Watson
D.J.T.C.C.:
—
This
appeal,
heard
under
the
informal
procedure
at
Sherbrooke,
Quebec
on
April
23,
1996,
was
made
against
a
reassessment
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
“Minister”)
for
the
1990
taxation
year.
In
his
tax
return
for
the
1990
taxation
year
the
appellant
reported
a
taxable
dividend
of
$7,500
and
a
taxable
capital
gain
of
$47,985
and
claimed
a
dividend
tax
credit
of
$999.75
and
a
capital
gains
deduction
in
the
amount
of
$46,735.
On
July
11,
1994
the
Minister
issued
the
appellant
a
notice
of
reassessment
for
the
1990
taxation
year
cancelling
the
taxable
capital
gain,
disallowing
the
capital
gains
deduction
and
adding
to
the
appellant’s
income
an
additional
taxable
dividend
of
$81,944
with
an
additional
dividend
tax
credit
of
$10,926,
and
imposing
a
late
filing
penalty
of
$599.72.
In
arriving
at
this
reassessment
the
Minister
relied
on
the
following
allegations
of
fact:
(a)
on
February
27,
1990,
at
a
special
meeting
of
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.,
it
was
resolved
that
in
May
1990
the
corporation
would
declare
and
pay
a
$6,000
dividend
on
the
10
Class
A
shares
held
by
the
appellant;
(b)
on
February
27,
1990,
at
the
said
special
meeting
of
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.,
it
was
resolved
that
Jean
Roberge
would
assume
the
position
of
director
in
this
corporation;
(c)
on
February
28,
1990,
at
another
special
meeting
of
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.,
attended
by
the
only
two
directors
of
the
corporation,
Jean
Roberge
and
the
appellant,
it
was
resolved
to
transfer
10
Class
A
shares
and
250
Class
D
shares,
completely
tax
free,
from
the
capital
stock
of
the
said
corporation
to
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.;
(d)
in
May
1990,
the
appellant
sold
10
Class
A
shares
and
250
Class
D
shares,
completely
tax
free,
and
representing
100
percent
of
the
issued
capital
stock
of
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.,
to
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.
for
the
sum
of
$67,990;
(e)
on
May
23,
1990
the
appellant
cashed
a
cheque
from
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.
in
the
amount
of
$67,990
in
payment
for
the
purchase
of
the
said
shares;
(f)
on
May
23,
1990
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.
paid
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.
the
sum
of
$67,990
to
repurchase
the
said
shares;
(g)
for
the
purposes
of
these
transactions
the
purchaser
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.
was
represented
by
its
president,
Jean
Roberge;
(h)
prior
to
this
transaction
Jean
Roberge
was
the
accountant
for
the
appellant
and
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.,
in
addition
to
being
a
director
of
the
latter
from
February
27,
1990
onwards;
(i)
the
purpose
of
this
share
sale
by
the
appellant
to
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.
was
to
take
advantage
of
the
capital
gains
exemption;
(j)
Jean
Roberge
and
Raynald
Lauzier
acted
in
concert
for
a
common
purpose
and
without
separate
interests,
thereby
creating
a
de
facto
relationship
of
dependence
in
respect
of
this
transaction
involving
the
sale
of
shares
by
the
appellant
to
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.;
(k)
immediately
after
this
disposition
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.
was
associated
with
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.,
since
the
latter
held
all
the
voting
shares
of
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.:
(1)
in
view
of
the
foregoing,
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.
is
deemed
to
have
paid
the
appellant
and
the
latter
to
have
received
a
dividend
amounting
to
$65,555,
of
which
the
sum
of
$81,944
is
taxable.
[Translation.]
At
the
hearing
of
the
appeal,
the
appellant
admitted
the
allegations
made
in
subparagraphs
(a)
to
(c),
(e)
to
(g)
and
(k)
and
denied
the
facts
alleged
in
subparagraphs
(d),
(h)
to
(j)
and
(1).
The
appellant
and
Mr.
Roberge
were
two
witnesses
giving
evidence
on
behalf
of
the
Appellant.
The
appellant
stated
that
insofar
as
paragraph
d)
above
was
concerned,
the
date
of
sale
of
his
shares
was
February
29,
1990
and
not
May
1990,
although
the
cheque
of
$67,990
was
deposited
only
in
May
1990.
He
could
not
recall
when
he
ceased
to
be
president
of
Gestion
R.
Lauzier
Inc.
(“GLI”).
He
recalls
signing
minutes
of
GLI
dated
February
28,
1990
stating
that
he
ceased
to
be
president
of
GLI
on
May
23,
1990,
and
signing
the
minutes
of
May
23
when
his
resignation
was
accepted
effective
May
23,
1990.
Insofar
as
paragraph
h)
above
is
concerned,
Mr.
Roberge
became
the
personal
accountant
of
the
appellant
sometime
in
1991
but
he
could
not
recall
when
Mr.
Roberge
became
GLI’s
accountant
or
became
a
director
of
GLI.
When
the
appellant
decided
to
cease
his
personal
activities
and
to
sell
his
shares
in
GLI,
he
relied
on
the
advice
of
various
accountants
on
how
to
sell
his
shares
to
take
advantage
of
the
capital
gains
exemption.
When
he
sold
his
shares
to
Logis
Jeunesse
Inc.
(“LJI”)
he
was
aware
that
he
would
claim
the
capital
gains
exemption
but
did
not
know
there
was
a
relationship
between
LJI
and
others,
including
Mr.
Roberge.
He
recalls
meeting
Mr.
Roberge
sometime
in
March
1990
and
that
the
minutes
dated
February
27,
1990
were
actually
done
in
March
1990
and
backdated
to
February
27,
1990.
Mr.
Roberge
stated
that
he
became
a
director
of
GLI
sometime
in
March
1990.
The
reason
for
backdating
the
minutes
to
February
27,
1990
was
to
permit
him
to
produce
and
sign
GLI’s
income
tax
return,
due
at
the
end
of
February
1990,
as
a
director
even
though
he
did
not
in
fact
become
a
director
until
sometime
in
March
1990.
He
had
no
contact
with
the
appellant
in
February
1990.
Mr.
Roberge
became
GLI’s
accountant
when
he,
not
the
appellant,
hired
himself.
The
minutes
nominating
him
director,
retroactively,
on
February
27,
1990
was
to
permit
him
to
do
what
he
later
did.
According
to
Mr.
Roberge,
he
had
been
hired
by
the
appellant
only
once,
and
that
was
in
March
1991
in
order
to
prepare
the
appellant’s
personal
income
tax
return
for
1990.
Mr.
Roberge
had
purchased
the
shares
of
LJI
from
a
Mr.
Levesque
on
February
14,
1990
for
$1
so
that
he
could
have
a
company
charter
readily
available
for
future
use
of
one
of
his
clients.
When
LJI
purchased
the
appellant
shares
in
GLI
for
$67,990,
it
borrowed
this
amount
from
GLI
and
gave
it
a
note;
it
then
paid
the
appellant
the
$67,990
for
his
shares.
On
May
23,
1990,
GLI
then
bought
back
the
shares
from
LJI,
using
the
same
note
that
had
been
given
by
LJI.
LJI’s
one
and
only
transaction
was
the
purchase
of
shares
from
the
appellant
and
the
resale
of
these
shares
to
GLI
on
May
23,
1990.
Mr.
Roberge
claimed
that
this
purchase
and
resale
was
done
primarily
to
produce
an
economic
gain
for
himself
while
at
the
same
time,
but
only
secondarily,
to
give
the
appellant
an
opportunity
to
benefit
from
the
capital
gains
exemption.
Some
time
later,
when
Revenue
Canada
issued
GLI
a
refund
cheque
for
approximately
$5,000
for
amounts
that
had
accumulated
as
a
credit
in
GLI’s
income
tax
account,
Mr.
Roberge
then
transferred
part
of
this
$5,000
from
GLI’s
bank
account
to
LJI’s
account
and
then
he
issued
himself
cheques
totalling
approximately
$4,000
from
both
accounts.
This
was
the
economic
gain
that
he
received
for
his
part
in
these
transactions.
There
was
one
witness
on
behalf
of
the
respondent,
the
person
who
had
done
the
audit
on
behalf
of
the
Minister.
In
a
discussion
he
had
with
Mr.
Roberge
on
June
6,
1994,
he
was
told
by
Mr.
Roberge
that
the
purpose
of
the
purchase
of
the
GLI
shares
from
the
appellant
and
the
immediate
resale
was
to
allow
the
appellant
to
take
advantage
of
the
capital
gains
exemption
and
that,
further,
by
giving
the
appellant
a
good
service,
he
could
hope
to
keep
him
for
a
long
time
as
a
client.
No
mention
was
made
at
that
time
of
the
so-called
economic
advantage
realized
by
Mr.
Roberge
in
the
amount
of
approximately
$4,000
for
arranging
the
various
transactions
that
gave
the
appellant
the
opportunity
to
claim
the
capital
gains
exemption
rather
than
declaring
a
dividend
and
paying
the
taxes
on
it.
It
is
clear
to
me
that
Mr.
Roberge
dealt
with
the
various
funds
in
both
GLI
and
LJI
as
if
they
were
his
own
funds
and
that
he
received
approximately
$4,000
for
setting
up
and
carrying
out
the
complicated
transactions
set
out
above.
With
Mr.
Roberge
as
the
common
link,
the
appellant
was
not
in
fact
dealing
with
LJI
at
arm’s
length.
The
only
reasonable
explanation
for
what
went
on
is
that
the
parties
involved
were
acting
in
concert
to
give
the
appearance
of
a
sale
of
shares
by
the
appellant
to
give
him
the
chance
to
claim
the
capital
gains
exemption
to
which
he
wad
not
really
entitled.
Mr.
Roberge
acted
on
behalf
of
GLI
by
appointing
himself
as
a
director
in
early
March
1990,
appointing
himself
as
its
accountant,
backdating
the
documents
and
then
representing
the
interests
of
both
GLI
and
LJI.
The
appellant
had
the
burden
of
establishing
on
a
balance
of
probabilities
that
when
the
Minister
considered
the
amount
received
by
the
appellant
as
a
dividend
pursuant
to
section
84.1
of
the.
Income
Tax
Act
rather
than
as
a
capital
gain,
he
erred
in
fact
and
in
law.
Taking
into
consideration
all
the
circumstances
of
this
appeal,
including
the
testimony,
admissions
and
documentary
evidence,
and
in
light
of
the
case
law,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
appellant
has
failed
in
this
burden.
Furthermore,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
Minister
has
met
his
onus
of
establishing
that
the
penalty
imposed
was
justified.
The
appeal
is
accordingly
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.