Guy
Tremblay:—This
case
was
heard
in
the
City
of
Winnipeg,
Manitoba
on
February
9,
1981.
1.
The
Point
at
Issue
The
issue
is
whether
during
the
1975
and
1976
taxation
years
the
appellant,
a
mechanical
inspector,
was
correct
in
claiming
deductions
in
the
amount
of
$6,028.99
and
$3,655.23
respectively
as
farming
losses,
from
raising
horses
for
resale.
The
respondent
contends
that
the
appellant’s
activities
concerning
horses
were
merely
a
hobby
with
no
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
and
therefore
that
they
are
personal
expenses
as
provided
in
the
Income
Tax
Act.
2.
The
Burden
of
Proof
2.01
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessment
is
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
results
particularly
from
several
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
delivered
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
2.02
In
the
same
judgment
the
court
decided
that
the
assumptions
of
fact
on
which
the
respondent
based
the
assessment
are
also
deemed
to
be
correct.
In
the
present
case,
in
paragraph
5
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
the
respondent
described
the
facts
on
which
he
based
his
assessment:
5.
In
re-assessing
the
Appellant
for
his
1975
and
1976
taxation
years,
the
Respondent
made
the
following
assumptions
of
fact,
inter
alia:
(a)
The
Appellant
in
his
1975
and
1976
taxation
years
was
a
mechanical
inspector
employed
by
the
Department
of
Highways,
Province
of
Manitoba;
(b)
the
Appellant’s
income
from
office
or
employment
during
the
1975
and
1976
taxation
years
was
$15,415
and
$17,530
respectively;
(c)
during
the
latter
part
of
the
1975
taxation
year
the
Appellant
acquired
one
mare
at
a
cost
of
$1,500;
(d)
during
the
1976
taxation
year
the
aforementioned
mare
was
bred
to
a
sire
unsuccessfully;
(e)
during
the
1977
taxation
year
the
aforementioned
mare
was
bred
once
more
to
a
Sire,
again
unsuccessfully;
(f)
during
the
1975-1977
taxation
years
the
appellant
owned
but
the
one
aforementioned
mare;
(g)
the
Appellant
was
not
maintaining
horses
for
racing;
(h)
the
Appellant,
during
the
1975
and
1976
taxation
years,
with
respect
to
his
activity
concerning
horses,
was
merely
indulging
in
a
hobby
with
no
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
(i)
the
amounts
of
$6,028
and
$3,655
sought
to
be
deducted
by
the
Appellant
in
his
1975
and
1976
taxation
years
respectively
as
farming
losses
were
personal
or
living
expenses.
3.
The
Facts
3.01
During
the
1975
and
1976
taxation
years,
the
appellant
resided
at
1785
Balgona
Road
in
the
City
of
Winnipeg,
Manitoba.
3.02
The
respondent’s
assumptions
of
fact
described
in
subparagraphs
(a)
to
(f)
inclusively
of
paragraph
5
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
were
admitted
by
the
appellant.
However,
he
denied
the
facts
alleged
in
subparagraphs
(g)
to
(i).
3.03
The
figures
of
the
expenses
incurred
by
the
appellant
are
not
in
dispute
except
for
the
1975
taxation
year.
For
the
said
year,
the
appellant
claimed
an
amount
of
$3,734.74
as
a
capital
cost
allowance
(cca).
The
contention
of
the
respondent
is
that
for
the
said
year
the
maximum
cca
allowable
to
the
appellant
was
$1,783.88.
3.04
One
can
read
the
following
figures
in
the
1974
to
1979
income
tax
re-
turns
of
the
appellant:
|
INCOME
|
EXPENSES
|
LOSS
|
|
(including
cca)
|
|
1974
|
$64.34
(potatoes)
|
$4,414.00
|
$4,349.66
|
|
$3,224.74
(cca)
|
|
1975
$1,198.67
(vegetables)
|
$7,227.66
|
|
$6,028.99
|
|
$3,734.74
(cca)
|
|
1976
|
$626.50
(grinding
and
chickens)
|
$4,281.73
|
|
$3,655.23
|
1977
$1,059.53
(grinding)
|
$3,155.08
|
|
$2,095.55
|
|
nil
|
(cca)
|
|
1978
|
nil
|
$6,462.58
|
|
$6,462.58
|
|
nil
|
(cca)
|
|
1979
|
—
|
—
|
|
$4,064.00
|
In
1978,
the
appellant
in
his
return
described
his
work
as
“hobby
farmer”
and
explained
his
“schedule
of
loss”
as
follows:
James
Luchuck
Hobby
Farmer
Schedule
of
loss
Net
Loss
—
1978
|
(6,462.58)
|
Claim
78
|
($2,500.00)
|
1
/
($6,432.58
—
$2,500)
|
($1,966.29)
|
|
($4,466.29)
|
Loss
Forward
to
79
|
($1,996.29)
|
|
($6,462.58)
|
3.05
In
his
1974
return
and
for
the
following
years,
the
appellant
declared
as
self-employment:
Type
of
business:
|
Market
gardener
&
drill
grinding
|
Principal
commodity
|
|
manufactured
or
sold
|
|
or
service
provided:
|
Fruits
and
vegetables
(onions,
|
|
potatoes)
mechanical
repairs,
|
|
drill
grinding
machine
service.
|
Name
of
firm:
|
West
Acres
Grinding
and
Produce
|
|
(West
Winds
Produce)
|
Name
of
partners:
|
Nil
|
Total
acreage:
|
5
|
Cultivated
acreage:
|
4
1
/2
|
3.06
The
appellant
testified
that
he
had
chickens
for
a
short
period
in
1976.
In
1978
or
1979,
he
had
some
turkeys.
3.07
The
appellant
testified
that
in
1975,
he
bought
a
mare
named
Lady
Question.
She
was
bred
four
times,
and
three
times
she
lost
her
foals.
This
mare
was
sold
in
1976
for
$6,000.
3.08
Two
other
mares
were
purchased.
One
was
sold
in
1977
and
one
in
1979;
the
latter
was
sold
for
$1,800.
3.09
Out
of
four
foals
only
one,
in
fact,
was
born.
3.10
The
appellant
explained
that
he
had
some
experience
in
farming
in
the
1930’s
when
he
had
worked
on
farms.
In
1976,
he
attended
10-night
lectures
of
two
hours
each
at
the
University
of
Manitoba
on
horse
breeding.
3.11
The
appellant
testified
that
his
intention
was
to
buy,
to
breed
and
to
sell
thoroughbred
horses.
However,
he
did
not
realize
at
the
time
all
the
risks
involved.
He
said
that
people
who
were
selling
and
breeding
horses
really
painted
an
overly
bright
picture
of
the
possible
prospects.
3.12
In
his
testimony,
the
appellant
claimed
that
his
wife
worked
approximately
three
hours
a
day
and
that
they
both
worked
at
least
six
hours
on
the
weekend.
He
also
said
that
he
himself
worked
from
one
hour
to
two
hours
every
evening.
This
works
out
to
a
minimum
of
44
hours
per
week.
4.
Law
—
Cases
at
Law
—
Analysis
4.01
Law
The
main
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
involved
in
the
present
case
are
subsections
31(1)
and
(2).
The
definitions
of
“farming”
and
“personal
or
living
expenses”
of
section
248
are
also
important.
They
read
as
follows:
31
(1)
Where
a
taxpayer’s
chief
source
of
income
for
a
taxation
year
is
neither
farming
nor
a
combination
of
farming
and
some
other
source
of
income,
for
the
purposes
of
sections
3
and
111
his
loss,
if
any,
for
the
year
from
all
farming
busi-
nessess
carried
on
by
him
shall
be
deemed
to
be
the
aggregate
of
(a)
the
lesser
of
(i)
the
amount
by
which
the
aggregate
of
his
losses
for
the
year,
determined
without
reference
to
this
section
and
before
making
any
deductions
in
respect
of
expenditures
described
in
section
37,
from
all
farming
businesses
carried
on
by
him
exceeds
the
aggregate
of
his
incomes
for
the
year,
so
determined
from
all
such
businesses,
and
(ii)
$2,500
plus
the
lesser
of
(A)
/2
of
the
amount
by
which
the
amount
determined
under
subparagraph
(i)
exceeds
$2,500,
and
(B)
$2,500,
and
(b)
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
(i)
the
amount
that
would
be
determined
under
subparagraph
(a)(i)
if
it
were
read
as
though
the
words
“and
before
making
any
deductions
in
respect
of
expenditures
described
in
section
37”
were
deleted
exceeds
(ii)
the
amount
determined
under
subparagraph
(a)(i);
and
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
amount
determined
under
subparagraph
(a)(i)
exceeds
the
amount
determined
under
subparagraph
(a)(ii)
is
the
taxpayer’s
“restricted
farm
loss”
for
the
year.
(2)
For
the
purpose
of
this
section,
the
Minister
may
determine
that
a
taxpayer’s
chief
source
of
income
for
a
taxation
year
is
neither
farming
nor
a
combination
of
farming
and
some
other
source
of
income.
248.
(1)
In
this
Act,
“farming”
includes
tillage
of
the
soil,
livestock
raising
or
exhibiting,
maintaining
of
horses
for
racing,
raising
of
poultry,
fur
farming,
dairy
farming,
fruit
growing
and
the
keeping
of
bees,
but
does
not
include
an
office
or
employment
under
a
person
engaged
in
the
business
of
farming;
“personal
or
living
expenses”
includes
(a)
the
expenses
of
properties
maintained
by
any
person
for
the
use
or
benefit
of
the
taxpayer
or
any
person
connected
with
the
taxpayer
by
blood
relationship,
marriage
or
adoption,
and
not
maintained
in
connection
with
a
business
carried
on
for
profit
or
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
(b)
the
expenses,
premiums
or
other
costs
of
a
policy
of
insurance,
annuity
contract
or
other
like
contract
if
the
proceeds
of
the
policy
or
contract
are
payable
to
or
for
the
benefit
of
the
taxpayer
or
a
person
connected
with
him
by
blood
relationship,
marriage
or
adoption,
and
(c)
expenses
of
properties
maintained
by
an
estate
or
trust
for
the
benefit
of
the
taxpayer
as
one
of
the
beneficiaries.
4.02
Cases
at
Law
The
counsel
for
the
parties
referred
the
Board
to
the
following
cases:
1.
William
Moldowan
v
HMQ,
[1977]
CTC
310;
77
DTC
5213;
2.
Joseph
Shiewitz
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2291;
79
DTC
340;
3.
Fred
L
Johnson
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2122;
78
DTC
1109;
4.
Ernest
Radies
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2601;
78
DTC
1448;
5.
McCleary
Drope
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
2639;
78
DTC
1483;
6.
Terrence
S.
Gray
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
3101;
78
DTC
1814;
7.
Donald
J
Gillis
v
HMQ,
[1978]
CTC
44;
78
DTC
6103;
8.
J
R
Zavitz
v
MNR,
[1978]
CTC
3021;
78
DTC
1730;
9.
Robert
E
Mullin
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2080;
79
DTC
113;
10.
C
A
Burns
Limited
v
MNR,
[1981]
CTC
2001;
81
DTC
14;
11.
The
Deputy
Minister
of
Revenue
of
Quebec
v
Julius
Lipson,
[1979]
CTC
247;
12.
F
George
Walker
v
MNR,
76
DTC
1224.
4.03
Analysis
4.03.1
In
cultivating
vegetables
and
in
buying,
breeding
and
selling
horses,
the
appellant
was
“farming”
for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
sections
31
and
248.
Concerning
section
31
of
the
new
Act
(subsection
13(1)
of
the
former
Act)
and
the
definition
of
“personal
or
living
expenses”,
it
is
appropriate
to
quote
Dickson,
J
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
William
Moldowan
v
HMQ,
[1977]
CTC
310
at
313;
and
77
DTC
5213
at
5215:
The
next
thing
to
observe
with
respect
to
subsection
13(1)
is
that
it
comes
into
play
only
when
the
taxpayer
has
had
a
farming
loss
for
the
year.
That
being
so,
it
may
seem
strange
that
the
section
should
speak
of
farming
as
the
taxpayer’s
chief
source
of
income
for
the
taxation
year;
if
in
a
taxation
year
the
taxpayer
suffers
a
loss
on
his
farming
operation
it
is
manifest
that
farming
would
not
make
any
contribution
to
the
taxpayer’s
income
in
that
year.
On
a
literal
reading
of
the
section,
no
taxpayer
could
ever
claim
more
than
the
maximum
$5,000
deduction
which
the
section
contemplates;
the
only
way
in
which
the
section
can
have
meaning
is
to
place
emphasis
on
the
words
“source
of
income”.
Although
originally
disputed,
it
is
now
accepted
that
in
order
to
have
a
“source
of
income”
the
taxpayer
must
have
a
profit
or
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
Source
of
income,
thus,
is
an
equivalent
term
to
business:
Dorfman
v
MNR,
[1972]
CTC
151,
72
DTC
6131.
See
also
paragraph
139(1
)(ae)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
includes
as
“personal
and
living
expenses”
and
therefore
not
deductible
for
tax
purposes,
the
expenses
of
properties
maintained
by
the
taxpayer
for
his
own
use
and
benefit,
and
not
maintained
in
connection
with
a
business
carried
on
for
profit
or
with
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit.
If
the
taxpayer
in
operating
his
farm
is
merely
indulging
in
a
hobby,
with
no
reasonable
expectation
of
profit,
he
is
disentitled
to
claim
any
deduction
at
all
in
respect
of
expenses
incurred.
There
is
a
vast
case
literature
on
what
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
means
and
it
is
by
no
means
entirely
consistent.
In
my
view,
whether
a
taxpayer
has
a
reasonable
expectation
of
profit
is
an
objective
determination
to
be
made
from
all
of
the
facts.
The
following
criteria
should
be
considered:
the
profit
and
loss
experience
in
past
years,
the
taxpayer’s
training,
the
taxpayer’s
intended
course
of
action,
the
capability
of
the
venture
as
capitalized
to
show
a
profit
after
charging
Capital
cost
allowance.
The
list
is
not
intended
to
be
exhaustive.
The
factors
will
differ
with
the
nature
and
extent
of
the
undertaking:
The
Queen
v
Matthews,
74
DTC
6193.
One
would
not
expect
a
farmer
who
purchased
a
productive
going
operation
to
suffer
the
same
start-up
losses
as
the
man
who
begins
a
tree
farm
on
raw
land.
and
William
Moldowan
v
HMQ,
[1977]
CTC
310
at
315,
and
77
DTC
5213
at
5216:
In
my
opinion,
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
a
whole
envisages
three
classes
of
farmers:
(1)
a
taxpayer,
for
whom
farming
may
reasonably
be
expected
to
provide
the
bulk
of
income
or
the
centre
of
work
routine.
Such
a
taxpayer,
who
looks
to
farming
for
his
livelihood,
is
free
of
the
limitation
of
s.
13(1)
in
those
years
in
which
he
sustains
a
farming
loss.
(2)
the
taxpayer
who
does
not
look
to
farming,
or
to
farming
and
some
subordinate
source
of
income,
for
his
livelihood
but
carried
on
farming
as
a
sideline
business.
Such
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
the
deductions
spelled
out
in
s.
13(1)
in
respect
of
farming
losses.
(3)
the
taxpayer
who
does
not
look
to
farming,
or
to
farming
and
some
subordinate
source
of
income,
for
his
livelihood
and
who
carried
on
some
farming
activités
as
a
hobby.
The
losses
sustained
by
such
a
taxpayer
on
his
nonbusiness
farming
are
not
deductible
in
any
amount.
4.03.2
In
the
present
case,
it
is
clear
from
the
evidence
that
Mr
Luchuck
cannot
be
classified
in
class
one
of
the
former
three
classes
of
farmers
determined
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
Therefore,
the
appellant
can
be
classified
in
class
two
(and
the
deduction
would
be
the
restricted
losses
of
section
31)
or
in
class
three
(and
there
would
be
no
deduction
at
all).
To
sum
up,
the
crux
of
the
matter
is
whether
the
appellant’s
interest
in
farming
is
a
sideline
business
or
a
hobby.
The
difference
can
be
minimal.
4.03.3
According
to
the
cases
at
law
referred
to
by
the
parties,
the
different
items
to
be
considered
are,
inter
alia,
experience
in
farming,
time
spent,
intent,
capital
committed
and
profitability
both
actual
and
potential.
4.03.4
Items
analysed
(a)
Experience
in
farming
The
evidence
concerning
the
item
(para
3.10)
is
not
in
favour
of
the
appellant.
The
fact
that
he
worked
on
farms
in
1930
and
that
he
went
to
10
lectures
on
horse
breeding
is
not
sufficient,
certainly
not
to
realize
the
risks
involved
in
such
business
as
he
himself
admitted.
The
Board
states
that
when
he
went
to
lectures
in
1976,
he
had
already
had
a
mare
for
at
least
one
year.
The
Board
states
also
that
the
assessments
issued
by
the
respondent
disallowed
all
the
farming
expenses
including
those
concerning
vegetables
and
chickens.
The
appellant
appeals
only
the
breeding
and
raising
of
horses.
However,
the
evidence
given
about
vegetables
and
chickens
(paras
3.04,
3.05
and
3.06)
is
far
from
convincing
that
he
was
an
experienced
farmer.
(b)
Time
spent
If
the
Board
accepts
the
evidence
given
on
the
time
spent
by
the
appellant
and
his
wife
(para
3.12)
despite
the
fact
it
is
not
confirmed
by
another
witness,
the
Board
concludes
that
this
item
is
in
favour
of
the
appellant’s
thesis.
(c)
Intent
The
affirmation
of
the
appellant
about
his
intention
of
breeding,
raising
and
selling
horses
is
clear,
but
not
confirmed.
However,
from
other
evidence,
the
Board
would
be
ready
to
accept
it
if
the
item
profitability
was
in
favour
of
the
appellant.
(d)
Capital
committed
No
particular
evidence
was
given
concerning
the
capital
committed.
However,
it
is
admitted
that
the
appellant
has
a
five
acre
farm
with
a
house
and
a
Stable.
(e)
Profitability
both
actual
and
potential
The
evidence
given
is
that
there
was
no
profit
at
all
during
the
taxation
years
1975
and
1976
involved
in
this
appeal,
and
there
was
no
profit
during
the
years
1977,
1978
and
1979
as
well.
Moreover,
the
appellant
has
chosen
not
to
declare
the
sale
of
the
mare
as
revenue,
because,
according
to
his
counsel,
it
was
on
a
cash
basis
accounting
system.
No
evidence
was
given
concerning
the
method
of
payment
by
the
purchaser.
Although,
it
was
possible
to
give
better
evidence
concerning
the
actual
profitability,
it
was
not
given.
Concerning
the
potential
profitability,
it
seems
that
the
remaining
foal
is
the
only
potential
source.
It
is
not
the
most
convincing
evidence.
4.03.5
In
the
Board’s
opinion,
the
time
spent
and
the
intent
(even
if
it
would
be
accepted)
which
are
the
two
items
in
favour
of
the
appellant,
are
not
sufficient
to
reverse
the
burden
of
proof.
The
most
important
item
was
the
profitability.
The
preponderance
of
the
evidence
on
this
point
is
not
in
favour
of
the
appellant.
His
testimony
in
paragraph
3.11
confirms
that
in
his
case
the
reality
was
far
from
the
picture
given.
With
the
evidence
given
by
the
appellant,
it
is
the
Board’s
opinion
that
the
appellant
has
well
described
his
whole
farming
operation
from
1975
to
1979,
when
in
his
1978
income
tax
return,
he
described
himself
as
a
“Hobby
Farmer”.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
dismissed
in
accordance
with
the
above
reasons
for
judgment.
Appeal
dismissed.