Roland
St-Onge:—The
appeal
of
Rev
H
Getkate
came
before
me
on
May
7,
1980
at
the
City
of
Peterborough,
Ontario,
and
the
issue
is
whether
he
is
allowed
to
deduct
an
amount
of
$200
as
a
charitable
donation
in
his
1976
taxation
year.
The
facts
of
this
appeal
are
well
spelled
out
in
paragraph
8
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
which
reads
as
follows:
8.
In
reassessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent
assumed,
inter
alia,
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
The
appellant
had
one
child
in
attendance
at
the
school
run
by
the
Lambton
Evangelical
Christian
School
Society.
(b)
The
school
provided
both
secular
instruction
and
religious
instruction.
(c)
The
net
cost
per
student
for
the
secular
education
given
by
the
school
was
$717.89
per
school
year.
(d)
The
appellant
gave
the
Lambton
Evangelical
Christian
School
Society
$200
during
the
1976
taxation
year.
(e)
The
school
records
show
that
a
donation
receipt
in
the
amount
of
$200
was
issued
or
the
appellant
in
1976.
(f)
The
school
records
show
that
no
amount
for
tuition
of
the
appellant’s
child
was
received
by
the
school
from
the
appellant.
(g)
The
appellant
received
consideration
for
his
$200
payment
to
the
Lambton
Evangelical
Christian
School
Society
in
the
form
of
the
secular
academic
training
received
by
his
child
when
attending
the
school.
The
respondent
disallowed
this
$200
on
the
assumption
that
the
appellant
received
consideration
for
his
$200
payment
to
the
Lambton
Evangelical
Christian
School
Society.
This
took
the
form
of
secular
academic
training
for
his
child
while
attending
this
school.
The
appellant
testified
that
in
the
year
1976,
his
child
Liana
went
to
that
school
in
order
to
obtain
her
Grade
9.
The
school
in
question,
among
other
religious
subjects,
taught
mathematics
and
English.
He
also
said
that
in
previous
years
he
had
made
a
donation
to
the
said
school
for
which
he
received
a
receipt
and
the
said
receipt
was
accepted
by
the
Department.
The
evidence
shows
that
the
amount
of
$200
was
paid
to
a
charitable
organization
and
the
appellant
was
able
to
produce
a
receipt
to
prove
it.
At
first
sight,
it
seems
that
the
appellant
complied
with
paragraph
110(1)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
but,
in
argument,
counsel
for
the
respondent
referred
to
a
decision
of
the
Federal
Court
reported
in
The
Queen
v
John
Zandstra,
[1974]
CTC
503;
74
DTC
6416,
and
I
quote
from
508
and
6419:
“But
it
is,
I
think,
clear
that
to
constitute
a
“gift”,
it
must
appear
that
the
property
transferred
was
transferred
voluntarily
and
not
as
the
result
of
a
contractual
obligation
to
transfer
it
and
that
no
advantage
of
a
material
character
was
received
by
the
transferor
by
way
of
return
.
.
.
If,
however,
the
payment
should
be
regarded
as
a
voluntary
payment,
the
taxpayer
made
it
in
the
expectation
that
in
return
he
would
receive,
and
he
did
in
fact
receive,
a
substantial
concession
in
the
fees
charged
for
the
education
of
his
son.
In
neither
event
did
he
make
a
“gift”
within
the
meaning
of
s
78(1).”
The
rationale
of
that
case
applies
equally
here.
Even
accepting
the
evidence
of
the
defendants
in
these
cases
that
subject
payments
were
voluntary
and
not
pursuant
to
a
contractual
obligation,
it
seems
clear
that
each
parent
here
received
a
consideration,
ie
the
Christian
education
of
his
children.
It
seems
clear
from
the
evidence
of
most
of
the
witnesses
that
they
considered
they
had
a
primary
duty
to
their
own
children
to
provide
them
with
a
Christian
education
in
a
separate
Christian
school
and
that
obligation
has
been
discharged
by
the
payments
to
the
Jarvis
School.
Such
a
factual
situation
clearly,
in
my
view,
removes
these
payments
from
the
“gift”
category.
The
appellant
argued
and
filed
documents
in
bulk
under
Exhibit
A-1,
part
of
which
reads
as
follows:
My
case
rests
inter
alia
upon
the
following
facts:
1.
My
transactions
were
not
with
Lambton
Christian
High
School,
but
with
the
Lambton
Evangelical
Christian
School
Society
(properly
so
identified
in
reply
to
notice
of
appeal).
2.
Failure
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
take
into
consideration
my
notice
to
them
of
matters
pertinent
to
the
audit
had
led
them
to
misunderstand
the
facts
of
the
Corporation
of
Lambton
Evangelical
School
Society
and
the
school
they
support
in
Sarnia.
3.
My
payments/donations
to
Lambton
Evangelical
Christian
School
Society
were
not
for
any
secular
education
to
my
child,
but
to
the
Society
(the
incorporated
society),
its
operation
—for
the
building
they
purchased
that
year
—for
auxiliary
staff
employed
to
effect
the
objects
of
the
corporation,
—the
materials
needed
to
effect
teaching
in
the
Christian
Religion
and
to
conduct
meetings
of
a
religious
and
evangelistic
nature.
4.
The
Department
rightly
acknowledges
that
I
made
no
tuition
payments.
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
there
is
no
doubt
that
the
appellant
received
an
advantage
of
a
material
character.
Consequently,
for
this
reason,
I
have
to
dismiss
the
appeal
and
follow
the
principles
enunciated
in
the
case
cited
by
the
respondent.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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