Taylor
J.T.C.C.
:
—
These
are
appeals
heard
in
London,
Ontario
on
August
27,
1996
under
the
Informal
Procedure,
against
assessments
in
which
the
Respondent
disallowed
claims
for
the
“Allowable
Business
Investment
Loss”
(A.B.I.L.)
as
follows:
|
TYPE
OF
DEBT
|
AMOUNT
|
TOTAL
ABIL
|
|
|
YEAR
|
|
|
(3/4)
|
|
1991
|
Loans
Related
to
Son's
|
|
|
Business
|
|
|
June
5,
1990
|
$2,000
|
|
|
May
15.
1991
|
$6,000
|
|
|
November
I.
199]
|
25,000
|
$13,000
|
$9,750
|
|
1991
|
Guaranteed
Bank
Loan
|
|
$15,000
|
$11,250
|
In
summary,
the
position
taken
by
Mr.
Taylor
in
the
pleadings,
in
Court,
and
by
the
documentation
filed
was
that
the
loans
and
the
guarantee
had
been
made
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income,
and
that
he
had
satisfied
himself
there
was
no
opportunity
for
collection
-
hence
the
claims.
Further
that
while
these
loans
and
the
guarantee
had
been
made
to
the
company
“Future
Alarms
Systems
and
Signals
Inc.”
while
his
son
was
the
director,
shareholder
and
officer
of
the
corporation,
these
amounts
had
become
uncollectible
only
after
his
son
no
longer
was
in
the
company,
and
it
was
under
the
sole
direction
of
an
unrelated
party.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
however
disagreed
with
all
the
points
noted
above.
As
she
saw
it,
for
the
guarantee
($15,000)
the
documentation
filed
gave
no
evidence
that
there
had
been
any
opportunity
for
profit
at
all,
no
consideration
or
security
had
been
provided
to
Mr.
Taylor
for
the
guarantee,
and
no
arrangement
was
made
(other
than
some
limited
conversations
with
the
son
and
the
new
owner)
for
payment
in
case
of
default.
Further
there
was
no
indication
that
Mr.
Taylor
had
tried
to
collect
in
any
formal
way,
from
the
son,
from
the
company
or
the
new
owner,
albeit
that
Mr.
Taylor
understood
the
company
and
business
with
no
longer
in
existence.
With
regard
to
the
loans,
a
similar
situation
obtained
according
to
Counsel.
For
the
$2,000
loan,
there
was
a
minor
question
whether
it
had
ever
reached
the
company
itself,
or
perhaps
a
predecessor
unincorporated
business,
or
the
son
personally.
For
the
other
amounts
($6,000
and
$5,000)
the
only
documentation
available
indicated
that
from
the
interest
rates
which
could
be
charged
to
the
Appellant
by
his
bank
for
the
funds,
in
order
for
him
to
make
these
advances
to
the
son’s
company,
he
(Mr.
Taylor)
could
not
possibly
make
a
profit
-
indeed
on
one
of
them
he
would
be
paying
more
interest
that
he
could
received
-
since
the
stated
rate
of
interest
on
the
“Promissory
Notes”
he
held
from
the
company
was
12
%
per
annum
-
even
though
no
interest
was
ever
received,
and
he
continued
to
increase
his
loans
from
$2,000
to
$8,000,
finally
to
$1,300.
Again
there
was
no
evidence
of
attempts
to
collect,
or
to
be
formally
assured
there
was
no
use
in
pursuing
the
debts.
Counsel
referred
to
two
cases
from
this
Court:
Lowery
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1986]
2
C.T.C.
2171,
86
D.T.C.
1649
(T.C.C.);
Strecker
v.
R.
((sub
nom.
Strecker
v.
Canada),
[1994]
2
C.T.C.
2341,
95
D.T.C.
3).
Analysis
In
my
view
the
comments
from
Counsel
regarding
the
guarantee
amount
($15,000)
are
correct
and
appropriate.
I
would
add
no
more,
other
than
the
fact
that
the
financial
statements
of
the
company
for
1990,
filed
by
the
Appellant
in
support
of
his
case,
do
not
contain
any
direct
reference
to
such
a
guarantee
from
Mr.
Taylor,
although
a
bank
loan
of
that
amount
was
shown
as
a
liability
of
the
company
presumably
supported
by
other
security.
Mr.
Taylor
was
called
on
by
the
bank
to
make
good
on
his
guarantee,
which
he
did,
and
that
forms
part
of
the
basis
for
this
claim
and
appeal.
The
difficulty
for
Mr.
Taylor
is
that,
even
though
he
paid
the
guarantee,
there
is
no
basis
for
concluding
that
it
was
his
money
(the
$15,000)
which
was
injected
into
the
company
in
the
first
place,
and
much
to
support
a
view
that
he
guaranteed
for
the
company
an
already
existing
loan,
and
that
without
prospect
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
it,
as
noted
above.
With
regard
to
the
loan
amounts
($13,000)
the
same
situation
and
result
obtains,
but
augmented
by
the
fact
that
no
reference
was
made
in
the
financial
statements
(see
above)
to
the
loans
at
all.
As
to
the
assertion
of
Mr.
Taylor’s
agent
that
the
situation
had
changed
when
the
new
owner
took
over
—
(no
longer
a
father-son
relationship)
I
find
that
to
be
unacceptable.
The
fact
is
that
the
limited
financial
information
made
available
to
the
Court,
supplemented
by
Mr.
Taylor’s
testimony,
leaves
no
doubt
that
when
the
new
owner
took
over,
the
company
was
insolvent,
and
the
prospects
of
Mr.
Taylor
collecting
on
his
promissory
notes,
or
escaping
from
his
guarantee,
was
nil.
In
my
opinion,
the
circumstances
of
this
case
reflect
broadly
the
principles
laid
down
in
the
case
law
submitted
by
Counsel
for
the
Respondent,
supra,
and
the
result
must
be
the
same.
The
loans
and
guarantees
(finally
paid)
were
not
made
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income,
in
any
event
they
were
made
during
the
time
Mr.
Taylor’s
son
was
in
charge
of
the
company,
if
uncollectible
were
in
that
state
when
he
sold
his
interests,
and
finally
that
there
is
no
clear
evidence
that
proper
collection
procedures
were
ever
attempted,
let
alone
pursued.
The
financial
accom-
modation
provided
by
Mr.
Taylor
was
for
his
son’s
business
purposes
as
I
see
it,
not
for
the
Appellant’s
business
purpose,
as
he
maintains.
When
an
“investment”
strategy
is
pursued
at
a
time
when
the
situation
is
tinged
with
“non-arm’s
length”
circumstances,
the
parties
must
be
doubly
vigilant,
and
not
benignly
negligent
in
understanding,
recording
and
dealing
with
the
events
which
transpire,
to
ensure
that
the
record
will
stand
up
to
examination
in
support
of
any
later
claims
made
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
I
am
well
aware
that
such
a
standard
goes
against
the
normal
familial
relationship,
but
it
is
crucial
when
things
do
not
turn
out
as
hoped
for.
The
appeals
are
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.