The
Assistant
Chairman:—The
appellant,
who
is
a
general
insurance
agent,
in
1974
and
1975
acquired,
in
total,
three
customer
lists
and
files
and,
when
preparing
his
income
tax
returns
for
those
years,
charged
the
amounts
paid
for
those
lists
as
an
expense
against
his
commission
income
to
arrive
at
his
net
profit
for
each
year
believing
that
the
expenditures
were
within
the
ambit
of
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
after
tax
reform.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
when
he
assessed
each
of
the
returns,
was
of
the
view
that
the
outlays
were
not
within
the
ambit
of
that
paragraph
but
were
within
the
ambit
of
paragraph
18(1)(b).
Accordingly
his
assessments
did
not
allow
the
deductions
claimed
by
the
appellant
but
took
the
position
that,
while
they
were
capital
expenses,
they
were
eligible
capital
expenditures
which
became
part
of
the
cumulative
eligible
capital
of
the
appellant,
and
gave
him
the
appropriate
deductions.
The
parties
agree
that,
if
the
assessments
are
correct
in
principle,
the
computations
are
correct.
They
also
agree
that
if
the
Minister
is
incorrect
then
the
position
taken
by
the
appellant
is
correct
and
he
should
be
reassessed
as
filed
in
so
far
as
these
items
are
concerned.
In
the
course
of
the
hearing
the
three
purchases
were
designated
by
using
the
vendors’
names,
namely,
Brown,
Atkinson
and
Harvey.
The
purchase
prices
were
$18,973.77,
$9,600
and
$77,500
respecitvely.
At
the
commencement
of
proceedings,
counsel
for
the
appellant
advised
the
Board
that
his
client
was
no
longer
disputing
the
Minister’s
treatment
of
the
Atkinson
purchase,
leaving
the
other
two
transactions
the
only
items
before
the
Board.
As
stated,
the
appellant
is
a
general
insurance
agent
licensed
to
sell
ali
types
of
insurance.
He
stated
that
his
firm
would
not
sell
one
life
policy
in
five
years.
The
business
which
he
now
carries
on
was
started
many
years
ago.
He
joined
his
father’s
firm
as
an
employee
in
1949
and,
about
1958,
took
over
from
his
father.
The
name
of
the
firm
was
then
W
A
Lester
&
Son.
He
stated
that
the
firm’s
business
consisted
of
about
60
to
70%
automobile,
20
to
25%
home
and
theft
and
the
balance
commercial.
In
the
main,
insurance
policies
were
usually
for
one
year
but
automobile
insurance
was
only
for
six
months.
He
is
an
agent
for
about
10
or
12
companies.
The
firm’s
clientele
would
reside,
generalizing,
in
the
metropolitan
Ottawa
area.
There
are
now,
including
himself,
five
people
in
the
office,
three
of
whom
are
licensed
agents.
Historically
there
was
generally
a
loyalty
of
client
to
agent
in
the
insurance
business,
however
this
general
loyalty
has
weakened
since
the
advent
of
direct
writers;
that
is,
employees
of
the
insurance
firm
selling
the
insurance
at
a
reduced
premium.
This
is
a
major
factor
in
the
change
in
the
client-agent
relationship.
In
the
days
gone
by
it
was
usual
for
the
children
to
use
the
agent
their
father
had
used.
It
is
not
so
today.
There
is
quite
an
annual
attrition
of
clients.
The
appellant
stated
that
he
had
made
a
count
of
his
clients
and,
in
the
period
1974
to
1979,
2,100
clients
had
left.
The
client
count
at
the
time
of
the
purchase
of
the
lists
was
3,000
but
his
clients
reached
a
low
of
2,600
in
1978.
While
attrition
always
existed,
with
normal
advertising
an
even
balance
was
usually
kept.
When
purchasing
lists
of
clients,
it
was
his
hope
to
keep
about
80%
but
he
was
never
that
successful.
His
first
acquisition
in
1974
related
to
the
Brown
Agency.
Brown’s
business
was
similar
to
the
appellant’s
but
smaller.
His
office
was
in
his
apartment
and
there
was
no
staff.
An
insurance
company
representative
told
the
appellant
about
a
week
after
Brown’s
death
that
there
was
no
one
to
look
after
it
and
it
was
for
sale.
Brown’s
clients
could
be
lost
to
the
insurance
companies
if
they
had
to
service
the
clients.
The
appellant
approached
Brown’s
daughter
who
was
the
executrix
of
his
estate
and,
about
two
weeks
after
Brown’s
death,
made
his
purchase.
The
appellant
prepared,
without
legal
advice,
the
conditions
of
purchase
(Exhibit
A-1)
which
read
as
follows:
1.
Purchase
price
shall
be
1
1
/2
times
annual
commission,
(12,649.18
X
1.5
=
$18,973.77).
2.
Payment
of
purchase
price
to
be
carried
over
1
year
as
follows:
1
/
Down
|
1/3
6th
Month
|
1
/
12
Month
|
(6,324.59)
|
(6,324.59)
|
(6,324.59)
|
3.
Use
of
Agency
name
(BROWN)
for
3
years
if
required
(ie
Lester
&
Brown).
4.
Collection
of
Accounts
Receivable
and
Réconciliation
of
Accounts
Payable,
(Insurance
Company
Accounts),
up
until
June
30,
1974.
5.
Provide
up
dated
copy
of
monthly
statement
of
Accounts
Receivable
and
Accounts
Payable,
prior
to
June
30,
1974.
6.
Necessary
notification
to
clientele
of
agency
merger.
(Sale).
7.
Immediate
Operation
of
agency
and
transfer
of
files
to
Lester
Agency,
(One-
Two
Weeks),
so
that
proper
service
can
be
provided
to
clients
and
value
of
agency
does
not
diminish.
8.
Companies
must
agree
to
continue
portfolio
with
Lester
Agency.
9.
Set
up
telephone
answering
service
if
required,
to
direct
business
calls
to
Lester
office
for
full
and
complete
service.
(re:
Item
4,
5,
6
&
7).
After
the
purchase
and
until
he
could
move
the
files,
he
spent
about
two
hours
a
day
at
Brown’s
apartment.
This
was
done
in
about
two
weeks
time.
When
he
took
the
files
he
took
all
the
information
which
Brown
had
relating
to
each
of
his
clients.
Nothing
else
was
taken.
He
cleaned
up
the
Brown
business
for
the
estate
and
charged
a
fee
for
those
services.
He
wrote
clients
who
were
in
arrears,
paid
the
insurance
company
when
the
money
came
in
etc,
all
on
behalf
of
the
Brown
Estate.
Shortly
after
the
transaction
the
appellant,
on
his
own
letterhead,
sent
a
letter
to
each
of
Brown’s
clients
(Exhibit
A-3),
which
letter
reads
as
follows:
It
is
with
regret
that
I
inform
you
of
the
passing
of
Mr
Thomas
Brown,
of
the
Thomas
Brown
Insurance
Agency.
The
Executors
of
the
Estate
of
Thomas
Brown,
in
order
to
continue
the
personalized
service,
have
arranged
a
merger
with
the
insurance
Agency
of
Wallace
A
Lester
&
Son,
effective
July,
1,
1974.
On
July
15,
1974,
the
transfer
of
all
records
to
the
Wallace
A
Lester
Agency
will
be
completed
and
for
future
prompt
and
helpful
service,
please
call
Mr
Bob
Lester
or
Mrs
Kathy
Neville,
at
236-7146.
In
the
meantime
I
have
arranged
for
a
telephone
answering
service
at
Mr
Brown’s
office,
and
I
will
be
picking
up
messages
twice
daily
to
ensure
that
everyone
is
looked
after
promptly.
Thank
you
for
your
anticipated
co-operation,
and
future
years
of
friendly
association.
The
word
“merger”
as
used
in
this
letter
(as
well
as
in
the
Harvey
matter)
was
the
subject
matter
of
evidence
both
in
chief
and
in
cross-examination.
The
appellant
stated
it
was
used
as
it
was
a
“softer”
word
than
sale
and
he
hoped
it
would
assist
in
keeping
the
Brown
clients
with
his
agency.
As
to
the
use
of
the
name
“Brown”,
it
was
never
used
by
him
except
in
Exhibit
A-3
and
was
only
asked
for
in
order
to
be
in
a
position
to
prevent
someone
else
from
doing
so.
The
appellant
estimated
there
were
about
500
names
on
the
Brown
client
list
and
he
believes
just
fewer
than
50%
stayed
with
him.
In
his
opinion
Brown’s
business
was
very
personal
—
the
clients
seemed
to
be
his
friends
and
also
he
gave
unlimited
credit.
While
the
appellant
accepted
the
assessment
with
respect
to
the
Atkinson
purchase,
the
letter
sent
to
the
Atkinson
clients
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-4.
It
was
on
the
appellant’s
letterhead
but
Atkinson
signed
it.
Likewise
it
was
prepared
by
the
appellant
without
professional
assistance.
It
reads
as
follows:
I
take
pleasure
in
announcing
the
merger
of
my
Insurance
Agency
with
the
firm
of
Wallace
A.
Lester
&
Son,
effective
May
1,
1975.
On
April
28th,
1975,
my
files
and
records
will
be
transferred
to
Mr
Lester’s
office
and
should
you
require
any
assistance
please
do
not
hesitate
to
contact
him,
as
I
know
you
will
receive
friendly
and
prompt
service.
Due
to
my
incapacity
as
the
result
of
a
recent
operation
my
personal
activities
will
be
restricted
to
handling
insurance
sales
only,
and
this
will
not
commence
for
possibly
another
2
months.
In
the
meantine
I
heartily
recommend
Bob
Lester
and
his
staff,
Mrs
Kathy
Neville
and
Mrs
Shirley
Goudie,
as
being
most
capable
and
eager
to
handle
all
your
insurance
needs.
One
again,
through
an
insurance
company
representative,
he
heard
of
the
illness
of
Harvey
and
the
fact
that
his
business
might
be
for
sale.
It
was
carried
on
in
the
name
of
Lew
Harvey
Insurance
Limited.
Harvey
had
just
had
his
second
open
heart
operation
and
had
been
out
of
his
office
for
about
six
months.
Since
his
staff
consisted
of
himself
and
his
secretary,
there
had
been
no
agent
in
the
office.
The
appellant
had
never
met
Harvey.
Lester
approached
Harvey’s
solicitor
and
got
a
customer
list
showing
hte
number
of
clients
and
negotiated
for
about
two
weeks
as
to
the
sale.
He
received
advice
from
his
auditors
as
to
the
form
of
the
agreement,
but
he
had
no
legal
advice.
The
agreement
(Exhibit
A-5),
including
recitals,
reads
as
follows:
WHEREAS,
the
Vendor,
LEW
HARVEY
INSURANCE
LIMITED,
carries
on
business
as
a
general
insurance
agent
in
the
Township
of
Nepean.
AND
WHEREAS
the
Vendor,
LEW
HARVEY
INSURANCE
LIMITED,
has
agreed
to
sell
to
the
Purchaser,
W.
A.
LESTER
&
SON,
and
W.
A.
LESTER
&
SON
has
agreed
to
purchase
the
attached
list
of
customers
with
related
information
for
the
price
hereinafter
set
forth.
WITNESSETH
that
the
parties
hereto
agree
as
follows:
1.
LEW
HARVEY
INSURANCE
LIMITED
doth
agree
to
sell
and
W.
A.
LESTER
&
SON
doth
agree
to
purchase
from
LEW
HARVEY
INSURANCE
LIMITED
the
list
of
customers
and
related
information
attached
as
Schedule
“A”.
2.
The
purchase
price
to
be
paid
by
W.
A.
LESTER
&
SON
to
LEW
HARVEY
INSURANCE
LIMITED
for
the
list
of
customers
and
related
information
agreed
to
be
sold,
shall
be
the
sum
of
SEVENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND
FIVE
HUNDRED
DOLLARS
($77,500.00)
which
shall
be
payable
as
follows:
the
sum
of
THIRTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND
SEVEN
HUNDRED
AND
FIFTY
DOLLARS
($38,750,00)
on
the
signing
of
this
agreement,
and
the
balance
of
THIRTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND
SEVEN
HUNDRED
AND
FIFTY
DOLLARS
($38,750.00)
on
the
1st
day
of
October,
1976.
This
transaction
shall
be
closed
as
of
the
1st
day
of
August,
1975.
4.
This
agreement
shall
be
binding
upon
the
parties
hereto,
their
heirs,
executors,
administrators,
successors
and
assigns
respectively.
A
letter
was
sent
by
Lew
Harvey
Insurance
Limited
to
all
clients
on
the
letterhead
of
the
appellant
but
over
the
signature
of
Harvey
(Exhibit
A-6)
as
follows:
“TO
MY
CLIENTS’’
I
take
pleasure
in
announcing
the
merger
of
my
Insurance
Agency
with
the
firm
of
Wallace
A.
Lester
&
Son
effective
August
1,
1975.
On
September
30,
1975,
my
files
and
records
will
be
transferred
to
Mr
Lester’s
Office
and
should
you
require
any
assistance
please
do
not
hesitate
to
contact
him,
as
I
know
you
will
receive
friendly
and
prompt
service.
I
am
also
very
pleased
to
advise
you
that
my
secretary,
Mrs
Alma
Lapierre
will
continue
in
the
business
with
Bob
Lester.
I
would
like
to
heartily
recommend
Bob
Lester
and
his
staff,
Mrs
Joyce
Gilmour
and
Mrs
Lee
Brown
as
being
most
capable
and
eager
to
handle
all
your
insurance
needs.
Thank
you
for
the
confidence
you
have
placed
in
me
over
the
many
years
of
our
association.”
The
appellant
supplied
information
to
his
auditor
as
to
certain
facts
by
letter
of
November
28,
1978,
(Exhibit
A-7)
as
follows:
The
total
number
of
customers
cancelled
since
1974
is
1,551.
With
reference
to
purchase
of
client
lists
from
other
agency’s
results
are
as
follows:
LEW
HARVEY
|
|
Total
accounts
|
517
|
|
accounts
cancelled
|
201
|
|
accounts
retained
|
316
|
|
CLIFF
ATKINSON
|
|
Total
Accounts
|
209
|
Total
accounts
|
1316
|
Total
Accounts
|
209
|
|
accounts
cancelled
|
105
|
accounts
cancelled
|
619
|
accounts
cancelled
|
105
|
|
accounts
retained
|
104
|
retained
|
697
|
accounts
retained
|
104
|
|
THOMAS
BROWN
|
|
Total
accounts
|
590
|
|
accounts
cancelled
|
313
|
|
accounts
retained
|
277
|
|
As
to
the
acquisition
from
Harvey,
there
was
no
other
collateral
agreement.
The
appellant
prepared
the
customer
list
from
the
Harvey
files.
The
Harvey
office
was
kept
open
for
about
30
days,
after
which
time
the
files
were
moved
to
his
office.
He
did
point
out
that
another
person
tried
to
buy
the
customer
list
but
was
unsuccessful.
Mrs
Lapierre,
an
employee
of
Harvey,
wanted
to
work
for
two
more
years
until
she
was
65
and
the
appellant
engaged
her
for
that
time,
when
she
retired.
Harvey,
the
appellant
advised,
is
alive
today,
but
not
back
in
business.
To
arrive
at
his
purchase
price
re
Brown,
the
appellant
checked
around
and
found
the
price
range
between
one
to
two
times
the
annual
commission.
He
decided
on
one
and
one-half.
As
to
Brown,
the
appellant
did
not
know
his
average
commission
but
he
did
know
his
volume.
He
arrived
at
the
Brown
commission
by
applying
his
own
average
rate
to
Brown’s
volume.
There
was
no
review
of
the
financial
statements.
The
appellant
agreed
that
after
the
sale
of
the
list
there
was
nothing
of
value
left
to
the
vendor;
only
the
physical
assets
remained.
After
the
purchase
of
the
list,
the
appellant
stated
he
had
a
list
of
potential
customers.
The
appellant
never
expected
that
Harvey,
should
he
recover
from
his
illness,
would
ever
be
a
competitor.
As
to
the
letter
of
announcement
to
Harvey’s
clients
(Exhibit
A-6),
the
appellant
stated
he
believed
he
discussed
it
with
Harvey’s
lawyer,
had
it
typed
in
his
office
and
turned
it
over
to
Harvey’s
solicitor
who
had
Harvey
sign
it.
Harvey
had
been
an
agent
for
20
years
at
the
time
of
the
transaction.
The
appellant
did
not
know
how
long
Brown
had
been
in
business.
Counsel
for
the
appellant’s
submission
was
that,
if
one
purchased
a
business
as
a
going
concern,
the
outlay
would
be
on
account
of
capital.
If,
however,
only
a
customer
list
were
purchased,
then
it
would
be
an
outlay
on
account
of
revenue.
His
submission
here
was
that,
since
only
a
customer
list
was
acquired,
it
was
a
revenue
expenditure.
One
must
consider
what
was
acquired
and
the
type
of
operation
from
which
it
was
acquired.
In
reality
all
that
was
acquired
was
the
right
to
solicit
business
from
the
vendor’s
former
clients
at
the
appropriate
time
and
with
precise
information.
He
had
the
client’s
file,
he
knew
when
the
renewal
date
was
coming
up
and
he
knew
what
type
of
coverage
the
person
had
pursuant
to
the
soon
expiring
policy.
He
was
acquiring,
in
each
case
from
both
vendors,
an
asset
of
unpredictable
value
which
was
not
really
enduring.
The
fall
off
of
those
clients
was
around
50%.
Exhibit
A-7
indicates
that
there
were
in
total
1,107
names
on
the
Brown
and
Harvey
lists
and,
as
of
November
28,
1978,
or
thereabouts,
514
had
been
lost.
Also
it
should
be
noted
that
both
the
Brown
Agency
and
the
Harvey
Agency
were
not
what
one
would
call
competitors
or
on-going
businesses.
Both
were
in
the
process
of
being
wound
up:
Brown
was
deceased
and
his
daughter,
the
executrix,
who
came
from
British
Columbia
wanted
to
return
there
as
soon
as
she
could;
and
the
Harvey
Agency
had
not
had
an
agent
for
about
six
months
and
it
was
not
expected
Harvey
would
return.
He
submitted
that
the
purchase
of
a
customer
list
consists
of
several
items;
namely,
the
name
and
address
of
the
client,
the
agency’s
file
for
that
client
and
permission
to
use
the
vendor’s
name
on
solicitation
or
as
the
appellant
stated
on
the
announcement.
While
the
appellant’s
counsel
made
reference
to
several
cases,
including
Simon,
Voyer
&
Castelli
Inc
v
MNR,
[1979]
CTC
2503;
79
DTC
41;
Harbord
Investments
Limited
v
MNR,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
717;
70
DTC
1488;
Halliday
Fuels
Limited
v
MNR,
25
Tax
ABC
186;
60
DTC
541;
and
Francis
David
Moyls
v
MNR,
41
Tax
ABC
411,
66
DTC
553,
his
main
reliance
was
on
the
case
of
Farquhar
Bethune
Insurance
Limited
v
The
Queen,
[1981]
CTC
35;
81
DTC
5028.
It
was
his
submission
that
this
appeal
was
virtually
on
all
fours
with
the
Farquhar
case.
He
submitted
it
was
like
the
Brown
transaction
and
his
position
with
respect
to
Harvey
was
much
stronger.
In
the
Farquhar
case
(supra)
there
was
a
restrictive
covenant
but
the
presiding
judge
said
it
was
not
operable
and
there
was
no
acquisition
of
a
business
or
a
capital
asset.
He
said
with
respect
to
the
letter
sent
by
the
vendor
to
his
clients
as
well
as
the
newspaper
advertisement
in
the
Farquhar
case
that,
“neither
of
these
two
facts
are
material
in
the
determination
of
the
issue
in
this
case.”
The
judge
held
that
only
customer
lists
and
access
to
the
vendor’s
files
were
acquired,
and
so
the
outlay
was
an
expense
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
18(1
)
(a).
The
Crown’s
position
is
that,
by
the
two
transactions,
the
appellant
acquired
an
enduring
benefit.
His
submission
was
that,
if
one
considered
all
the
circumstances
surrounding
each
transaction
and
the
commercial
reality
of
the
transactions,
the
only
conclusion
one
could
come
to
was
that
each
expenditure
was
on
account
of
capital.
The
Brown
agreement
was
drawn
up
without
any
advice,
whereas
there
was
advice
from
his
accountant
on
the
Harvey
agreement.
Yet
when
one
considers
the
terms
of
the
Brown
agreement,
it
was
suggested
that
the
written
agreement
for
the
Harvey
purchase
was
not
the
full
agreement
or
understanding.
The
purchase
price
in
Brown
was
1
Z>
times
the
annual
commission
(#1
in
Exhibit
A-1).
Even
if
all
of
Brown’s
customers
renewed
with
the
appellant
in
the
first
year,
he
could
not
recover
the
full
purchase
price.
In
order
to
recover
what
he
had
paid,
the
benefit
acquired
must
last
at
least
more
than
one
year
if
not
several
years
as
some
clients
would
not
renew.
The
appellant
also
acquired
the
right
to
use
the
Brown
name
for
three
years
(#3
of
Exhibit
A-1
).
Clause
6
of
Exhibit
A-1
is
only
consistent
with
the
sale
of
a
business.
With
resepect
to
clause
7
of
Exhibit
A-1,
really
what
did
the
Brown
agency
have
to
sell
besides
its
customer
list?
Clause
9
of
Exhibit
A-1,
when
coupled
with
all
the
preceding
clauses,
only
indicates
that
what
was
purchased
was
a
going
concern.
With
Harvey,
what
was
supposedly
acquired
was
only
a
list
of
customers,
yet
after
the
acquisition
the
appellant
and
his
daughter
went
to
the
Harvey
office
to
check
the
customer
list
after
the
appellant’s
business
hours.
Later
they
transferred
the
files
to
the
appellant’s
office
and
then
at
Harvey’s
nothing
was
left
but
the
physical
assets.
His
submission
continued
that
the
letter
of
announcement
which
had
been
prepared
by
the
appellant
clearly
showed
the
nature
of
the
transaction.
The
reference
to
Harvey’s
former
secretary
in
the
letter
of
announcement
would
leave
the
impression
in
the
client’s
mind
that
the
business
had
been
purchased.
Counsel
culminated
his
submission
by
submitting
that
neither
vendor
had
anything
left
to
sell
after
the
customer
lists
had
been
sold
and
so
in
fact
he
had
sold
his
business.
In
rebuttal
counsel
for
the
appellant
submitted
that
it
is
the
purchaser
who
has
appealed
and
it
is
he
to
whom
one
should
look
and
say,
what
did
he
get?
He
received
only
the
customer
list.
This
was
different
from
the
case
of
The
Queen
v
Baine,
Johnstone
&
Company
Limited,
[1977]
CTC
556;
77
DTC
5394,
where
he
submitted
the
findings
were
different.In
that
case,
the
vendor
agreed
not
to
compete
and
to
do
liaison
work
for
the
purchaser,
which
led
to
a
finding
that
a
competitor
had
been
eliminated.
In
considering
this
matter,
while
a
finding
of
fact
is
necessary,
it
would
appear
that
the
two
deciding
cases
of
the
Federal
Court
are
in
conflict,
namely,
Farquhar,
Bethune
Insurance
Limited
v
The
Queen
(supra)
and
The
Queen
v
Baine,
Johnstone
&
Company
Limited
(supra).
As
to
competing
with
the
purchaser
after
the
purchase,
in
so
far
as
the
Brown
purchase
was
concerned,
Brown
was
dead
and
the
agreement
gave
the
appellant
the
right
to
use
the
name
for
three
years.
In
the
case
of
Harvey
it
was
not
expected
that
Mr
Harvey’s
health
would
improve.
It
appeared
most
likely
there
would
be
no
competition
from
either.
As
Mr
Justice
Addy
stated
in
the
Baine
case
(supra),
the
fact
that
one
vendor
“probably
[was]
anxious
to
sell
and
to
withdraw
gradually
from
the
business
does
not
in
my
view
affect
the
basic
nature
of
the
transaction.”
In
the
same
case,
Mr
Justice
Addy
also
noted,
“It
appears
also
that
the
Defendant
determined
the
amount
of
its
offer
in
each
case
by
employing
the
earnings
approach
that
is,
it
based
the
offers
on
the
earning
records
of
the
vendors
and
calculated
the
amount
on
a
multiple
of
two
or
three
times
the
past
annual
earnings.”
As
previously
indicated,
Mr
Justice
Gibson
in
the
Farquhar
case
(supra)
did
not
consider
the
letters
to
the
clients
and
the
newspaper
advertisement
as
being
material
in
the
determination
of
the
issue.
To
decide
this
case
one
should
consider
the
words
of
Mr
Justice
Addy
in
the
Baine
case
(supra):
“In
considering
the
issue
one
must
look
at
the
true
nature
and
substance
of
the
transaction
not
merely
at
the
words
used
by
the
parties
in
describing
it.“
To
this
I
would
add
“as
well
as
the
words
not
used.”
In
this
respect
it
clearly
should
be
noted
that
the
appellant
drew
up
the
agreement
with
the
Brown
agency,
but
had
assistance
with
the
Harvey
agency.
A
letter
was
sent
to
the
former
clients
in
each
instance
but
such
was
not
required
by
the
Harvey
agreement
although
the
appellant
believed
it
was
discussed
with
the
vendor’s
solicitor.
I
find,
all
things
being
considered,
that
each
vendor
sold
to
the
appellant
everything
he
could
have
sold
in
so
far
as
his
business
was
concerned.
If
the
letters
which
used
the
word
“merge”
instead
of
sale
do
not
at
least
endeavour
to
pass
the
goodwill
of
the
vendor
to
the
appellant,
then
the
letters
are
useless.
The
result
is
I
find
that
the
appellant
purchased
the
business
of
each
vendor
and
as
such
the
expenditure
was
within
the
ambit
of
paragraph
18(1
)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
with
the
result
that
judgment
will
go
dismissing
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.