Lamarre
Proulx
J.T.C.C.:
—
These
appeals,
brought
by
way
of
the
informal
procedure,
were
heard
on
common
evidence.
The
taxation
years
under
appeal
are:
for
Stephen
James
Creagh,
George
Hodorowski
and
Ajit
Thomas,
the
years
1992
and
1993;
for
William
Crowe,
Daniel
Cloutier,
Roy
S.
Carmichael,
Tim
Bain,
Rick
Hearnden,
Lawrence
N.
Hepple,
Richard
Johnstone,
James
Neill,
Tim
Simmons,
and
Timothy
Burril,
1993;
and
for
Harry
Alex
Laird,
1992.
The
question
at
issue
is
whether
the
employment
income
earned
by
the
Appellants
as
employees
of
Canadian
Helicopter,
with
respect
to
a
United
Nations
peacekeeping
mission,
was
income
from
employment
with
a
prescribed
international
organization
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
110(l)(f)(iii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Act”).
Alternatively,
for
the
Appellants
who
were
aircraft
maintenance
engineers,
whether
they
were
employed
by
an
employer
who
carried
on
business
outside
Canada
with
respect
to
an
engineering
activity
within
the
meaning
of
clause
122.3(l)(b)(i)(B)
of
the
Act.
Some
of
the
Appellants,
for
some
part
of
the
year
or
years
under
appeal,
earned
income
from
employment
outside
Canada
with
an
employer
who
carried
on
business
outside
Canada
in
support
of
natural
resource
exploration
being
done
in
Burma
or
some
other
foreign
country.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
stated
that
the
Respondent
did
not
dispute
that
the
Appellants
were
entitled
to
the
deduction
from
tax
payable
as
provided
for
in
section
122.3
of
the
Act.
Consequently,
as
regards
that
deduction,
where
applicable,
the
appeals
will
be
allowed.
Respecting
the
first
question
at
issue,
Mr.
Stephen
James
Creagh
was
the
only
Appellant
to
testify,
the
other
Appellants
having
agreed
through
their
representative,
at
the
hearing,
that
the
facts
of
their
appeal
were
similar.
Respecting
the
alternative
question
at
issue,
it
was
Mr.
Ajit
Thomas
who
testified.
Applicable
Legislative
Provisions
Subparagraph
110(
1
)(f)(iii)
of
the
Act
reads
as
follows:
110(1)
For
the
purpose
of
computing
the
taxable
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable:
(f)
...
or
any
amount
that
is
(iii)
income
from
employment
with
a
prescribed
international
organization,
or
(iv)
...
to
the
extent
that
it
is
included
in
computing
the
taxpayer’s
income
for
the
year.
Section
8900
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations,
(the
“Regulations”)
reads
as
follows:
8900
For
the
purposes
of
paragraph
110(
1
)(f)
of
the
Act,
(a)
the
United
Nations,
and
any
specialized
agency
that
is
brought
into
relationship
with
the
United
Nations
in
accordance
with
article
63
of
the
Charter
of
the
United
Nations,
are
prescribed
international
organizations;
and
(b)
...
Clause
122.3(1
)(b)(i)(B)
of
the
Act
reads
as
follows:
(1)
Where
an
individual
is
resident
in
Canada
in
a
taxation
year
and,
throughout
any
period
of
more
than
6
consecutive
months
that
commenced
before
the
end
of
the
year
and
included
any
part
of
the
year
(in
this
subsection
referred
to
as
the
“qualifying
period”)
(a)
was
employed
by
a
person
who
was
a
specified
employer,
other
than
for
the
performance
of
services
under
a
prescribed
international
development
assistance
program
of
the
Government
of
Canada,
and
(b)
performed
all
or
substantially
all
the
duties
of
the
individual’s
employment
outside
Canada
(i)
in
connection
with
a
contract
under
which
the
specified
employer
carried
on
business
outside
Canada
with
respect
to
(A)
the
exploration
for
or
exploitation
of
petroleum,
natural
gas,
minerals
or
other
similar
resources,
(B)
any
construction,
installation,
agricultural
or
engineering
activity,
or
there
may
be
deducted,
from
the
amount
that
would,
but
for
this
section,
be
the
individual’s
tax
payable
under
this
Part
for
the
year,
an
amount
equal
to
that
proportion
of
the
tax
otherwise
payable
under
this
Part
for
the
year
by
him
that
the
lesser
of....
In
reassessing
the
Appellant
Stephen
James
Creagh,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(the
“Minister”)
made
the
assumptions
of
fact
described
in
paragraph
5
of
the
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal
(the
“Reply”)
as
follows:
a)
in
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years
the
Appellant
was
employed
by
Canadian
Helicopters
Ltd.,
(“CHL”)
as
a
helicopter
pilot;
b)
CHL
had
a
contract
with
the
United
Nations
whereby
it
was
required
to
send
pilots
to
the
nation
of
Cambodia;
c)
in
carrying
out
the
duties
of
his
employment
in
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
year
the
Appellant
was
required
to
work
for
the
period
November
22,
1992
to
June
30,
1993
in
support
of
the
United
Nations
Transitional
Authority
in
Cambodia
(UNTAC);
d)
the
said
duties
were
carried
on
outside
of
Canada
and
were
in
the
nature
of
supporting
the
United
Nations
peacekeeping
mission
in
the
nation
of
Cambodia;
e)
in
carrying
out
the
duties
described
in
subparagraph
c)
above,
the
Appellant
received
employment
income
of
$16,795.70
and
$33,916.34
for
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years,
respectively;
f)
in
the
1993
taxation
year,
the
Appellant
was
also
employed
by
Northern
Mountain
Helicopters
Inc.
and
received
employment
income
of
$15,435.16;
g)
CHL
is
not
a
prescribed
international
organization
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
110(1
)(f)(iii)
of
the
Act;
h)
Northern
Mountain
Helicopters
Inc.
is
not
a
prescribed
international
organization
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
110(l)(f)(iii)
of
the
Act;
i)
the
Appellant
is
not
entitled
to
deductions
of
$16,795.70
and
$49,214.51
in
respect
of
employment
with
a
prescribed
international
organization
for
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years,
respectively;
j)
the
duties
described
in
subparagraph
5(d)
herein
are
not
duties
of
employment
included
in
subparagraph
122.3(1
)(b)
of
the
Act
in
respect
of
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years
of
the
Appellant;
k)
the
Appellant
is
not
entitled
to
a
deduction
in
the
said
taxation
years,
in
computing
tax
payable,
in
respect
of
employment
outside
of
Canada
pursuant
to
section
122.3
of
the
Act.
At
the
outset
of
the
hearing,
the
parties
filed
the
following
Agreed
Statement
of
Facts:
1.
S.A.T.S.
Inc.
(“Skylink”)
had
an
aircraft
lease
agreement
with
the
United
Nations
(the
“UN”)
dated
November
18,
1992
(the
“Skylink-UN
Lease”)
wherein
Skylink
agreed
to
provide
six
Bell
212
Helicopters,
six
Bell
206
Helicopters
and
at
least
one
pilot
and
co-pilot
for
each
aircraft
for
use
in
support
of
the
UN
mission
in
Cambodia;
2.
Pursuant
to
Article
C
of
the
Skylink-UN
Lease,
the
agreement
would
expire
for
six
of
the
aircraft
1
1/2
months
after
positioning
of
the
aircraft
in
Cambodia
and
would
expire
for
the
remainder
of
the
aircraft
2
1/2
months
after
positioning;
3.
The
Skylink-UN
Lease
was
extended
by
various
amendments
through
August
31,
1993
with
respect
to
the
six
Bell
212
Helicopters
and
through
July
15,
1993
for
the
six
Bell
206
Helicopters;
4.
CHL
had
an
aircraft
lease
agreement
with
Skylink
dated
November
20,
1992
(the
“Skylink-CHL
Lease”)
wherein
CHL
would
lease
to
Skylink
six
Bell
212
Helicopters
and
six
Bell
206
Helicopters
and
provide
a
pilot
and
co-pilot
for
each
aircraft
for
use
by
the
UN
in
accord
with
the
Skylink-UN
Lease;
5.
In
the
1992
and
1993
taxation
years
the
Appellant
was
employed
at
various
times
by
Canadian
Helicopters
Ltd.
(“CHL”)
as
a
helicopter
pilot;
6.
In
carrying
out
the
duties
of
his
employment
with
CHL
for
the
period
November
22,
1992
to
June
30,
1993,
the
Appellant
was
required
to
work
outside
Canada
in
support
of
the
UN
mission
in
Cambodia
in
accord
with
the
Skylink-
CHL
Lease;
7.
CHL
had
an
aircraft
charter
agreement
with
the
UN
to
provide
air
transportation
services
between
September
1,
1993
and
November
30,
1993
for
the
UN
mission
in
Cambodia
(the
“CHL-UN
Charter”);
8.
In
carrying
out
the
duties
of
his
employment
with
CHL
for
the
period
September
1,
1993
to
November
30,
1993
the
appellant
was
required
to
work
for
CHL
outside
Canada
in
support
of
the
UN
mission
in
Cambodia
in
accord
with
the
CHL-UN
Charter;
9.
CHL
is
not
a
prescribed
international
organization
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
110(1
)(f)(iii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act;
10.
Other
than
the
alleged
employment
with
the
UN,
the
Appellant
was
not
employed
by
a
prescribed
international
organization
during
1992
or
1993;
11.
No
special
levy
or
withholding,
other
than
Canadian
source
deductions
which
were
made
by
CHL,
was
made
by
the
UN
from
the
salary
or
wages
earned
by
the
Appellant
in
either
1992
or
1993
from
their
duties
with
CHL.
As
previously
mentioned,
the
evidence
in
the
appeal
of
Mr.
Stephen
James
Creagh
will
serve
to
determine
the
issue
as
regards
the
other
appellants
because
the
facts
are
identical.
Mr.
Creagh
was
a
pilot
during
the
years
in
question.
Not
all
of
the
Appellants
were
pilots.
Some
were
aircraft
maintenance
engineers
and
for
them
their
representative
raises
an
alternative
argument,
but
all
the
Appellants
were
involved
in
a
United
Nations
peacekeeping
mission
in
Cambodia
or
in
Kuwait.
In
the
fall
of
1992
and
the
following
year,
Mr.
Creagh
worked
as
an
aircraft
captain
for
Canadian
Helicopters.
Canadian
Helicopters
supplied
12
helicopters
with
pilots
and
maintenance
engineers
to
the
United
Nations
in
Cambodia.
The
aircrafts
were
painted
white
with
a
large
UN
insignia
on
either
side
of
the
fuselage
and
the
words
United
Nations
on
either
side
of
the
tail
boom.
The
pilots
were
advised
by
the
United
Nations
that
they
were
to
use
the
UN
aircraft
call
signs
instead
of
the
Canadian
registration
letters.
They
received
their
instructions
as
to
flight
routes
from
the
UN
air
operations
officer.
The
Appellants
were
issued
UN
identification
cards
on
the
back
of
which
appeared
the
following:
The
bearer
of
this
card
is
a
member
of
the
United
Nations
Transitional
Authority
in
Cambodia.
All
civilian
and
military
personnel
are
requested
to
extend
him/her
free
passage
and
afford
him/her
all
privileges
necessary
in
the
execution
of
his/her
duties.
They
were
taken
to
the
UN
field
hospital
where
they
received
the
required
vaccinations.
The
meals
were
served
in
a
common
mess
area
and
they
ate
with
UN
personnel.
The
communications
equipment
at
the
base
was
supplied
by
the
UN
Some
of
the
pilots
were
issued
a
UN
driver’s
licence
to
operate
UN
vehicles.
Room
and
board
was
provided
by
the
UN
Mr.
Creagh
stated
that
he
did
not
have
a
contract
of
employment
in
writing
with
Canadian
Helicopters.
He
believed
that
the
other
Appellants
did
not
have
one
either.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
produced
as
Exhibit
R-l
a
book
containing
four
documents:
1.
Aircraft
Lease
Agreement
CPTS/CON/214/92
between
the
United
Nations
and
Skylink;
2.
Amendment
No.
1
to
Aircraft
Lease
Agreement
CPTS/CON/214/92
between
the
United
Nations
and
Skylink;
3.
Aircraft
Lease
Agreement
between
Skylink
and
Canadian
Helicopters
Limited
dated
November
20,
1992;
4.
Aircraft
Charter
Agreement
No.
PTS/CON/237/93
between
the
United
Nations
and
Canadian
Helicopters
Limited.
On
November
18,
1992,
the
United
Nations
signed
with
Skylink
an
Aircraft
Lease
Agreement
(Tab
1
of
Exhibit
R-1).
On
November
20,
1992,
Skylink
subcontracted
with
Canadian
Helicopters
(Tab
3
of
Exhibit
R-1).
Effective
September
1,
1993,
the
United
Nations
concluded
directly
with
Canadian
Helicopters
an
Aircraft
Charter
Agreement
(Tab
4
of
the
same
Exhibit).
As
to
the
services
to
be
rendered
by
Canadian
Helicopters
Limited,
counsel
for
the
Respondent
referred
the
Court
to
clauses
4.1
and
4.2
of
the
latter
agreement
which
read
as
follows:
4.1
The
Carrier
recognizes
that
the
UN
requires
air
transportation
services
to
be
performed
in
connection
with
the
United
Nations
peacekeeping
activities
mandated
by
the
Security
Council.
Those
services
may
include
cargo
resupply,
troop
movements,
VIP
transport,
medical
transport
and
reconnaissance
flights.
Due
to
the
nature
of
peacekeeping
missions,
such
air
transportation
services
may
involve
operation
into
hostile
areas
or
fields
where
there
is
no
ground
support
or
where
airfield
security
cannot
be
guaranteed.
4.2
The
Carrier
agrees
to
provide
to
the
UN
the
air
transportation
services,
as
set
forth
herein.
In
particular,
the
Carrier
shall
provide
to
the
UN
the
Aircraft,
fit
for
the
purpose
for
which
they
are
required
and
properly
equipped
and
maintained,
and
a
flight
crew
and
maintenance
personnel
who
are
qualified,
competent,
and
fully
licensed
for
the
duties
required
under
this
Charter
Agreement.
The
Carrier
shall
perform
the
services
under
this
Charter
Agreement
in
good
faith
and
in
compliance
with
the
terms
and
conditions
of
this
Agreement,
and
shall
abide
by
all
reasonable
instructions
of
the
UN.
As
to
the
legal
status
of
the
carrier
and
of
its
employees,
counsel
for
the
Respondent
referred
the
Court
to
clause
5
of
the
same
document:
5.1
It
is
understood
that
the
Carrier
is
an
independent
contractor,
and
shall
remain
in
control
of
the
Aircraft
and
shall
be
responsible
for
navigation,
operation
and
maintenance
of
the
Aircraft,
and
that
the
flight
crew
and
maintenance
personnel
shall
at
all
times
remain
the
servants
or
agents
of
the
Carrier.
The
UN
shall
have
the
right
to
provide
reasonable
instructions
to
the
Carrier
and
shall
provide
to
the
Carrier
the
schedule
of
flights,
as
required.
However,
the
pilot
in
command
shall
retain
the
right
to
make
decisions
as
to
the
feasibility
of
a
flight
in
the
light
of
weather
and
other
conditions,
for
the
safety
of
the
passengers.
The
representative
of
the
Appellants
submitted
two
arguments.
The
first,
based
on
the
interpretation
of
subparagraph
110(l)(f)
of
the
Act,
was
that
the
use
of
the
expression
“employment
with”
did
not
mean
“employment
by”
and
could
encompass
employment
activities
performed
at
the
request
of
the
United
Nations
and
that
a
person
did
not
need
to
be
an
employee
of
the
United
Nations
as
long
as
that
person
carried
on
his
or
her
employment
activities
in
connection
with
the
United
Nations.
The
second
argument,
respecting
the
aircraft
maintenance
engineers,
was
based
on
the
interpretation
of
section
122.3
of
the
Act
and
the
words
“employment
outside
Canada”
in
any
“engineering
activity”.
The
Appellants’
representative
argued
that
although
the
Appellant
Stephen
James
Creagh
was
an
employee
of
Canadian
Helicopters,
his
duties
were
with
the
United
Nations.
He
took
his
directions
from
them.
He
was
represented
to
be
a
member
of
the
United
Nations.
The
use
of
the
preposition
“with”
rather
than
“by”
was
an
indication
of
the
legislator’s
intent
which
was
to
cover
the
exact
situation
of
the
Appellants.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
referred
to
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Quebec
(Communauté
urbaine)
v.
Corp.
Notre-Dame
de
Bonsecours,
(sub
nom.
Quebec
(Communate
urbaine)
v.
Corp.
Notre-
Dame
de
Bon-Secours))
3
S.C.R.
3,
(sub
nom.
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-
Secoures
(Corp.)
v.
Quebec
(Communauté
urbaine))
[1995]
1
C.T.C.
241,
(sub
nom.
Corp.
Notre-Dame
de
Bon-Secours
v.
Quebec
(Communauté
urbaine)),
95
D.T.C.
5017,
where
Mr.
Justice
Gonthier
formulates
the
rules
of
interpretation
of
tax
legislation
at
pages
251-52
(D.T.C.
5023):
The
rules
formulated
on
those
pages,
some
of
which
had
been
relied
on
recently
in
Symes
v.
Canada,
[1993]
4
S.C.R.
695,
[1994]
2
C.T.C.
40,
95
D.T.C.
6001,
may
be
summarize
follows:
-
The
interpretation
of
tax
legislation
should
follow
the
ordinary
rules
of
interpretation;
-
A
legislative
provision
should
be
given
a
strict
or
liberal
interpretation
depending
on
the
purpose
underlying
it,
and
that
purpose
must
be
identified
in
light
of
the
context
of
the
statute,
its
objective
and
the
legislative
intent;
this
is
the
teleological
approach;
-
The
teleological
approach
will
favour
the
taxpayer
or
the
tax
department
depending
solely
on
the
legislative
provision
in
question,
and
not
on
the
existence
of
predetermined
presumptions;
-
Substance
should
be
given
precedence
over
form
to
the
extent
that
this
is
consistent
with
the
wording
and
objective
of
the
statute;
-
Only
a
reasonable
doubt,
not
resolved
by
the
ordinary
rules
of
interpretation,
will
be
settled
by
recourse
to
the
residual
presumption
in
favour
of
the
taxpayer.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
also
drew
the
attention
of
the
Court
to
the
history
of
subparagraph
110(
1
)(f)(iii)
of
the
Act
which
was
enacted
to
avert
double
taxation.
It
was
added
in
1994,
being
applicable
to
the
1991
and
subsequent
taxation
years.
This
provision
which
allows,
in
the
circumstances
therein
described,
to
be
deducted
in
computing
taxable
income,
income
from
employment
replaced
the
tax
credit
previously
available
under
subsection
126(3)
of
the
Act.
The
Technical
Note
explaining
the
reason
for
the
enactment
of
paragraph
126(3)
of
the
Act
states
the
following:
Certain
international
organizations,
such
as
the
United
Nations
and
its
agencies,
impose
a
special
levy
on
the
salaries
and
wages
of
its
employees
computed
in
the
same
manner
as
income
tax.
In
order
to
avert
the
double
taxation
that
would
occur
if
this
employment
income
were
subject
to
tax
under
the
Act,
subsection
126(3)
provides
a
special
deduction
for
these
employees
in
computing
their
tax
liability.
This
takes
the
form
of
a
credit
equal
to
the
lesser
of
the
amount
of
the
special
levy
and
the
Canadian
tax
otherwise
payable
on
their
remuneration
from
the
international
organization.
In
practice,
for
most
employees
the
amount
of
the
special
levy
exceeds
the
amount
allowed
as
a
credit
under
subsection
126(3).
Subsection
126(3)
is
amended
for
the
1985
and
subsequent
taxation
years
for
employees
of
the
United
Nations
and
most
of
its
agencies,
such
that
the
credit
will
be
computed
simply
as
the
amount
of
Canadian
tax
otherwise
payable
on
income
from
such
employment,
without
reference
to
the
amount
of
the
special
levy.
This
last
reference,
according
to
the
rules
of
statutory
interpretation,
is
legislative
history
and,
where
an
enactment
is
ambiguous,
legislative
history
may
be
used
to
determine
the
purpose
of
such
legislative
enactment
or
the
mischief
that
the
enactment
sought
to
correct.
I
do
not
find
that
the
legislative
enactment
herein
is
ambiguous
and
I
shall
then
follow
the
ordinary
rules
of
interpretation.
One
of
the
ordinary
rules
of
interpretation
is
that
the
words
of
an
act
are
to
be
read
in
their
entire
context
and
in
their
ordinary
sense
In
my
view,
an
examination
of
the
context
and
of
the
language
of
the
legislative
enactment
in
question
suffices
to
enable
one
to
understand
that
the
legislator’s
intent
is
to
allow
income
from
employment
to
be
deducted
if
certain
conditions
are
met.
The
legislator
did
not
give
reasons
why
such
a
deduction
was
allowed
in
the
calculation
of
income.
From
this
perspective,
it
is
of
interest
and
comforting
to
read
the
legislative
history
of
the
enactment,
but
being
subject
to
taxation
by
the
United
Nations
does
not
become
a
condition
for
the
application
of
the
legislative
provision.
What
is
a
condition
is
that
the
employment
income
be
income
from
employment
with
a
prescribed
organization.
The
Appellants’
representative
has
put
much
emphasis
on
the
preposition
“with”
that
follows
the
term
“employment”.
The
argument
is
interesting
but
it
cannot
alter
the
fact
that
the
essential
word
to
examine
is
“employment”.
In
a
sentence,
the
substantive
is
primary;
the
preposition
is
subordinate.
It
serves
to
join
one
word
to
another.
The
preposition
“with”
is
used
to
make
a
link
between
employment
and
the
prescribed
organization.
It
is
the
meaning
of
the
term
“employment”
that
must
be
determinative
as
well
as
whether
this
meaning
may
be
subject
to
variation
depending
on
whether
it
is
used
with
the
preposition
“by”
or
“with”.
Employment
is
defined
in
paragraph
248(1)
of
the
Act
as
follows:
“employment”
means
the
position
of
an
individual
in
the
service
of
some
other
person
(including
Her
Majesty
or
a
foreign
state
or
sovereign)
and
“servant”
or
“employee”
means
a
person
holding
such
a
position.
The
term
“employment”
is
used
several
times
in
the
Act,
and
when
it
is
used,
it
always
means
the
contractual
relationship
of
an
employer
and
an
employee
as
is
the
case
when
this
term
is
used
in
any
legal
text.
It
does
not
mean
an
activity
in
which
a
person
engages.
The
preposition
“with”
cannot
change
the
meaning
of
the
word
“employment”
in
the
Act.
If
the
legislator
had
wanted
to
provide
for
the
case
of
work
activity
and
not
for
the
case
of
employment,
it
would
have
used
the
former
expression
and
not
the
latter.
It
has
been
admitted
by
the
Appellants
and
it
is
also
abundantly
clear
from
the
evidence,
that
the
Appellants
were
employees
of
Canadian
Helicopters
and
that,
this
company
was
their
employer.
The
appeals
consequently
fail
on
this
point.
As
for
the
Appellants
who
are
aircraft
maintenance
engineers,
their
representative
pursued
an
alternative
argument,
i.e.
that
they
came
within
the
scope
of
section
122.3
of
the
Act,
which
refers
to
employment
outside
Canada
in
engineering
activities.
Mr.
Ajit
Thomas
explained
that
to
obtain
an
aircraft
maintenance
engineer’s
licence
it
takes
a
minimum
three
years’
aircraft
maintenance
apprenticeship
followed
by
a
written
examination
administered
by
Transport
Canada.
In
Cambodia
and
Kuwait
this
Appellant’s
basic
duties
were
to
perform
maintenance
on
his
employer’s
aircraft
and
to
keep
them
up
to
the
standards
laid
down
by
Transport
Canada.
He
also
stated
that
he
was
not
a
professional
engineer.
The
Appellant’s
representative
referred
to
clause
7
of
the
Aircraft
Lease
Agreement
between
the
United
Nations
and
Sky
link
(Exhibit
R-1,
tab
1),
which
reads
as
follows:
7.
Supply
during
the
term
of
the
Lease
Agreement
the
minimum
number
of
licensed
ground
aircraft
maintenance
personnel
consistent
with
flight
safety
and
serviceability
requirements
to
maintain
the
Aircraft
in
such
condition
as
to
satisfy
all
applicable
air
worthiness
requirements
of
country
of
registration.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
submitted
on
the
one
hand
that
the
qualifying
activities
described
in
section
122.3
of
the
Act
must
be
looked
at
from
the
perspective
of
the
employer
not
of
the
employee
and
that
the
nature
of
the
contract
between
Canadian
Helicopters
and
the
United
Nations
was
an
aircraft
lease
agreement
and
was
not
and
could
not
be
considered
an
engineering
contract,
and
on
the
other
hand,
that
although
one
speaks
in
English
of
an
aircraft
maintenance
engineer,
such
an
“engineer”
is
not
to
be
confused
with
a
professional
engineer,
and
the
engineering
activities
referred
to
in
clause
122.3(l)(b)(i)(B)
of
the
Act
refer
to
professional
engineering.
The
French
version
of
this
legislative
enactment
confirms
this
interpretation.
Counsel
for
the
Respondent
drew
the
attention
of
the
Court
to
the
pertinent
Technical
Note,
which
says
that
the
enactment’s
purpose
was
to
improve
the
international
competitive
position
of
Canadian
companies
undertaking
engineering
projects
outside
Canada.
Again,
although
it
is
interesting
to
read
the
Technical
Note
in
order
to
understand
the
reasons
which
brought
the
legislator
to
enact
the
particular
legislative
provision
in
question,
the
Technical
Note
is
not
needed
in
order
to
interpret
this
provision.
The
text
is
not
ambiguous.
It
requires,
if
we
restrict
ourselves
to
the
arguments
raised
in
the
present
appeals,
that
the
employer
carry
on
business
outside
Canada
with
respect
to
any
engineering
activity.
There
is
no
evidence
before
me
that
the
business
carried
on
by
the
employer
was
with
respect
to
an
engineering
activity
or
to
any
other
activity
described
in
clauses
(A)
or
(B)
of
section
122.3
of
the
Act,
cited
at
the
beginning
of
these
reasons.
The
evidence
was
that
it
was
with
respect
to
a
peacekeeping
mission.
In
consequence,
the
appeals
fail
on
this
point
also.
As
mentioned
at
the
beginning,
the
appeals
of
the
Appellants
who
have
earned
employment
income
outside
Canada
from
an
employer
who
carried
on
business
outside
Canada
in
support
of
natural
resource
exploration
are
allowed
as
regards
that
portion
of
their
employment
income.
The
appeals
concerning
the
employment
income
earned
by
the
Appellants
as
employees
of
Canadian
Helicopter
with
respect
to
a
United
Nations
peacekeeping
mission
are
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.