Campbell
J.
—:
The
decision
which
I
must
make
is
within
very
narrow
limits
set
by
the
judicial
review
application
which
Ms.
Barrons
has
brought.
The
decision
on
which
Ms.
Barrons
seeks
the
judicial
review
is
that
contained
within
the
letter
from
the
Deputy
Minister
of
Revenue
to
her,
dated
March
19th,
1996.
Specifically,
the
decisions
that
are
challenged
here
are
disclosed
in
the
following
paragraph:
Senior
officials
of
the
Toronto
East
Tax
Services
Office
have
further
reviewed
your
request
for
remission
and
based
on
the
information
you
provided,
and
in
the
absence
of
compatibility
with
any
of
the
principal
categories,
it
has
been
concluded
that
your
case
does
not
qualify
for
remission.
In
addition,
your
account
has
been
reviewed
for
cancellation
of
interest
under
the
fairness
provisions
of
the
Act.
Under
these
provisions,
consideration
may
be
given
to
waiving
interest
in
those
instances
where
an
individual
is
experiencing
financial
hardship,
and
has
no
ability
to
pay
the
liability
in
full.
This
is
determined
by
a
review
of
factors
such
as
household
income,
non-discretionary
living
expenses,
and
incapacity
to
borrow.
In
this
regard,
I
regret
to
inform
you
that
the
payment
of
the
interest
in
question
will
not,
in
my
view,
result
in
financial
hardship:
therefore,
I
am
unable
to
grant
the
interest
relief
that
you
have
requested.
The
waiver
decision
was
made
under
subsection
220(3.1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
the
law
in
relation
to
this
type
of
decision
has
been
pronounced,
and
I
feel
correctly,
by
Mr.
Justice
Cullen,
in
the
case
of
Orsini
Estate
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Orsini
Family
Trust
v.
Revenue
Canada
(Customs,
Excise
&
Taxation)),
[1996]
2
C.T.C.
248,
96
D.T.C.
6347
(F.C.T.D.).
In
that
case
Mr.
Justice
Cullen
said
as
follows:
A
decision
made
under
the
“fairness
legislation”
is
discretionary.
It
is
not
a
case
where
a
decision-maker
must
arrive
at
a
certain
outcome;
rather,
the
decision-maker,
after
considering
all
the
circumstances,
may
come
to
a
certain
conclusion.
Discretionary
decisions
cannot
be
made
arbitrarily
or
in
bad
faith
and,
like
other
decisions,
are
subject
to
judicial
review.
The
scope
of
judicial
review
however,
is
quite
narrow.
This
court
should
not
substitute
its
decision
for
that
of
the
Minister’s
statutory
delegate.
Rather,
the
court
must
determine
whether
the
decision
was
made
fairly,
not
arbitrarily
or
in
bad
faith.
So
long
as
the
evidence
in
the
record
supports
the
decision,
this
court
should
not
interfere.
I
must
say
that
after
hearing
the
latest
submissions
of
Ms.
Barrons,
and
reviewing
the
material,
I
am
completely
satisfied
that
the
decision
was
made
fairly,
on
reasonable
advice
to
her,
and
also
on
reasonable
consideration.
There
is
absolutely
no
evidence
that
this
decision
was
made
arbitrarily
or
in
bad
faith.
In
fact,
it
is
clear
from
the
record
that
the
opposite
occurred.
A
great
deal
of
time
and
attention
was
paid
to
her
submissions,
and
a
great
deal
of
time
and
consideration
was
given
to
the
result.
There
is
no
reviewable
error
in
the
making
of
this
decision.
Applying
the
standard
set
out
in
Orsini
to
the
decision
regarding
remission
under
subsection
23(2)
of
the
Financial
Administration
Act,
I
find
there
is
no
evidence
of
a
reviewable
error.
Consequently,
this
application
for
judicial
review
is
dismissed.
Application
dismissed.