Guy
Tremblay
[TRANSLATION]:—This
case
was
heard
at
Quebec
City,
Quebec
on
October
19,
1979.
It
was
taken
under
advisement
on
January
7,
1980
after
the
last
pleading
had
been
filed.
1.
Issue
The
issue
is
whether
the
appellant,
a
pediatrician,
was
justified
in
claiming
the
sums
of
$2,062.87,
$2,564.13
and
$5,188.09
for
the
1972,
1973
and
1974
taxation
years
respectively
as
expenses
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
professional
income.
The
respondent
maintained
that
the
said
sums
were
personal
expenses
and
therefore
not
deductible
in
calculating
the
appellant’s
income.
2.
Burden
of
proof
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessments
are
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
derives
not
from
one
particular
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
but
from
a
number
of
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
delivered
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v
MNR
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
3.
Facts
A.
General
3.01
During
1972,
1973
and
1974
the
appellant
practised
as
a
doctor
specializing
in
pediatrics,
a
profession
he
had
practised
since
1964.
In
1972
he
practised
in
association
with
Dr
R
Albert
and
in
1973
and
1974
with
Dr
Albert
and
Dr
P
Grégoire.
The
appellant’s
fiscal
year
ended
on
January
31
of
each
year.
3.02
The
appellant
was
a
member
of
numerous
organizations
and
held
various
positions,
including:
1.
Head
of
the
Pediatrics
Department
at
the
Jeffrey
Hale
Hospital:
2.
Member
of
the
Executive
Committee
of
the
Council
of
Doctors
and
Dentists
at
the
Jeffrey
Hale
Hospital:
3.
Member
of
the
Medical
and
Dental
Evaluation
Committee
at
the
Jeffrey
Hale
Hospital:
4.
Active
member
of
the
St-Sacrement
Hospital:
5.
President
of
the
Quebec
Pediatric
Society;
6.
Member
of
the
Pediatric
Practice
Committee
of
the
Canadian
Paediatric
Society;
7.
Member
of
the
Public
Safety
Committee
of
the
Canadian
Paediatric
Society:
8.
Member
of
the
complex
pediatric
cases
committee
of
the
Health
Insurance
Board;
9.
Member
of
the
Board
at
the
St-Ambroise
Hospital;
10.
Member
of
the
committee
of
examiners
for
certification
in
pediatrics
of
the
Province
of
Quebec;
11.
Lecturer
at
Laval
University;
12.
Chairman
of
the
pediatrician’s
Reunification
Committee
in
Quebec
City.
3.03
For
the
years
concerned
the
appellant
claimed
the
following
expenses
in
computing
his
net
income,
part
of
which
were
allowed
by
the
respondent
and
part
disallowed:
|
Claimed
|
Allowed
|
Disallowed
|
1972
|
$6,430.79
|
$4,367.92
|
$2,062.87
|
1973
|
$7,735.99
|
$5,171.86
|
$2,564.13
|
1974
|
$9,672.73
|
$4,484.64
|
$5,188.09
|
The
following
is
a
breakdown
of
these
amounts
for
1974:
|
1974
|
|
|
Claimed
|
Allowed
|
Difference
|
General
expenses
|
|
Association
|
$
913.50
|
$1,003.00
$
(89.50)
|
Travel,
conferences,
entertainment
|
|
and
subscriptions
|
$4,089.59
|
293.51
|
$3,696.08
|
Legal
fees
and
collection
|
|
Telephone
|
$
379.33
|
$
279.30
$
100.03
|
Medicaments
and
instruments
|
$
400.75
|
205
97
|
$
194.78
|
|
$5,783.17
|
$1,881.78
|
$3,901.39
|
Automobile
expenses
|
|
Gas
and
maintenance
|
$3,170.73
|
$2,746.15
|
$
424.58
|
Insurance
|
$
392.00
|
$
392.00
|
|
Garage
rental
and
snow
removal
|
$
319.23
|
—
|
$
319.23
|
Parking
|
$
46.30
|
—
|
47.30
|
Depreciation
|
|
-Automobile
|
$1,114.02
$1,199.94
$
(85.92)
|
-Snowblower
|
$
142.80
|
—
|
$
142.80
|
|
$5,186.08
|
$4,338.09
$
847.99
|
Less
|
|
Personal
use
|
$,296.52
|
$,735.23
|
$
438.71
|
|
$3,889.56
|
$2,602.86
|
$1,286.70
|
|
$9,672.73
|
$4,484.64
|
$5,188.09
|
3.04
The
appellant
produced
an
impressive
number
of
receipts
to
prove
these
expenses.
The
amount
of
the
expenses
claimed
was
equal
to
the
total
of
the
individual
receipts
when
he
submitted
them
to
the
respondent.
B.
Automobile
expenses
3.05
The
appellant
owned
two
automobiles
during
the
years
in
question:
a
Camaro
purchased
before
1972
and
a
vehicle
called
a
Jimmy
4X4
purchased
on
April
27,
1972
and
replaced
by
a
Blazer
4
X
4
in
1973.
He
still
owned
it
and
the
Camaro
in
1974.
3.06
The
appellant
used
the
4X4
chiefly
for
professional
purposes.
Because
of
the
nature
of
his
work
as
a
frontline
doctor,
that
is,
one
of
the
first
to
be
called
in
cases
of
emergency,
the
appellant
had
to
use
such
a
vehicle
to
be
able
to
get
to
the
hospital
at
any
time
despite
the
problems
posed
by
winter
conditions.
During
storms
he
even
replaced
other
doctors
who
could
not
travel
through
the
snow
in
their
vehicles.
He
was
on
emergency
duty
every
second
day
and
every
second
weekend
in
1972;
every
third
day
and
every
third
weekend
in
1973
and
1974.
On
weekends
he
had
to
be
available
24
hours
a
day.
House
calls
were
limited
to
the
Quebec
City
area.
The
appellant
did
not
adduce
any
evidence
respecting
the
frequency
of
such
visits,
even
though
he
maintained
that
they
were
more
frequent
than
at
present.
The
appellant
also
used
his
4X4
to
go
to
his
parents’
farm
at
least
once
a
week,
a
farm
that
was
located
65
miles
from
Quebec
City
(Transcript,
pp
54
and
55).
The
various
hospitals
he
attended
were
located
at
the
following
distances
from
his
residence:
|
Miles
|
Jeffrey
Hale
|
2
Z?
|
St-Sacrement
|
3
|
St-Ambroise
|
12
|
During
the
hunting
and
fishing
season
the
appellant
used
his
4
X
4
for
trips
to
Chicoutimi
and
Squatec.
He
also
used
the
4
X
4
to
go
to
Laval
University
to
give
classes
and
to
go
to
meetings
of
the
various
associations
to
which
he
belongs.
3.07
The
appellant
did
not
keep
any
mileage
records
for
the
years
in
question.
3.08
The
Camaro
was
used
for
personal
purposes
after
the
Jimmy
4X4
was
purchased
on
April
27,
1972.
It
was
only
occasionally
used
for
professional
purposes
after
that
time.
No
expenses
in
connection
with
the
Camaro
were
claimed
in
computing
the
appellant’s
income.
3.09
Two
of
the
invoices
filed
in
support
of
automobile
expenses
related
to
the
Camaro:
one
dated
July
21,
1971
and
one
April
25,
1971.
The
other
invoices
do
not
necessarily
relate
to
the
4X4.
The
gas
for
the
Camaro
was
purchased
at
the
same
garage
as
that
for
the
4
X
4
(Transcript,
p
47).
3.10
The
appellant
claimed
75%
of
the
expenses
for
the
4
X
4
as
professional
use,
25%
being
considered
personal
use.
He
did
not
claim
any
expenses
for
the
Camaro
as
professional
use.
C.
Expenses
in
connection
with
a
snowblower
and
garage
3.11
The
appellant
also
claimed
depreciation
on
a
snowblower
used
to
clear
the
entrance
to
a
garage
he
had
rented,
presumably
not
far
from
his
residence.
In
1974
he
claimed
inter
alia,
$319.23
for
"garage
rental
and
snow
removal"
and
$142.80
for
"depreciation
of
the
snowblower".
These
sums
were
disallowed
totally.
D.
Telephone
expenses
3.12
The
appellant
testified
that
in
computing
his
income
he
deducted
the
entire
cost
of
the
telephone
in
his
residence
without
subtracting
the
personal
portion.
There
is
only
one
telephone
in
his
residence
which
is
for
the
use
of
the
entire
family,
including
two
daughters
aged
10
and
12.
The
respondent’s
witness
stated
that
he
allowed
all
long
distance
call
charges
to
be
deducted,
even
though
some
of
the
calls
may
have
been
personal.
The
telephone
expenses
claimed,
allowed
and
disallowed
are
as
follows:
|
1972
|
1973
1973
|
1974
1974
|
Claimed
|
$489.22
|
$331.34
|
$379.33
|
Allowed
|
$358.91
|
$280.00
|
$179.30
|
Disallowed
|
$130.31
|
$
51.34
|
$100.03
|
E.
Promotion
expenses
3.13
The
expenses
claimed
for
“travel,
conferences,
entertainment
and
Subscriptions”
and
those
allowed
and
disallowed
are
as
follows:
|
1972
|
1973
1973
|
1974
1974
|
Claimed
|
$1,974.32
|
$2,822.54
|
$4,089.59
|
Allowed
|
$
630.00
|
$1,203.00
|
$
293.51
|
Disallowed
|
$1,344.32
|
$1,619.54
|
$3,969.08
|
3.14
In
assessing
the
appellant
the
respondent
allowed
all
the
conference
expenses
but
disallowed
the
others.
3.15
According
to
the
appellant,
most
of
the
expenses
disallowed
were
for
meals
and
drinks
bought
for
medical
colleagues
and
nurses:
In
addition,
colleagues
in
general
practice
—
or
specialists
or
interns,
when
they
were
in
private
practice
elsewhere
—
when
they
came
into
town
they
always
came
to
see
Maurice
—
they
never
called
me
Dr
Bouchard,
it
was
always
Maurice.
Our
house
was
always
full,
and
it
wasn’t
always
up
to
my
wife
to
prepare
meals,
so
I
had
to
incur
expenses
going
to
eat
in
restaurants,
buying
liquor
and
giving
presents,
even
to
nurses
and
interns
or
residents,
to
thank
them.
These
are
part
of
my
expenses,
and
these
presents
were
mostly
in
the
form
of
liquor,
of
bottles.
(Transcript,
pp
21-22).
Q.
There
were
get-togethers
at
home,
get-togethers
elsewhere?
A.
Get-togethers
at
home;
I
gave
receptions,
even
completely
for
interns,
with
specialists
at
my
house,
what
could
be
called
large
parties
to
thank
these
people
for
practising,
because
this
was
the
only
way
of
thanking
them
for
the
favours
they
had
done
us.
(Transcript,
p
22)
Q.
How
did
you
compile
this,
the
entertainment
expenses
for
($1,344)?
A.
I
collected
my
hotel
receipts,
my
American
Express
and
Diner’s
Club
card
expenses,
which
I
added
up
at
the
end
of
the
year,
and
my
Liquor
Board
expenses.
And
in
addition,
restaurant
expenses.
DANIELLE
THOBODEAU:
Q.
But
explain
to
us
in
greater
detail
what
you
mean
by
entertainment
expenses,
the
expenses
you
claimed;
what
are
they,
the’re
presents,
meals
you
bought
for
clients?
A.
There
were
some
presents
in
this,
as
I
said,
mostly
liquor
from
the
Liquor
Board.
Q.
Who
did
you
give
these
presents
to?
A.
Either
to
interns.
Q.
Interns
who
had
worked
for
you?
A.
That’s
right.
Q.
As
you
said,
“to
thank
them
for
good
service”?
A.
That’s
right,
that’s
right.
Either
to
my
colleagues
who
saw
my
wife
or
my
daughters
because
they
got
sick
as
well.
These
were
gifts
given
at
Christmas
time,
mostly.
And
even
during
the
year
as
well.
(Transcript,
pp
63-64)
DANIELLE
THIBODEAU:
Q.
Your
colleagues
are
also
your
friends:
do
you
have
any
friends
other
than
your
colleagues?
A.
Certainly
after
15
years
of
practice
I
have
many
friends.
Q.
And
they
can
refer
clients
to
you
like
that,
just
as
any
friend
can
refer
a
client?
A.
Definitely.
Q.
The
expenses
you
claimed,
you
said
gifts
of
liquor?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are
there.
.
.
A.
There
are
—
I’m
sorry
—
there
aren’t
just
presents!
When
I
receive
a
colleague
at
our
home,
if
I
decide
to
buy
him
a
drink,
I
think
that
out
of
regard
or
gratitude
for
what
he’s
done,
or
if
he
comes
to
see
me
or
consult
me,
then
I’m
entitled
to
deduct
it.
This
is
why
the
liquor
was
included,
plus
part
that
was
for
the
presents
as
well.
CHAIRMAN:
Q.
The
meeting
at
your
house,
for
parties
which
would
be
parties
only
for
your
own
family,
personal,
parties.
..
A.
That’s
not
certain.
Q.
You
sometimes
have
them,
like
that?
A.
Yes,
yes.
(Transcript,
pp
67,
68,
69)
Q.
Did
you
receive
them
individually
or
at
receptions?
A.
No.
We
might
have
a
meal
at
our
house,
we
might
have
an
evening
at
home.
They
might
come
—
they
might
be
passing
through
Quebec
City,
people
from
elsewhere,
and
stay
in
the
hotel
or
spend
an
evening
at
the
house,
that’s
how
it
was.
I
received
interns,
I
received
residents,
it’s
only
been
in
the
last
two
years
that
there
have
no
longer
been
any
at
Jeffrey
Hale;
we
received
these
people,
we
received
general
practitioners,
four,
five,
six,
seven,
eight.
One
evening
we
even
received
80
people
at
one
time;
they
were
all
colleagues
and
.
.
.
(Transcript,
pp
77,
78)
DANIELLE
THIBODEAU:
Q.
But
I
would
like
to
know,
when
you
received
people
at
home,
your
colleagues,
what
type
of
meeting
was
it,
were
there
wives
with
them?
A.
On
some
occasions
yes,
on
some
occasions
no.
Q.
Yes?
A.
There
were
friendly
meetings,
others
were
receptions
to
thank
people.
Like
interns,
colleagues,
specialists,
GP’s.
(Transcript,
pp
81-82).
Q.
The
Chicken
Villa,
that
would
be
the
same
thing?
A.
The
same
thing.
When
friends
came
to
spend
the
evening
with
us,
and
we
decided
we
were
hungry
at
the
end
of
the
evening,
I
don’t
think
it
was
up
to
my
wife
to
prepare
a
snack.
So
we
used
to
send
out
for
it.
(Transcript,
p
83)
Q.
But
you
received
colleagues
at
Christmas
time;
do
you
often
receive
guests
as
a
family?
A.
It’s
not
among
friends!
When
I
have
a
get-together
it’s
to
chat
with
colleagues
or
because
I
owe
them
thanks;
these
are
the
people
I
invite
to
my
house.
But
I
don’t
invite
the
Jeffrey
Hale
hospital
to
my
house;
I
invite
friends
with
whom
I
have
dealings,
professional
dealings.
(Transcript,
p
88)
Q.
Mr
Bouchard,
I
note
than
in
the
partnership’s
financial
statements
no
such
expenses
are
Claimed;
and
yet
—
how
is
this
so?
A.
No,
because
our
personal
expenses
are
not
billed
at
the
partnership
level.
(Transcript,
pp
88-89)
The
appellant
testified
that
in
1973
there
were
14
pediatricians
working
with
him
at
one
point
and
that
he
paid
for
food
for
all
of
them.
3.16
the
appellant,
who
practises
in
association
with
two
other
doctors,
shares
the
net
profits
equally,
that
is,
one-third
each.
Promotion
expenses
are
not
paid
by
the
partnership,
however.
The
appellant
explained
why:
Q.
Mr
Bouchard
I
note
that
in
the
partnership’s
financial
statements
no
such
expenses
are
claimed;
and
yet
—
how
is
this
so?
A.
No,
because
our
personal
expenses
are
not
billed
at
the
partnership
level.
(Transcript,
pp
88-89)
Q.
Mr
Bouchard,
I
don’t
understand
how
it
is
that
you
don’t
claim
expenses
in
your
partnership;
because
you
explained
at
the
outset
that
ultimately
you
shared
expenses
and
profits
—
one-third,
one-third,
one-third
—
how
is
it
that
you
did
not
insist
on
reducing
the
partnership’s
expenses;
why
did
you
assume
these
expenses
all
on
your
own,
when
they
produced
income?
Since
this
income
is
divided
three
(3)
ways,
why
wouldn’t
the
expenses
be
assumed
by
all
three
(3)?
A.
It’s
for
the
same
reason
that
when
Dr
Albert
came
to
work
with
me,
from
the
first
day
the
income
was
split
fifty
(50);
and
the
same
thing
when
Dr
Grégoire
arrived,
it
was
split
one-third,
one-third,
one-third.
There
were
not
twenty
(20),
forty
(40),
sixty
(60)
per
cent
shares,
that’s
why
we
didn’t
include
the
social
things
because
I
have
more,
social
in
the
sense,
to
go
back
a
bit,
I
do
much
more
outside,
I
meet
many
more
patients,
I
receive
many
more
colleagues
at
home
to
develop
my
practice.
It’s
not
my
business
to
have
my
colleagues
share
at
the
office
level
for
income.
(Transcript,
p
112)
3.17
The
receipts
filed
by
the
appellant
concerning
promotion
expenses
are
not
as
detailed
as
they
might
be
to
show
that
they
relate
to
expenses
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income.
The
receipts
from
the
liquor
board
do
not
indicate
any
name
or
shed
any
light
on
the
circumstances
of
the
expenditure.
Several
do
not
even
give
the
date.
At
the
hearing
the
appellant
was
not
generally
able
to
state
the
specific
purpose
of
a
particular
expenditure.
Some
of
the
receipts
related
to
the
hunting
trip.
As
for
the
meal
invoices,
a
number
of
them
related
to
meals
delivered
to
the
appellant’s
residence.
Others
were
for
meals
eaten
in
the
Quebec
City
area
near
the
Jeffrey
Hale
hospital.
The
appellant
admitted
that
these
were
meals
he
had
eaten
when
he
did
not
go
home
for
dinner.
4.
Act
—
case
law
—
comments
4.1
Act
The
statutory
provisions
relevant
to
this
case
are
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
and
section
67
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
These
sections
read
as
follows:
18.
General
limitations.
(1)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
or
property
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
General
limitation.—an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property;
67.
General
limitation
re
expenses.
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
an
outlay
or
expense
in
respect
of
which
any
amount
is
otherwise
deductible
under
this
Act,
except
to
the
extent
that
the
outlay
or
expense
was
reasonable
in
the
circumstances.
4.2
Case
law
The
parties
referred
the
Board
to
the
following
cases:
1.
Doctor
E
Poss
Henry
v
MNP,
[1972]
CTC
33;
72
DTC
6005;
2.
Dr
Lemeul
F
Prowse
v
MNR,
[1971]
CTC
736;
71
DTC
5443;
3.
H
Lionel
Posen
v
The
Queen,
[1976]
CTC
462;
76
DTC
6274;
4.
Rev
Gary
Ostler
v
MNP,
[1979]
CTC
2775;
79
DTC
657;
5.
Bentleys,
Stokes
&
Lowless
v
Beeson,
33
TC
491;
6.
Manning
Harold
Roebuck
v
MNP,
26
Tax
ABC
11;
61
DTC
72;
7.
Dr
W
F
Shaw
v
MNP,
[1978]
CTC
3230;
79
DTC
26;
8.
John
Adaskin
v
MNP,
8
Tax
ABC
356;
53
DTC
242;
9.
Herbert
L
Wisebrod
v
MNP,
[1978]
CTC
2782;
78
DTC
1581;
10.
Tim
Alfred
Brice
Clements
v
MNP,
21
Tax
ABC
77;
58
DTC
752;
11.
R
M
Latta,
Active
Petroleum
Products
Ltd
v
MNP,
[1978]
CTC
3003;
78
DTC
1719;
12.
Jean-Charles
Beauchemin
v
MNP,
[1977]
CTC
2029;
77
DTC
26.
4.3
Comments
A.
Automobile
expenses
4.3.1
The
receipts
dated
1971
(para
3.09)
related
to
the
1972
fiscal
year
since
the
fiscal
year
ended
on
January
31,
1972.
During
this
period,
moreover,
the
Camaro
was
still
the
vehicle
used
for
professional
purposes
since
the
Jimmy
4X4
was
not
purchased
until
April
1972,
during
the
1973
fiscal
year.
4.3.2
In
addition
to
the
lack
of
detail
in
the
receipts,
on
the
face
of
which
it
is
not
always
clear
whether
they
relate
to
the
4
X
4,
the
chief
weakness
in
the
evidence
is
the
fact
there
there
is
no
indication
of
the
mileage
covered
during
the
year.
The
appellant
stated
that
the
vehicle
was
used
75%
for
professional
purposes,
and
the
mileage
covered
during
the
year
would
have
been
an
important
means
of
verifying
this
statement.
The
court
cannot
accept
the
statement
of
a
fact
unless
it
is
confirmed
by
other
evidence,
even
if
the
person
presiding
personally
believes
the
satement.
In
his
pleadings
the
appellant’s
representative
stated
the
following:
When
the
appellant
claimed
25
per
cent
personal
use
on
his
4
X
4
vehicle,
he
had
already
allowed
for
his
personal
travel
between
his
house
and
the
hospital,
the
occasional
trips
to
his
farm
and
one
or
two
seasonal
hunting
and
fishing
trips.
The
appellant
testified
before
the
Board,
inter
alia,
that
he
used
his
principal
vehicle
75%
for
professional
purposes;
it
seems
obvious
that
we
must
know
the
number
of
miles
travelled,
especially
since
the
evidence
indicated
that
he
travelled
at
least
6,500
miles
merely
to
go
to
his
father’s
farm
on
weekends.
With
this
personal
use
of
the
vehicle
alone,
the
appellant
would
have
had
to
travel
26,000
miles
during
the
year
to
be
able
to
claim
75%
as
professional
expenses,
without
taking
into
account
the
personal
use
of
the
vehicle
to
travel
from
his
residence
to
the
hospital
or
the
office
or
the
university,
or
to
go
to
meetings
of
various
associations.
The
Board
must
uphold
the
assessment
on
this
matter
of
automobile
expenses.
B.
Snowblower
and
garage
4.3.3
The
appellant
argued
that
the
snowblower
was
absolutely
necessary
to
keep
the
entrance
to
his
garage
clear
in
case
of
emergencies,
which
might
arise
at
any
time
of
day
or
night.
On
the
other
hand,
the
appellant
did
not
have
an
office
at
home.
If
this
expense
had
been
incurred
in
clearing
the
snow
from
the
parking
lot
at
his
office,
there
is
no
doubt
that
it
would
have
been
deductible.
Moreover,
the
evidence
respecting
the
garage
does
not
establish
clearly
which
vehicle
used
the
said
garage.
The
claim
for
these
expenses
must
be
disallowed.
C.
Telephone
expenses
4.3.4
In
view
of
the
evidence
adduced,
the
Board
has
no
hesitation
in
upholding
the
assessment.
The
amounts
disallowed
are
barely,
and
sometimes
less
than,
25%
of
the
total.
For
a
family
of
four,
including
two
daughters
aged
10
and
12,
family
use
of
the
telephone
is
really
estimated
at
a
minimum.
The
amount
disallowed
is
barely
the
amount
paid
for
a
personal
telephone
line.
In
addition,
the
total
cost
of
the
long-distance
calls
was
allowed
as
a
deduction.
D.
Promotion
expenses
4.3.5
The
Board
is
of
the
view
that
part
of
the
appellant’s
clientele
may
come
from
the
good
relations
maintained
with
doctors
in
other
specialties
and
nurses.
Such
good
relations
may
be
maintained
by
means
of
get-
togethers
and
presents
to
express
gratitude.
It
must
be
admitted,
however,
that
these
are
in
part
social
activities
which
would
take
place
in
any
event
between
employer
and
employee
and
also
among
friends
and
people
who
do
favours:
such
as
presents
for
the
doctors
who
treat
or
examine
the
appellant’s
wife
and
children.
It
has
long
been
established
by
the
case
law
that
in
order
to
be
deductible,
the
expense
must
be
principally
aimed
at
earning
income.
The
evidence
of
the
expense,
namely
the
receipts
from
all
the
purchases
at
the
Liquor
Board,
in
restaurants,
and
so
on
(para
3.16),
is
not
the
clearest
evidence
possible.
The
Board
is
of
the
view,
however,
that
some
of
the
expenses
were
in
fact
incurred
principally
to
earn
income
and
allows
40%
of
the
expenses
disallowed.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
allowed
in
part
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.