
that
Air
Rock
did
not
incur
a
business
investment
loss
of
$200,000
in
its
1991
taxation
year
but
it
did
incur
a
business
investment
loss
of
$454,152
in
its
1992
taxation
year.
I
will
dismiss
Air
Rock’s
appeal
for
1991
but
will
allow
its
appeal
for
1992
to
permit
the
deduction
of
a
business
investment
loss
in
the
amount
of
$454,152.
At
the
end
of
the
hearing,
counsel
made
submissions
as
to
costs.
The
three
appeals
are
allowed
with
costs
subject
to
the
following
conditions.
The
dismissal
of
Air
Rock’s
appeal
for
1991
is
not
a
factor
in
costs
because
the
loss
claimed
in
that
year
is
simply
deferred
to
1992.
Air
Rock
is
entitled
to
costs
as
if
it
were
the
only
Appellant
but
I
will
not
allow
any
costs
with
respect
to
the
so-called
expert
evidence
of
Mr.
Mason
because
his
evidence
was
extraneous
or
irrelevant.
Wallace
is
entitled
to
costs
in
the
fixed
amount
of
$500.
Shelva
is
entitled
to
costs
in
the
fixed
amount
of
$500.
Appeals
allowed.