John
B
Goetz:—This
is
an
appeal
with
respect
to
two
assessments
of
the
appellant’s
liability
pursuant
to
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-
71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
The
notices
of
assessment
were
dated
March
7,
1980.
The
respondent
submits
that:
5.
.
.
.
the
Appellant
is
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
the
amount
that
Leonard
P
Carrigan
was
liable
to
pay
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
a
result
of
the
property
transferred
to
the
Appellant
on
August
23,1974,
Pursuant
to
Section
160(1
)(d)(i).
6.
.
.
.
the
appellant
is
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
a
part
of
the
amount
that
Leonard
P
Carrigan
was
liable
to
pay
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
equal
to
the
value
of
the
property
transferred
to
the
Appellant
on
June
7,
1977,
pursuant
to
section
160(1)(d)(ii).
In
assessing
the
appellant,
the
respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
Issue
The
issues
to
be
determined
are
whether
the
transfer
of
property
dated
October
23,
1974,
from
Leonard
P.
Carrigan
to
the
appellant,
and
also
the
transfer
of
property
dated
June
7,
1977
from
Leonard
P
Carrigan
to
the
appellant
come
within
the
ambit
of
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
stated
that
section
160
applied.
Facts
The
provisions
of
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
read
as
follows:
160.
(1)
Where
a
person
has,
on
or
after
the
1st
day
of
May,
1951,
transferred
property,
either
directly
or
indirectly,
by
means
of
a
trust
or
by
any
other
means
whatever,
(a)
to
his
spouse
or
to
a
person
who
has
since
become
his
spouse,
or
(b)
to
a
person
who
was
under
18
years
of
age,
the
following
rules
are
applicable:
(c)
the
transferee
and
transferor
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
a
part
of
the
transferor’s
tax
under
this
Part
for
each
taxation
year
equal
to
the
amount
by
which
the
tax
for
the
year
is
greater
than
it
would
have
been
if
it
were
not
for
the
operation
of
section
74
or
section
75,
as
the
case
may
be,
in
respect
of
income
from
the
property
so
transferred
or
from
property
substituted
therefor;
and
(d)
the
transferee
and
transferor
are
jointly
and
severally
liable
to
pay
the
lesser
of
(i)
any
amount
that
the
transferor
was
liable
to
pay
under
this
Act
on
the
day
of
the
transfer,
and
(ii)
a
part
of
any
amount
that
the
transferor
was
so
liable
to
pay
equal
to
the
value
of
the
property
so
transferred;
but
nothing
in
this
subsection
shall
be
deemed
to
limit
the
liability
of
the
transferor
under
any
other
provision
of
this
Act.
At
all
times
material
to
this
appeal,
the
appellant
was
the
spouse
of
one
Leonard
P
Carrigan,
who
came
under
investigation
by
Revenue
Canada.
William
Mader,
an
investigator,
indicated
that
in
July
1977
he
was
assigned
to
check
into
the
record
of
Lake
Echo
Forest
Park
Limited
(“Lake
Echo
Park
Limited”),
of
which
Mr
Leonard
P
Carrigan
was
a
50%
shareholder.
In
attempting
to
conduct
an
audit
earlier
in
1977,
Leonard
Carrigan
advised
that
records
were
not
available
and
that
they
had
been
“stolen”.
The
limited
company
bought
two
plots
of
land
in
Echo
Park
area
which
is
recreation-
al/residential
area
near
a
lake,
for
the
purpose
of
subdividing.
On
examination
of
the
records
at
the
local
municipal
county
office,
it
was
discovered
that
some
of
the
proceeds
of
the
Lake
Echo
Park
Limited
property
went
unreported
and
therefore
there
arose
a
situation
of
unreported
income.
This
witness
filed
two
certified
copies
of
records
of
conviction
of
Mr
Carrigan
for
tax
evasion
under
section
239
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
representing
misconduct
on
the
part
of
Leonard
Carrigan
between
December
31,
1972
and
August
1,
1977.
Leonard
Carrigan
was
tried
in
Halifax
on
January
13,
1981.
Assessments
were
filed
indicating
that
they
had
been
issued
prior
to
the
above-mentioned
prosecutions
and
convictions.
Two
certificates
in
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
were
filed
indicating
in
the
Certificate
of
Certificate
of
Registration
whereby
$86,001.13,
together
with
additional
interest
on
the
sum
of
$59,463.51
was
payable
by
Leonard
Carrigan
on
arrears
and
interest
on
taxes
owing
to
the
Government
of
Canada.
The
respondent
also
filed
as
Exhibit
R-11
a
Certificate
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Nova
Scotia,
relating
to
assessments
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
said
Certificate
indicating
that
the
appellant
owed
$33,694.73,
together
with
additional
interest
on
the
sum
of
$23,310.63.
Clearly,
the
respondent
has
proved
one
of
the
essential
ingredients
involving
the
application
of
section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
I
am
referring
to
the
evidence
of
the
special
investigator
prior
to
referring
to
the
evidence
of
the
appellant
so
that
the
inconsistencies
in
the
appellant’s
evidence
and
the
nefarious
conduct
of
Leonard
Carrigan
(who
was
not
called
by
the
appellant’s
counsel,
which
under
the
circumstances
I
consider
prudent)
could
not
be
more
thoroughly
examined.
The
investigator
examined
and
analyzed
all
the
accounts
in
the
names
of
Mr
and
Mrs
Carrigan.
He
noticed
no
movement
of
the
sum
of
$500
(hereinafter
referred
to
in
the
evidence
of
Mrs
Carrigan)
on
a
monthly
basis.
As
a
result
of
this
investigation
Mr
Mader
determined
that
Leonard
Carrigan
had
charged
a
portion
of
his
house
to
Lake
Echo
Park
Limited.
In
fact,
in
1973
Carrigan
was
paid
$45,200
In
cheques
through
Lake
Echo
Park
Limited.
These
cheques
went
into
his
own
account.
This
is
not
all
of
the
evidence
given
by
Mr
Mader.
I
will
allude
to
it
further
as
I
deal
with
the
evidence
given
by
the
appellant.
The
appellant
lived
with
her
husband
at
15
Charlois
Court
in
the
City
of
Dartmouth,
in
the
County
of
Halifax.
Mrs
Carrigan
filed
Exhibit
A-3
which
purports
to
be
an
offer
to
purchase
by
her,
from
Leonard
P
Carrigan,
of
15
Charlois
Court
and
Lots
7
and
8
Dempster
Crescent
which
is
known
as
the
“lake
property”.
One
of
the
figures
appearing
in
this
document
is
“Cost
of
House
—
$35,309.85”.
Mrs
Carrigan
stated
that
this
agreement
had
been
drawn
up
by
her
husband
and
that
the
first
time
that
she
had
observed
it
was
two
weeks
prior
to
the
hearing
in
the
office
of
her
counsel,
Mr
Gregg,
and
this
was
in
preparation
for
the
hearing.
The
figure
of
$35,309.85
has
an
interesting
background
in
that
it
appears
at
9
and
10
of
the
appellant’s
appraiser’s
report
referred
to
as
appendix
“C”.
This
purports
to
be
a
schedule
of
personal
expenses
of
L
P
Carrigan
charged
to
the
company.
Mrs
Carrigan,
the
appellant,
admitted
that
she
had
not
seen
appendix
“C”
until
it
was
presented
to
her
at
the
hearing.
She
identified
her
husband’s
signature
to
the
document.
Mr
Mader,
in
his
evidence,
says
that
appendix
“C”
does
not
show
the
whole
cost
of
Charlois
Court
but
only
represents
a
Lake
Echo
Park
Limited
write-off
and
it
was
written
off
in
the
books
of
the
limited
company
but
revealed
the
expenses
of
Mr
and
Mrs
Carrigan.
Mader
unequivocally
states
that
the
figure
of
$35,309.85
appearing
in
Exhibit
A-3
could
not
have
been
prepared
prior
to
1979
because
that
figure
came
directly
from
appendix
“C”
of
Exhibit
A-1
which
is
the
appraisal
report;
and
in
fact
Mader
says
that
he
prepared
appendix
“C”,
that
is
he
had
it
typed
from
a
handwritten
list
given
to
him
with
respect
to
Lake
Echo
Park
Limited
by
Mr
Carrigan’s
accountant
who
attempted
to
show
it
as
a
business
expense
on
Lake
Echo
Park
Limited
books.
Mrs
Carrigan’s
answer
in
cross-examination
as
to
the
reason
for
the
transfer
of
her
husband’s
interest
in
the
various
properties
to
her
was
because
she
was
having
domestic
problems
and
her
husband
over-drank.
She
maintains
that
she
paid
him
$500
cash
per
month
but
there
is
no
indication
of
any
activity
in
any
of
her
accounts
relating
to
$500,
nor
does
it
appear
in
the
accounts
of
her
husband
Leonard
Carrigan.
In
the
midst
of
her
cross-examination,
her
counsel
Mr
Gregg
asked
leave
to
file
certain
receipts,
purportedly
made
by
Leonard
Carrigan
to
his
wife.
The
respondent
consented
to
this
request
and
then
on
further
examination
the
appellant
admitted
that
she
had
never
received
the
receipts
at
any
time,
that
she
knew
that
she
always
paid
him
$500
in
cash.
In
spite
of
Mr
Mader’s
careful
investigation
of
Leonard
Carrigan’s
affairs,
he
stated
that
these
receipts
were
never,
at
any
time,
presented
to
him
and
the
first
time
he
saw
them
was
at
the
hearing
of
the
appeal.
My
conclusion
at
looking
at
this
bundle
of
receipts
known
as
Exhibit
A-4,
is
that
they
were
indeed
written
by
Mr
L
P
Carrigan,
all
with
the
same
pen
(purportedly
over
a
long
period
of
time)
and,
in
my
view,
they
can
only
have
been
prepared
for
the
hearing
and
drawn
all
at
the
same
time.
As
mentioned,
appendix
“C”
was
drawn
from
handwritten
notes
with
respect
to
Lake
Echo
Park
Limited
and
provided
by
their
accountant
and
it
is
entitled:
“Paid
For
Lake
Echo
Forest
Park
Limited
by
L
P
Carrigan”,
and
filed
as
Exhibit
R-13.
It
is
from
this
document
that
appendix
“C”
was
drawn
by
Mr
Mader,
the
Revenue
Canada
investigator.
Findings
From
the
facts
above,
I
have
concluded
that
the
appellant
was,
in
spite
of
herself,
drawn
into
the
tax
problems
of
her
husband.
In
the
appellant’s
notice
of
appeal
prepared
by
Mr
Gregg,
he
says
as
follows:
Facts
On
March
7,
1980,
Mrs
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan
was
assessed,
under
Section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
for
$15,210.61,
by
way
of
Notice
of
Assessment
Number
378625,
as
follows:
“You
are
hereby
assessed
tax
under
Section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
By
instrument
dated
August
23,
1974,
Leonard
P
Carrigan
did
transfer
to
you
one-
half
of
all
his
rights
and
interest
in
the
family
home
at
15
Charlois
Court,
Dartmouth,
Nova
Scotia.
The
assessment
represents
the
amount
of
income
tax
owed
by
Leonard
P
Carrigan
at
the
date
of
transfer.”
On
the
same
date,
March
7,
1980,
Mrs
Carrigan
was
assessed
for
$60,000.00
by
way
of
Notice
of
Assessment
Number
378629
as
follows:
“You
are
hereby
assessed
tax
under
Section
160
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
By
instrument
dated
June
7,
1977,
Leonard
P
Carrigan
did
transfer
to
you
all
his
rights
and
interest
in
the
family
home
at
Charlois
Court,
Dartmouth,
Nova
Scotia,
together
with
two
lots
and
cottage
at
Mineville,
Halifax
County,
Nova
Scotia.”
The
abstract
of
title
for
the
two
cottage
properties
at
Mineville,
Halifax
County,
Nova
Scotia,
is
as
follows:
Warranty
Deed
|
Lake
Echo
Forest
Park
Limited
|
2975/24
|
—
to
—
|
August
21,
1974
|
Leonard
P
Carrigan
and
wife,
|
January
13,
1976
|
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan,
|
$1.00
|
as
Joint
Tenants
|
Warranty
Deed
|
Lake
Echo
Forest
Park
Limited
|
2975/28
|
—
to
—
|
August
21,
1974
|
Leonard
P
Carrigan
and
wife,
|
January
13,
1976
|
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan,
|
$1.00
|
as
Joint
Tenants
|
Warranty
Deed
|
Leonard
P
Carrigan
and
wife,
|
3122/473
|
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan,
|
June
7,
1977
|
—
to
—
|
June
10,
1977
|
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan,
|
$1.00
|
|
The
abstract
of
title
for
the
family
home
at
15
Charlois
Court,
Dartmouth,
Nova
Scotia,
is
as
follows:
This
document
clearly
sets
forth
the
dealings
with
the
properties
at
issue
in
this
appeal.
I
find
that
the
respondent
is
correct
in
his
assertion
that
on
August
23,
1974
Leonard
P
Carrigan
transferred
to
the
appellant,
as
a
joint
tenant,
one-half
interest
in
the
land
and
house
located
at
15
Charlois
Court,
Dartmount,
Nova
Scotia,
at
which
time
Carrigan
had
accumulated
(apparently
from
the
records
filed)
tax
arrears
in
the
amount
of
$15,210.61
for
his
1973
taxation
year.
I
further
find
that
on
June
7,
1977,
Leonard
P
Carrigan
transferred
to
the
appellant
his
remaining
one-half
interest
in
the
land
and
house
located
at
15
Charlois
Court,
Dartmouth,
Nova
Scotia,
and
also
his
interest
in
two
cottage
properties
hereinbefore
referred
to
as
Lots
7
and
8,
located
at
Mineville,
Halifax
County,
Nova
Scotia.
Warranty
Deed
|
Glendale
Building
Company
Limited
|
2707/440
|
—
to
—
|
August
23,
1973
|
Lake
Echo
Forest
Park
Limited
|
September
27,
1973
|
|
$1.00
|
|
Warranty
Deed
|
Lake
Echo
Forest
Park
Limited
|
2771/296
|
—
to
—
|
September
28,
1973
|
L
P
Carrigan
|
April
8,
1974
|
|
$1.00
|
|
Warranty
Deed
|
L
P
Carrigan
|
2824/166
|
—
to
—
|
August
23,
1974
|
Leonard
P
Carrigan
and
wife,
|
August
29,
1974
|
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan,
|
$1.00
|
as
Joint
Tenants
|
Warranty
Deed
|
Leonard
P
Carrigan
and
wife,
|
3122/992
|
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan,
|
June
7,
1977
|
—
to
—
|
June
13,
1977
|
Margaret
Theresa
Anne
Carrigan
|
$1.00
|
|
What,
then,
was
the
value
of
15
Charlois
Court
on
August
23,
1974
and
on
June
7,
1977?
And
what
was
the
value
of
the
two
cottage
properties
on
June
7,
1977?
One
Robert
E
Beer,
FRI,
was
called
as
an
appraiser
for
the
appellant.
Mr
Beer
found
that
the
15
Charlois
Court
property,
as
of
August
1974,
was
worth
$50,000
and
that
as
of
June
1977,
it
was
worth
$70,000.
He
values
Lots
7
and
8
Dempster
Crescent,
Echo
Park
area,
as
of
June
1977,
in
the
amount
of
$23,000.
Both
he
and
the
government
appraiser
used
the
cost
approach
and
the
market
data
approach,
each
giving
the
sale
prices
of
what
they
individually
considered
comparable
properties
at
or
about
the
dates
in
question,
that
is
1974
and
1977.
Mr
Lome
Richard
Perry
appeared
as
a
witness
for
the
respondent.
Mr
Perry
is
a
real
estate
appraiser
with
high
qualifications
and
considerably
more
experience
than
the
appellant’s
appraiser.
I
found
his
appraisal
report
complete
and
thorough
and
in
comparison
to
that
of
Mr
Beer’s
appraisal,
considerably
superior.
Mr
Perry
felt
that
the
15
Charlois
Court
property,
as
of
August
23,
1974,
was
worth
$102,500
and
that
as
of
June
7,
1977,
it
was
worth
$113,000.
It
was
his
opinion
that
Lots
7
and
8
Dempster
Crescent,
Echo
Park
subdivision,
Mineville,
Halifax
County,
Nova
Scotia,
had
a
value
as
of
June
1977
of
$40,400.
The
appellant’s
appraiser
valued
these
properties
at
$23,000.
Both
appraisers
felt
that
the
cottage
properties’
highest
and
best
use
would
be
residential,
and
indeed
all
properties
were
used
as
residential
properties
above
Dempster
Road,
which
was
the
road
that
gave
access
to
the
said
lots.
After
having
perused
both
appraisals
very
carefully,
I
have
concluded
that
the
appraised
values
for
the
residential
and
cottage
properties
by
Mr
Lome
Richard
Perry
appear
reasonable.
I
have
also
perused
the
following
cases
which
were
cited
to
me:
Allison
Janet
Craig
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
2119;
73
DTC
116;
Maria
Elizabeth
Rafael
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2398;
78
DTC
1300;
Dorrine
L
Payette
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2052;
79
DTC
81;
Aneda
Fisher
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2771;
79
DTC
661.
For
the
above
reasons,
I
dismiss
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.