Guy
Tremblay
[TRANSLATION]:—This
case
was
heard
at
Québec
City,
Québec
on
April
17
and
October
15,
1979.
1.
Point
at
Issue
The
question
is
whether
the
appellant
(a
general
foreman
for
a
reinforced
steel
laying
contractor)
is
entitled
not
to
be
taxed
on
the
amount
(0.25¢
a
mile)
received
from
his
employer
between
1973
and
1976
inclusive,
as
compensation
for
the
use
of
his
automobile
in
travelling
from
one
site
to
another,
carrying
men
and
materials.
2.
Burden
of
Proof
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessment
is
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
derives
not
from
one
particular
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
but
from
a
number
of
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
delivered
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
R
l/V
S
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
3.
Facts
3.01
In
1973
the
appellant,
who
until
then
had
been
operating
his
own
business
as
a
“concrete
reinforcer”
(laying
reinforced
steel),
was
hired
by
Paul
and
Marcel
Boucher
Inc
(a
reinforced
steel
laying
firm)
as
general
foreman.
3.02
His
duties
consisted
primarily
of
Supervision
and
of
solving
with
the
site
foreman
problems
which
arose
in
the
course
of
work
on
various
sites.
3.03
These
duties
caused
the
appellant
to
move
around
from
one
site
to
another,
either
simply
to
see
to
the
progress
of
work
or
to
carry
men
or
materials.
3.04
From
1973
to
1975
the
company
had
no
vehicles.
It
began
acquiring
them
in
1976
and
1977.
Consequently,
men
and
materials
had
to
be
carried
by
employees’
vehicles,
including
that
of
the
appellant.
3.05
In
addition
to
the
written
contract
(Exhibit
1-1)
which
contains
the
following
clauses:
—
Work
outside
of
Quebec
City:
the
salary
remains
the
same
and
the
expense
allowance
will
be
determined
with
the
employers,
—
It
is
agreed
that
expense
or
allowance
cheques
will
not
be
included
in
forms
T4
and
TP4,
a
verbal
agreement
was
made
setting
use
of
the
appellant’s
vehicle
for
company
purposes
at
$0.25
a
mile.
According
to
the
appellant,
the
payment
of
$0.25
a
mile
was
justified
because
men
in
working
clothes
dirtied
the
car,
and
the
same
applied
to
the
materials,
which
were
very
heavy
to
be
carried
in
a
car.
3.06
During
the
period
1973
to
1976
the
appellant
did
a
certain
number
of
miles
and
claimed
and
received
the
following
amounts,
according
to
a
document
probably
prepared
by
the
appellant’s
accountant
and
filed
as
Ex-
hibit
I-2.
|
Mileage
|
Total
|
Total
|
1973
|
10,867
x
0.25¢
|
=
|
$2,716.75
|
1974
|
14,633
x
0.25¢
|
=
|
$3,658.25
|
1975
|
25,482
x
0.25¢
|
=
|
$6,370.50
|
1976
|
11,194
x
0.25¢
|
=
|
$2,798.50
|
3.07
In
assessing
the
years
1973
to
1976,
the
respondent
added
the
foregoing
amounts.
However,
he
allowed
the
following
deductions:
$500
for
1973
and
$1,000
for
each
of
the
years
1974,
1975
and
1976.
3.08
During
1974,
the
evidence
showed
(Exhibit
A-1)
that
the
company
had
30
different
sites,
16
of
which
were
in
the
area
of
metropolitan
Quebec
City.
Of
the
14
other
sites
located
outside
the
metropolitan
area,
there
were
7
on
which
the
appellant
was
not
responsible
for
supervision
and
7
more
which
he
had
to
visit
regularly
(Gentilly,
Mont
Ste-Anne,
Autoroute
de
Beauce,
and
so
on).
3.09
For
his
part,
the
appellant
clearly
showed
that
the
mileage
done,
for
which
he
claimed
expenses,
in
no
way
covered
the
mileage
done
to
get
from
his
residence
to
the
job
and
back
again.
3.10
With
respect
to
1973
and
1974,
the
evidence
for
the
appellant
was
the
filing
of
pay
cheque
stubs
(Exhibit
A-3)
in
those
years
and
receipts,
on
which
was
written
in
ink
(probably
by
him):
Expense
and
an
amount.
The
appellant
stated
that
this
was
the
sum
received
for
transportation
to
various
Sites.
The
parties
were
agreed
that
the
total
amount
received
was
$2,716.75
in
1973
and
$3,658.25
in
1974.
3.11
On
the
cheque
stubs
relating
to
1975,
filed
as
Exhibit
A-4,
it
can
be
clearly
seen
that
with
each
payment
a
sum
was
paid
to
the
appellant
as
the
“Non-taxable
total”.
According
to
the
evidence
these
amounts
in
fact
totaled
$5,108.43,
and
not
$6,370.50,
after
being
recounted
twice.
The
Board
accordingly
accepts
this
amount
as
being
that
received
by
the
appellant.
After
the
hearing
was
reopened,
the
appellant
was
able
to
show
that
the
difference
of
$1,200
was
explained,
first,
by
the
sale
in
1974
of
a
welding
machine
to
his
employer
Paul
and
Marcel
Boucher
Inc
for
$800.
In
addition,
he
earned
$400
from
the
rental
of
machinery
in
1974,
the
whole
as
appeared
from
an
income
statement
attached
to
his
1974
tax
return.
The
whole
amount
was
paid
in
January
1975.
3.12
With
regard
to
1976,
the
pay
cheque
stubs
(Exhibit
A-5),
the
amounts
shown
in
the
item
“Gross
non-taxable
total”,
vary
from
one
pay
cheque
to
another
(for
example,
$82.25,
$99.75,
$93.75,
and
so
on),
until
the
middle
of
April.
Thereafter,
because
of
administrative
problems
relating
to
the
filing
of
TP4s
and
mileage
documents
to
be
compiled,
it
was
agreed
to
give
a
fixed
amount
and
make
a
subsequent
adjustment.
The
amount
then
appearing
on
the
cheques
until
the
end
of
September
1976
is
$63
(sometimes
$73).
From
the
end
of
September
onwards,
the
sum
of
$35
appears
regularly
until
the
end
of
1976,
except
for
a
few
times
when
no
payment
was
made.
The
parties
admitted
that
the
total
amount
received
in
1976
was
$2,798.50.
4.
Act—Case
Law—Comments
4.1
Act
The
principal
sections
involved
in
the
case
at
bar
are
paragraph
8(1)(h)
and
subparagraph
6(1
)(b)(vii),
which
is
referred
to
in
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
These
two
provisions
are
as
follows:
8.(1)
In
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(h)
where
the
taxpayer,
in
the
year,
(i)
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
the
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
in
different
places,
(ii)
under
the
contract
of
employment
was
required
to
pay
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment,
and
(iii)
was
not
in
receipt
of
an
allowance
for
travelling
expenses
that
was,
by
virtue
of
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(v),
(vi)
or
(vii),
not
included
in
computing
his
income
and
did
not
claim
any
deduction
for
the
year
under
paragraph
(e),
(f)
or
9),
amounts
expended
by
him
in
the
year
for
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment;
6.(1)
There
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
as
income
from
an
office
or
employment
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable:
(b)
all
amounts
received
by
him
in
the
year
as
an
allowance
for
personal
or
living
expenses
or
as
an
allowance
for
any
other
purpose,
except
(v)
reasonable
allowances
for
travelling
expenses
received
by
an
employee
from
his
employer
in
respect
of
a
period
when
he
was
employed
in
connection
with
the
selling
of
property
or
negotiating
of
contracts
for
his
employer,
(vi)
reasonable
allowances
received
by
a
minister
or
clergyman
in
charge
of
or
ministering
to
a
diocese,
parish
or
congregation
for
expenses
for
transportation
incident
to
the
discharge
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment,
(vii)
allowances
(not
in
excess
of
reasonable
amounts)
for
travelling
expenses
received
by
an
employee
(other
than
an
employee
employed
in
connection
with
the
selling
of
property
or
negotiating
of
contracts
for
his
employer)
from
his
employer
if
they
were
computed
by
reference
to
time
actually
spent
by
the
empoyee
travelling
away
from
(A)
the
municipality
where
the
employer’s
establishment
at
which
the
employee
ordinarily
worked
or
to
which
he
ordinarily
made
his
reports
was
located,
and
(B)
the
metropolitan
area,
if
there
is
one,
where
that
establishment
was
located,
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment.
4.2
Case
Law
The
case
law
cited
by
the
respondent
is
the
following:
1.
Michael
J
Zukiwski
v
MNR,
[1977]
CTC
2371;
77
DTC
261;
2.
Edward
W
Moran
v
MNR,
[1969]
Tax
ABC
1108;
69
DTC
772;
3.
J
M
Livingston
v
MNR,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
373;
70
DTC
1252;
4.
M
D
Pawliuk
v
MNR,
[1971]
CTC
785;
71
DTC
559;
5.
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
v
Eric
L
Lavers,
[1978]
CTC
341;
78
DTC
6230;
6.
D
B
Lahey
v
MNR,
[1967]
Tax
ABC
262;
67
DTC
222.
The
appellant
submitted
Interpretation
Bulletin
IT-91
-R.
4.3
Comments
4.3.1
When
the
Board
considers,
first,
the
requirements
of
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(vii)
granting
the
allowance
only
to
travel
outside
the
metropolitan
area,
then
considers
the
restrictive
interpretation
which
must
be
given
to
this
section,
and
finally
takes
into
account
the
facts
set
forth
in
paragraph
3.08,
it
finds
it
hard
to
allow
more
than
35%
of
the
allowance
received.
Thus,
of
the
21
different
sites
which
the
appellant
was
responsible
for
Supervising,
only
7
were
located
outside
of
the
Quebec
City
metropolitan
area.
These
figures
were
applicable
only
to
1974.
The
respondent
admitted
this
evidence
for
the
other
years.
4.3.2
So
far
as
the
other
65%
of
the
allowance
is
concerned,
therefore,
it
should
at
this
stage
remain
in
the
appellant’s
income.
However,
should
paragraph
8(1)(h)
be
applied
and
this
amount,
equivalent
to
65%
of
the
allowance,
be
claimed
as
expenses.
All
the
conditions
contained
in
paragraph
8(1)(h)
cited
above
must
be
met
for
the
deduction
to
be
allowed.
According
to
the
evidence
presented,
the
condition
laid
down
in
paragraph
8(1
)(h),
to
the
effect
that
the
taxpayer
under
a
contract
of
employment
must
be
required
to
pay
his
own
expenses,
has
not
been
met:
the
appellant
in
fact
received
$0.25
a
mile
for
his
travelling
expenses.
In
addition,
under
subparagraph
8(1)(h)(iii)
the
appellant
should
not
have
received
a
travelling
allowance
under
subparagraph
6(1
)(b)(vii),
and
he
did
receive
one.
As
the
appellant
does
not
meet
all
the
conditions
of
paragraph
8(1
)(h),
he
cannot
claim
the
expense,
and
the
Board
must
therefore
arrive
at
a
conclusion
that
is
not
equitable,
namely
to
maintain
the
taxation
of
65%
of
the
expenses
in
the
appellant’s
income.
Thus,
with
regard
to
travelling
expenses,
an
employee
who
incurs
such
costs
on
behalf
of
his
employer
within
“the
metropolitan
area
where
that
establishment
was
located’’,
and
who
is
reimbursed
by
his
employer
for
this
expense
in
the
form
of
an
allowance,
must
be
taxed
on
this
reimbursement
unless
the
employee’s
work
is
connected
with
the
selling
of
property
or
negotiation
of
contracts
(subparagraph
6(1)(b)(v))
or
the
employee
is
a
minister
(subparagraph
6(1
)(b)(vi)).
Parliament
makes
the
laws,
and
the
courts
interpret
them.
The
Income
Tax
Act
must
be
interpreted
strictly.
There
is
no
room
for
equity.
The
courts
can
only
interpret
in
light
of
the
wording
before
them.
In
the
opinion
of
the
Board,
the
Act
should
be
changed;
but
that
is
the
function
of
members
of
the
House
of
Commons,
and
not
of
the
courts.
4.3.3
Finally,
with
regard
to
the
amount
of
$1,200
received
by
the
employer
in
1975,
which
was
originally
considered
an
amount
paid
for
mileage,
the
Board
allows
the
evidence
submitted
by
the
appellant,
namely
$800
received
for
the
sale
of
machinery
and
$400
included
in
1974
income
as
income
from
the
rental
of
machinery,
but
received
in
January
1975
(3.11
of
the
facts).
The
Board
concludes
that
this
amount
should
be
deducted
from
the
appellant’s
income,
as
the
latter
has
discharged
the
burden
of
proof
in
this
regard.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
allowed
in
part
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
foregoing
reasons
for
judgment.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.