M
J
Bonner:—I
will
give
my
decision.
This
is
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
appellant’s
1976
taxation
year.
The
appellant,
in
his
return
of
income,
claimed
a
deduction
of
$1,000
under
section
63
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
respect
of
payments
in
that
amount
for
the
care
of
his
child,
Robert
Gordon.
The
respondent
allowed
a
deduction
of
$300.
The
deduction
allowed
was
apparently
limited
by
the
formula
prescribed
in
subsection
63(2)
of
the
Act
on
the
basis
that
the
number
of
weeks
in
the
year
throughout
which
the
appellant
was
not
married
or
was
separated
from
his
wife
pursuant
to
a
written
separation
agreement,
and
it
is
not
clear
which,
was
ten;
that
is
to
say,
the
period
from
January
1
to
March
10.
The
appellant’s
marriage
to
his
first
wife
was
dissolved
on
March
5,
1976.
On
March
10,
1976,
the
appellant
married
again.
The
appellant
separated
from
his
second
wife
in
July
of
that
year.
There
is
no
evidence
whether
any
written
separation
agreement
was
entered
into.
The
agent
for
the
appellant
asserted
firstly
that
the
intention
of
section
63
was
to
provide
relief
to
single
parents,
and
thus
he
apparently
concluded
that
the
words
of
subparagraph
63(2)(a)(i)
“he
was
not
married”
should
be
read
as
qualified
by
words
such
as
“to
the
mother
of
the
child”
or
“to
a
woman
who
was
prepared
to
care
for
the
child
as
a
mother
should”.
Secondly
he
argued
that
the
result
contended
for
by
the
respondent
would
produce
“discriminatory
hardships”
in
that
the
result
would
deny
the
appellant
the
right
available
to
other
persons
of
the
same
class
in
contravention
of
the
appellant’s
basic
human
rights.
The
appellant’s
first
argument
was
not
based
on
any
principle
of
statutory
interpretation
which
was
mentioned
in
argument.
Rather,
it
appeared
that
the
argument
was
based
on
the
belief
of
the
appellant’s
agent
that
the
Legislature
had
failed
to
afford
a
sufficiently
broad
deduction.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
hold
that
view,
but
the
ambit
of
the
deduction
is
a
matter
for
the
Legislature.
The
appellant
has
not
shown
that
he
has
been
disallowed
a
deduction
to
which
he
was
entitled
on
any
tenable
interpretation
of
the
words
of
the
Act.
No
legal
basis
for
the
second
argument
was
advanced.
If
that
argument
was
intended
to
be
founded
on
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Bights,
and
that
was
not
entirely
clear,
but
I
assume
that
it
is
so,
I
can
only
say
that
the
basis
on
which
section
63
of
the
Act
is
said
to
offend
was
not
made
apparent.
The
effect
of
the
Bill
of
Rights
on
section
63
was
considered
in
Ayala
v
The
Queen,
[1979]
1
FC
695;
[1979]
CTC
111;
79
DTC
5083.
The
section
was
found
not
to
offend.
The
assessment
is
therefore
not
shown
to
be
wrong
and
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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