Teitelbaum
J.:
Introduction
By
this
application
for
judicial
review,
the
applicant
seeks
an
order
quashing
the
decision
of
Mr.
Harvey
Beaulac,
Director
of
the
Ottawa
Tax
Services
Office,
Department
of
National
Revenue,
dated
December
9,
1997,
which
cancelled
the
interest
accumulated
subsequent
to
the
reassessments
of
July
21,
1997
in
the
amount
of
$314.40
and
declined
to
cancel
the
remainder
of
interest
payable
by
the
applicant.
Facts
As
stated
in
Mr.
McKenzie’s
affidavit
for
the
respondent
(Respondent’s
Application
Record,
tab.
I),
the
applicant’s
returns
for
1994,
1995
and
1996
were
respectively
assessed
on
June
8,
1995,
June
17,
1996
and
May
29,
1997,
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
Minister).
By
Notices
of
reassessment
dated
July
21,
1997,
the
Minister
disallowed
the
capital
cost
allowance
claimed
with
respect
to
rental
properties
which
created
or
increased
a
loss
for
the
years
1994,
1995
and
1996.
By
letter
dated
July
23,
1997,
the
applicant
requested
a
cancellation
of
interest
on
tax
owing
for
the
1994,
1995
and
1996
taxation
years
pursuant
to
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
Act).
Mr.
McKenzie
of
the
Ottawa
Tax
Services
Office,
Department
of
National
Revenue,
reviewed
the
request
and
made
a
recommendation
to
Mr.
Malhotra.
By
letter
dated
November
6,
1997,
Mr.
Malhotra
advised
the
applicant
that
this
was
not
an
appropriate
case
for
cancellation
of
interest.
By
letter
dated
November
17,
1997,
the
applicant
filed
a
second
request
for
cancellation
of
interest.
Mr.
Young
reviewed
the
request
and
made
a
recommendation
to
Mr.
Beaulac,
Director
of
the
Ottawa
Tax
Services
Office,
Department
of
National
Revenue.
By
letter
dated
December
9,
1997,
Mr.
Beaulac
advised
the
applicant
that
the
interest
arrears
which
accumulated
subsequent
to
the
reassessments
of
July
21,
1997
in
the
amount
of
$314.40
were
cancelled,
but
that
the
remainder
of
interest
was
still
owing
as
the
applicant’s
circumstances
were
not
appropriate
to
justify
the
cancellation
or
waiver
of
interest.
Submissions
Applicant’s
submissions
The
applicant,
who
is
representing
himself,
argues
essentially
that
the
Minister
erred
in
applying
the
criteria
set
out
in
paragraphs
5
and
6
of
the
Information
Circular
92-2
(IC
92-2)
and
failed
to
consider
all
the
information
submitted
by
the
applicant
in
making
a
determination
under
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Income
tax
Act.
The
applicant’s
submissions
can
be
divided
into
three
subcategories:
1
)
The
interest
resulted
from
circumstances
beyond
his
control.
It
is
argued
that
the
applicant
has
always
complied
in
a
timely
manner
with
Revenue
Canada’s
requests,
namely,
the
filing
of
income
tax
returns
and
payment
in
full
for
the
taxation
years
1994,
1995
and
1996.
2)
Processing
delays
resulted
in
the
applicant
not
being
informed
within
a
reasonable
time
that
an
amount
was
owing.
It
is
submitted
that
the
applicant
was
not
informed
of
the
balance
owing
until
July
21,
1997
even
though
tax
returns
were
filed
on
time,
i.e.
April
30,
1994,
1995
and
1996.
From
March
25,
1997,
the
applicant
had
difficulty
in
contacting
the
tax
officer
from
the
Audit
Division
which
resulted
in
further
delay
leading
to
Mr.
Beaulac’s
decision
dated
December
9,
1997.
3)
Material
available
to
the
public
contained
errors
which
led
the
applicant
to
file
returns
or
make
payments
based
on
incorrect
information.
a)
The
applicant
submits
that
Mr.
Beaulac’s
letter
dated
December
9,
1997
indicating
that
capital
cost
allowance
to
increase
a
rental
loss
is
not
permitted
on
rental
units
qualified
as
multiple
unit
residential
buildings
(MURBS)
contradicts
information
received
earlier
by
letter
dated
June
27,
1997
stating
that
the
applicant’s
buildings
were
reclassified
as
Class
3
pursuant
to
schedule
11
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations
and
that
capital
cost
allowance
was
only
available
to
reduce
a
net
rental
income
to
nil.
b)
It
is
also
submitted
that,
contrary
to
information
available
to
the
public,
Revenue
Canada
disallowed
external
painting
as
a
current
expense;
repairs
as
capital
expenditures
where
it
is
a
condition
of
sale;
deduction
of
legal
fees,
financial
services
and
expenses
used
in
preparation
of
tax
returns
from
the
proceeds
of
disposition;
costs
of
landscaping
around
rental
property;
use
of
the
calendar
year
for
claiming
capital
cost
allowance
on
rental
properties;
the
necessity
to
provide
a
tax
shelter
identification
number
only
after
August
1,
1989;
post-
ponement
or
deferral
of
a
capital
gain;
recapture
of
capital
cost
allowance;
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
(UCC);
as
well
as
the
calculation
of
capital
gain
and
capital
loss.
Respondent’s
submissions
The
respondent
raises
preliminary
issues.
It
is
submitted
that
the
applicant
improperly
named
“Revenue
Canada
Fairness
Group
Appeals”
as
the
respondent
and
that
the
style
of
cause
should
be
amended
to
identify
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
given
that
the
decision
was
made
by
the
Minister’s
delegate,
pursuant
to
paragraph
900(2)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
regulations.
Also,
it
is
submitted
that
the
applicant
has
improperly
included
unsworn
facts
in
his
memorandum
of
points
to
be
argued
with
respect
to
the
judicial
review
application
and
the
information
is
improperly
before
this
Court.
With
respect
to
jurisdiction,
the
respondent
submits
that
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
does
not
have
jurisdiction
to
vary
or
vacate
the
notices
of
reassessment
of
income
dated
July
21,
1997
and
that
the
only
issue
for
determination
is
whether
the
Minister
discharged
his
duty
to
act
fairly
in
declining
to
exercise
his
discretion
to
cancel
the
interest
owed
by
the
applicant
pursuant
to
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Act.
The
Minister
submits
that
the
purpose
of
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Act
is
to
allow
Revenue
Canada
to
administer
the
tax
system
more
fairly
in
dealing
with
taxpayers
who,
because
of
personal
misfortune
or
circumstances
beyond
their
control,
are
unable
to
meet
the
deadlines
or
comply
with
tax
legislation.
In
this
context,
the
minister’s
duty
to
act
fairly
requires
that
the
Minister
give
the
person
the
opportunity
to
make
submissions
and
that
all
evidence
presented
be
considered.
In
coming
to
a
determination
with
respect
to
the
cancellation
of
the
interest,
Mr.
Beaulac
considered
the
criteria
set
out
in
IC
92-2,
as
well
as
the
fact
that
the
respondent
did
not
give
erroneous
directions
to
the
applicant,
that
the
accumulation
of
interest
was
not
due
to
the
negligence,
fault
or
misrepresentation
of
the
respondent,
and
that
the
applicant
did
not
demonstrate
undue
financial
hardship
justifying
the
cancellation
of
interest.
Furthermore,
the
assessment
of
the
applicant’s
tax
returns
for
1994,
1995
and
1996
were
done
in
the
normal
reassessment
period
and
the
accumulation
of
interest
does
not
arise
from
the
Minister’s
actions.
Thus,
it
is
submitted
that
the
Court
should
not
intervene
with
the
decision
of
the
Minister’s
delegate
given
that
all
relevant
considerations
upon
which
to
base
a
decision
to
exercise
or
not
his
discretion
in
favour
of
the
applicant
were
before
the
Minister’s
delegate
and
that
he
acted
in
accordance
with
principles
of
natural
justice
in
declining
to
cancel
or
waive
the
outstanding
interest
under
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Act.
Issues
This
application
for
judicial
review
raises
the
following
issues:
1)
What
is
the
scope
of
the
Court’s
jurisdiction
to
quash
the
decision
of
December
9,
1997,
or
to
vary
or
amend
Revenue
Canada’s
determination
with
respect
to
interest
owed
by
the
applicant?
2)
Whether
the
Minister’s
delegate
committed
a
reviewable
error
to
justify
the
intervention
of
this
Court?
Analysis
Jurisdiction
of
the
Court
In
a
judicial
review
application
of
the
Minister’s
decision
pursuant
to
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Federal
Court
is
concerned
with
the
legality
of
the
decision
under
review
which
includes
compliance
with
principles
of
natural
justice
and
fairness.
It
is
clearly
established
that
the
Court
is
not
competent
to
vary
or
amend
Revenue
Canada’s
assessment
of
interest
payable
by
the
applicant:
Floyd
Estate
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1993),
68
F.T.R.
157
(Fed.
T.D.).
In
Floyd
supra,
which
was
cited
with
approval
in
Bourgeois
v,
Revenue
Canada
(1996),
96
D.T.C.
6304
(Fed.
T.D.)
Justice
Dubé
states
at
page
159:
At
the
outset,
I
should
point
out
that
it
is
not
for
the
Court
to
decide
whether
the
interest
otherwise
payable
by
the
taxpayer
ought
to
be
waived
or
cancelled.
It
is
within
the
discretion
of
the
Minister.
The
function
of
the
Court
in
this
judicial
review,
as
I
understand
it,
is
to
determine
whether
or
not
the
Minister
failed
to
observe
procedural
fairness
or
erred
in
law
in
making
his
decision,
as
outlined
under
subsection
18.1(4)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
Minister’s
decision
The
decision
under
review
was
made
pursuant
to
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
which
reads
as
follows:
220.(3.1)
The
Minister
may
at
any
time
waive
or
cancel
all
or
any
portion
of
any
penalty
or
interest
otherwise
payable
under
this
Act
by
a
taxpayer
or
partnership
and,
not
withstanding
subsections
152(4)
to
(5),
such
assessment
of
the
interest
and
penalties
payable
by
the
taxpayer
or
partnership
shall
be
made
as
is
necessary
to
take
into
account
the
cancellation
of
the
penalty
or
interest.
Pursuant
to
subsection
900(2)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations,
the
Minister’s
powers
and
duties
may
be
exercised
by
the
Director
of
Taxation
in
a
District
Office
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue.
It
is
clearly
established
that
the
Minister’s
decision
under
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
discretionary
and
as
such
gives
rise
to
a
narrow
scope
of
review.
The
standard
of
review
for
the
Minister’s
decision
pursuant
to
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Act
is
discussed
in
Kaiser
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1995),
93
F.T.R.
66
(Fed.
T.D.),
where
Justice
Rouleau
states
at
page
68:
The
purpose
of
this
legislative
provision
is
to
allow
Revenue
Canada,
Taxation,
to
administer
the
tax
system
more
fairly,
by
allowing
for
the
application
of
common
sense
in
dealing
with
taxpayers
who,
because
of
personal
misfortune
or
circumstances
beyond
their
control,
are
unable
to
meet
deadlines
or
comply
with
rules
under
the
tax
system.
The
language
used
in
the
section
bestows
a
wide
discretion
on
the
Minister
to
waive
or
cancel
interest
at
any
time.
To
assist
in
the
exercise
of
that
discretion,
policy
guidelines
have
been
formulated
and
are
set
out
in
Information
Circular
92-2.
The
jurisprudence
has
established
the
standard
to
be
employed
by
the
Courts
when
called
upon
to
review
the
exercise
of
a
discretionary
power
such
as
the
one
in
question
here.
In
Re
Maple
Lodge
Farms
Ltd.
and
Government
of
Canada
et
al.
(1982),
137
D.L.R.
(3d)
558
(S.C.C.),
McIntyre
J.
stated
at
p.
562:
In
construing
statutes
such
as
those
under
consideration
in
this
appeal,
which
provide
for
far-reaching
and
frequently
complicated
administrative
schemes,
the
judicial
approach
should
be
to
endeavour
within
the
scope
of
the
legislation
to
give
effect
to
its
provisions
so
that
the
administrative
agencies
created
may
function
effectively,
as
the
legislation
intended.
In
my
view,
in
dealing
with
legislation
of
this
nature,
the
courts
should,
wherever
possible,
avoid
a
narrow,
technical
construction,
and
endeavour
to
make
effective
the
legislative
intent
as
applied
to
the
administrative
scheme
involved.
It
is,
as
well,
a
clearly-established
rule
that
courts
should
not
interfere
with
the
exercise
of
a
discretion
by
a
statutory
authority
merely
because
the
court
might
have
exercised
the
discretion
in
a
different
manner
had
it
been
charged
with
that
responsibility.
Where
the
statutory
discretion
has
been
exercised
in
good
faith
and,
where
required,
in
accordance
with
the
principles
of
natural
justice,
and
where
reliance
has
not
been
placed
upon
considerations
irrelevant
or
extraneous
to
the
statutory
purpose,
the
courts
should
not
interfere.
The
guidelines
set
out
in
the
IC
92-2
were
adopted
by
the
Minister
to
assist
in
making
a
determination
with
respect
to
requests
for
cancellation
or
waiver
of
interest
pursuant
to
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Act.
The
relevant
portion
of
IC
92-2
for
the
purpose
of
this
proceeding
are
sections
5,
6
and
10:
5.
Penalties
and
interest
may
be
waived
or
cancelled
in
whole
or
in
part
where
they
result
in
circumstances
beyond
a
taxpayer’s
or
employer’s
control.
For
example,
one
of
the
following
extraordinary
circumstances
may
have
prevented
a
taxpayer,
a
taxpayer’s
agent,
the
executor
of
an
estate,
or
an
employer
from
making
a
payment
when
due,
or
otherwise
complying
with
the
Income
Tax
Act:
(a)
natural
or
human-made
disasters
such
as,
flood
or
fire:
(b)
civil
disturbances
or
disruptions
in
services
such
as,
a
postal
strike;
(c)
serious
emotional
or
mental
distress
such
as,
death
in
the
immediate
family.
6.
Cancelling
or
waiving
interest
or
penalties
may
also
be
appropriate
if
the
interest
or
penalty
arose
primarily
because
of
actions
of
the
Department,
such
as:
(a)
processing
delays
which
result
in
the
taxpayer
not
being
informed,
within
a
reasonable
time,
that
an
amount
was
owing;
(b)
material
available
to
the
public
contained
errors
which
led
the
taxpayers
to
file
returns
or
make
payments
based
on
incorrect
information.
(c)
a
taxpayer
or
employer
receives
incorrect
advice
such
as
in
the
case
where
the
Department
wrongly
advises
a
taxpayer
that
no
instalment
payments
will
be
required
for
the
current
year;
(d)
errors
in
processing;
or
(e)
delays
in
providing
information
such
as
the
case
where
the
taxpayer
could
not
make
the
appropriate
instalment
or
arrears
payments
because
the
necessary
information
was
not
available.
10.
The
following
factors
will
be
considered
when
determining
whether
or
not
the
Department
will
cancel
or
waive
interest
or
penalties:
(a)
whether
or
not
the
taxpayer
or
employer
has
a
history
of
compliance
with
tax
obligations;
(b)
whether
or
not
the
taxpayer
or
employer
has
knowingly
allowed
a
balance
to
exist
upon
which
arrear
interest
has
accrued;
(c)
whether
or
not
the
taxpayer
or
employer
has
exercised
a
reasonable
amount
of
care
and
has
not
been
negligent
or
careless
in
conducting
their
affairs
under
the
self-assessment
system;
(d)
whether
or
not
the
taxpayer
or
employer
has
acted
quickly
to
remedy
any
delay
or
omission;
In
the
present
case,
Mr.
Beaulac,
Director
of
the
Ottawa
Tax
Services
Office,
Department
of
National
Revenue,
stated
in
his
affidavit
(Respondent’s
Application
Record,
tab
4)
that,
in
making
this
decision,
he
considered
the
following
facts:
(a)
the
request
made
by
the
Applicant
in
his
letter
dated
November
17,
1997;
(b)
the
file
in
respect
of
the
Applicant’s
applications
for
waiver
of
interest;
(c)
the
accumulation
of
interest
in
respect
of
the
period
prior
to
the
Notices
of
Reassessments
dated
July
21,
1997
was
not
due
to
the
negligence,
fault
or
misrepresentation
of
the
Department
neither
was
it
a
result
of
circumstances
beyond
the
control
of
the
Applicant;
(d)
there
was
insufficient
information
to
establish
financial
hardship
justifying
a
waiver
of
interest;
(e)
the
guidelines
established
in
Information
Circular
No.
92-2
were
not
met
in
this
case;
and
(f)
my
decision
was
based
in
part
on
the
recommendation
made
by
Mr.
Dave
Young,
appeals
officer,
Revenue
Canada.
In
exercising
his
discretion,
the
Minister’s
delegate
properly
took
into
consideration
the
non-exhaustive
criteria
outlines
in
IC
92-2
as
well
as
the
information
outlined
above.
In
my
opinion,
the
applicant’s
argument
that
the
Minister
failed
to
consider
all
the
information
that
was
submitted
must
fail.
The
applicant’s
contention
seems
to
flow
from
a
series
of
disagreements
with
respect
to
allowable
deductions
and
expenses,
for
example,
the
applicant
argues
that
exterior
paint
claimed
as
a
current
expense
was
not
allowed
because
the
revised
detailed
expense
statement
submitted
by
the
applicant
was
not
accepted
by
Revenue
Canada.
It
appears
that
the
applicant’s
argument
relates
mostly
to
the
assessment
of
his
returns
for
the
1994,
1995
and
1996
taxation
years.
The
assessment
of
the
applicant’s
income
tax
returns
is
not
under
review.
I
have
no
jurisdiction
to
review
the
respondent’s
reassessment
of
the
applicant’s
tax
returns
in
the
present
proceedings.
Furthermore,
the
applicant
has
not
pointed
to
any
information
or
document
which
the
Minister’s
delegate
failed
to
consider
in
determining
whether
to
cancel
or
waive
the
interest.
In
addition,
I
have
no
evidence
by
the
applicant
that
the
respondent
considered
irrelevant
information
or
considered
documents
which
were
irrelevant
and
was
taken
into
consideration
by
the
Minister
in
arriving
at
his
decision.
The
applicant
contends
that
the
interest
resulted
from
circumstances
beyond
his
control.
Examples
of
such
circumstances
can
be
found
in
the
IC
92-2:
human
or
natural
disasters,
civil
disturbances
or
disruptions
in
services
such
as
postal
strike,
and
serious
emotional
or
mental
distress
such
as
death
in
the
immediate
family.
While
the
circumstances
outlined
in
IC
92-2
are
non-exhaustive,
there
is
no
indication
that
the
applicant
submitted
to
Revenue
Canada
evidence
that
he
experienced
such
circumstances.
The
applicant’s
contention
is
unsubstantiated.
The
circumstances
invoked
by
the
applicant,
such
as
payment
in
full
for
the
1994,
1995
and
1996
taxation
years
and
the
delays
in
informing
him
of
the
amount
owing,
do
not
fall,
I
am
satisfied,
within
the
meaning
of
“circumstances
beyond
a
taxpayer’s
control”
under
subsection
220.(3.1)
of
the
Act.
Secondly,
the
applicant
argues
that
the
interest
is
primarily
due
to
processing
delays
which
resulted
in
the
applicant
not
being
informed
within
a
reasonable
time
that
the
amount
was
owing.
The
applicant
submits
that
Revenue
Canada
notified
him
of
the
amounts
owing
in
1997
while
the
returns
in
question
had
been
filed
in
a
timely
fashion
in
1994,
1995
and
1996.
This
argument
must
also
fail.
The
Income
Tax
Act
confers
upon
the
minister
authority
to
reassess
the
taxpayers’
returns
within
a
three
year
period
and
such
delay
cannot
be
considered
a
processing
delay
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
6
of
the
IC
92-2.
In
Floyd
Estate,
supra,
Justice
Dubé
states,
at
page
160,
that
“since
the
whole
Canadian
income
tax
system
is
based
on
self-assessment,
the
officers
of
the
Minister
cannot
be
blamed
for
not
having
detected
the
taxpayer’s
own
mistake
sooner”.
All
that
is
required
by
the
Minister
is
that
the
steps
or
process
undertaken
commence
within
a
reasonable
time.
In
the
present
case,
there
is
no
indication
that
the
steps
undertaken
by
Revenue
Canada
to
inform
the
applicant
of
amounts
remaining
owing
were
not
accomplished
within
reasonable
time
limits.
The
applicant’s
last
argument
relates
to
the
numerous
alleged
discrepancies
or
errors
between
the
material
available
to
the
public
and
the
information
he
was
given.
In
the
present
case,
the
applicant
has
attempted
to
highlight
numerous
minor
discrepancies
between
the
information
available
to
the
public
and
the
information
he
was
given
as
well
as
the
treatment
of
such
information
by
Revenue
Canada.
However,
the
only
evidence
relevant
to
this
proceeding
is
that
which
was
before
the
Minister.
Other
information
referred
to
by
the
applicant
is
not
relevant
for
purposes
of
judicial
review.
By
letter
dated
July
30,
1997,
the
applicant
submitted
arguments
with
respect
to
erroneous
information
relied
upon
(Respondent’s
Application
Record,
Tab
3,
Affidavit
of
David
Young,
Exhibit
C,
at
page
28).
These
arguments
were
considered
by
Mr.
Young
in
the
context
of
the
applicant’s
second
request
for
cancellation
of
interest.
As
stated
in
his
affidavit,
Mr.
David
Young,
Officer
with
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
reviewed
the
applicant’s
letter
dated
July
23,
1997
and
made
the
following
recommendation
to
Mr.
Beaulac:
-Points
#1,
#2
&
#4
-
These
comments
all
deal
with
taxation
year
prior
to
1994.
However,
effective
with
the
1994
and
subsequent
taxation
years,
an
individual
may
no
longer
create
or
increase
a
loss
by
claiming
CCA
on
a
Class
31
or
Class
32
property.
This
information
was
stated
in
the
1989
and
1994
Rental
Guides.
Photocopies
of
the
applicable
pages
should
be
sent
to
the
client.
Therefore,
it
is
irrelevant
if
the
rental
property
was
a
MURBS
or
not
as
starting
in
1994,
he
could
not
increase
his
rental
loss
by
claiming
CCA
on
a
Class
32
property
which
is
what
he
did
in
1994
and
1996.
In
1995,
his
CCA
schedule
indicates
Class
#6.
The
fact
that
this
information
is
stated
in
the
1989
Rental
Guide
indicates
that
it
was
available
to
the
client
for
at
least
five
years
prior
to
1994.
This
information
was
not
provided
to
the
client
during
the
course
of
the
audit
and
Fairness
review.
-The
details
surrounding
the
reassessment
of
October
22,
1996
indicates
that
the
adjustment
had
nothing
to
do
with
the
client’s
rental
activity.
Rather,
an
amount
of
23,350.00
was
deleted
from
line
#130
(other
income)
as
pension
income
of
this
amount
had
been
erroneously
included
twice
at
both
lines
#115
and
#130.
Mr.
BRACELAND’s
discussions
concerning
this
matter
were
with
a
J.A.
Proulx
and
not
J.A.
Delorme.
In
the
case
of
Barron
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(1997),
97
D.T.C.
5121
(Fed.
C.A.),
a
case
very
similar
to
the
case
at
bar,
in
that
it
deals
with
a
discretionary
decision
of
the
Minister,
Mr.
Justice
Pratte
states
at
page
5122:
Before
saying
why
we
think
that
these
findings
are
wrong,
it
may
be
useful
to
recall
that
subsection
152(4.2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
confers
a
discretion
on
the
Minister
and
that,
when
an
application
for
judicial
review
is
directed
against
a
decision
made
in
the
exercise
of
a
discretion,
the
reviewing
court
is
not
called
upon
to
exercise
the
discretion
conferred
on
the
person
who
made
the
decision.
The
court
may
intervene
and
set
aside
the
discretionary
decision
under
review
only
if
that
decision
was
made
in
bad
faith,
if
its
author
clearly
ignored
some
relevant
facts
or
took
into
consideration
irrelevant
facts
or
if
the
decision
is
contrary
to
law.
Conclusion
The
applicant
has
not
demonstrated
that
the
Minister’s
delegate
erred
in
considering
the
evidence
or
failed
to
observe
principles
of
natural
justice.
The
application
for
judicial
review
is
denied
with
costs
which
I
fix
at
the
sum
of
$250.00.
Application
dismissed.