Bowman
J.T.C.C.:
-
This
appeal
is
from
an
assessment
for
the
1992
taxation
year.
It
is
concerned
with
the
inclusion
in
Mr.
Chen’s
income
of
$993.92
in
respect
of
contributions
that
he
made
to
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan.
If
this
case
established
nothing
else,
it
is
that
the
RRSP
regime
in
Canada
has
reached
a
point
of
complexity
where
it
is
beyond
the
grasp
of
the
average
taxpayer.
Mr.
Chen
is
a
chemist
who
came
to
Canada
in
1969
from
Taiwan.
On
March
12,
1992,
he
withdrew
from
his
and
his
wife’s
RRSPs
$4,958.68
and
$4,959.61
respectively.
These
amounts,
totalling
$9,918.26
were
used
to
purchase
a
home
under
the
home
buyers’
plan
introduced
in
that
year.
Accordingly,
they
were
not
taxed
in
his
hands
under
subsection
146(8)
because
they
were
eligible
amounts
and
therefore
excluded
withdrawals
within
subsection
146.01(1).
All
the
conditions
required
for
their
exclusion
from
income
were
met
and
their
taxability
is
not
in
issue.
Their
withdrawal
and
exclusion
from
income
is,
however,
relevant
to
the
treatment
of
subsequent
contributions.
On
March
1,
1993,
the
appellant
made
contributions
to
his
and
his
wife’s
RRSPs
in
the
amounts
of
$2,993.92
and
$2,000.00
totalling
$4,993.92.
On
the
basis
of
advice
that
he
received
from
the
tax
department
he
deducted
this
amount
in
computing
his
income
for
1992
and
also
in-
eluded
it
in
his
income,
thereby
neutralizing
any
possible
benefit
that
he
might
have
had
from
his
contribution
to
his
and
his
wife’s
RRSPs
and
rendering
the
amount
of
$4,993.92
subject
to
tax
when
he
withdrew
it.
On
May
13,
1993,
the
appellant
visited
the
offices
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
signed
three
forms
T3012A(E).
On
those
forms
he
designated
a
total
of
$4,993.92
($993.92
+
$2,000.00
+
$2,000.00).
One
designation
read
as
follows:
Of
the
total
contributions
entered
on
line
1,
$4,993.92
was
contributed
to
the
following
plan.
I
designate
$993.92
for
refund
from
this
plan.
The
total
amounts
you
designate
for
refund
from
this
plan,
and
from
any
other
plans,
cannot
be
more
than
the
amount
shown
on
line
7.
The
other
forms
each
designated
$2,000.00.
On
the
same
date
he
signed
a
form
T-196
requesting
an
amendment
of
his
1992
return
on
lines
208
and
129,
the
amounts
of
$4,993.92
and
$4,993.92
which
were
the
amounts
which
he
originally
included
and
deducted
as
set
out
above.
These
were
described
on
the
form
T-196
as
“amounts
are
being
withdrawn
on
a
T3012A
($4,993.92
total)”
and
were
to
be
reduced
to
zero.
In
fact,
in
1993,
he
withdrew
only
$4,000.00
from
the
two
RRSPs.
This
amount,
according
to
paragraph
7(f)
of
the
Reply:
was
included
in
the
income
of
the
Appellant
in
1993
pursuant
to
subsections
146(8)
and
146(8.3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Act”).
From
this
the
respondent
stated
in
paragraph
7(g):
the
net
premium
balance
of
the
Appellant
for
1992
is
$993.92
calculated
as
follows:
Total
premiums
per
paragraph
(d)
supra:
$4,993.92
Less:
Total
per
paragraph
(f)
supra:
4,000.00
Net
Premium
Balance
for
1992:
$
993.92
The
representative
of
the
respondent,
after
the
case
was
closed,
filed
a
copy
of
the
appellant’s
1993
return.
I
accepted
it
for
what
it
was
worth
but
it
was
not
properly
identified,
nor
were
the
notes
and
adjustments,
apparently
made
by
an
assessor,
properly
explained
or
identified.
The
inference
that
the
respondent’s
representative
asks
me
to
draw
is
that
the
assessor
added
$4,000.00
at
line
129
and
deducted
it
at
line
232.
In
the
absence
of
testimony
by
the
assessor,
I
do
not,
however,
regard
this
as
acceptable
evidence
and
all
I
am
left
with
is
the
unrebutted
“assumption”,
so-called,
that
the
sum
of
$4,000.00
was
included
in
the
appellant’s
income
for
1993.
The
appellant’s
1993
assessment
was
not
put
in
evidence.
The
basis
of
the
inclusion
in
the
appellant’s
income
for
1992
of
$993.92
is
subsection
146.01(9)
which
requires
the
inclusion
in
income
for
1992,
the
lesser
of:
(a)
the
net
premium
balance
for
the
year
of
the
individual,
and
(b)
the
total
of
(i)
all
eligible
amounts
received
by
the
individual
before
March
2,
1993
(in
this
case,
the
$4,958.68
that
he
withdrew
on
March
12,
1992
and
possibly
also
the
$4,959.61
that
he
withdrew
from
his
wife’s
RRSP
under
the
home
buyers’
plan),
and
(ii)
the
lesser
of
(A)
+
(B)
(Essentially
amounts
calculated
in
respect
of
the
individual’s
spousal
RRSP).
The
calculation
of
net
premium
balance
is
provided
in
subsection
146.01(10).
The
Department
of
National
Revenue
calculated
it
as
$993.92,
being
the
excess
of
the
$4,993.92
which
he
contributed
on
March
1,
1993
over
the
$4,000.00
which
he
withdrew
in
1993.
In
fact
by
including
the
$4,993.92
in
his
1992
income
and
also
deducting
it,
the
appellant
effectively
neutralized
the
effect
of
his
paying
the
amount
and
so
the
net
premium
balance
should
arguably
have
been
nil
under
subsection
146.01(10).
I
do
not
however
have
to
put
my
decision
on
this
basis.
What,
on
the
evidence,
is
the
net
result
of
all
of
this?
(a)
A
payment
of
$4,993.92
into
the
RRSPs
for
1992
which,
effectively,
gives
him
no
tax
benefit
because
its
deduction
is
offset
by
an
equal
inclusion,
but
which,
when
withdrawn,
must
be
included
in
income
as
indeed,
according
to
the
Reply,
$4,000
was.
(b)
The
sum
of
$993.92
which
in
1992
is
subjected
to
tax
under
subsection
146.01(9)
and
remains
subject
to
tax
again
when
it
is
withdrawn.
In
short,
on
the
evidence
before
me,
Mr.
Chen
gets
no
deduction
when
the
$993.92
goes
into
the
plan,
he
is
taxed
on
it
in
1992
under
subsection
146.01(9)
when
it
is
in
the
plan
and
he
is
taxed
on
it
again
when
it
comes
out.
Moreover,
if
he
does
not
repay
the
$9,918.26
which
he
withdrew
under
the
home
buyer’s
plan,
he
is
taxed
on
that.
The
result
is,
to
say
the
least,
bizarre.
Indeed,
it
is
penal
and
confiscatory
and,
as
such,
intolerable.
Where
an
interpretation
of
a
statute
leads
to
a
patent
absurdity
it
is
to
be
avoided.
(Victoria
(City)
v.
Bishop
of
Vancouver
Island,
[1921]
2
A.C.
384,
59
D.L.R.
399
(P.C.);
R.
v.
Consumers'
Co-op.
Refineries
Ltd.
(sub
nom.
The
Queen
v.
Consumers'
Co-operative
Refineries
Ltd.),
[1987]
2
C.T.C.
204,
87
D.T.C.
5409
(F.C.A.)).
The
result
of
the
Department’s
interpretation
is
not
in
conformity
with
the
scheme
of
the
Act
(Highway
Sawmills
Ltd.
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1966]
S.C.R.
384,
[1966]
C.T.C.
150,
66
D.T.C.
5116,
at
page
393
(C.T.C.
157-58))
or
its
object
and
spirit
(Stubart
Investments
Ltd.
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Stubart
Investments
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen),
[1984]
1
S.C.R.
536,
[1984]
C.T.C.
294,
84
D.T.C.
6305).
The
benefit
of
the
doubt
must
be
given
to
the
taxpayer
in
these
circumstances
R.
v.
Fries
((sub
nom.
Canada
v.
Fries;
The
Queen
v.
Fries),
[1990]
2
S.C.R.
1322
(sub
nom.
Fries
v.
Canada),
[1990]
2
C.T.C.
439
(sub
nom.
Fries
v.
R.),
90
D.T.C.
6662;
Stubart,
supra).
To
accept
the
respondent’s
interpretation
would
be
to
follow
a
“purely
mechanical
approach”
rather
than
a
“functional
one”
in
which
the
scheme
is
“considered
as
a
whole,
taking
into
account
the
intent
of
the
legislation,
its
object
and
spirit
and
what
it
actually
accomplishes”.
(Swantje
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Swantje
v.
Canada),
[1994]
2
C.T.C.
382
(sub
nom.
R.
v.
Swantje),
94
D.T.C.
6633
(F.C.A.);
aff’d,
[1996]
1
S.C.R.
73,
[1996]
1
C.T.C.
355,
96
D.T.C.
6310).
Moreover,
the
Department’s
interpretation
and
application
of
the
provisions
of
sections
146
and
146.1
are
contrary
to
the
provision
of
subsection
4(4)
of
the
Act
which
prohibits,
in
the
clearest
terms,
double
taxation.
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
assessment
for
1992
is
referred
back
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
to
delete
from
the
appellant’s
income
the
sum
of
$993.92.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
his
costs,
if
any.
Appeal
allowed.