Rothstein
J.T.C.C.:
-
Introduction
The
issue
in
this
judicial
review
is
the
validity
and
enforceability
of
notices
of
requirements
to
provide
documents
and
information
(referred
to
as
“Requirements”
or
“Notice
of
Requirements”)
issued
to
the
applicant
(“AGT”)
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(“Minister”)
pursuant
to
subsection
231.2(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act',
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
1
(5th
Supplement,
as
amended).
The
Requirements
require
production
of
“Documents
and
Information
filed
with
the
CRTC
and
not
previously
produced
for
the
years
1990
to
July,
1995”.
Three
identical
requirements
were
issued
by
the
Minister,
one
dated
July
20,
1995
addressed
to
and
served
on
George
K.
Petty,
President
and
CEO
of
AGT,
a
second
dated
July
24,
1995
addressed
to
and
served
on
Jim
McGillicuddy,
Tax
Manager
for
AGT
and
a
third,
dated
July
27,
1995
addressed
to
and
served
on
AGT
counsel,
Al
Meghji,
a
lawyer
with
the
Calgary
law
firm
of
Bennett,
Jones,
Verchere
and
one
of
AGT’s
counsel
in
this
case.
BACKGROUND
The
documents
sought
by
the
Minister
under
the
Requirements
and
which
AGT
does
not
wish
to
produce
are
answers
to
interrogatories
provided
to
the
CRTC
in
confidence
by
AGT.
Some
background
as
to
why
such
documents
came
into
existence
will
help
to
place
the
dispute
in
context
.
Prior
to
October
4,
1990
telephone
service
in
the
Province
of
Alberta
was
provided
by
the
Alberta
Government
Telephone
Commission.
As
the
Commission
was
a
crown
corporation
that
was
exempt
from
federal
and
provincial
income
tax,
it
never
made
a
claim
for
capital
cost
allowance
for
income
tax
purposes.
By
the
Alberta
Government
Telephones
Reorganization
Act
the
Commission
was
restructured
as
of
October
4,
1990
to
provide
for
privatization.
Telus
Corporation
was
acquired
by
the
Province
of
Alberta
to
act
as
a
holding
company.
Most
telephone
operations
and
assets
were
transferred
to
AGT,
a
subsidiary
of
Telus.
At
this
time
AGT
came
under
the
jurisdiction
of
the
CRTC
and
became
a
taxable
entity.
In
preparation
for
privatization,
the
Minister
was
asked
for
an
advance
tax
ruling
as
to
whether
depreciable
assets
for
tax
purposes
should
be
valued
at
original
cost,
approximately
$4
billion,
or
at
net
book
value,
i.e.
original
cost
less
depreciation,
of
about
$2.2
billion.
The
tax
ruling
allowed
the
original
cost
as
undepreciated
capital
cost.
The
additional
capital
cost
allowance
for
income
tax
purposes
available
by
use
of
the
original
cost
as
undepreciated
capital
cost
as
opposed
to
net
book
value
was
referred
to
as
Additional
Tax
Deductions
(ATD).
In
addition
to
the
ATDs
arising
from
the
use
of
the
original
cost
of
assets
as
opposed
to
net
book
value
for
income
tax
purposes,
there
were
a
number
of
other
matters
relating
to
privatization
which
resulted
in
further
ATDs.
AGT
made
an
application
to
the
CRTC
for
purposes
of
the
CRTC
establishing
AGT’s
revenue
requirements,
initially
for
1992.
Once
revenue
requirements
are
determined,
rates
are
set
with
a
view
to
recovering
the
allowed
revenue.
The
revenue
is
intended
to
cover
AGT’s
expenses,
cost
of
capital
and
perhaps
other
items;
but
of
relevance
here,
the
allowed
revenue
is
intended
to
cover
AGT’s
income
tax
liability.
AGT
should
be
in
a
position
after
attending
to
its
expenses,
including
its
income
tax
liability,
to
meet
its
cost
of
capital
which
includes
interest
on
debt
and
its
allowed
return
on
equity.
Before
the
CRTC,
AGT
took
a
more
conservative
approach
to
its
income
tax
liability
than
in
its
income
tax
returns
to
the
Minister.
Its
reasons
include
intergenerational
equity.
Since
its
risk
adjusted
ATDs
in
its
submissions
to
the
CRTC
reflected
AGT’s
best
judgment
of
the
more
likely
outcome
of
its
ultimate
tax
liability
than
its
filed
income
tax
returns,
using
its
liability
as
reflected
in
its
income
tax
returns
for
revenue
requirements
purposes
would
pose
a
greater
risk
to
a
post-audit
generation
than
a
re-
audit
generation.
Further,
AGT
expressed
the
concern
that
future
competition
would
affect
urban
communities
more
than
rural
ones,
leaving
the
rural
users
to
absorb
a
greater
proportion
of
tax
costs
as
a
result
of
any
reassessment
by
the
Minister.
Finally
there
was
a
concern
that
attempting
to
recover
past
income
taxes
reassessed
by
the
Minister
would
amount
to
retrospective
rate
making.
The
CRTC
did
not
accept
AGT’s
submissions.
In
particular,
it
found
that
setting
rates
in
future
years
to
take
account
of
any
additional
income
tax
liability
would
not
constitute
retrospective
rate
making
any
more
than
any
other
changes
to
accounting
estimates
requiring
future
recovery.
Accordingly,
it
found
that
it
would
be
able
to
make
adjustments
to
AGT’s
rates
in
the
future
to
reflect
any
differences
between
the
amount
of
ATDs
accounted
for
in
prior
periods
and
the
amount
permitted
by
the
Minister
on
a
reassessment.
Leading
up
to
CRTC
decision
Telecom
93-9
on
July
23,
1993,
there
were
a
number
of
proceedings,
including
income
tax
specific
proceedings.
In
these
proceedings,
the
CRTC
and
other
parties
issued
interrogatories
which
were
answered
by
AGT.
Some
answers
relating
to
income
tax
issues
were
provided
to
the
CRTC
with
a
request
that
they
remain
confidential.
In
addition
there
were
proceedings
subsequent
to
July
23,
1993
in
which
AGT
responded
to
interrogatories
with
similar
confidentiality
requests.
Without
addressing
in
detail
AGT’s
reasons
for
seeking
confidentiality,
suffice
it
to
say
that
AGT
was
of
the
opinion
that
making
public
the
information
it
sought
to
keep
confidential
would
prejudice
its
position
vis-a-vis
the
Minister
in
any
subsequent
reassessment
by
the
Minister.
For
example,
AGT
may
have
assessed
the
risk
of
reassessment
of
its
ATDs
in
its
submissions
to
the
CRTC
for
revenue
requirements
purposes.
For
the
Minister
to
have
access
to
such
information
might
prompt
the
Minister
to
reassess
AGT
or
at
least
would
damage
AGT’s
negotiating
position
with
the
Minister.
The
CRTC
has
specific
rules
dealing
with
confidentiality
requests.
In
essence,
the
Rules
provide
that
the
CRTC
must
weigh
the
public
interest
in
disclosure
against
the
specific
direct
harm
to
an
applicant
that
might
result
from
such
disclosure.
In
accordance
with
this
approach,
the
CRTC
denied
AGT’s
requests
for
confidentiality
in
respect
of
some
information,
but
allowed
others.
It
is
the
documents
which
the
CRTC
found
were
entitled
to
confidentiality
to
which
AGT
says
the
Minister’s
Requirements
should
not
apply.
ISSUES
AGT
acknowledges
that
by
its
wording,
subsection
231.2(1)
is
very
broad
and
could
apply
to
any
document
or
any
information.
However,
it
raises
a
number
of
defences
which
it
says
disentitle
the
Minister
from
relying
on
the
Requirements
issued
under
that
section
in
this
case.
1.
The
case
law
has
narrowed
the
scope
of
Requirements
under
subsection
231.2(1)
and
what
the
Minister
seeks
in
this
case
is
outside
the
boundaries
of
subsection
231.2(1)
as
determined
by
the
jurisprudence.
2.
Common-law
privilege
attaches
to
the
documents
in
that
they
were
produced
with
the
understanding
that
they
would
not
be
disclosed.
3.
The
Minister’s
Requirements
constitute
an
abuse
of
the
process
in
view
of
the
confidentiality
rulings
of
the
CRTC.
4,
There
is
an
operational
conflict
created
for
AGT
between
the
Minister’s
Requirements
and
the
CRTC’s
confidentiality
orders.
The
Minister
should
go
before
the
CRTC
to
ask
for
a
variation
of
its
confidentiality
orders
rather
than
proceeding
by
way
of
Requirements.
5.
The
Requirements
constitute
an
unreasonable
seizure
contrary
to
section
8
of
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms
.
1.
The
Scope
of
Subsection
231.2(1)
Counsel
for
AGT
says
that
much
of
the
information
sought
by
the
Minister
is
irrelevant.
He
points
to
admissions
in
cross-
examination
of
the
Minister’s
deponent
to
that
effect.
In
any
event,
counsel
says
the
Minister
was
indifferent
as
to
whether
information
or
documents
could
possibly
be
relevant
and
therefore
his
conduct
is
not
reasonable.
Further,
he
says,
there
is
evidence
to
indicate
the
information
sought
is
not
necessary
to
determine
AGT’s
tax
liability.
He
submits
that
this
is
a
fishing
expedition
which,
he
says,
is
not
permitted
under
subsection
231.2(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
James
Richardson
&
Sons
Ltd.
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
Wilson
J.,
relying
on
Canadian
Bank
of
Commerce
v.
Canada
(Attorney
General)*
found
that
subsection
231(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63,
as
amended
(now
with
differences
that
are
inconsequential
for
purposes
of
this
case,
subsection
231.2(1)
of
the
current
Income
Tax
Act
)
was
not
to
be
construed
as
broadly
as
its
language
on
its
face
could
suggest.
In
Richardson,
supra,
the
Minister
had
served
Requirements
on
Richardson
to
disclose
information
about
certain
of
its
trading
customers
whose
tax
liability
was
not
under
investigation.
Wilson,
J.
called
such
a
general
check
on
compliance
with
the
Income
Tax
Act
a
fishing
expedition
into
the
affairs
of
Richardson’s
customers.
However,
she
did
state
that
if
the
tax
liability
of
a
customer
was
the
subject
of
a
genuine
inquiry,
the
Minister
would
have
been
entitled
to
require
Richardson
to
disclose
information
about
its
customer
even
if
innocent
taxpayers’
information
was
disclosed
in
the
process.
In
R.
v.
McKinlay
Transport
Ltd)®,
the
question
was
whether
a
Requirements
Notice
under
subsection
231(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63,
was
a
reasonable
seizure
under
section
8
of
the
Charter
of
Rights
and
Freedoms.
In
the
Ontario
High
Court,
Trainer
J.
found
that
relevance
was
a
prerequisite
to
a
Requirements
Notice
under
subsection
231(3).
He
also
said,
amongst
other
things,
that
a
Requirements
Notice
could
be
attacked
on
the
grounds
that
the
Minister
was
on
a
fishing
expedition.
In
addition,
he
was
of
the
opinion
that
where
the
issues
had
not
been
clearly
identified,
it
would
be
incumbent
on
the
Minister
to
set
out
the
grounds
for
the
demand
in
order
that
relevance
could
be
ascertained.
In
the
Ontario
Court
of
Appeal,
Grange
J.A.
found
that
a
Requirements
Notice
was
subject
to
being
objectively
tested
to
determine
whether
it
was
authorized
by
the
section
and
whether
it
was
relevant
to
the
tax
liability
of
a
specific
person.
At
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
Wilson
J.
observed
that
subsection
231(3)
was
enacted
because
of
the
reality
that
under
Canada’s
self
reporting
income
tax
system,
some
persons
would
attempt
to
avoid
paying
their
full
share
of
the
tax
burden.
She
then
addressed
the
criteria
to
be
met
in
order
that
a
search
be
reasonable.
After
analyzing
the
criteria
in
the
criminal
context
as
set
forth
by
Dickson
J.
(as
he
then
was)
in
Canada
(Director
of
Investigation
&.
Research,
Combines
Investigation
Branch)
v.
Southam
Inc)\
she
concluded
that
such
criteria
were
not
applicable
to
regulatory
provisions
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
particular,
she
found
that
the
Hunter
requirement
that
there
be
reasonable
grounds
for
believing
that
a
particular
taxpayer
had
failed
to
observe
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
not
a
requirement
for
the
Minister
acting
under
subsection
231(3).
She
specifically
found
that
the
other
Hunter
requirements
were
also
not
applicable.
Thus,
there
is
no
necessity
that
there
be
reasonable
grounds
to
believe
that
a
Requirements
Notice
will
turn
up
something
related
to
a
particular
assessment
or
that
only
documents
strictly
relevant
to
the
assessment
may
be
authorized
to
be
seized.
Further,
she
concluded
that
subsection
231(3)
provided
for
the
compelled
production
of
a
wide
array
of
documents
and
not
just
those
which
are
required
to
be
prepared
and
maintained
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Wilson
J.
does
not
grant
the
Minister
unconditional
power
to
search
and
seize
documents
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
She
observes
that
if
a
seizure
involves
entry
onto
private
property
of
a
taxpayer,
the
Hunter
safeguards
may
be
required.
However,
she
also
concludes
that
subsection
231(3)
is
the
least
intrusive
means
by
which
effective
monitoring
of
compliance
with
the
Income
Tax
Act
can
be
effected.
She
states
at
page
649-50:
In
my
opinion,
subsection
231(3)
provides
the
least
intrusive
means
by
which
effective
monitoring
of
compliance
with
the
Income
Tax
Act
can
be
effected.
It
involves
no
invasion
of
a
taxpayer’s
home
or
business
premises.
It
simply
calls
for
the
production
of
records
which
may
be
relevant
to
the
filing
of
an
income
tax
return.
A
taxpayer’s
privacy
interest
with
regard
to
these
documents
vis-à-vis
the
Minister
is
relatively
low.
The
Minister
has
no
way
of
knowing
whether
certain
records
are
relevant
until
he
has
had
an
opportunity
to
examine
them.
At
the
same
time,
the
taxpayer’s
privacy
interest
is
protected
as
much
as
possible
since
section
241
of
the
Act
protects
the
taxpayer
from
disclosure
of
his
records
or
the
information
contained
therein
to
other
persons
or
agencies.
Having
considered
Richardson
and
McKinlay,
I
conclude:
1.
The
expectation
of
privacy
in
relation
to
business
records
is
relatively
low.
2.
As
long
as
the
Minister’s
purpose
is
related
to
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
relevance
of
the
material
sought
to
a
particular
issue
is
not
a
prerequisite
to
a
Requirements
Notice
under
subsection
231.2(1).
3.
Documents
may
be
compelled
even
if
they
are
not
required
to
be
prepared
or
kept
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
4.
It
is
not
necessary
that
a
Requirements
Notice
set
out
the
grounds
or
particulars
for
which
the
documents
sought
are
required.
5.
As
long
as
the
documents
pertain
to
a
genuine
inquiry
into
the
tax
liability
of
a
person,
they
may
be
the
subject
of
a
Requirements
Notice
under
subsection
231.2(1).
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
Minister
had
been
conducting
an
audit
of
AGT.
In
1994
the
Minister
became
aware
that
confidential
information
had
been
filed
with
the
CRTC
by
AGT
pertaining
to
income
tax
issues.
The
Minister
requested
such
information
from
AGT
but
not
all
of
it
was
produced.
The
information
not
produced
was
that
which
had
been
supplied
to
the
CRTC
and
which
was
subject
to
the
CRTC’s
confidentiality
orders.
The
Minister
then
sought
to
obtain
the
confidential
information
from
the
CRTC.
The
CRTC
would
not
disclose
the
information
(I
will
return
to
this
issue).
It
was
at
that
point
the
Requirements
were
issued.
As
the
Minister
had
been
conducting
an
extensive
audit
of
AGT,
this
is
the
case
of
a
genuine
inquiry
into
the
income
tax
liability
of
AGT.
There
is
no
doubt
that
the
subject
matter
of
the
documents
which
the
Minister
sought
pertains
to
AGT’s
tax
liability.
The
Minister
is
entitled
to
business
records,
which
these
are,
whether
relevant
or
irrelevant
to
any
specific
issue.
The
fact
that
the
documents
may
not
have
been
prepared
for
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
of
no
consequence.
I
do
not
see
any
general
condition
precedent
to
the
Minister
invoking
subsection
231.2(1)
that
he
first
attempt
to
obtain
the
documents
voluntarily
or
that
he
limit
his
requirements
by
some
preliminary
determination
of
likely
relevance.
Certainly
the
Minister
may
not
invoke
subsection
231.2
(1)
in
bad
faith.
However,
the
fact
that
he
acknowledges
that
some
of
the
information
he
seeks
is
not
relevant,
is
not
fatal
to
the
Minister.
In
the
absence
of
some
other
specific
rationale
to
the
contrary,
the
Minister
is
entitled
in
the
present
case
to
the
documents
he
seeks
from
AGT.
2.
Common
Law
Privilege
AGT
says
the
confidential
documents
submitted
to
the
CRTC
are
subject
to
common-law
privilege
and,
therefore,
production
cannot
be
compelled
by
the
Minister
using
a
Requirements
Notice
under
subsection
231.2(1).
This
argument,
I
think,
goes
to
whether
there
is
a
reasonable
expectation
of
privacy
with
respect
to
the
documents.
As
Wilson
J.
pointed
out
in
McKinlay,
business
records
are
subject
to
a
low
expectation
of
privacy.
However,
while
such
expectation
may
be
low,
it
is
not
zero.
Common
law
privilege
is
defined
by
the
“Wigmore
Rules”
as
outlined
in
cases
such
as
R.
v.
Forty
.
The
“Wigmore
Rules”
are
set
forth
in
Gruenke
at
page
284
(C.C.C.
301):
(1)
The
communications
must
originate
in
a
confidence
that
they
will
not
be
disclosed.
(2)
This
element
of
confidentiality
must
be
essential
to
the
full
and
satisfactory
maintenance
of
the
relation
between
the
parties.
(3)
The
relation
must
be
one
in
which
the
opinion
of
the
community
ought
to
be
sedulously
fostered.
(4)
The
injury
that
would
inure
to
the
relation
by
the
disclosure
of
the
communications
must
be
greater
than
the
benefit
thereby
gained
for
the
correct
disposal
of
litigation.
Gruenke
distinguishes
between
those
situations
in
which
there
is
a
prima
facie
presumption
of
privilege
and
those
when
the
prima
facie
presumption
is
against
privilege.
At
page
286
(C.C.C.
303),
Lamer
C.J.C.
states:
The
term
“case
by
case”
privilege
is
used
to
refer
to
communications
for
which
there
is
a
prima
facie
assumption
that
they
are
not
privileged
(ie
are
admissible).
The
case-by-case
analysis
has
generally
involved
an
application
of
the
“Wigmore
test”
(see
above),
which
is
a
set
of
criteria
for
determining
whether
communications
should
be
privileged
(and
therefore
not
admitted)
in
particular
cases.
In
other
words,
the
case-by-case
analysis
requires
that
the
policy
reasons
for
excluding
otherwise
relevant
evidence
be
weighed
in
each
particular
case.
As
I
understand
AGT’s
argument,
while
there
is
no
presumption
of
privilege
over
the
documents,
application
of
the
“Wigmore
Rules”
to
the
circumstances
of
this
case
will
result
in
them
being
found
to
be
privileged
and
exempt
from
seizure
under
subsection
231.2(1).
I
turn
to
the
first
of
the
“Wigmore
Rules”
—
the
documents
must
originate
in
a
confidence
that
they
will
not
be
disclosed.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
documents
in
question
were
submitted
to
the
CRTC
by
AGT
with
the
request
that
they
remain
confidential.
The
CRTC
ruled
that
some
documents
should
be
disclosed
and
others
should
remain
confidential.
In
making
such
rulings,
the
CRTC
had
regard
for
sections
350
and
358
of
the
Railway
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
R-3,
as
amended,
and
sections
18
and
19
of
the
C.R.T.C.
Telecommunications
Rules
of
Procedure
.
In
relevant
part
they
provide:
350.
Where
information
concerning
the
costs
of
a
railway
company
or
other
information
that
is
by
its
nature
confidential
is
obtained
from
the
company
by
the
Commission
in
the
course
of
any
investigation
under
this
Act,
the
information
shall
not
be
published
or
revealed
in
such
a
manner
as
to
be
available
for
the
use
of
any
other
person,
unless
in
the
opinion
of
the
Commission
the
publication
is
necessary
in
the
public
interest.
358.
(1)
The
Commission
may,
by
notice
served
on
any
railway,
telegraph,
telephone
or
express
company
or
any
officer,
servant
or
agent
of
the
company,
require
it,
the
officer,
servant
or
agent
to
furnish
the
Commission,
at
or
within
any
time
stated
in
the
notice,
with
a
written
statement
or
statements
showing
in
so
far,
and
with
such
detail
and
particulars,
as
the
Commission
requires.
(3)
Any
information
furnished
to
the
Commission
by
any
return,
or
any
evidence
taken
by
the
Commission
in
connection
therewith,
shall
not
be
open
to
the
public,
or
published,
but
shall
be
for
the
information
of
the
Commission
only.
(5)
The
Commission
may
authorize
any
part
of
the
information
obtained
by
it
to
be
made
public
when,
and
in
so
far
as,
there
may
appear
to
the
Commission
to
be
good
and
sufficient
reasons
for
so
doing,
18.
(2)
A
party
who
is
unable
or
unwilling
to
provide
a
full
and
adequate
response
to
an
interrogatory
shall
(c)
where
the
party
contends
that
the
information
sought
is
of
a
confidential
nature,
provide
a
response
that
sets
out
the
reasons
therefor
as
required
by
subsection
19(2),
and
file
with
the
Secretary
a
copy
of
the
response
provided.
19.
(1)
Where
a
document
is
filed
with
the
Commission
by
a
party
in
relation
to
any
proceeding,
the
Commission
shall
place
the
document
on
the
public
record
unless
the
party
filing
the
document
asserts
a
claim
of
confidentiality
at
the
time
of
such
filing.
(5)
Where
a
claim
for
confidentiality
is
made
in
connection
with
a
document
that
has
not
been
filed
by
a
party,
the
Commission
may
require
the
party
to
file
the
document
and,
after
the
document
has
been
filed,
the
document
shall
(a)
be
reviewed
by
the
Commission
in
confidence;
and
(b)
be
dealt
with
as
provided
in
subsection
(10)
or
(11),
whichever
is
applicable.
(10)
Where
the
Commission
is
of
the
opinion
that,
based
on
all
the
material
before
it,
no
specific
direct
harm
would
be
likely
to
result
from
disclosure,
or
where
any
such
specific
direct
harm
is
shown
but
is
not
sufficient
to
outweigh
the
public
interest
in
disclosing
the
document,
the
document
shall
be
placed
on
the
public
record.
[Emphasis
added.
I
(11)
Where
the
Commission
is
of
the
opinion
that,
based
on
all
the
material
before
it,
the
specific
direct
harm
likely
to
result
from
public
disclosure
justifies
a
claim
for
confidentiality,
the
Commission
may
(a)
order
that
the
document
not
be
placed
on
the
public
record;
(b)
order
disclosure
of
an
abridged
version
of
the
document;
or
(c)
order
that
the
document
be
disclosed
to
parties
at
a
hearing
to
be
conducted
in
camera.
It
is
apparent
that
sections
350
and
358
of
the
Railway
Act
confer
a
discretion
on
the
CRTC
to
disclose
confidential
information
where
it
considers
the
public
interest
requires
such
disclosure.
Rules
18
and
19
provide
a
procedure
and
criteria
under
which
the
CRTC
is
to
determine
whether
information
that
is
confidential
should
be
revealed.
The
CRTC
is
required
to
exercise
its
discretion
based
on
the
specific
direct
harm
criteria
in
Rules
19(10)
and
(11)
as
to
whether,
and
the
extent
to
which,
to
order
disclosure
of
documents
submitted
in
confidence
in
any
given
case.
It
is
these
discretionary
provisions
under
which
the
Commission
acted
with
respect
to
the
documents
in
question
in
this
case.
For
example,
in
its
decision
on
requests
for
disclosure,
dated
January
20,
1992,
the
Commission
states:
This
letter
constitutes
the
Commission’s
decision
regarding
requests
of
the
parties
to
this
proceeding
for
public
disclosure
and
for
further
responses
in
relation
to
the
responses
to
interrogatories
filed
by
AGT....
In
assessing
AGT’s
claims
for
confidentiality,
the
Commission
is
governed
by
the
provisions
of
sections
350
and
358
of
the
Railway
Act
and
section
19
of
the
CRTC
Telecommunications
Rules
of
Procedure.
In
each
case,
the
Commission
has
weighed
the
public
interest
in
disclosure
and
the
specific
direct
harm
that
might
result
from
such
disclosure.
In
applying
these
principles,
the
Commission
has
considered
a
number
of
factors.
The
Commission
goes
on
to
give
examples
of
the
matters
it
considered.
One
was
the
extent
of
competition
in
a
particular
market.
The
Commission
states:
The
Commission
considers
that,
other
things
being
equal,
the
greater
the
degree
of
competition,
the
greater
the
specific
harm
that
could
be
expected
to
result
from
disclosure.
The
Commission
concluded
that
some
information,
for
which
confidentiality
was
requested,
should
be
placed
on
the
public
record.
Other
information
should
remain
confidential.
The
Commission
states:
Having
regard
to
these
considerations,
the
Commission
has
decided
that
all
or
part
of
the
information
subject
to
a
claim
of
confidence
in
the
interrogatories
listed
in
Appendix
A
of
this
decision
should
be
placed
on
the
public
record
of
this
proceeding.
In
each
such
case,
the
Commission
has
concluded
that
the
specific
direct
harm
likely
to
be
caused
by
disclosure
would
not
outweigh
the
public
interest
in
disclosure.
Accordingly,
unless
otherwise
expressly
indicated
in
Appendix
A,
AGT
is
directed
to
place
on
the
public
record
all
of
the
information
which
was
subject
to
a
claim
of
confidence
in
each
of
the
interrogatories
listed
in
Appendix
A.
The
requests
for
public
disclosure
that
are
the
subject
of
this
decision
which
relate
to
interrogatories
that
are
not
listed
in
Appendix
A
are
hereby
denied.
In
Gruenke,
supra,
it
was
found
that
the
communications
between
the
accused
and
a
pastor
and
counsellor
did
not
originate
in
a
confidence
that
they
would
not
be
disclosed.
The
pastor
and
counsellor
testified
that
they
were
unclear
as
to
whether
they
were
expected
to
keep
confidential
what
the
accused
told
them.
This
led
the
Court
to
the
conclusion
that
the
accused
did
not
make
her
admissions
to
them
in
the
confident
belief
they
would
not
be
disclosed.
In
the
case
at
bar,
the
basis
of
the
privilege
claim
is
that
the
documents
were
submitted
to
the
CRTC
with
a
claim
for
confidentiality
pursuant
to
Rules
18
and
19
of
the
Telecommunications
Rules
of
Procedure.
There
is
no
evidence
of
any
other
reason
supporting
the
argument
that
they
originated
in
the
confidence
that
they
would
not
be
disclosed.
Undoubtedly,
AGT
hoped
the
CRTC
would
rule
that
the
documents
not
be
disclosed;
but
in
making
their
submissions,
they
left
themselves
in
the
hands
of
the
CRTC.
The
CRTC
was
bound
to
follow
the
relevant
provisions
of
the
Railway
Act
and
Telecommunications
Rules
of
Procedure
and
exercise
its
discretion
as
to
whether
to
allow
AGT’s
claim
for
confidentiality
in
whole
or
in
part.
This
inevitably
leads
to
the
conclusion
that
AGT
could
not
have
originated
the
documents
it
submitted
to
the
CRTC
in
the
confidence
they
would
not
be
disclosed.
AGT
says
that
from
its
experience
with
the
CRTC
and
from
the
way
in
which
the
CRTC
dealt
with
its
first
submission
of
documents
with
a
request
for
confidentiality,
it
had
confidence
that
the
CRTC
would
not
disclose
the
documents
which
AGT
considered
confidential.
Indeed
after
its
first
submission,
and
because
of
the
CRTC’s
first
decision,
AGT
probably
had
some
confidence
that
a
number
of
the
documents
subsequently
submitted
would
not
be
disclosed.
However,
AGT
could
not
have
had
such
confidence
with
respect
to
its
first
submission
of
documents
and
indeed
could
never
be
certain
that
a
new
argument
from
another
party
might
not
result
in
the
CRTC
deciding
to
order
further
disclosure.
Further,
there
is
some
indication
in
the
material
that
the
CRTC
revisited
at
least
one
of
its
confidentiality
decisions.
In
addition,
the
CRTC
indicates
in
its
August
7,
1992
decision,
that
AGT
had
submitted
that
the
material
in
question
in
this
case
was
of
a
“uniquely
sensitive
nature”
and
that
the
CRTC
agreed
that
the
circumstances
are
unique.
That
the
CRTC
considered
it
necessary
to
revisit
one
of
its
confidentiality
decisions
and
that
the
circumstances
in
this
case
were
unique,
suggests
that
little
reliance
could
be
placed
on
prior
decisions
of
the
CRTC
with
respect
to
confidentiality.
In
all
the
circumstances,
I
am
convinced
that
AGT
could
not
have
originated
the
documents
it
submitted
to
the
CRTC
in
the
confidence
that
they
would
not
be
disclosed.
As
a
result,
the
first
of
the
“Wigmore”
tests
has
not
been
met
and
it
is
not
necessary
to
go
on
to
consider
the
other
tests.
Common
law
privilege
is
simply
not
applicable
in
this
case.
3.
Abuse
of
the
Process
AGT
says
that
Requirements
are
an
abuse
of
the
process
for
the
following
reasons:
1.
Access
to
the
documents
should
only
be
made
by
way
of
application
to
the
CRTC
to
vary
its
confidentiality
orders.
The
Requirements
should
not
be
used
to
circumvent
such
procedure.
2.
The
Requirements
constitute
an
“end
run”
around
the
CRTC’s
confidentiality
orders.
The
confidentiality
orders
have
been
filed
in
the
Federal
Court.
This
Court
should
not,
in
effect,
sanction
a
variation
of
such
confidentiality
orders,
especially
when
they
have
been
filed
in
this
Court,
in
the
absence
of
truly
compelling
reasons
which
are
not
present
here.
3.
The
Requirements
undermine
the
supervisory
role
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
over
actions
of
the
CRTC.
4.
The
Requirements
undermine
the
relationship
between
regulated
entities
and
the
CRTC
and
the
confidence
regulated
entities
must
have
in
the
efficacy
of
CRTC
orders
pertaining
to
the
confidentiality
of
information
submitted
by
these
entities.
1.
Is
it
necessary
for
the
Minister
to
apply
to
the
CRTC
to
vary
its
confidentiality
orders?
It
may
be
open
to
the
Minister
to
apply
to
the
CRTC
to
vary
its
confidentiality
orders.
However,
I
see
nothing
in
subsection
231.2(1)
that
suggests
that
it
cannot
be
invoked
by
the
Minister
even
in
the
face
of
such
confidentiality
orders.
I
accept
that
the
statutory
power
of
the
Minister
may
be
subject
to
statutory
or
common
law
exceptions.
Such
statutory
exceptions
are
not
confined
to
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Thus,
if
the
Railway
Act
or
Telecommunications
Act,
S.C.
40-41-42
Elizabeth
II,
c.
38,
provided
for
an
absolute
privilege
with
respect
to
specific
returns
made
to
the
CRTC,
a
Requirements
Notice
might
not
be
effective
in
respect
of
such
documents.
No
such
statutory
exception
has
been
pointed
out
in
this
case.
Similarly,
if
common
law
exceptions
applied,
such
as
common
law
privilege,
the
Requirements
Notice
might
not
be
effective.
However,
it
has
already
been
determined
that
the
common
law
privilege
exception
is
not
applicable
in
this
case.
What
is
left
is
a
discretionary
order
of
the
CRTC
made
as
a
result
of
submissions
of
the
parties
before
it.
The
Minister
was
not
such
a
party.
It
would
be
quite
a
leap
of
logic
to
conclude
that
the
CRTC’s
discretionary
confidentiality
orders
override
other
statutory
powers,
especially
when
the
person
invoking
the
statutory
power
was
not
a
party
before
the
CRTC.
It
is
not
necessary
for
the
Minister
to
apply
to
the
CRTC
to
vary
its
confidentiality
orders.
2.
The
Requirements
Notice
constitutes
an
end
run
around
the
CRTC
confidentiality
orders.
The
end
run
argument
is
just
a
variation
of
the
argument
that
the
Minister
must
seek
a
variation
of
the
CRTC
confidentiality
orders.
In
this
end
run
argument,
the
context
is
that
the
CRTC
orders
have
been
filed
in
the
Federal
Court
and
that
sanctioning
Requirements
under
subsection
231.2(1)
constitutes
a
variation
of
the
CRTC
orders
by
this
Court.
AGT
relies
on
Smith,
Kline
and
French
Laboratories
Ltd.
v.
Canada
(Attorney
General),
for
the
proposition
that
a
confidentiality
order
should
only
be
varied
for
“truly
compelling
reasons”.
However,
Smith,
Kline
and
French
Laboratories
Ltd.,
supra
is
not
applicable.
In
that
case,
the
Minister
did
not
proceed
under
subsection
231.2(1),
but
simply
applied
to
the
Court
to
vary
a
confidentiality
order
of
the
Court.
Here,
however,
we
are
not
dealing
with
an
application
to
vary.
If
the
Minister
was
simply
proceeding
as
a
private
citizen
to
obtain
documents
subject
to
a
confidentiality
order,
he
would
have
to
apply
to
vary
the
CRTC
confidentiality
orders
as
he
attempted
to
do
in
respect
of
a
sealing
Order
of
this
Court
in
Smith,
Kline.
Here,
however,
the
Minister
is
proceeding
under
subsection
231.2(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Parliament
has
conferred
on
the
Minister
special
power
in
relation
to
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
it
is
that
scheme
that
is
at
play
and
not
an
application
to
vary
a
confidentiality
order.
Indeed,
the
confidentiality
orders
are
not
varied.
They
remain
in
place.
They
are
binding
on
the
CRTC
and
any
person
who
seeks
the
information
from
the
CRTC.
That
is
not
the
route
the
Minister
has
followed
in
this
case.
3.
Undermining
of
supervisory
role
of
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
It
is
argued
that
issuance
of
the
Requirements
Notice
undermines
the
supervisory
role
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
over
the
CRTC.
Again,
the
gist
of
this
argument
is
that
the
Minister
should
seek
a
variation
of
the
CRTC
orders
from
the
CRTC.
If
he
is
dissatisfied
with
the
result
of
such
application
his
recourse
is
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
The
general
scheme
of
supervision
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
over
the
CRTC
is
not
in
issue.
That
scheme
subsists.
However,
it
may
not
operate
in
the
face
of
legislation
to
the
contrary.
For
example,
subsection
12(1)
of
the
Telecommunications
Act
provides
for
a
petition
to
the
Governor-in-Council
for
variation
or
recision
of
an
order
of
the
CRTC.
This
is
a
statutory
form
of
recourse
from
orders
of
the
CRTC
which
does
not
involve
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
By
the
same
reasoning,
the
Income
Tax
Act
gives
the
Minister
the
power
to
obtain
information
from
taxpayers.
This
power,
in
effect,
is
an
alternative
to
the
Minister
having
to
seek
a
variation
of
a
CRTC
confidentiality
order
and,
by
extension,
the
necessity
of
having
to
appeal
a
negative
ruling
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
This
power
does
not
derogate
from
the
general
supervisory
role
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
Each
operates
within
its
own
sphere.
This
argument
is
without
merit.
4.
Undermining
the
Relationship
between
the
CRTC
and
Regulated
Entities
If
any
person
without
alternative
specific
statutory
authority
seeks
confidential
information
from
the
CRTC,
a
variation
order
would
seem
to
be
the
only
way
in
which
that
person
could
obtain
access
to
such
documents.
The
Minister
is
in
a
different
and
preferred
position
by
virtue
of
the
specific
power
conferred
upon
him
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
CRTC’s
orders
are
binding
on
the
CRTC.
They
do
not
purport
to
affect
the
operation
of
another
statute
under
which
the
Minister
seeks,
and
is
entitled
to
seek,
confidential
documents
from
taxpayers
including
regulated
entities
such
as
AGT.
When
the
Minister
sought
to
obtain
confidential
information
from
the
CRTC
without
issuing
a
Requirements
Notice,
the
CRTC
refused
the
request.
It
is
clear
that
regulated
entities
may
continue
to
have
full
confidence
in
the
efficacy
of
CRTC
confidentiality
orders.
That
other
statutory
provisions
enable
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
to
obtain
access
to
confidential
information
has
no
bearing
on
that
general
relationship.
4.
Operational
Conflict
AGT
relies
on
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
British
Columbia
Telephone
Co.
v.
Shaw
Cable
Systems
(B.C.)
Ltd.}*.
Operational
conflict
arises
when
a
person
is
subjected
to
conflicting
orders
from
different
authorities
such
that
compliance
with
one
would
necessitate
violation
of
the
other.
In
such
case,
the
person
may
seek
guidance
from
the
Court
as
to
which
order
to
follow.
In
the
present
case
there
are
no
conflicting
orders
of
this
nature.
The
CRTC
confidentiality
orders
are
binding
on
the
CRTC
in
proceedings
before
that
tribunal.
They
are
for
the
benefit
of
AGT
but
they
do
not
bind
AGT.
They
do
not
purport
to
prevent
AGT
from
voluntarily
disclosing
documents
or
information
as
it
sees
fit
or
from
complying
with
lawful
disclosure
obligations
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
By
contrast,
the
Minister’s
Requirements
Notices
are
binding
on
AGT.
AGT
must
comply
with
them.
There
is
no
operational
conflict.
5.
Unreasonable
Seizure
Contrary
to
Section
8
of
The
Charter
AGT
submits
that
the
Requirements
in
this
case
constitute
an
unreason-
able
seizure
and
therefore
violate
section
8
of
the
Charter.
AGT’s
Charter
attack
in
this
case
is
not
against
the
constitutional
validity
of
subsection
231.2(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Indeed,
it
cannot
be,
as
Wilson
J.
in
McKinlay
concluded
at
page
650
(C.T.C.
114-15)
that
the
seizure
contemplated
by
subsection
231
(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
reasonable
and
does
not
violate
section
8
of
the
Charter.
Rather,
AGT
submits
that
in
the
particular
circumstances
of
this
case,
a
seizure
under
subsection
231.2(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
unreasonable,
and
violates
section
8
of
the
Charter
in
that
respect.
AGT
says
that
whether
a
search
and
seizure
is
or
is
not
reasonable
requires
a
balancing
of
the
individual’s
right
to
privacy
and
the
government’s
interest
in
law
enforcement.
In
Hunter
v.
Southam
Inc.,
Dickson
J.
states
at
page
159-60
(D.T.C.
6473-74)
:
The
guarantee
of
security
from
unreasonable
search
and
seizure
only
protects
a
reasonable
expectation.
This
limitation
on
the
right
guaranteed
by
section
8,
whether
it
is
expressed
negatively
as
freedom
from
“unreasonable”
search
and
seizure,
or
positively
as
an
entitlement
to
a
“reasonable”
expectation
of
privacy,
indicates
that
an
assessment
must
be
made
as
to
whether
in
a
particular
situation
the
public’s
interest
in
being
left
alone
by
government
must
give
way
to
the
government’s
interest
in
intruding
on
the
individual’s
privacy
in
order
to
advance
its
goals,
notably
those
of
law
enforcement.
In
favour
of
the
privacy
interest
of
the
individual,
AGT
submits:
1.
The
documents
were
prepared
with
the
assistance
of
counsel.
2.
The
documents
were
not
brought
into
existence
voluntarily.
3.
The
documents
are
the
subject
of
confidentiality
orders
which
reflect
the
view
of
the
CRTC
that
it
is
in
the
public
interest
that
they
remain
confidential.
4.
The
documents
are
not
required
by
the
Income
Tax
Act.
5.
The
documents
were
brought
into
existence
with
the
expectation
that
they
would
be
treated
as
confidential.
AGT
submits
that
these
reasons
outweigh
the
Minister’s
interest
in
law
enforcement.
AGT
says
that
the
Minister
has
admitted
that
a
large
number
of
documents
are
irrelevant,
the
Minister’s
audit
has
been
completed,
the
initial
reasons
advanced
for
requiring
the
documents
have
been
satisfied,
and
the
material
before
the
Court
does
not
specify
why
the
documents
are
required.
I
will
deal
first
with
AGT’s
expectations.
As
to
the
involvement
of
counsel,
the
short
answer
is
that
solicitor-client
privilege
is
not
claimed.
If
there
is
no
solicitor-client
privilege
in
respect
of
the
documents,
and
indeed
there
cannot
be
because
the
documents
have
been
disclosed
to
a
third
party,
the
CRTC,
there
is
no
basis
for
an
argument
that
there
is
some
expectation
of
privacy
because
of
the
involvement
of
counsel.
As
to
the
fact
the
documents
were
not
brought
into
existence
volun-
tarily,
the
recent
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
R.
v.
Fitzpatrick,
[1995]
4
S.C.R.
154,
43
C.R.
(4th)
343,
is
instructive.
In
that
case,
reports
which
a
fisherman
was
required
to
keep
and
submit
under
the
Fisheries
Act
were
used
in
a
prosecution
of
that
fisherman
under
the
Act.
The
Supreme
Court
held
it
was
not
contrary
to
fundamental
justice
under
section
7
of
the
Charter
for
an
individual
to
be
convicted
of
a
regulatory
offence
on
the
basis
of
a
record
or
return
that
he
was
required
to
submit
as
one
of
the
terms
of
his
participation
in
the
regulated
sphere.
In
the
case
at
bar,
AGT
chose
to
ask
the
CRTC
to
include
in
its
revenue
requirements
for
rate
making
purposes
an
allowance
for
income
tax
on
a
more
conservative
basis
than
the
income
tax
liability
reflected
in
AGT’s
income
tax
returns.
While
there
may
have
been
some
reasons
for
doing
so,
AGT
was
not
compelled
to
do
so.
When
it
chose
to
do
so,
it
was
faced
with
interrogatories
that
it
was
then
required
to
answer
and
which
it
now
says
the
Minister
should
not
see.
I
think
the
words
of
La
Forest
J.
in
Fitzpatrick
at
page
178
(C.R.
360)
are
apposite:
...
the
individual
is
furnishing
information
that
is
meant
to
benefit
him
or
her,
through
proper
and
fair
distribution
of
scarce
fishing
resources.
Just
because
this
information
may
later
be
used
in
an
adversarial
proceeding,
when
the
state
seeks
to
enforce
the
restrictions
necessary
to
accomplish
its
regulatory
objectives,
does
not
mean
that
the
state
is
guilty
of
coercing
the
individual
to
incriminate
himself.
The
state
required
certain
information
to
be
provided,
and
the
individual
voluntarily
assumed
the
obligation
to
do
so
in
deciding
to
become
a
fisher
in
the
first
place.
It
ill
lies
in
the
mouth
of
someone
who
knowingly
assumes
an
obligation
for
a
beneficial
purpose
to
argue
later
that
this
obligation
has
the
effect
of
denying
him
his
rights.
[Emphasis
added.
I
It
was
open
to
AGT
to
claim
an
allowance
for
income
tax
on
the
basis
of
the
returns
it
filed
with
the
Minister.
When
it
chose
to
claim
an
allowance
for
income
tax
on
a
more
conservative
basis,
it
voluntarily
assumed
the
obligation
to
bring
into
existence
documents
which
it
now
wishes
to
withhold
from
the
Minister.
The
fact
that
the
CRTC
served
interrogatories
on
AGT
requiring
the
documents
in
question
is
of
no
consequence.
It
was
AGT
that
voluntarily
initiated
the
process.
As
La
Forest
J.
pointed
out
in
Fitzpatrick,
it
ill
lies
in
the
mouth
of
one
who
knowingly
assumes
an
obligation
for
a
beneficial
purpose
to
argue
later
that
the
obligation
has
the
effect
of
denying
him
his
rights.
As
to
AGT’s
argument
that
the
documents
are
subject
to
confidentiality
orders
which
are
based
on
a
public
interest
finding
in
favour
of
confidentiality,
this
is
not
a
relevant
consideration
in
this
case.
The
Minister
was
not
a
party
to
the
proceedings
that
led
to
such
orders.
The
context
in
which
they
were
made
was
with
respect
to
participants
in
proceedings
before
the
CRTC.
The
public
interest
implication
of
such
orders
cannot
be
taken
further
than
that.
Moreover,
subsection
231.2(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
under
which
the
Minister
is
proceeding
is
also
in
the
public
interest.
Whether
the
documents
are
or
are
not
required
to
be
maintained
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
not
a
consideration.
Wilson
J.,
at
page
642
(C.T.C.
110)
of
McKinlay,
states:
First,
section
231(3),
even
construed
narrowly
in
accordance
with
prior
authority,
envisages
the
compelled
production
of
a
wide
array
of
documents
and
not
simply
those
which
the
state
requires
the
taxpayer
to
prepare
and
maintain
under
the
legislation.
This
argument
does
not
avail
to
the
benefit
of
AGT
in
this
case.
I
have
already
dealt
with
AGT’s
argument
that
the
documents
in
question
were
brought
into
existence
in
the
expectation
that
they
would
be
kept
confidential.
On
the
evidence,
the
documents
were
brought
into
existence
in
the
expectation
the
CRTC
would
rule
on
whether
they
would
be
kept
confidential.
Some
documents
were
ordered
to
be
placed
on
the
public
record.
The
evidence
does
not
support
AGT’s
argument.
As
to
AGT’s
argument
that
the
Minister
does
not
have
a
compelling
case
for
disclosure
of
the
documents
because
he
has
admitted
that
many
of
them
are
irrelevant,
McKinlay,
supra,
stands
for
the
proposition
that
relevance
is
not
a
prerequisite
for
a
Requirements
Notice
under
subsection
231.2(1).
(See
McKinlay
at
page
650.)
Contrary
to
AGT’s
submission,
the
Minister’s
audit
was
not
unconditionally
completed.
In
her
June
14,
1995
letter
to
AGT,
Marlene
White,
Manager
of
the
Minister’s
Audit
Team
for
AGT
states:
We
have
now
completed
our
audit
of
the
above
noted
years
and
wish
to
formalize
our
position
papers
into
a
proposal
letter.
In
some
instances
where
additional
questions
were
asked
and
a
reply
was
not
given
to
date,
we
have
made
the
necessary
assumptions
to
put
our
proposals
forward....
It
is
apparent
that
the
audit
was
based
on
the
information
in
the
possession
of
the
Minister
at
the
time.
The
letter
expressly
refers
to
information
not
yet
provided.
Utilizing
assumptions
in
respect
of
information
not
yet
provided,
the
audit
was
completed.
But
it
is
quite
clear
that
the
Minister
was
still
seeking
information
which
AGT
was
refusing
to
disclose.
The
audit
was
therefore
not
unconditionally
completed
as
it
is
obvious
that
the
Minister
was
still
seeking
the
answers
to
certain
questions.
As
to
whether
the
specific
reasons
initially
given
for
requiring
the
documents
must
subsist
to
support
the
Requirements
Notice,
I
conclude
that
they
need
not.
The
Requirements
must
only
be
related
to
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
An
audit
is
surely
encompassed
in
these
terms
and
supports
the
Requirements
Notice.
Finally,
the
Minister
need
not
specify
why
the
documents
are
required
with
any
greater
degree
of
particularity
than
is
apparent
in
the
evidence
in
this
case.
It
is
clear
the
Minister
was
conducting
an
audit
of
AGT
and
that
the
documents
he
was
seeking
were
business
records
pertaining
to
AGT’s
income
tax
liability.
That
is
sufficient.
I
am
satisfied
in
the
circumstances
of
this
case,
the
Requirements
under
subsection
231.2(1)
do
not
constitute
an
unreasonable
seizure.
COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN
THE
MINISTER’S
OFFICIALS
AND
THE
CRTC
Earlier,
I
said
I
would
return
to
the
attempt
by
the
Minister’s
officials
to
obtain
AGT’s
confidential
information
from
the
CRTC.
According
to
the
evidence,
three
representatives
of
the
Minister
visited
the
CRTC.
Counsel
for
the
Minister
says
this
was
an
innocent
visit
simply
to
ascertain
whether
the
CRTC
would
disclose
the
subject
documents.
I
have
some
difficulty
with
this
characterization
of
what
occurred.
The
visit
was
occasioned
as
a
result
of
a
May
8,
1995
memo
from
the
Acting
Director/Audit,
at
the
Edmonton
Tax
Service
Office,
to
the
Interim
Assistant
Deputy
Minister,
Verification,
Enforcement
and
Compliance
Research
Branch.
The
memo
raises
the
concern
that
if
Requirements
are
issued,
they
could
be
subject
to
an
adverse
court
decision:
We
are
considering
the
issuance
of
requirements
on
AGT
for
this
information,
but
are
concerned
over
any
“down
side”
that
may
result
from
an
adverse
court
decision.
Numerous
companies
are
regulated
by
the
CRTC
as
well
as
any
number
of
other
regulators
in
the
country.
Should
we
lose,
a
significant
flow
of
information
on
other
files
may
be
closed
off.
As
an
alternative,
the
memo
states:
There
may
be
diplomatic
ways
to
have
the
CRTC
provide
the
information
to
Revenue
Canada
but
this
avenue
has
not
been
explored
locally,
as
protocol
would
deem
this
to
be
a
ministerial
matter.
[Emphasis
added.]
As
a
result
of
the
memo,
three
representatives
of
the
Minister
visited
the
CRTC
on
June
22,
1995.
At
that
meeting,
the
CRTC
refused
to
provide
information
to
the
Minister’s
officials
and
it
was
therefore
decided
to
issue
the
Requirements.
What
occurred
raises
a
number
of
questions.
What
was
meant
by
“diplomatic
channels”
referred
to
in
the
memo
to
the
Interim
Assistant
Deputy
Minister?
Why
would
protocol
deem
this
to
be
a
ministerial
matter?
Why
would
an
“innocent”
visit
require
three
representatives
of
the
Minister?
There
was
some
indication
that
two
of
the
three
representatives
were
senior
personnel.
One
was
the
Director,
Large
Business
Audit
Division.
Most
significantly,
why
would
the
Minister’s
officials
not
have
told
AGT
that
representatives
would
be
requesting
confidential
information
directly
from
the
CRTC?
One
explanation
for
the
procedure
followed
by
the
Minister’s
officials
is,
as
counsel
for
the
Minister
submits,
that
it
was
entirely
innocent.
The
other
is
that
in
order
to
avoid
the
risk
of
a
court
challenge
that
might
be
occasioned
by
serving
a
Notice
of
Requirements
under
subsection
231.2(1),
it
constituted
a
“back
door”
attempt
by
the
Minister’s
officials
to
obtain
documents
from
another
government
agency
to
which
the
Minister,
in
the
absence
of
a
Requirements
Notice,
was
not
entitled.
Regrettably,
I
must
conclude
that
the
evidence
is
consistent
with
the
latter
explanation.
Parliament
has
conferred
on
the
Minister,
in
subsection
231.2(1),
extensive
powers
of
search
and
seizure
on
taxpayers.
Subsection
231.2(1)
has
been
found
to
be
constitutionally
valid.
In
the
absence
of
consent
by
the
taxpayer,
the
Minister’s
officials
must
proceed
under
the
statutory
power
conferred
on
the
Minister
and
in
no
other
way.
The
May
8,
1995
memo
states:
Audit
is
of
the
opinion
that
supplying
complete
information
to
the
audit
team
is
in
the
“public
interest”
and
any
increased
reassessment
can
hardly
be
held
by
AGT
not
to
be
in
the
overall
public
interest.
Indeed,
compliance
with
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
in
the
public
interest.
But
that
objective
does
not
justify
attempts
to
obtain
information
to
that
end
from
other
government
departments
by
extra-
legal
means
in
order
to
avoid
a
court
challenge
to
the
lawful
procedures
provided
by
the
Income
Tax
Act.
If
the
courts,
through
a
proper
interpretation
of
the
legislation
and/or
the
facts,
limit
the
Minister’s
power
under
subsection
231.2(1),
the
Minister
must
accept
that
verdict,
just
as
the
taxpayer
must
accept
a
wider
interpretation
of
the
Minister’s
authority
under
subsection
231.2(1).
It
must
be
remembered
that
Parliament,
because
of
its
concern
that
some
taxpayers
will
not
voluntarily
conform
to
the
requirements
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
has
conferred
wide
powers
of
search
and
seizure
on
the
Minister.
The
Minister’s
actions,
therefore,
must
be
beyond
reproach.
The
public
must
have
confidence
that
in
their
dealings
with
the
Minister,
the
Minister
is
not
acting
outside
the
scope
of
the
powers
conferred
upon
him
by
Parliament.
Having
said
this,
the
Minister’s
officials’
actions
do
not
affect
the
Minister’s
authority
under
subsection
231.2(1)
once
he
invokes
that
authority.
Therefore,
while
the
actions
of
the
Minister’s
officials
in
contacting
the
CRTC
are
regrettable,
those
actions
do
not
provide
a
basis
for
relief
to
AGT
with
respect
to
the
Requirements
that
were
ultimately
issued.
Conclusion
Although
counsel
for
the
respondent
was
not
mentioned
in
these
reasons
except
where
her
submissions
were
not
accepted
with
respect
to
the
Minister’s
officials’
visit
to
the
CRTC,
her
argument
was
of
significant
assistance
to
the
Court.
This
application
for
judicial
review
is
dismissed.
In
order
to
preserve
the
efficacious
result
of
a
successful
appeal,
the
Minister
should
not
enforce
the
Notice
of
Requirements
until
after
the
time
for
appeal
has
expired
or
if
notice
of
appeal
is
filed,
until
the
appeal
is
determined,
provided
AGT
acts
expeditiously
on
the
appeal.
Application
dismissed.