John
B
Goetz:—The
appellant
has
filed
a
notice
of
appeal
for
the
1974,
1976
and
1977
taxation
years.
In
particular,
he
claims
$6,800
with
respect
to
the
cost
of
horses
acquired,
as
he
says,
in
1974,
as
well
as
other
expenses
incurred
in
the
other
taxation
years.
The
Minister
has
disallowed
the
claim
for
$6,800
for
cost
of
horses
and
has
reduced
certain
expenses
subsequently
incurred
in
the
appellant’s
farming
operation.
In
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
sections
3,
18,
28
and
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
The
respondent
particularly
submits
that
the
horses
referred
to,
acquired
for
$6,800,
were
not
used
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
of
farming
nor
was
there
a
reasonable
expectation
that
they
would
so
be
sold.
He
further
submitted
that
the
snowmobile
purchased
by
the
appellant
was
for
personal
use.
Facts
The
appellant’s
main
occupation
was
that
of
project
co-ordinator
for
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan,
and
he
lived
in
the
City
of
Regina.
He
started
farming
in
1974,
having
acquired
22
acres
and
a
quarter
section
of
land
in
the
spring
of
1974,
near
the
City
of
Regina.
Findings
In
cross-examination,
it
appeared
that
the
four
or
five
horses
acquired
by
the
appellant
were
acquired
prior
to
1974
and
as
a
result
I
cannot
allow
that
as
an
expense
either
current
or
as
a
capital
expense.
In
1976
he
acquired
a
Snowmobile
which
was
a
1968
or
1969
model.
In
1975
he
also
acquired
a
1973
model,
secondhand
snowmobile,
which
he
submits
he
used
to
haul
manure
and
for
the
purpose
of
servicing
his
horses.
He
submitted
vouchers
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
for
certain
expenses
and
claimed
the
sum
of
$2,257.81
as
expenses
re
the
purchase
of
a
truck.
The
respondent
only
allowed
him
the
sum
of
$1,653.11
and
disallowed
$604.70
which
did
not
include
oil
and
gas.
It
was
agreed
during
the
course
of
argument
that
the
expenses
claimed
by
the
appellant
should
be
raised
to
the
sum
of
$1,874.38
as
a
result
of
the
Department
giving
him
a
further
allowance
for
these
expenses
in
the
amount
of
$221.27.
This
part
of
the
appeal
is
therefore
allowed
to
that
extent.
In
that
the
appellant
was
operating
on
a
cash
basis,
any
expenses
claimed
for
in
1974,
must
be
incurred
in
that
year.
This
did
not
happen
so
therefore
I
cannot
allow
any
claim
for
the
$6,800
for
purchase
of
horses.
I
might
say
that
had
these
horses
been
acquired
subsequent
to
1974
and
paid
for
thereafter,
they
could
possibly
have
been
considered
as
a
capital
asset.
The
appellant
sold
no
horses
since
1974
and
the
following
is
a
picture
of
his
profit
and
loss
for
the
years
1974,
1976,
1977
and
1978:
1974—$11,181.20
(loss)
1976—
$
5,514.00
(loss)
1977—
$
5,019.37
(loss)
1978—
$
1,135.00
(profit)
I
refer
specifically
to
the
case
of
William
Moldowan
v
Her
Majesty
The
Queen,
[1977]
CTC
310;
77
DTC
5213.
Mr
Justice
Dickson
at
313
and
5215
respectively,
stated:
.
.
.
If
the
taxpayer
in
operating
his
farm
is
merely
indulging
in
a
hobby,
with
no
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
he
is
disentitled
to
claim
any
deduction
at
all
in
respect
of
expenses
incurred.
There
is
a
vast
case
literature
on
what
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
means
and
it
is
by
no
means
entirely
consistent.
In
my
view,
whether
a
taxpayer
has
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
is
an
objective
determination
to
be
made
from
all
of
the
facts.
The
following
criteria
should
be
considered:
the
profit
and
loss
experience
in
past
years,
the
taxpayer’s
training,
the
taxpayer’s
intended
course
of
action,
the
capability
of
the
venture
as
capitalized
to
show
a
profit
after
charging
capital
cost
allowance.
The
list
is
not
intended
to
be
exhaustive.
The
factors
will
differ
with
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
undertaking:
The
Queen
v
Matthews,
74
DTC
6193.
One
would
not
expect
a
farmer
who
purchased
a
productive
going
operation
to
suffer
the
same
startup
losses
as
the
man
who
begins
a
tree
farm
on
raw
land.
I
further
quote
from
Mr
Justice
Dickson’s
decision
at
315
and
5216
respectively:
In
my
opinion,
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
a
whole
envisages
three
classes
of
farmers:
(1)
a
taxpayer,
for
whom
farming
may
reasonably
be
expected
to
provide
the
bulk
of
income
or
the
centre
of
work
routine.
Such
a
taxpayer,
who
looks
to
farming
for
his
livelihood,
is
free
of
the
limitation
of
s
13(1)
in
those
years
in
which
he
sustains
a
farming
loss.
(2)
the
taxpayer
who
does
not
look
to
farming,
or
to
farming
and
some
subordinate
source
of
income,
for
his
livelihood
but
carried
on
farming
as
a
sideline
business.
Such
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
the
deductions
spelled
out
in
s
13(1)
in
respect
of
farming
losses.
(3)
the
taxpayer
who
does
not
look
to
farming,
or
to
farming
and
some
subordinate
source
of
income,
for
his
livelihood
and
who
carried
on
some
farming
activities
as
a
hobby.
The
losses
sustained
by
such
a
taxpayer
on
his
nonbusiness
farming
are
not
deductible
in
any
amount.
The
appellant
stated
under
oath
that
for
one
of
the
horses
acquired
prior
to
1974,
for
which
he
paid
$2,500,
he
has
since
been
offered
the
sum
of
$14,000
for
the
said
horse.
One
of
the
three
horses
that
he
owned
in
Canada
qualified
for
the
Oklahoma
Opulucius
Show,
which
is
a
breeding
show.
It
Is
quite
clear
that
the
appellant’s
farming
operations
relating
to
the
breeding
of
horses,
which
sometimes
can
be
disastrous
financially,
can,
on
the
other
hand,
be
extremely
successful.
He
studied
horse
breeding
extensively
and
this,
coupled
with
growing
up
on
a
“mixed
farming”
farm,
certainly
extended
his
farming
knowledge.
I
find
that
the
1973
snowmobile
purchased
in
1975
by
the
appellant
was
a
necessary
expense
in
his
horse
breeding
operations
in
the
care
and
maintenance
of
the
horses.
The
fact
that
the
respondent
alleges
that
the
appellant
had
no
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
from
the
raising
and
breeding
of
horses
falls
in
face
of
the
offer
of
$14,000
for
one
of
the
appellant’s
horses
which
he
has
retained
as
part
of
his
herd.
I
further
find
that
the
taxpayer
did
not
look
to
farming
as
some
subordinate
source
of
income
for
his
livelihood
but
carried
on
farming
as
a
sideline
business.
Such
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
deductions
spelled
out
in
subsection
13(1)
of
the
Act
in
respect
of
farming
losses
(now
section
31).
See
also
J
eno
Horvath
v
MNR,
[1980]
CTC
2636;
80
DTC
1540.
For
the
above
reasons,
I
allow
the
appeal
in
part
and
refer
the
matter
back
to
the
Minister
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.