M
J
Bonner:—The
appellant
appeals
from
assessments
of
income
tax
for
the
1977
and
1978
taxation
years.
On
assessment
the
Minister
disallowed
an
investment
tax
credit
claimed
for
1977
and
he
allowed
a
lesser
credit
than
was
claimed
for
1978.
During
the
relevant
years
the
appellant
was
employed
by
Great
Lakes
Paper
Company
Ltd
as
a
truck
driver.
Under
contracts
separate
from
the
employment
contract,
Great
Lakes
hired
from
the
appellant:
(a)
in
July
of
1978,
a
tandem
truck,
and
(b)
in
January
of
1979,
a
four-axle
logging
trailer.
In
consideration,
Great
Lakes
paid
the
appellant
an
hourly
rate
for
each
piece
of
equipment.
The
investment
tax
credits
were
claimed
in
respect
of
the
capital
cost
to
the
appellant
of
the
truck
acquired
in
1977
and
the
trailer
acquired
in
1978.
The
equipment
was
used
exclusively
in
the
transportation
of
pulpwood
belonging
to
Great
Lakes
from
the
site
of
the
company’s
logging
operations
to
its
mill
in
Thunder
Bay.
The
equipment
was
acquired
by
the
appellant
with
a
view
to
such
use.
It
was
the
appellant’s
contention
that
the
truck
and
trailer
were
acquired
to
be
used
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
logging
and
that
the
equipment
was
therefore
“qualified
property”
as
defined
in
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(vii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
equipment
was
not
acquired
by
the
appellant
..
to
be
used
by
him
in
Canada
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
.
..
logging”.
There
was
no
suggestion
in
the
evidence
that
the
use
intended
at
the
time
of
acquisition
and
the
use
ultimately
made
were
different.
The
evidence
plainly
showed
that
it
was
Great
Lakes
and
not
the
appellant
who
was
engaged
in
logging.
The
transportation
of
logs
may
well
be
a
part
of
logging,
but
the
transportation
of
logs
by
itself
is
not
logging.
The
argument
advanced
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
ignored
the
statutory
words
“by
him”
and
must
therefore
fail.
The
appellant
contended
further
that
the
trailer
was,
having
regard
to
the
date
of
its
acquisition,
“qualified
transportation
equipment”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
127(10.1)(d)
of
the
Act.
The
short
answer
to
this
contention
is
that
the
trailer
was
acquired
to
be
leased
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
(d)(ii)
and
the
appellant
is
not
a
corporation.
The
appeals
are
therefore
dismissed.
Appeals
dismissed.
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