MacKay
J.:
Reasons
for
Orders
These
reasons
concern
orders
issued,
after
considering
submissions
by
Mary
David,
a
plaintiff
in
the
action
in
Court
file
T-1436-92,
who
appeared
on
her
own
behalf
and
as
representative
of
the
corporate
plaintiff,
Olympia
Interiors
Ltd.
(Hereinafter,
Mary
David
and
Olympia
Interiors
Ltd.
are
sometimes
referred
to
as
the
“plaintiffs”).
The
submissions
in
this
matter
were
made
in
support
of
applications
by
the
plaintiffs,
pursuant
Rule
355
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules,
for
the
Court
to
issue
show
cause
orders.
The
orders
sought
would
have
directed
that
Mr.
McPhadden,
counsel
of
record
representing
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
and
Ms.
Boucher,
as
instructing
counsel
from
the
office
of
the
Department
of
Justice
to
counsel
of
record
in
these
proceedings,
should
appear
and
show
cause
why
each
of
them
should
not
be
sentenced
for
contempt
of
court.
At
the
hearing
before
me,
both
of
the
counsel
against
whom
the
orders
were
sought,
were
represented
by
counsel
who
made
representations
in
response
to
those
of
Ms.
David,
who
is
not
a
lawyer.
For
both
counsel
cited
by
plaintiffs’
motions,
submissions
were
made
that
the
plaintiffs’
applications
both
be
dismissed
with
costs.
For
the
record,
I
note
that
the
plaintiffs’
motion
directed
against
counsel
of
record,
Mr.
McPhadden,
was
received
by
the
Court
on
August
21,
1996,
and
was
made
in
relation
to
Court
file
ITA-8447-92.
It
was
ordered
to
be
filed
at
the
hearing
of
this
matter
on
October
23,
1996.
A
Memorandum
of
the
Plaintiffs
in
support
of
that
motion,
received
by
the
Court
on
October
18,
1996,
and
directed
to
be
filed
at
the
hearings,
is
identified
as
being
in
relation
to
Court
file
numbers
T-1436-96,
GST-41-92
and
ITA-8447-92,
and
that
memorandum
includes
the
styles
of
cause
of
the
three
files.
An
affidavit
of
Mary
David
in
support
of
the
motion,
sworn
August
21,
1996,
is
included
in
a
bound
collection
with
that
memorandum
but
the
affidavit
bears
only
Court
file
ITA-8447-92.
The
plaintiffs’
motion
for
a
show
cause
order
directed
to
Ms.
Boucher,
instructing
counsel
for
the
Attorney
General,
is
dated
September
18,
1996;
it
was
received
by
the
Court
and
later
was
directed
to
be
filed
at
the
hearing
on
October
23.
It
bears
Court
file
numbers
T-1436-92
and
GST-41-92.
It
is
supported
by
a
Memorandum
of
the
Plaintiffs
received
October
18
and
also
directed
to
be
filed
at
the
hearing,
and
that
memorandum
carries
the
style
of
cause
and
the
Court
file
number
T-1436-92
only.
Appended
to
that
Memorandum
is
a
further
affidavit
of
Mary
David,
sworn,
October
18,
1996,
which
bears
all
three
Court
file
numbers
and
styles
of
cause.
Because
all
three
Court
files
are
interrelated,
and
with
a
view
to
avoiding
any
confusion,
I
direct
that
a
copy
of
these
Reasons,
relating
to
both
of
the
plaintiffs’
motions,
be
filed
on
each
of
the
three
Court
files.
Similarly,
the
Order
accompanying
these
Reasons
is
directed
to
be
filed
on
each
of
these
files.
Background
The
three
Court
files,
for
the
proceedings
which
include
these
motions
for
show
cause
orders,
originated
after
assessments
for
income
tax
and
for
excise
taxes
were
made
against
Olympia
Interiors
Ltd.
relating
to
taxation
years
in
the
1980’s.
Thereafter,
that
company
and
perhaps
Mary
David
were
declared
bankrupt;
at
one
time
criminal
proceedings
were
initiated,
by
information
laid,
I
believe,
against
both
of
the
plaintiffs.
Subsequently,
in
June
1990
one
or
more
charges
were
withdrawn
and
all
other
criminal
proceedings
were
stayed.
At
one
time,
as
a
result
of
the
criminal
charges
and
the
outstanding
tax
claims
of
the
Crown,
Mary
David
initiated
other
proceedings
in
the
Ontario
Courts
claiming,
in
part
at
least,
damages
against
Crown
servants.
Those
proceedings
remain
outstanding,
if
dormant,
at
this
stage.
Meanwhile,
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
the
process
for
recovery
of
taxes
assessed
as
unpaid
was
continuing,
and
is
said
by
the
Crown
to
have
been
in
accord
with
the
statutory
powers
of
the
Minister.
Ultimately,
in
1992
certificates
were
filed
in
this
Court,
in
accord
with
the
statutory
provisions
for
recovery
of
taxes
assessed
but
which
remain
unpaid.
Separate
proceedings
thus
were
initiated
in
relation
to
income
taxes
assessed
as
owing,
in
Court
file
ITA-8447-92,
and
in
relation
to
excise
taxes
assessed
as
owing,
in
Court
file
GST-41-92.
While
seeking
to
contest
those
assessments
by
applications
in
each
of
those
files,
Mary
David
on
behalf
of
Olympia
Interiors
Ltd.,
and
for
herself,
as
plaintiffs,
also
initiated
proceedings
in
Court
file
T-1436-92
against
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
for
relief
in
relation
to
the
Crown’s
effort
to
recover
taxes
said
to
be
outstanding
and
for
other
relief.
By
an
earlier
order
of
the
Court
Mary
David
was
authorized
to
act
on
behalf
of
the
corporate
plaintiff,
now
bankrupt,
of
which
she
was
at
relevant
times
and
is
now
the
principal
shareholder
and
director.
When
these
motions
for
show
cause
orders
came
on
for
hearing
on
October
23,
1996,
they
were
among
a
number
of
applications
outstanding,
initiated
by
both
parties.
The
others
were
dealt
with
following
hearings
on
October
23
and
November
19,
and
these
Reasons
deal
only
with
the
two
motions
for
show
cause
orders.
The
grounds
for
each
motion
differ
somewhat.
The
motion
in
relation
to
counsel
of
record
The
motion
for
a
show
cause
hearing
against
Mr.
McPhadden
is
set
out
in
a
document
entitled
“Application
for
a
Show
Cause
Order,
Rule
355
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules”
It
gives
notice
of
a
motion
to
be
made
on
September
9,
1996,
but
ultimately
the
matter
was
set
over
to
be
heard
with
other
outstanding
matters
on
the
three
files
in
which
one
or
both
of
the
parties
had
initiated
procedural
steps.
The
application,
was
received
by
the
Court
on
August
21,
1996
and
filed
by
my
direction
at
the
hearing.
Two
affidavits
of
Mary
David
are
related
to
this
motion,
one
sworn
on
August
21,
1996
and
the
other,
contained
in
a
bound
Memorandum
of
the
Plaintiffs,
in
support
of
the
show
cause
motion,
sworn
October
18,
1996,
was
received
by
the
Court
that
day
and
directed
to
be
filed
at
the
hearing.
Only
the
first
of
those
affidavits
describes
the
factual
basis
on
which
the
motion
is
based,
and
it
appends
certain
documents
or
excerpts
as
exhibits.
The
second
affidavit
simply
appends
true
copies
of
some
of
the
same
documents
and
a
number
of
others
as
exhibits.
The
first
of
the
affidavits
describes
the
facts
as
follows:
1.
On
July
10,
1996
His
Lordship
Justice
J.
A.
Jerome
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
issued
an
Order
pursuant
to
Rule
2200
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules.
Attached
hereto
and
marked
exhibit
“A”
to
this
my
affidavit
is
a
true
copy
of
this
Order.
2.
On
August
8,
1996
Bryan
C.
McPhadden
served
a
Direction
to
Attend
on
me
pursuant
to
the
Order
issued
by
His
Lordship
Justice
Jerome.
Attached
hereto
and
marked
exhibit
“B”
to
this
my
affidavit
is
a
true
copy
of
the
Direction
to
attend.
3.
Difficulties
arose
during
the
judgment
debtor
examination.
Mr.
McPhadden
wanted
to
re-examine
me
on
matters
already
covered
in
previous
examinations
on
this
file
and
on
matters
dating
back
to
1984,
contrary
to
Rule
2200.
Attached
hereto
and
marked
exhibit
“C”
to
this
my
affidavit
are
true
copies
of
pgs.
48
&
49
of
the
examination.
4.
Counsel
McPhadden
asked
that
I
again
supply
all
the
documentation
which
was
seized
by
the
Government
and
which
they
held
for
50
months
and
have
made
copies
of.
Also,
during
discoveries
on
September
20,
1995
in
this
matter,
all
additional
corporate
documents
were
shipped
to
the
Department
of
Justice,
copies
were
made
and
the
boxes
were
then
returned
to
me.
These
documents
are
listed
in
the
Affidavit
of
documents.
Attached
hereto
and
marked
exhibit
“D”
to
this
my
affidavit
are
true
copies
of
the
examinations.
5.
At
6
minutes
after
12:00
I
left
the
examination.
Attached
hereto
and
marked
exhibit
“E”
to
this
my
affidavit
are
true
copie
[sic]
of
transcripts.
6.
Mr.
McPhadden
followed
me
into
the
elevator
when
I
was
leaving
the
offices
of
Alfred
Devenport,
Official
Examiner.
We
were
alone
in
the
elevator.
Mr.
McPhadden
positioned
himself
face
to
face
with
me
and
without
saying
a
word
kept
staring
at
me
until
the
elevator
reached
the
ground
floor.
7.1
experienced
very
rapid
heartbeat
and
proceeded
to
the
Federal
Court
Offices
in
an
attempt
to
reach
a
Judge
of
the
Federal
Court
and
lay
a
complaint
against
Mr.
McPhadden.
When
I
reached
the
8th
floor
of
330
University,
I
had
to
be
helped
by
the
staff,
I
was
close
to
a
heart
attack.
No
judges
were
available.
8.
The
demands
made
on
me
by
Mr.
McPhadden
and
the
actions
taken
by
him
are
in
violation
of
my
Charter
Rights.
I
have
supplied
the
Government
with
schedules
of
documents
listed
by
number
and
by
date
and
require
to
know
the
relevance
and
foundation
of
any
further
demands.
9.
On
August
19,
1996,
Mr.
Alfred
C.
Devenport
conducted
a
Judgment
Debtor
Examination
of
me
in
the
matter
herein.
I
have
filed
same
in
the
Federal
Court.
Mr.
Devenport
had
been
asked
by
Ms.
Bonnie
Boucher
and
Mr.
Bryan
McPhadden
to
conduct
such
an
examination
on
September
20,
1995.
The
grounds
for
the
motion
are
set
out
in
the
plaintiffs’
application
and
their
Memorandum,
and
the
evidence
in
support
of
them,
in
the
affidavit
of
Mary
David,
is
that
set
out
above.
My
conclusions
about
those
grounds
as
alleged
and
argued
can
be
summarized
under
the
four
headings
which
follow,
1.e.,
abuse
of
process;
non-compliance
with
the
Order
for
judgment
debtor
examination;
needlessly
abuse,
hector
and
harass,
or
needlessly
inconvenience
a
witness;
and
abuse
of
the
plaintiffs’
Charter
rights.
Abuse
of
process
The
plaintiffs
apparently
perceive,
as
I
understand
from
their
memorandum
dated
October
18,
1996,
that
Mr.
McPhadden,
as
solicitor
for
the
Minister
“is
aware
that
the
Certificate
of
Default
GST-41-92
represents
the
alleged
criminal
charges,
for
which
the
Plaintiffs
were
prosecuted
in
the
Ontario
Court
Criminal
Division
for
11
days
and
against
which
the
presiding
Judge
entered
a
final
stay
under
the
Constitution
Act
of
Canada”.
From
this
I
infer,
the
plaintiffs
conceive
that
proceedings
under
file
GST-41-92
are
an
abuse
of
process,
as
if
the
stay
of
criminal
proceedings,
which
might
have
led
to
penalties
upon
conviction
for
criminal
activities
arising
in
relation
to
tax
claims,
would
automatically
result
in
the
wiping
from
the
record
the
Crown’s
right
to
proceed
to
recover
taxes
claimed.
The
facts
supporting
such
an
inference
are
not
set
out
in
any
evidence,
i.e.
a
sworn
affidavit
or
document
before
the
Court.
The
conclusion
underlying
the
inference,
if
facts
were
established
to
support
it,
that
is,
that
by
staying
criminal
proceedings
the
Court
granting
the
stay
determined
the
tax
liability
of
the
plaintiffs,
or
that
the
Crown
by
seeking
or
supporting
a
stay
of
criminal
proceedings,
was
ipso
facto
foregoing
its
right
to
recover
outstanding
taxes,
are
legal
conclusions
that
would
require
argument
and
a
finding
by
the
Court
on
the
basis
of
facts
properly
established.
No
facts
are
in
evidence
to
support
the
argument
and
no
finding
has
been
made
by
any
court
in
support
of
the
plaintiffs’
conclusion.
There
is
no
basis
established
for
concluding
that
proceedings
by
the
Minister
to
recover
outstanding
excise
taxes
claimed
constitute
an
abuse
of
process.
Even
if
it
were
so
established,
that
would
not
provide
a
basis
for
a
show
cause
order
directed
against
counsel
for
the
Minister,
as
I
note
in
general
discussion
of
contempt
proceedings
at
the
conclusion
of
these
Reasons.
Non-compliance
with
Order
for
Judgment
Debtor
Examination
So
far
as
facts
are
in
evidence
before
the
Court
about
this
failure
alleged
of
Mr.
McPhadden,
those
are
set
out
in
paragraphs
1
to
5
of
the
affidavit
of
Mary
David
quoted
earlier
in
these
reasons,
and
in
supporting
documents
related
to
those
paragraphs.
As
I
understand
this
aspect
of
the
plaintiffs’
claims
it
concerns
an
examination
of
Mary
David
as
a
judgment
debtor,
ordered
by
the
Honourable
Associate
Chief
Justice
Jerome
in
July
1996
by
orders
made
in
each
of
files
GST-41-92
and
ITA-8447-92,
in
relation
to
the
claims
of
the
Crown
respectively,
in
regard
to
excise
taxes
and
income
taxes
certified
as
outstanding
and
unpaid.
The
plaintiffs’
perception
appears
to
be
that
questions
in
such
an
examination
are
to
be
directed
to
the
current
status
of
financial
assets
of,
and
debts
owed
to,
the
party
examined.
As
the
terms
of
Rule
2200(1)(a)
and
(b)
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
provide,
and
the
Orders
of
Jerome
A.C.J.
in
this
case
reflect
and
direct,
examination
may
be
directed
not
only
to
current
assets
and
debts,
but
to
all
assets
and
debts
of
the
party
examined
since
incurring
the
obligation
that
is
the
basis
of
the
judgment
or
order.
Thus,
the
terms
of
the
orders
here
issued
include
provision
for
Mary
David
to
attend
and
be
examined
on
the
following
questions
a)
as
to
all
the
property
that
Olympia
Interiors
Ltd.
possesses
or
has
possessed
since
incurring
the
obligation
that
is
the
basis
of
the
Certificate
filed
in
this
Court,
and
b)
without
limiting
the
generality
of
paragraph
(a),
whether
and,
if
so,
what
debts
are
owing
to
the
judgment
debtor.
Excerpts
from
transcripts
of
the
examination
presented
in
relation
to
this
complaint
indicate
questions
asked
by
Mr.
McPhadden
concerning
the
financial
status
of
the
corporate
plaintiff,
and
his
perception
that
the
corporation
incurred
a
substantial
loss,
in
1984.
That
year
is
one
for
which
claims
for
taxes
unpaid
are
outstanding.
In
my
opinion,
questions
related
to
the
financial
status
of
the
company
at
that
time
are
within
the
scope
of
the
Court’s
rules
and
of
the
orders
issued
in
this
case.
If
Mary
David
takes
exception
to
questions
asked
at
the
examination
ordered
she
may
object
and
decline
to
answer
those,
subject
to
any
subsequent
order
of
the
Court
that
might
require
the
questions
to
be
answered.
She
does
not
comply
with
the
orders
to
be
examined
by
deciding
not
to
answer
and,
without
reference
to
the
examiner
or
to
the
Court,
by
leaving
the
examination.
In
my
opinion,
there
is
no
basis
established
for
concluding
that
there
was
any
failure
on
the
part
of
Mr.
McPhadden
to
comply
with
an
order
of
the
Court,
and
this
allegation,
not
established
by
evidence,
provides
no
basis
for
a
show
cause
order
to
be
issued.
Needlessly
abuse,
hector
and
harass
a
witness;
and
needlessly
inconvenience
a
witness
The
factual
basis
for
these
allegations
is
set
out
in
paragraphs
4
and
8,
and
possibly
9,
of
the
affidavit
of
Mary
David
sworn
August
21,
1996.
Argument
by
Mary
David
at
the
hearing
and
in
the
written
memorandum
of
the
plaintiffs
urged
that
the
plaintiffs
have
previously
been
thoroughly
examined
in
these
three
files,
and
that
the
Crown
had
already
copied
all
of
the
plaintiffs’
documents,
yet
Mr.
McPhadden
required
her
to
bring
boxes
and
boxes
of
documents
to
the
examination.
I
presume
that
is
the
examination
commenced,
but
not
yet
completed,
under
the
Order
of
Jerome,
A.C.J.
That
task
was
said
to
be
physically
difficult
for
her
and
it
could
have
been
alleviated
had
notice
been
given
in
advance
of
the
examination
of
the
documents
expected
to
be
required
for
the
questions
to
be
asked.
I
note
that
the
plaintiffs
appear
to
misunderstand
the
nature
of
an
examination,
arranged
to
be
before
a
designated
examiner.
As
I
understand
it,
Ms.
David
was
surprised
that
at
the
examination
questions
were
asked
by
Mr.
McPhadden
representing
the
Crown,
and
not
by
the
examiner
designated.
But
the
examiner
is
a
hearing
officer
and
in
such
an
examination
it
is
the
regular
process
for
counsel
of
the
judgment
creditor,
in
this
case
Mr.
McPhadden
for
the
Crown,
to
ask
appropriate
questions
for
the
judgment
creditor,
who
knows
the
case,
subject
only
to
the
questions
being
disallowed
by
the
hearing
officer,
i.e.,
the
examiner
before
whom
the
examination
is
conducted,
or
later
by
Court
order.
Again,
in
my
opinion
no
basis
is
here
established
for
an
order
to
show
cause
directed
to
Mr.
McPhadden
for
his
questioning
of
the
witness
at
the
examination
in
August
1996.
I
note
for
the
record
that
following
the
hearing
of
these
show
cause
motions
on
October
23,
1996,
completion
of
the
examination
of
Mary
David
was
arranged,
this
was
to
be
accomplished
in
premises
of
the
Court
where
the
documents
of
the
plaintiffs
might
be
retained
and
readily
available
until
completion
of
the
examination.
Abuse
of
the
Plaintiffs’
Charter
Rights
The
factual
basis
of
the
plaintiffs’
claim
in
this
respect
is
set
out
in
paragraphs
6,
7
and
8
of
the
affidavit
of
Mary
David
sworn
August
21,
1996.
The
alleged
abuse
of
Charter
rights
is
said
to
concern
two
matters.
First,
is
“the
demands
made
...
by
Mr.
McPhadden”
which
can
only
relate
to
questions
asked
by
him
and
to
the
requests
to
produce
documents,
which
I
have
already
indicated
provide
no
basis
for
finding
the
questions
or
requests
to
be
abusive
or
a
basis
for
a
show
cause
order.
Second,
is
the
action
alleged
to
have
been
taken
by
Mr.
McPhadden
in
following
Mary
David
to
and
riding
with
her
in
an
elevator.
In
the
circumstances,
Ms.
David,
who
had
walked
away
from
the
examination
without
its
being
completed,
may
have
considered
she
was
threatened,
but
there
is
no
evidence
before
me
that
there
was
an
intention
to
create
that
perception.
Even
if
that
were
established,
the
conduct
alleged
might
be
subject
to
discipline
or
penalty
by
other
processes.
It
would
not
establish
any
abuse
of
Charter
rights
that
would
constitute
a
basis
for
a
show
cause
order.
The
motion
in
relation
to
instructing
counsel
As
I
understand
it,
the
principle
allegation
concerning
Ms.
Boucher,
now
instructing
counsel,
is
that
she
was
counsel
of
record
earlier
in
this
action
and
perhaps
in
other
proceedings
in
the
Ontario
Courts,
and
that
she
must
have
been
aware
that
criminal
proceedings
against
the
plaintiffs
had
been
stayed
when
the
certificate
of
outstanding
excise
taxes
unpaid
was
filed
in
this
Court
in
file
GST-41-92
and
similarly
in
relation
to
income
taxes
in
file
ITA-8447-92.
In
the
plaintiffs’
view,
the
proceedings
commenced
by
filing
certificates
are
wrong,
representing
the
same
matter
as
the
criminal
proceedings.
While
that
may
be
Mary
David’s
opinion,
there
is
no
basis
established
yet
for
that
conclusion,
indeed
a
primary
purpose
of
the
action
against
Her
Majesty
in
Court
file
T-1436-92
is
to
establish
that.
Other
allegations
in
regard
to
Ms.
Boucher
concern
an
affidavit
filed
in
Ontario
proceedings,
an
affidavit
said
to
have
been
sworn
and
presented
when
she
was
counsel
of
record
in
those
proceedings
some
years
ago.
The
facts
supporting
these
allegations
are
not
established
by
any
affidavit
evidence.
Even
if
they
were,
they
would
provide
no
basis
for
finding
that
a
show
cause
order
is
warranted
against
Ms.
Boucher.
There
is
no
evidence
of
any
action
or
failure
to
act
by
her
which
would
establish
a
basis
for
a
show
cause
order
concerning
alleged
contempt
of
this
Court
on
her
part.
The
nature
of
contempt
proceedings
Having
found
that
the
plaintiffs
have
not
established
by
their
allegations
any
basis
for
the
Court
to
issue
show
cause
orders
to
require
justification
of
actions
that
might
otherwise
be
deemed
to
be
contempt,
there
is
no
necessity
to
say
more.
Yet
since
these
proceedings
are
not
yet
complete
and
Mary
David
appears
not
to
fully
understand
the
nature
of
contempt
proceedings,
I
propose
to
discuss
that
briefly.
Rule
355
(1)
provides:
Anyone
is
guilty
of
contempt
of
court
who
disobeys
any
process
or
order
of
the
Court
or
a
judge
thereof,
or
who
acts
in
such
a
way
as
to
interfere
with
the
orderly
administration
of
justice,
or
to
impair
the
authority
or
dignity
of
the
Court.
In
this
case
the
closest
circumstance
alleged
to
be
within
Rule
355,
is
the
allegation
that
Mr.
McPhadden
did
not
comply
with
the
order
concerning
the
examination
of
the
plaintiff
corporation
as
a
judgment
debtor.
But
that
order
was
directed
not
to
him
or
to
the
Crown,
but
to
Mary
David,
and
Mr.
McPhadden
did
not
disobey
that
order.
There
is
no
evidence
of
any
other
activity
which
would
warrant
a
conclusion
that
Mr.
McPhadden
or
Ms.
Boucher
acted
in
any
way
that
would
interfere
with
the
orderly
administration
of
justice,
or
to
impair
the
authority
or
dignity
of
this
Court.
For
any
such
claim
there
must
be
activity
alleged
which
clearly
appears
to
be
contrary
in
some
specific
manner
to
this
Court’s
responsibility
for
the
administration
of
justice,
and
none
is
here
suggested.
Contempt
of
court
is
a
most
serious
process.
Proceedings
in
relation
to
contempt
are
quasi-criminal
in
the
sense
that
if
the
serious
penalties
of
a
fine
or
imprisonment
are
to
be
imposed,
the
person
ultimately
found
guilty
of
contempt
must
have
had
fair
notice
of
the
facts
on
which
he
or
she
is
charged
and
must
have
been
found
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt
to
have
knowingly
committed
the
offence.
A
definition
of
the
offence
will
usually
be
with
reference
to
the
failure
to
comply
with
a
particular
order
of
the
court
or
of
a
judge;
otherwise
the
particular
offence
may
be
difficult
to
establish.
Abuse
of
the
process
of
the
court,
by
using
its
processes
for
unwarranted
ends,
would
not
ordinarily
constitute
contempt
of
court
by
a
party.
Abuse
of
process
may
be
dealt
with
by
the
striking
out
of
pleadings
or
dismissal
of
actions
or
motions,
and
it
may
be
“penalized”
by
awards
of
costs.
Alleged
abuse
of
a
witness,
or
alleged
violation
of
a
Charter
right,
cannot
constitute
contempt
of
court
unless
it
also
violates
an
order
of
the
court
or
in
some
particular
manner
also
interferes
with
the
orderly
administration
of
justice.
Procedural
steps
by
a
party
in
an
action
are
not,
as
the
claims
of
Mary
David
in
these
applications
would
appear
to
assume
they
are,
considered
as
the
personal
responsibility
of
counsel
who
represents
the
party
in
question.
Thus,
for
example,
the
filing
of
a
certificate
of
excise
taxes
claimed
to
be
outstanding
in
Court
file
GST-41-92
is
not
an
action
for
which
counsel
is
personally
responsible.
It
is
an
action
which
counsel
takes
only
on
instructions
of
and
for
the
party
he
or
she
represents;
in
this
case
it
was
done
for
the
Minister,
or
the
Crown.
A
party
may
be
responsible
for
the
action.
It
would
be
extraordinary
for
counsel
to
be
held
in
contempt
for
actions
undertaken
for
and
on
instructions
of
the
party
represented.
In
the
same
way,
it
would
be
unusual
for
this
Court
to
find
Mary
David
personally
responsible
for
action
undertaken
by
her
in
these
proceedings
on
behalf
of
the
corporate
plaintiff
Olympia
Interiors,
so
long
as
she
is
permitted
to
represent
the
corporate
plaintiff,
unless
that
action
contravened
a
specific
court
order.
Where
there
is
a
basis
for
contempt
proceedings
within
Rule
355,
the
motion
and
supporting
affidavit
for
a
show
cause
order
must
be
sufficiently
precise
about
the
violation
of
a
court
order,
or
about
other
alleged
interference
with
the
orderly
administration
of
justice.
That
permits
the
respondent
to
the
motion
to
know
the
basis
of
the
wrong
alleged
and
to
respond,
and
it
permits
the
Court
to
determine
whether
there
is
a
prima
facie
case
that
can
be
described
in
adequate
detail
to
provide
fair
notice
and
an
opportunity
to
answer
by
the
respondent
when
the
order
to
show
cause
is
returned
for
hearing
before
the
court.
The
motions
and
affidavits
before
the
Court
in
these
proceedings
do
not
precisely
describe
activity
that
is
contrary
to
an
Order
of
or
contrary
to
the
orderly
administration
of
justice
in,
this
Court.
Conclusions
On
the
basis
of
the
motions
and
affidavits
in
support,
I
find
there
is
no
case
made
out
for
the
issue
of
a
show
cause
order
directing
either
Mr.
McPhadden
or
Ms.
Boucher
to
answer
why
he
or
she
should
not
be
sentenced
for
contempt
of
this
Court.
In
each
case,
in
my
opinion,
the
motion
was
misconceived,
for
no
factual
evidence
establishes
that
either
of
those
persons,
as
counsel
involved
in
proceedings
in
relation
to
these
three
Court
files,
committed
any
act
that
was
in
disobedience
of
any
process
or
order
of
this
Court
or
a
judge,
or
that
constituted
any
interference
with
this
Court’s
responsibility
for
the
administration
of
justice
or
any
impairment
of
its
authority
or
dignity.
Counsel
for
the
solicitors
against
whom
show
cause
orders
were
sought,
urged
at
the
hearing
that
the
Court’s
file
be
sealed
to
protect
the
names
and
reputations
of
counsel
whom
he
represented.
In
my
opinion,
that
would
be
an
extraordinary
step
and
I
see
no
real
basis
for
that.
Indeed,
there
seems
to
me
to
be
merit
in
keeping
this
matter
within
the
context
of
the
open
file
of
these
proceedings,
particularly
since
I
find
no
basis
to
issue
the
orders
sought.
At
the
hearing
counsel
for
the
solicitors
against
whom
show
cause
orders
were
sought
also
urged
that
dismissal
of
both
of
the
plaintiffs’
motions
be
ordered,
with
costs
in
each
case
awarded
against
the
plaintiffs,
payable
forthwith,
in
an
amount
of
$1,000.00,
plus
disbursements,
in
each
case.
At
a
later
hearing,
on
November
19,
1996
while
this
matter
was
still
on
reserve,
counsel
for
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
suggested
that
costs
in
relation
to
the
applications
for
show
cause
orders
might
be
addressed
after
decision
was
rendered
on
the
merits
of
the
applications.
I
propose
to
deal
with
costs
on
the
basis
of
submissions
made
on
October
23
when
the
applications
were
heard.
My
conclusion,
in
dismissing
the
plaintiffs’
motions,
is
that
I
am
prepared
to
award
costs
against
the
plaintiffs
in
the
case
of
each
of
the
two
motions
in
an
amount
of
$500.00
plus
disbursements.
The
amount
is
less
than
asked
since
the
two
motions
were
argued
at
the
same
time,
as
one,
with
brief
reference
to
the
differences
in
factual
allegations.
Those
costs
now
directed
shall
be
paid
in
any
event
of
the
cause.
I
do
not
direct
they
be
paid
forthwith
at
this
stage
of
proceedings.
In
light
of
arrangements,
ordered
following
further
hearing
of
other
outstanding
motions,
for
leave
of
the
Court
to
be
required
for
formal
filing
of
further
motions
or
applications
of
the
plaintiffs,
and
for
discoveries
and
examination
of
the
plaintiff
corporation
as
a
judgment
debtor
to
proceed,
these
arrangements
for
costs,
in
relation
to
the
plaintiffs’
motions
for
show
cause
orders,
seem
to
me
to
be
appropriate,
with
a
view
to
facilitating
trial
on
an
expedited
basis,
if
that
be
possible.
Motions
dismissed.
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