John Ian McPhee v. Minister of National Revenue, [1980] CTC 2042, 80 DTC 1034

M J Bonner:—I will now give my decision. This is an appeal from assessments of income tax for the 1972 to 1975 taxation years, both inclusive.

On assessment, deductions which had been claimed under section 109 of the Income Tax Act were disallowed. The basis of the disallowance was that at the relevant time the appellant was not a married person who supported his spouse.

In 1947 the appellant married Josephine. The couple lived together until 1956. They then separated. No divorce proceedings were ever taken. Although the appellant has not seen Josephine since 1957 or 1958, the death of that lady cannot be presumed. No evidence was adduced from which it can be concluded that her absence was unexplained. Her absence is probably explained by the circumstances which I will now detail.

Ever since 1957 the appellant has cohabited openly with another woman, Reta. The appellant regards her as his wife. During the years in question, and in fact I gather since 1957, the appellant supported, cohabited with and was reputed within the community to be married to Reta. During those years, or certainly during the years in issue in this appeal, the appellant did not support Josephine.

The contention that Reta was the appellant’s wife must fail. It is not necessary to decide whether the admitted fact that the appellant never went through any form of marriage ceremony with Reta is an effective bar to a contention that Reta is the appellant’s spouse. She cannot have become the appellant’s spouse because the appellant was already married and because it was not shown that the marriage to Josephine was terminated, either by death or divorce. Annulment was not mentioned.

It was also contended on behalf of the appellant that the definition of “spouse” under the O/d Age Security Act is incorporated in the Income Tax Act by reason of the reference in paragraph 110(1 )(f) to “spouse’s allowance under the O/d Age Security Act". The word “spouse” is not defined in the Income Tax Act. It is to be given its ordinary meaning, that is to say, a married woman in relation to her husband or the reverse. No authority or logical reason was advanced as a basis for what was, in effect, a submission that an extended definition of a word in one statute should be applied when the meaning of that word in another statute is under consideration. It should be observed that the opening words of section 2 of the Old Age Security Act are “In this Act”.

The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.