Sarchuk
T
.
C.J.:
These
are
applications
by
Diane
and
James
Hudrick
for
an
Order
extending
the
time
within
which
they
may
file
notices
of
objection
with
respect
to
their
1994
and
1995
taxation
years.
The
Applicants
carry
on
business
in
Ste.
Anne’s,
Manitoba.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
initially
assessed
the
Applicants
for
the
1994
taxation
year
on
May
1,
1995
and
for
the
1995
taxation
year
on
April
4,
1996.
Following
an
audit,
the
Minister,
on
July
31,
1997
reassessed
each
Applicant
for
those
taxation
years.
The
evidence
adduced
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
from
Alice
Newman,
the
appeals
officer
who
had
conduct
of
this
file
for
Revenue
Canada,
establishes
that
the
notices
of
reassessment
were
mailed
to
the
Applicants’
address
of
28
Seine
Road,
Ste.
Anne’s,
MB,
RSH
1
Al,
each
in
a
separate
envelope.
The
Applicants
failed
to
file
notices
of
objection
within
the
time
limited
by
section
165
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
Act).
Subsequently,
their
accountant,
C.
Les
Champagne,
submitted
a
request
to
the
Minister
for
an
extension
of
time
on
their
behalf
by
way
of
letter
dated
May
7,
1998.
The
reason
cited
for
failing
to
file
within
the
required
time
limit
was
that
each
was
unaware
of
the
reassessments
and
that
neither
had
received
their
respective
notices
of
reassessment.
The
Minister
denied
the
application
and
the
Applicants
were
advised
thereof
by
mail
on
June
10,
1998.
On
August
25,
1998,
each
Applicant
filed
an
application
with
the
Tax
Court
of
Canada
for
an
extension
of
time
to
file
the
notices
of
objection
pursuant
to
section
166.2
of
the
Act.
The
grounds
relied
upon
were
that
each
Applicant
“was
not
aware
nor
has
in
his/her
possession
a
reassessment
notice
for
the
said
years
1994-1995”.
Both
Applicants
testified.
To
put
it
charitably
Mr.
Hudrick’s
testimony
was
of
absolutely
no
assistance
to
the
Court.
He
could
not
recall
receiving
the
assessments
nor
could
he
recall
seeing
other
documents
which
had
been
sent
to
him
by
Revenue
Canada
including
a
letter
dated
June
19,
1997
from
the
auditor
setting
out
the
proposed
basis
for
reassessment.
This
letter,
it
might
be
added,
was
included
with
the
documents
and
other
material
subsequently
turned
over
by
the
Applicants
to
their
accountant.
Diane
Hudrick
also
asserted
that
she
could
not
recall
receiving
the
notices
of
reassessment.
She
conceded
that
Revenue
Canada
had
returned
by
Priority
Post
all
of
the
documents
that
the
Applicants
had
provided
to
it
during
the
audit
but
could
not
recall
seeing
the
proposal
letter
which
accompanied
those
documents.
In
cross-examination,
she
conceded
that
since
their
accountant
had
the
proposal
letter
in
his
possession
and
had
received
it
from
the
Applicants
then
she
must
have
seen
it
at
some
point
of
time.
Her
testimony
on
the
whole
was
vague
and
of
no
assistance
to
the
Applicants
or
to
the
Court.
Mr.
Champagne
has
been
the
Applicants’
accountant
for
a
number
of
years.
With
respect
to
this
particular
matter,
his
involvement
began
in
or
about
May
1998
when
he
applied
to
the
Minister
for
an
extension
of
time
on
behalf
of
his
clients.
This
was
precipitated
by
questions
put
to
him
by
the
Hudrick’s
at
the
time
he
was
preparing
their
1997
returns.
At
that
time,
the
Applicants
provided
him
with
a
copy
of
the
proposal
letter
and
told
him
that
they
had
no
recollection
of
receiving
any
notices
of
reassessment.
Evidence
was
adduced
on
behalf
of
the
Respondent
from
Lillian
Fargey,
a
collection
officer
with
Revenue
Canada.
The
Hudricks’
file
was
assigned
to
her
on
October
28,
1997.
She
contacted
the
Applicants
and
spoke
to
Mrs.
Hudrick
on
October
30,
who
advised
her
“that
she
was
going
to
be
presenting
more
receipts
to
have
the
reassessment
done
again”.
There
was,
according
to
her
diary
entries,
no
suggestion
by
Mrs.
Hudrick
that
the
reassessment
had
not
been
received.
The
testimony
adduced
by
the
Applicants
fails
to
establish
that
they
did
not
receive
their
respective
notices
of
assessment.
The
evidence
is
clear
that
the
Minister
sent
the
notices
to
each
Applicants’
address
appearing
on
their
file.
Furthermore,
the
testimony
of
Fargey
casts
great
doubt
on
the
evidence
given
by
the
Applicant,
Diane
Hudrick.
I
accordingly
conclude
that
the
Applicants
have
not
demonstrated
that
within
the
time
otherwise
limited
by
the
Act
for
serving
the
notice,
they
were
unable
to
act
or
instruct
another
to
act
as
required
by
subparagraph
166.2(5)(Z?)(i).
The
applications
are
denied.
Application
dismissed.