Guy
Tremblay:—This
case
was
heard
in
Saint
John,
New
Brunswick
on
July
29,
1980.
1.
The
Point
at
Issue
The
point
is
whether
the
appellant
who
got
married
on
December
23,
1977,
could
claim,
in
filing
her
income
tax
return
for
the
year
1977,
an
exemption
for
her
spouse,
she
being
a
married
person
who
supported
her
spouse.
The
latter’s
income
for
1977
while
married
was
less
than
$250.
The
respondent
disallowed
the
exemption.
2.
Burden
of
Proof
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessment
is
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
results
particularly
from
several
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
delivered
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
In
the
same
judgment,
the
Court
says
that
the
facts
on
which
the
respondent
based
the
assessment
are
also
deemed
to
be
correct.
3.
Facts
Assumed
by
the
Respondent
The
respondent
based
his
assessment
on
the
following
assumed
facts
detailed
in
paragraph
6
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal:
(a)
during
the
1977
taxation
year
the
appellant
was
employed
as
a
clerk-typist
by
Transport
Canada
and
resided
in
the
City
of
Moncton,
in
the
Province
of
New
Brunswick;
(b)
the
appellant
married
Robert
Robichaud
on
December
23,
1977;
(c)
in
computing
her
taxable
income
for
the
1977
taxation
year,
the
appellant
claimed
a
married
exemption
in
the
amount
of
$1,990.
(d)
in
1977
the
appellant
was
not
a
married
person
who
supported
her
spouse.
4.
Facts
Proven
Before
the
Board
4.01
The
appellant
was
employed
in
1977
by
the
Department
of
Transport
Canada.
She
earned
a
gross
income
of
$8,467.30.
4.02
The
appellant
married
Robert
R.
Robichaud
on
December
23,
1977.
The
latter
in
1977
earned
about
$15,000.
4.03
The
appellant
and
her
spouse
resided
together
between
December
24
and
31,
1977
at
66
Islington
Street,
Moncton,
New
Brunswick.
4.04
In
filing
his
1977
income
tax
return,
the
appellant’s
spouse
claimed
in
the
computation
of
his
taxable
income
the
maximum
deduction
allowed
under
paragraph
109(1
)(a).
This
deduction
was
allowed
by
the
Minister.
4.05
The
appellant
also
claimed
entitlement
to
the
deduction
allowed
under
paragraph
109(1
)(a)
on
the
basis
that
she
was
an
individual
who
during
1977
was
a
married
person
who
supported
her
spouse
and
her
spouse’s
income
was
less
than
$250
for
1977
while
married.
4.06
According
to
the
appellant,
during
the
last
two
months
of
1977,
she
spent
considerable
sums
and
incurred
large
debts
in
purchasing
a
home
and
setting
up
housekeeping.
During
November
and
December
1977
over
$200
cash
was
spent
on
groceries
to
stock
the
new
household
and
other
cash
monies
on
houseware.
However,
it
is
uncertain
whose
resources
these
monies
come
from.
4.07
The
appellant
jointly
with
her
spouse
borrowed
$3,000
of
which
$2,720.30
(November
30,
1977)
was
used
to
pay
the
downpayment
on
their
residence.
The
appellant
jointly
signed
the
mortgage
in
the
amount
of
$31,279.70
on
the
personal
residence
(Exhibit
A-1).
4.08
The
appellant
paid
by
cheque
$129.95
(November
19,
1977)
and
$33
(December
22,
1977)
to
purchase
and
alter
clothing
for
her
spouse.
The
appellant
gave
$37.10
(December
14,
1977)
to
her
future
spouse
for
personal
use.
She
paid
$27.15
(November
29,
1977)
for
cablevision
and
$54
(November
30,
1977)
towards
insurance
on
their
residence
(Exhibit
A-1).
4.09
The
appellant’s
spouse
during
November
and
December
1977
paid
$500
(November
9,
1977)
as
a
downpayment
towards
the
personal
residence,
$162
(November
3,
1977)
for
an
oven,
$400
(November
28,
1977)
towards
a
range
top
and
fridge
having
a
total
price
of
$929
(December
5,
1977)
(Exhibit
A-2).
5.
Law
—
Precedent
Cases
—
Analysis
5.01
Law
The
main
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
involved
in
the
present
case
is
paragraph
109(1
)(a)
which
reads
as
follows:
For
the
purpose
of
computing
the
taxable
income
of
an
individual
for
a
taxation
year,
there
may
be
deducted
from
his
income
for
the
year
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable:
(a)
in
the
case
of
an
individual
who,
during
the
year,
was
a
married
person
who
supported
his
spouse,
an
amount
equal
to
the
aggregate
of
(i)
$1,600,
and
(ii)
$1,400
less
the
amount,
if
any,
by
which
the
spouse’s
income
for
the
year
while
married
exceeds
$300;
5.02
Precedent
Cases
The
appellant
referred
to
the
following
cases:
1.
—
Percy
Walker
Thomson
v
MNR,
[1946]
CTC
51;
2
DTC
812;
2.
—
Roderick
W
S
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1065;
3.
—
Frank
Wesley
McKee
v
MNR,
25
Tax
ABC
8;
60
DTC
443;
4.
—
No
502
v
MNR,
19
Tax
ABC
40;
58
DTC
164;
and,
5.
—
William
Buzsik
v
MNR,
12
Tax
ABC
285;
55
DTC
165.
5.03
Analysis
5.03.1
The
requirement
of
paragraph
109(1
)(a)
that
the
taxpayer
must
support
his
spouse
during
the
year
is
regarded
as
meaning
“in
the
course
of
the
year”
and
not
as
meaning
“throughout
the
year”
so
that
support
for
any
length
of
time,
however
small,
will
qualify
for
exemption
in
the
case
of
persons
marrying
near
the
end
of
the
calendar
year
(P
W
Thomson
v
MNR,
(supra),
and
L
W
F
H
Cooper
v
MNR,
29
Tax
ABC
294;
62
DTC
339).
“Spouse”
has
been
strictly
construed
to
mean
a
spouse
by
lawful
marriage
and
not
by
a
“common
law”
assumption
of
matrimonial
relationship
(
No
673
v
MNR,
23
Tax
ABC
240;
60
DTC
21).
5.03.2
Even
if
the
requirement
of
paragraph
109(1
)(a)
is
that
the
individual
must
support
his
spouse,
there
is
no
requirement
that
the
taxpayer
shall
have
wholly
supported
his
spouse
(William
Buzsik
v
MNR,
(supra)',
Sammy
Lee
v
MNR,
15
Tax
ABC
225;
56
DTC
321
and
Gus
Constantine
v
MNR,
8
Tax
ABC
303;
53
DTC
213).
Moreover,
one
spouse
supports
the
other
spouse
despite
the
fact
that
the
latter
had
an
independent
income
(F
W
McKee
v
MNR
(supra).
5.03.3
In
the
present
case
with
the
evidence
adduced,
both
spouses
helped
mutually.
All
the
cheques
were
written
before
December
23,
1977,
before
the
marriage.
However,
as
most
of
the
expenses
were
for
commodities
which
were
used
after
the
marriage
(suits,
food,
cablevision,
etc),
in
the
Board’s
opinion,
those
expenses
must
be
considered
as
expenses
made
to
support
the
appellant’s
spouse
after
the
marriage.
There
is
no
requirement
that
the
taxpayer
shall
have
wholly
supported
his
spouse.
Although
they
were
married
only
the
seven
days
in
the
year
1977,
the
Board
is
satisfied
with
the
adduced
evidence
that
the
requirements
of
paragraph
109(1
)(a)
are
met.
6.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
above
reasons
for
judgment.
Appeal
allowed.