Grant,
DJ:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
plaintiff
from
reassessments
of
his
taxable
income
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
respect
of
the
year
1977
by
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
whereby
the
latter
adjusted
the
same
to
include
a
special
payment
made
by
Westinghouse
Electric
Corporation
to
him
in
the
total
sum
of
$2,144.
The
appellant
has
chosen
to
appeal
direct
to
the
Federal
Court
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
172(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
rather
than
to
the
Tax
Review
Board.
The
parties
have
filed
a
statement
of
facts
agreed
upon
by
them
(ex
1)
which
is
in
the
following
words
and
figures;
AGREED
STATEMENT
OF
FACTS
With
respect
to
the
appeal
from
the
reassessment
of
tax
for
the
plaintiff’s
1977
taxation
year,
the
plaintiff
and
the
defendant,
by
their
respective
solicitors,
for
the
purposes
of
this
action
only,
admit
the
following
facts:
1.
The
plaintiff
is
an
individual
who
resides
in
the
City
of
Burlington,
in
the
Province
of
Ontario.
2.
During
1977,
the
plaintiff
beneficially
owned
640
common
shares
in
the
capital
stock
of
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“WCL”),
a
publicly-traded
Canadian
corporation.
3.
On
February
8,
1977,
Westinghouse
Electric
Corporation
(“Westinghouse
Electric”),
a
publicly-traded
US
corporation,
extended
to
shareholders
of
WCL
the
alternatives
of
tendering
their
shares
to
Westinghouse
Electric
at
$26
per
share
or
of
accepting
a
direct
cash
payment
of
$3.35
per
share
from
Westinghouse
Electric
and
keeping
their
shares.
4.
The
plaintiff
did
not
tender
any
of
his
shares
of
WCL
pursuant
to
the
above-
mentioned
alternative
offers.
Therefore,
in
accordance
with
the
second
alternative
referred
to
above,
on
or
about
March
18,
1977,
the
plaintiff
received
a
direct
cash
payment
from
Westinghouse
Electric
in
the
amount
of
$2,144.
5.
The
plaintiff
was
not
a
shareholder
of
Westinghouse
Electric
nor
had
any
connection
with
it
at
any
material
time.
6.
At
the
time
the
alternative
offers
were
made,
Westinghouse
Electric
held
approximately
75%
of
the
shares
of
WCL.
7.
By
agreement
with
White
Consolidated
Industries
Inc,
a
US
corporation,
Westinghouse
Electric
sold
its
appliance
business
and
certain
of
its
world-wide
rights
to
White
Consolidated
Industries
Inc
as
of
December
31,
1974.
WCL
subsequently
agreed
to
sell
to
WCI
Canada
Limited
a
subsidiary
of
White
Consolidated
Industries
Inc,
certain
assets
of
its
household
appliance
business.
The
consideration
to
be
received
by
WCL
for
such
assets
was
to
have
been
equal
to
their
net
book
value,
to
be
paid
by
WCI
Canada
Limited,
plus
$8,000,000,
to
be
paid
by
Westinghouse
Electric.
8.
The
proposed
sale
to
WCI
Canada
Limited
was
subject
to
the
approval
under
the
Foreign
Investment
Review
Act,
SC
73-74,
c
46,
and
after
two
applications
was
subsequently
not
approved
and
the
agreement
between
WCL
and
WCI
Canada
Limited
was
terminated.
9.
As
of
December
31,1976,
WCL
agreed
to
sell
its
household
appliance
business
to
Canadian
Appliance
Manufacturing
Company
Limited
(“CAMCO”).
The
price
to
be
paid
by
CAMCO
was
approximately
$6,000,000
less
than
the
book
value
of
the
household
applicance
business
as
of
December
31,
1976.
The
closing
of
the
sale
of
CAMCO
took
place
on
June
30,
1977.
10.
The
alternative
offers
were
made
by
Westinghouse
Electric
for
its
business
purposes
and
in
the
hope
of
avoiding
controversy
or
potential
litigation
on
behalf
of
minority
shareholders
of
WCL
which
may
have
arisen
in
respect
of
the
sale
of
the
household
appliance
division,
particularly
as
a
result
of
the
disallowance
of
the
original
sale
to
WCI
Canada
Limited
pursuant
to
the
Foreign
Investment
Review
Act.
The
respective
offers
were
not
made
by
reason
of
any
enforceable
claims
by
WCL
shareholders
against
Westinghouse
Electric.
11.
In
computing
his
income
for
the
1977
taxation
year,
the
plaintiff
did
not
include
the
direct
cash
payment
received
from
Westinghouse
Electric.
12.
By
his
Notice
of
Reassessment
No
604960
dated
September
25,
1978,
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
the
plaintiff
in
respect
of
the
1977
taxation
year
and
adjusted
the
plaintiff’s
income
to
include
the
amount
of
$1,474,000.
the
Notice
of
Reassessment
stated
as
follows:
“Your
income
has
been
adjusted
to
include
a
special
payment
of
$1,474
received
in
1977
from
Westinghouse
Electric
Corporation
as
a
shareholder
of
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited.”
This
amount
represents
the
direct
cash
payment
in
respect
of
the
440
shares
registered
in
the
plaintiff’s
own
name
(the
remaining
200
shares
owned
by
the
plaintiff
are
registered
in
the
name
of
Wood
Gundy
Limited).
13.
On
October
4,
1978,
the
plaintiff
duly
filed
a
Notice
of
Objection
with
respect
to
the
said
reassessment.
14.
By
his
Notice
of
Reassessment
No
605202
dated
October
31,1978,
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
further
reassessed
the
plaintiff
in
respect
of
the
1977
taxation
year
and
adjusted
the
plaintiff’s
income
to
include
the
amount
of
$670.
The
Notice
of
Reassesment
stated
as
follows:
“Your
return
has
been
adjusted
to
include
an
additional
payment
from
Westinghouse
Electric
Corporation
of
$670.”’
This
additional
amount
represents
the
direct
cash
payment
in
respect
of
the
200
shares
of
the
plaintiff
registered
in
the
name
of
Wood
Gundy
Limited.
DATED
at
Toronto
this
10th
day
of
January,
1980.
BLAKE,
CASSELS
&
GRAYDON
Per:
John
B
Tinker
(signed)
Solicitors
for
the
plaintiff
DATED
at
Toronto
this
10th
day
of
January,
1980.
R
TASSE
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Ontario
Per:
N
M
Helfield
(signed)
Solicitor
for
the
defendant
The
plaintiff
also
gave
evidence
to
the
effect
that
at
all
material
times
he
was
a
Shareholder
in
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited
but
that
he
was
never
associated
with
Westinghouse
Electric
Limited
and
was
never
a
shareholder
in
that
company
or
employed
by
it.
The
only
communication
he
ever
had
from
such
company
was
the
offer
of
February
8,
1977
(ex
2).
He
retained
his
shares
in
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited
and
without
any
solicitation
on
his
part
received
from
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited
the
cheque
for
$2,144
which
he
cashed.
He
did
not
start
litigation
over
the
sale
by
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited
of
certain
of
its
household
appliance
business
nor
did
he
communicate
with
other
shareholders
in
respect
of
the
matter.
The
question
to
be
decided
is
the
nature
of
such
payment.
Was
it
a
receipt
of
income
within
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act?
Counsel
for
the
Minister
acknowledges
that
if
it
is
to
be
adjudged
income
it
must
be
in
relation
to
property.
Section
9
of
the
Act
reads:
(1)
Subject
to
this
part,
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property
is
his
profit
therefrom
for
the
year.
Subsection
248(1)
of
the
Act
states:
In
this
Act
property
means
property
of
any
kind
whatever
whether
real
or
personal
or
corporeal
or
incorporeal
and,
without
restricting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing,
includes
(a)
a
right
of
any
kind
whatever,
a
share
or
a
chose
in
action,
(b)
unless
a
contrary
intention
is
evident,
money,
and
(c)
a
timber
resource
property;
The
payment
does
not
come
within
the
provisions
of
section
15
of
the
Act
because
the
taxpayer
was
not
a
shareholder
in
the
corporation
which
made
the
payment
to
him.
It
was
made
in
such
unusual
circumstances
that
counsel
advise
me
they
have
been
unable
to
find
a
precedent.
Most
of
the
decisions
which
relate
to
the
determination
as
to
whether
a
payment
should
be
classed
as
income
for
taxation
purposes
or
otherwise
are
in
relation
to
payments
which
bear
some
resemblance
to
remuneration
for
services
rendered
such
as
Seymour
v
Reed,
[1927]
AC
554;
Hochstasser
v
Mayes,
38
TC
673;
Curran
v
MNR,
[1959]
SCR
850;
[1959]
CTC
416;
59
DTC
1247;
Moore
v
Griffiths,
48
TC
338;
Domenic
Cirella
v
The
Queen,
[1976]
CTC
2292;
77
DTC
5442;
Phaneuf
v
The
Queen,
[1978]
2
FC
564;
[1978]
CTC
21;
78
DTC
6001;
The
Queen
v
McLaughlin,
[1979]
1
FC
470;
[1978]
CTC
602;
78
DTC
6406.
Moneys
received
by
a
taxpayer
from
his
insurance
company
for
stock
destroyed
or
for
stock-in-trade
which
has
been
expropriated
is
a
trade
receipt
and
is
included
in
the
taxpayers
taxable
income.
The
moneys
so
received
were
held
to
be
part
of
the
taxpayers
trading
receipts
for
taxation
purposes
since
they
were
money
into
which
the
stock-in-trade
was
converted
and
was
received
in
the
course
of
their
business.
J
Gliksten
&
Son
Ltd
v
Green,
[1929]
AC
381;
London
Investment
Co
v
IRC,
[1957]
1
All
ER
277;
[1958]
2
All
ER
230.
A
case
which
bears
closer
resemblance
is
Federal
Farms
Limited
v
MNR,
[1959]
Ex
CR
91;
[1959]
CTC
98;
59
DTC
1050.
It
arose
from
damage
sustained
by
a
market
gardening
corporation
in
the
Holland
Marsh
area
at
the
time
that
hurricane
Hazel
flooded
lands
and
spoiled
farm
products
in
the
fields.
A
company
was
incorporated
to
receive
voluntary
contributions
to
be
distributed
among
the
unfortunate
farmers.
The
funds
collected
were
not
Sufficient
to
cover
all
damage
and
was
divided
proportionately
among
those
who
had
suffered
loss.
The
plaintiff
was
one
who
was
a
recipient
of
such
fund
in
the
amount
of
$10,000.
The
taxpayer
carried
no
flood
insurance
and
received
nothing
from
any
other
source
to
cover
such
loss.
The
Minister
in
reassessing
the
taxpayer’s
taxable
income
added
such
amounts
thereto.
He
took
the
position
that
such
amounts
took
the
place
of
the
vegetables
and
crops
destroyed
which
had
been
the
stock-in-trade
of
the
plaintiff.
Cameron,
J,
distinguished
the
case
from
Gliksten
et
al
v
Green
(supra)
on
the
basis
that
(a)
the
payment
was
entirely
voluntary,
(b)
it
was
given
by
persons
who
had
no
business
relations
with
the
taxpayer,
(c)
it
was
unrelated
to
the
taxpayer’s
business
activities,
(d)
the
taxpayer
had
no
legal
right
to
demand
any
portion
of
the
fund,
(e)
at
the
time
of
the
loss
he
had
no
expectation
of
being
so
compensated,
and
(f)
it
was
unlikely
ever
to
happen
again.
He
held
that
the
payment
was
a
gift
and
accordingly
was
not
income
or
a
revenue
receipt
taxable
under
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
parties
hereto
by
paragraph
10
of
such
Agreed
Statement
of
Facts
have
agreed
that
the
said
offers
of
$3.35
per
share
to
shareholders
of
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited
were
made
by
Westinghouse
Electric
for
its
business
purposes
and
in
the
hope
of
avoiding
controversy
or
potential
litigation
on
behalf
of
minority
shareholders
of
Westinghouse
Canada
Limited
which
may
have
arisen
in
respect
of
the
sale
of
the
household
ap-
plicance
division,
particularly
as
a
result
of
the
disallowance
of
the
original
sale
to
WCI
Canada
Limited
pursuant
to
the
Foreign
Investment
Review
Act.
The
respective
offers
were
not
made
by
reason
of
any
enforceable
claim
by
WCL
shareholders
against
Westinghouse
Electric.
There
was
no
evidence
other
than
that
contained
in
such
paragraph
10,
to
indicate
the
nature
of
the
controversy
or
litigation
which
Westinghouse
Electric
hoped
to
avoid
by
the
payments
made
to
the
minority
shareholders
who
retained
their
shares.
If
an
action
could
have
been
brought
against
some
of
the
parties
involved
as
a
result
of
the
disallowance
of
such
sale
any
recovery
by
the
plaintiff
would
not
ordinarily
have
the
characteristics
of
income.
In
any
event
as
far
as
the
plaintiff
was
concerned
the
payment
to
him
was
voluntary
and
no
relationship
existed
between
the
payor
and
the
taxpayer
who
had
no
expectation
of
receiving
the
same
until
he
received
the
offer
(ex
2).
It
is
most
unlikely
that
a
further
payment
will
be
made
by
him
in
respect
of
the
transaction.
The
payment
might
be
termed
a
windfall.
I
am
convinced
it
was
not
a
payment
of
income
within
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Judgment
should
therefor
go
declaring
that
the
payment
in
question
was
not
a
receipt
of
income
by
the
plaintiff
and
referring
the
assessment
of
the
plaintiff’s
taxable
income
for
the
year
1977
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
on
such
basis.
The
plaintiff
should
be
allowed
his
costs
of
these
proceedings
against
the
defendant
after
taxation
thereof.