Bowman
T.C.J.:
This
appeal
is
from
an
assessment
for
1996
whereby
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
denied
to
the
appellant
the
disability
tax
credit
under
section
118.3
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Mr.
Froese
was
involved
in
a
motorcycle
accident
in
1982
and
his
left
leg
was
amputated
about
two
inches
below
the
knee.
He
has
received
the
disability
tax
credit
since
1985
up
to
1996,
when
it
was
denied
him.
He
is
at
present
36
years
old.
I
need
not
set
out
the
historical
development
of
the
provisions
permitting
the
disability
tax
credit.
This
has
been
done
in
other
cases,
and
in
particular
by
Lamarre
Proulx
J.
in
Landry
c.
R.
(1994),
[1995]
1
C.T.C.
2030
(T.C.C.),
and
by
Létourneau
J.A.
in
Johnston
v.
R.,
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
file
numbers
A-347-97
and
A-348-97,
February
6,
1998
[reported
[1997]
2
C.T.C.
3012
(T.C.C.)].
Under
section
118.4
an
individual’s
ability
to
perform
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living
(in
this
case,
walking)
is
markedly
restricted
only
where
all
or
substantially
all
of
the
time,
even
with
therapy
and
the
use
of
appropriate
devices
and
medication,
the
individual
is
blind
or
is
unable
(or
requires
an
inordinate
amount
of
time)
to
perform
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living.
On
the
evidence
it
is
clear
that
Mr.
Froese’s
impairment
is
prolonged.
It
has
lasted
since
1982
and
will
last
for
the
rest
of
his
life.
It
is
getting
neither
better
nor
worse.
Also,
on
the
evidence,
and
on
the
basis
of
the
material
submitted,
my
observation
of
him
and
his
own
testimony
his
ability
to
walk
is
markedly
restricted.
He
walks
with
a
cane
and
wears
an
artificial
leg
(a
prosthesis).
He
walks
slowly
and
painfully.
He
cannot
run.
It
takes
him
an
inordinate
length
of
time
to
walk
anywhere.
Climbing
stairs
is
a
particular
ordeal
for
him.
He
is
frequently
in
pain.
When
he
comes
home
at
night
he
takes
off
his
artificial
leg
and
moves
about
the
house
on
crutches.
In
the
morning
it
takes
him
about
one-half
hour
to
put
on
his
leg.
He
uses
a
dressing
called
SPENCO
2nd
SKIN
which
prevents
the
prosthesis
from
moving.
After
that
he
puts
several
layers
of
socks
over
the
stump,
which
is
then
inserted
in
the
artificial
leg.
The
case
is
an
obvious
one
and
indeed
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
must
have
thought
so
as
well
up
until
1996.
In
that
year
there
arose
a
problem.
Under
subsection
118.3(1)
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
a
credit
for
mental
or
physical
impairment
where:
(a)
an
individual
has
a
severe
and
prolonged
mental
or
physical
impairment,
[Mr.
Froese
obviously
has]
(a.l)
the
effects
of
the
impairment
are
such
that
the
individual’s
ability
to
perform
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living
is
markedly
restricted,
[clearly
they
are]
(a.2)
a
medical
doctor,
...
has
certified
in
prescribed
form
that
the
individual
has
a
severe
and
prolonged
mental
or
physical
impairment
the
effects
of
which
are
such
that
the
individual’s
ability
to
perform
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living
is
markedly
restricted,
(b)
the
individual
has
filed
for
a
taxation
year
with
the
Minister
the
certificate
described
in
paragraph
(a.2),
Dr.
Kusch
signed
the
certificate
for
1996
on
30
March
1997
and
in
answer
to
question
9:
Is
the
impairment
severe
enough
to
restrict
the
basic
activity
of
daily
living
identified
above,
all
or
almost
all
the
time,
even
with
therapy
and
the
use
of
appropriate
aids
and
medication?
He
ticked
the
box
“NO”.
He
also
wrote
“Can’t
lift
20
#’s
&
walk
at
the
same
time”.
On
page
1
of
the
certificate
Dr.
Kusch
ticked
the
word
“Permanently”
after
the
words:
The
patient
will
be
markedly
restricted.
After
the
words
“Indicate
how
your
patient
is
markedly
restricted”
he
ticked
the
word
“Walking”.
In
Part
B
of
the
certificate
Dr.
Kusch
described
the
diagnosis
as
follows:
L
above
knee
amputation
1982
-
MVA
Pt
[patient,
I
assume]
uses
his
cane
full
time
-
The
pt
has
chronic
unrelenting
pain
(stump
and
phantom
limb).
As
it
happens,
the
amputation
was
below
the
knee.
The
Department,
on
July
18,
1997,
wrote
to
Dr.
Kusch
and
sent
him
a
questionnaire.
Among
the
questions
and
answers
were
the
following:
Does
you
patient
take
an
inordinate!
amount
of
time
to
walk,
even
with
the
use
of
assistance,
special
devices,
medication
or
therapy?
The
answer
given
was
“Yes”.
What
percentage
of
the
time
was
your
patient
unable
to
walk,
even
with
the
use
of
assistance,
special
devices,
medication
or
therapy?
The
answer
given
was
“16
hrs
per
day”.
The
material
from
Dr.
Kusch
was
clearly
contradictory.
In
Narsing
v.
R.,
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
file
numbers
A-939-96
and
A-942-96,
January
26,
1998
[reported
(1998),
98
D.T.C.
6176
(Fed.
C.A.)],
it
was
stated
orally
from
the
bench:
[4]
It
is
clear
to
us
that,
on
the
sole
basis
of
the
ambiguous
medical
certificates
on
file,
not
otherwise
clarified
by
appropriate
medical
evidence,
the
Tax
Court
judge
could
not
disapprove
and
reject
the
conclusions
of
the
Minister.
In
this
case,
however,
I
have
ample
evidence.
The
question
of
the
conclusive
effect
of
a
tick
mark
on
a
medical
certificate
under
section
118.3
will
have
to
be
left
for
another
day.
It
does
seem
rather
strange
that
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
routinely
ignores
certificates
by
doctors
that
a
patient
has
a
severe
and
prolonged
impairment,
but
where
the
doctor,
in
the
face
of
all
of
the
evidence,
ticks
a
box
that
does
not
favour
the
impaired
person,
this
is
treated
as
a
conclusive
bar
to
his
or
her
claim.
Such
an
approach
is
an
unacceptable
use
of
technicalities
to
deny
worthy
claims.
As
Létourneau
J.A.
said
in
Johnston
(supra):
[10]
The
purpose
of
sections
118.3
and
118.4
is
not
to
indemnify
a
person
who
suffers
from
a
severe
and
prolonged
mental
or
physical
impairment,
but
to
financially
assist
him
or
her
in
bearing
the
additional
costs
of
living
and
working
generated
by
the
impairment.
As
Bowman
T.C.J.
wrote
in
Radage
v.
J?.
at
p.
2528:
The
legislative
intent
appears
to
be
to
provide
a
modest
relief
to
persons
who
fall
within
a
relatively
restricted
category
of
markedly
physically
or
mentally
impaired
persons.
The
intent
is
neither
to
give
the
credit
to
every
one
who
suffers
from
a
disability
nor
to
erect
a
hurdle
that
is
impossible
for
virtually
every
disabled
person
to
surmount.
It
obviously
recognizes
that
disabled
persons
need
such
tax
relief
and
it
is
intended
to
be
of
benefit
to
such
persons.
The
learned
Judge
went
on
to
add,
at
p.
2529,
and
I
agree
with
him:
If
the
object
of
Parliament,
which
is
to
give
to
disabled
persons
a
measure
of
relief
that
will
to
some
degree
alleviate
the
increased
difficulties
under
which
their
impairment
forces
them
to
live,
is
to
be
achieved
the
provisions
must
be
given
a
humane
and
compassionate
construction.
[11]
Indeed,
although
the
scope
of
these
provisions
is
limited
in
their
application
to
severely
impaired
persons,
they
must
not
be
interpreted
so
restrictively
as
to
negate
or
compromise
the
legislative
intent.
It
may
be
that
Roger
Casement
was
hanged
because
of
a
comma.
I
am
not,
however,
prepared
to
deny
this
obviously
meritorious
claim
because
of
a
misplaced
tick
mark.
The
appeal
is
allowed.
Appeal
allowed.