Roland
St-Onge:—The
appeal
of
Phyllis
D
Boadway
came
before
me
on
October
12,
1979
at
the
City
of
Saskatoon,
Sask.
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
ceased
to
be
an
Indian
upon
her
marriage
to
a
non-Indian
on
December
18,
1972,
and
thereby
render
her
income
taxable
in
her
1973
taxation
year.
The
facts
of
this
appeal
are
well
spelled
out
in
the
notice
of
appeal
at
paragraphs
1
to
6
inclusive
and
also
in
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
at
paragraph
3,
A
to
F
inclusive,
which
are
quoted
bolow:
Notice
of
Appeal
1.
I
married
a
non-Indian
on
December
18,
1972.
2.
At
the
time
of
my
marriage,
the
Laval
(sic)
court
case
was
in
progress
wherein
Mrs
Laval
(sic)
had
married
a
non-Indian
and
thereby
lost
her
status.
She
was
appealing
the
loss
of
her
status.
3.
At
the
time
of
my
marriage
the
Department
of
Indian
Affairs
was
not
deregistering
Indian
women
marrying
non-Indians
pending
the
outcome
of
the
Laval
(sic)
case.
4.
I
therefore,
remained
a
registered
Indian
until
September
30,
1973
when
Mrs
Laval’s
(sic)
case
was
decided.
This
fact
is
evidenced
by
the
enclosed
letter
from
the
District
Manager
of
the
Saskatoon
district
of
the
Department
of
Indian
Affairs.
5.
My
earnings
during
the
period
were
earned
solely
on
Indian
reserves.
This
fact
is
not
in
dispute.
6.
In
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
the
Indian
Act,
my
earnings
during
the
period—January
1,
1973
to
September
30,
1973
were
not
subject
to
income
tax.
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
3.
In
so
assessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent,
assumed
inter
alia,
that:
(a)
The
appellant
was
at
all
material
times
a
resident
of
the
City
of
Regina
in
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan;
(b)
The
appellant
ceased
to
be
an
Indian
upon
her
marriage
to
a
non-Indian
on
December
18,
1972;
(c)
That
subsequent
to
her
marriage
the
appellant
was
not
entitled
to
be
registered
as
an
Indian
pursuant
to
the
Indian
Act.
(c)
The
appellant
during
the
material
time
was
employed
as
a
librarian
by
the
Federation
of
Saskatchewan
Indians;
(e)
The
amount
received
from
the
Federation
of
Saskatchewan
Indians
by
the
appellant
during
the
1973
taxation
year
was
not
personal
property
situated
on
a
reserve;
(f)
There
was
no
provision
with
respect
to
the
1973
taxation
year
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
or
the
Indian
Act
which
exempts
the
appellant
from
income
tax.
This
case
is
more
a
question
of
law
than
a
question
of
fact
because,
apparently,
according
to
the
evidence
adduced,
the
facts
are
admitted.
The
main
question
is
to
decide
whether
the
registration
or
the
fact
that
the
appellant
remained
registered
on
the
list
made
it
possible
for
her
to
keep
the
status
as
an
Indian.
There
is
no
doubt
in
my
mind
that
the
mere
registration
does
not
create
the
law.
It
is
well
defined
in
the
Indian
Act
at
subsection
12.(1):
The
following
persons
are
not
entitled
to
be
registered,
namely,
(b)
a
woman
who
marries
a
person
who
is
not
an
Indian
.
.
.
Furthermore,
the
Supreme
Court
decision
in
A
G
of
Canada
v
Lavell,
[1974]
CLR
1349,
decided
that
point.
Therefore,
whether
the
appellant’s
name
remained
on
the
list
or
not
is
immaterial
in
the
present
case.
The
list
is
only
for
administration
purposes.
I
refer
also
to
subsection
2(1)
of
the
Indian
Act,
and
I
quote:
“Indian”
means
a
person
who
pursuant
to
this
Act
is
registered
as
an
Indian
or
is
entitled
to
be
registered
as
an
Indian.
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
the
appellant
was
not
entitled
to
be
registered
as
an
Indian,
and
as
such
she
is
subject
to
taxation
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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