John
B
Goetz:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
appellant
with
respect
to
his
1975
and
1976
taxation
years
whereby
he
declared
income
and
expenses
on
the
basis
of
being
self-employed,
as
an
independent
agent
in
the
business
of
selling
insurance.
The
appellant
relied
upon
section
12
and
subsection
18(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
The
respondent
assessed
the
appellant
as
an
employee
of
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
Company
during
the
1975
and
1976
taxation
years
because
he
had
been
given
a
sales
territory
comprising
the
Province
of
Manitoba
and
had
received
commission
income
from
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
Company.
The
Minister
relied,
inter
alia,
as
follows
in
his
reply
to
notice
of
appeal:
7.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
relies
inter
alia,
upon
sections
2,
3,
8
and
248
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
as
amended
for
the
appellant’s
1975
and
1976
taxation
years,
and
upon
Regulation
1102
and
Schedule
B
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations,
as
amended
for
the
appellant’s
1975
and
1976
taxation
years.
8.
He
submits
that
the
appellant
was
an
employee
of
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
Company
and
that
under
the
appellant’s
contract
of
employment
with
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
he
was
not
required
to
maintain
an
office
with
the
result
that
the
appellant
was
not
entitled
to
claim
any
deduction
in
respect
of
expense
for
the
cost
of
maintaining
an
office
in
his
home
by
virtue
of
subparagraph
8(1
)(i)(ii)
and
subsection
8(2)
of
the
Act.
9.
He
submits
that
the
amount
of
expenses
claimed
by
the
appellant
in
excess
of
the
amounts
allowed
by
the
respondent
(other
than
the
amounts
for
expenses
of
maintaining
an
office
in
the
appellant’s
home)
were
not
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
the
appellant’s
employment
with
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
Company
and,
consequently,
were
not
deductible
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
paragraph
8(1
)(f)
and
subsection
8(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Facts
The
appellant
had
been
a
semi-trailer
truck
driver
for
Gulf
of
Canada
and
decided
to
try
his
fortunes
in
selling
insurance
for
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
Company
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“Pioneer”)
in
the
years
1975
and
1976.
In
his
returns
for
the
said
years,
he
stated
as
present
employer
—
“Pioneer
Life”.
He
maintains
that
he
was
an
independent
contractor
as
an
insurance
agent
for
Pioneer
and
that
his
expenses
for
the
two
relevant
years
exceeded
his
income.
The
appellant
filed
as
Exhibit
A-1,
“Agent’s
Contract,
.
.
.
made
this
30th
day
of
May,
1975,
between
Pioneer
Life
Assurance
Company
of
Regina,
Saskatchewan,
hereinafter
called
the
Company,
and
Melvin
Dueck,
of
Winnipeg,
Manitoba,
hereinafter
called
the
agent.”
Some
of
the
pertinent
clauses
read
as
follows:
1.
APPOINTMENT
The
Company
hereby
appoints
the
agent
as
an
independent
contractor
for
the
purpose
of
soliciting,
procuring,
and
submitting
applications
for
all
of
the
forms
of
life
insurance
issued
by
the
Company.
3.
STATUS
OF
AGENT
This
contract
shall
in
no
way
be
construed
as
having
established
the
relationship
of
employer
and
employee
between
the
company
and
the
agent
although
the
company
may
from
time
to
time
prescribe
rules
and
regulations
respecting
the
matters
referred
to
herein,
and
such
rules
and
regulations
shall
be
conformed
to
and
observed
by
the
agent.
If
training
courses,
sales
methods
and
materials,
prospect
leads,
office
facilities,
or
similar
agent
services
are
extended
or
made
available
to
the
agent,
it
is
agreed
that
the
purpose
and
effect
thereof
shall
be
to
assist
the
agent
in
obtaining
applications
for
insurance
with
the
company.
The
appellant
filed
as
Exhibit
A-2
an
agent’s
contract
between
Dueck
and
Pioneer,
commencing
October
1,
1976.
The
relevant
clauses
in
this
contract
are
clauses
1
and
2
which
are
identical
to
clauses
1
and
3
cited
above.
Subparagraph
(f)
of
clause
3
prohibits
the
appellant
to
“work
for
or
act
on
behalf
of
any
other
insurance
company
or
subsidiary
of
any
insurance
company,
directly
or
indirectly
during
the
term
of
this
agreement”.
He
was
merely
licensed
as
an
insurance
agent
and
not
as
a
broker.
He
was
subject
to
certain
regulations
of
the
company
in
the
preparation
of
application
forms,
etc.
The
appellant
maintained
a
small
office
in
his
home
but
gave
no
information
as
to
the
size
of
the
office,
although
the
office
had
an
extension
to
his
home
personal
phone.
He
received
all
his
mail
there
and
kept
his
own
filing
system.
His
business
cards
mainly
disclosed
his
name,
with
the
name
of
Pioneer
in
small
letters
at
the
bottom
right
hand
corner
thereof.
He
was
remunerated
for
his
efforts
solely
by
way
of
commissions
which
was
set
out
in
the
agent’s
contracts.
Quotas
were
suggested
but
never
enforced.
The
appellant
says
that
he
attended
training
school
which
cost
him
$700
together
with
obtaining
his
licence
as
an
insurance
salesman.
The
company
supplied
him
with
company
application
forms,
limited
stationery
for
use
for
memos
between
offices
and
administrative
use,
letterheads
and
preaddressed
envelopes.
Other
stationery
used
by
him
were
at
his
own
expense.
He
did
his
own
typing,
filing
and
mailing.
He
said
that
he
did
his
work
from
his
office
in
his
home,
in
that
all
of
the
company’s
60
agents
worked
out
of
a
small
office,
dimension:
25'
x
25',
and
could
sometimes
use
the
phone
from
that
point.
He
purchased
promotional
material
such
as
pens,
pocket
calendars,
attended
various
meetings
and
purchased
business
cards.
He
could
not
publish
the
company
name
and
it
merely
showed
on
the
letterhead
that
he
was
an
agent
for
Pioneer.
His
promotional
material
was
all
approved
by
the
company.
He
never
received
any
salary
or
wages
from
Pioneer
although
he
became
district
manager
in
1976
and
his
commissions
would
increase
accordingly
with
the
duty
of
hiring
and
training
agents,
whom
he
recruited
and
trained
in
his
home.
Commission
cheques
were
sent
from
Regina
to
his
home.
Applications
and
premiums
had
to
be
according
to
fixed
figures
set
and
approved
by
the
company.
The
company
provided
him
with
a
handbook
or
manual
showing
him
the
premiums
for
different
types
of
insurance
coverage.
He
states
that
his
expenses
substantially
exceeded
his
income
in
1975
and
1976
taxation
years,
and
that
while
he
was
acting
as
district
manager,
he
recruited
and
trained
his
agents
from
his
home
office
but
they
did
not
do
well.
He
finally
resigned
in
that
obviously
he
was
not
meant
to
be
an
insurance
agent
and
took
what
he
calls
“a
good
salary
job”.
The
office
he
said
he
used
in
his
home
was
not
specified
in
his
contract
but
was
necessary
for
his
activities
as
an
insurance
agent
for
the
company.
In
the
small
office
he
had
a
desk,
a
chair
and
a
telephone.
Quoting
from
paragraphs
4
and
5
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
the
following
indicates
what
was
claimed
by
the
appellant
and
what
was
allowed
by
the
respondent:
4.
In
filing
his
1975
T-1
tax
return,
the
appellant
claimed
and
the
respondent
subsequently
allowed
the
following
expenses:
|
1975
|
|
|
Expense
claimed
|
|
|
(as
filed
|
|
Item
|
per
return)
|
Allowed
|
Disallowed
|
Car
Expenses:
|
|
Interest
|
$
|
Nil
|
$
|
417.48
|
|
Insurance
|
|
Nil
|
|
137.67
|
|
Gasoline
|
1,109.33
|
|
367.87
|
|
Maintenance
&
repairs
|
|
999.92
|
|
770.35
|
|
CCA
|
1,590.00
|
1,184.02
|
|
|
$3,699.25
|
$2,877.39
|
|
Less
35%
personal
use
|
|
Nil
|
1,007.09
|
|
|
$3,699.25
|
$1,870.30
|
$1,828.95
|
Licence
|
|
133.00
|
|
133.00
|
Nil
|
Parking
|
|
45.00
|
|
45.00
|
Nil
|
Car
Washes
|
|
33.50
|
|
33.50
|
Nil
|
Advertising
&
Promotion
|
|
82.00
|
|
90.25
|
-
8.25
|
Travel
&
Accommodation
|
|
208.78
|
|
Nil
|
208.78
|
Entertainment
|
|
506.19
|
|
269.32
|
236.87
|
Training
allowance
|
|
190.00
|
|
190.00
|
Nil
|
Telephone
|
|
75.35
|
|
29.55
|
45.80
|
Office
Equipment
&
Supplies
|
|
854.50
|
|
10.37
|
844.13
|
Winnipeg
Flying
Club
|
|
646.58
|
|
318.01
|
328.57
|
|
$6,474.15
|
$2,989.30
|
$3,484.85
|
5.
In
filing
his
1976
T-1
tax
return,
the
appellant
claimed
and
the
respondent
allowed
the
following
expenses:
|
1975
|
|
|
Expense
claimed
|
|
|
(as
filed
|
|
Item
|
per
return)
|
Allowed
|
Disallowed
|
Car
Expenses:
|
|
Operating
Expense
|
$1,595.20
|
$2,216.56
|
|
CCA
|
1,113.00
|
874.18
|
|
|
$2,708.20
|
$3,090.74
|
|
Less
35%
personal
use
|
Nil
|
1,081.76
|
|
|
$2,708.20
|
$2,008.98
|
$
|
699.22
|
Accounting
|
29.00
|
25.00
|
|
Nil
|
Advertising
&
Promotion
|
88.25
|
90.25
|
|
—
2.00
|
Travel
&
Accommodation
|
72.51
|
72.51
|
|
Nil
|
Entertainment
|
982.27
|
250.00
|
|
732.27
|
Telephone
|
198.71
|
80.88
|
|
117.83
|
Office
Equipment
&
Supplies
|
606.31
|
61.41
|
|
544.90
|
Winnipeg
Flying
Club
|
715.47
|
672.29
|
|
43.18
|
Fire
&
Liability
Insurance
|
516.00
|
Nil
|
|
516.00
|
Interest,
Exchange,
etc
|
1,766.66
|
Nil
|
1,766.66
|
Rent
|
1,321.11
|
Nil
|
1,321.11
|
CCA
(Class
8)
|
156.23
|
Nil
|
|
156.23
|
|
$9,156.72
|
$3,261.32
|
$5,895.40
|
Findings
The
respondent
treated
the
appellant
solely
as
an
employee
and
not
as
an
independent
contractor
and
therefore
took
the
position
that
the
expenses
relating
to
his
office
maintained
by
him
were
not
required
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
and
further
that
his
contract
of
employment
did
not
require
him
to
keep
an
office.
It
seems
to
me
that
the
appellant
could
not
operate
in
any
other
way
in
any
efficient
manner
unless
he
worked
from
his
car.
Issue
The
main
issue
to
be
determined
by
me
is
whether
the
appellant
was
an
employee
of
Pioneer
or
acted
as
a
sales
agent,
therefore
as
an
independent
contractor
for
Pioneer.
Chitty
on
Contracts,
Twenty-Fourth
Edition,
Volume
II,
London,
Sweet
&
Maxwell,
1977,
at
p
530,
paragraph
3508,
states:
.
.
.
The
particular
words
found
in
the
contract
between
the
parties
are
not
conclusive,
since
the
law
is
only
concerned
with
the
nature
or
substance
of
the
relation
which
the
contract
has
created.
The
appellant
was
a
licensed
life
insurance
agent
selling
insurance
under
a
prescribed
arrangement
with
Pioneer
Life.
He
was
only
remunerated
on
a
purely
commission
basis
and
had
no
fixed
hours
and
could
come
and
go
as
he
pleased
and
do
as
little
or
as
much
work
as
he
chose.
I
would
find
that
he
was
a
free-lance
or
independent
contractor
and
in
no
sense
an
employee.
The
expenses
directly
relating
to
the
maintenance
of
the
office
were
deductible
as
expenses
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
the
appellant’s
income.
see
Daniel
DiFrancesco
v
MNR,
34
Tax
ABC
380;
64
DTC
106;
Chris
G
Danggas
v
MNR,
35
Tax
ABC
44;
64
DTC
196;
and
No
732
v
MNR,
26
Tax
ABC
285;
61
DTC
251.
See
also
Dr
William
H
Alexander
v
MNR,
[1969]
CTC
715;
70
DTC
6006,
wherein
the
appellant
in
that
case,
Dr
William
H
Alexander,
was
employed
by
a
hospital
for
the
purpose
of
being
responsible
for
the
radiology
department.
His
duties
as
a
radiologist
included
the
interpretation
of
films
and
consultations
with
the
attending
physicians
regarding
the
radiological
findings.
In
addition,
the
radiologist
was
responsible
for
consultation
with
regard
to
methods
and
procedures
used
in
the
radiology
department.
The
hospital
considered
him
as
a
member
of
the
medical
staff
of
the
hospital.
Jackett,
P
held
that
Alexander
was
not
under
a
contract
of
service
employed
as
an
officer
or
servant
of
the
hospital
authority
and
found
with
some
hesitation
at
724
and
6011
respectively:
On
the
other
hand,
a
contract
for
services
is
a
contract
under
which
the
one
party
agrees
that
certain
specified
work
will
be
done
for
the
other.
A
contract
of
service
does
not
normally
envisage
the
accomplishment
of
a
specified
amount
of
work
but
does
normally
contemplate
the
servant
putting
his
personal
services
at
the
disposal
of
the
master
during
some
period
of
time.
At
725
and
6011
respectively
he
says:
A
servant
can
be
employed
on
terms
that
he
is
paid
on
a
basis
related
to
the
volume
of
work
and
that
he
himself
hires
and
pays
help
that
is
required.
At
pages
726
and
6012
respectively
he
further
states:
With
considerable
hesitation,
having
regard
particularly
to
the
fact
that
during
the
years
in
question
the
appellant
carried
on
the
work
exactly
as
he
would
have
done
if
he
had
been
an
employee,
my
conclusion
is
that
he
was
working
under
a
contract
for
services
and
was
therefore
not
an
officer
or
servant.
In
perusing
the
calculations
of
the
expenses
allowed
and
disallowed
by
the
respondent
in
1975,
I
find
that
the
appellant
should
be
allowed
25%
of
his
personal
use
of
his
vehicle.
Although
realizing
that
it
is
an
arbitrary
decision
on
my
part,
I
cannot
see
the
appellant,
in
1975,
spending
$506.19
for
entertainment
and
I
approve
the
figure
allowed
by
the
Minister.
I
believe
he
should
be
allowed
$104
for
travel
and
accommodation.
The
entry
for
“Office
Equipment
&
Supplies”
expense
of
$854.50
seems
to
be
most
excessive;
I
allow
him
$300
for
this
item.
Similarly,
I
approve
the
figure
of
the
allowance
of
$318.01
made
by
the
Minister
for
the
appellant’s
membership
in
the
Winnipeg
Flying
Club.
Dealing
with
paragraph
5
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal,
relating
to
the
expenses
claimed
and
allowed
for
1976,
I
would
disallow
the
figures
sought
as
expenses
claimed
by
the
appellant
for
“Office
Equipment
&
Supplies”
but
allow
him
$300
as
a
reasonable
figure
in
this
regard.
Similarly,
with
respect
to
the
Winnipeg
Flying
Club,
I
approve
the
figure
as
allowed
by
the
Minister.
With
respect
to
“Fire
&
Liability
Insurance”,
I
find
that
this
is
not
a
legitimate
expense
under
the
circumstances.
I
disallow
the
expense
claimed
as
“Interest,
Exchange,
Etc”
as
the
appellant
gave
no
evidence
as
to
what
this
item
consisted
of
and
so
agree
with
the
respondent
in
disallowing
this
item
of
expense.
I
disallow
the
amount
of
$1,321.11
claimed
for
rent
but
allow
the
appellant
$600
for
use
of
his
home
office
in
1976.
His
claim
for
entertainment
in
the
sum
of
$982.27
is,
to
me,
excessive
but
I
allow
him
$350
for
entertainment
in
view
of
his
evidence
that
he
had
dinners
and
meetings
with
prospects
and
recruits,
the
cost
of
which
was
mainly
borne
by
him.
I
have
also
considered
the
following
cases:
Massey
v
Crown
Life
Insurance
Co.,
[1978]
2
All
ER
576;
and
Co-Operators
Insurance
Association
and
Robert
Henry
(Bert)
Kearney,
[1965]
SCR
106.
Decision
The
appeal
is
allowed
in
part
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed
in
part.