Guy
Tremblay:—These
appeals
were
heard
on
common
evidence
on
April
27,
1982,
at
the
City
of
London,
Ontario.
1.
The
Point
at
Issue
The
point
at
issue
is
whether
each
of
the
taxpayers
is
correct
in
considering
the
amount
of
$12,979
as
a
capital
gain
received
in
1975
as
their
share
of
the
profit
from
a
partnership
known
as
“Deenbar
Investments”,
on
the
sale
of
a
property
located
in
London,
Ontario.
This
property
was
purchased
in
May
1974
and
sold
in
March
1975.
2.
The
Burden
of
Proof
2.01
The
burden
is
on
the
appellants
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessments
are
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
results
particularly
from
several
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
delivered
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
2.02
In
the
same
judgment,
the
Court
decided
that
the
assumed
facts
on
which
the
respondent
based
his
assessment
or
reassessment
are
also
deemed
to
be
correct.
In
the
present
case,
the
assumed
facts
are
described
in
the
replies
to
notice
of
appeal
as
follows:
6.
In
reassessing
the
Appellant
as
aforesaid,
the
Respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
the
following
findings
or
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
“Deenbar
Investments”
purchased
the
subject
property
together
with
adjoining
property
municipally
known
as
74
-
93
Arbour
Glen
on
or
about
May
14,
1974;
(b)
on
or
about
March
7,
1975,
“Deenbar
Investments”
sold
the
subject
property
to
J
and
F
Goose
for
total
proceeds
of
disposition
of
$351,000;
(c)
the
cost
of
the
subject
property
was
not
greater
than
$293,016;
(d)
outlays
and
expenditures
with
respect
to
the
disposition
in
1975
of
the
subject
property
were
not
greater
than
$6,068;
(e)
the
sum
of
$51,916
was
income
of
“Deenbar
Investments”
in
the
1975
taxation
year,
of
which
each
partner’s
share
is
%
or
$12,979;
(f)
at
all
material
times,
and
in
particular
at
the
time
of
acquisition
of
his
interest
in
the
subject
property,
the
Appellant
had
the
intention
of
dealing
in,
trading
in,
or
otherwise
turning
the
property
to
account
for
profit;
(g)
at
all
material
times,
the
Appellant
had
in
mind
the
possibility
of
re-selling
the
subject
property
as
an
operating
motive
for
the
acquisition.
3.
The
Facts
3.01
In
1974,
the
appellants
with
two
brothers,
Darwa
Chahbar
and
Adna
Chahbar,
bought
the
partnership
known
as
Deenbar
Investments,
a
38-
townhouse
property
located
in
the
City
of
London,
Ontario.
There
were
two
buildings:
one
was
an
18-unit
complex
and
one
was
a
20-unit
complex.
In
1975,
the
18-unit
complex
was
sold.
The
latter
is
the
subject
property
involved
in
the
present
case.
3.02
The
price
was
paid
with
money
received
from
a
fire
insurance
company
as
indemnity
for
the
destruction
by
fire
of
a
hotel
in
1973.
This
hotel,
which
was
located
in
Woodstock,
had
been
purchased
in
1969
by
the
four
partners.
3.03
According
to
the
appellants,
their
intention
at
the
time
of
purchase
of
the
townhouse
property
was
to
replace
the
investment
made
in
the
hotel.
Their
intention
was
not
to
resell
but
to
keep
it
as
an
investment.
It
was
treated
as
a
fixed
asset
by
the
accountant.
Depreciation
was
taken
on
it.
3.04
The
18
townhouses
were
rented
at
the
time
of
purchase.
It
was
their
first
experience
in
townhouse
property.
The
partners
had
not
considered
all
the
problems
involved
in
such
a
property:
doing
the
maintenance,
cutting
the
grass,
collecting
the
rent,
taking
all
the
calls
from
the
tenants,
their
complaints,
etc.
The
main
problem
had
to
do
with
the
roof
and
the
sewer
system.
3.05
In
July
1974,
water
was
leaking
from
the
roof
in
an
apartment
of
the
18-unit
complex.
Mr
L
Blythe,
a
roofer,
did
the
repairs
for
$600
(Exhibit
A-1).
He
told
Mr
Rafaat
Mahadeen:
“.
.
.
if
(you)
can
get
rid
of
those
units
(you)
would
be
further
ahead
to
sell
them,
because
in
the
future
it
will
cost
(you)
too
much
money
to
put
a
new
roof
on.”
(SN
page
8).
The
same
Mr
Blythe
signed
an
affidavit
dated
March
31,
1982,
that
in
1975
he
had
informed
Mr
Mahadeen
that
the
roof
needed
major
repairs
and
that
it
would
be
wise
to
sell
the
property
(Exhibit
A-2).
The
respondent
admitted
this
affidavit
as
an
Exhibit.
In
fact,
the
partners
changed
the
roof
of
the
20-unit
property.
More-
over,
Mrs
Fania
Goose,
the
purchaser
of
the
subject
property
in
1975
and
witness
for
the
respondent,
testified
that
the
property
needed
a
new
roof
at
the
cost
of
$25,000
as
“Nick
Roofing”
told
her.
Moreover,
Mrs
Goose
said
that
every
year
she
had
to
spend
from
$900
to
$1,200
to
patch
up
the
roof
and
clean
the
sewers.
3.06
Concerning
the
sewers,
the
problem
was
that
the
“sewage
used
to
back
up”
(SN
page
10).
This
occurred
in
one
unit
of
the
subject
property
(18-unit
complex)
and
in
many
other
units
of
the
20-unit
complex.
3.07
Mr
Assem
Mahadeen
daid
that
prior
to
commencing
any
repair
work,
they
received
an
offer
for
the
disposition
of
the
subject
property.
The
offer
was
$19,500
per
unit;
they
had
paid
$16,500
per
unit.
At
the
time
the
offer
in
question
was
submitted,
there
was
no
listing
agreement
in
effect
with
any
realtor.
The
realtor
who
approached
them
with
Mrs
Goose’s
offer
was
Asset
Real
Estate,
the
same
“which
we
bought
the
townhouses
from.”
(SN
page
11,
lines
20
and
21).
3.08
In
cross-examination,
Mr
Assem
Mahadeen
explained:
(a)
He
had
been
part-owner
of
Hassan
Steel
since
1977
which
in
1975
was
associated
with
the
corporation
Mahadeen
Brothers
Limited.
(b)
He
and
his
brother
are
the
sole
shareholders
of
Mahadeen
Brothers
Limited,
a
company
incorporated
in
1974.
(c)
Also,
in
June
1974,
the
appellants
and
one
of
the
Chahbar
brothers
bought
the
Empire
Hotel
in
St
Thomas.
It
was
sold
afterwards
but
it
seems
without
profit.
(S
N
page
19)
(d)
In
1974,
Mr
Chahbar
approached
the
appellants
regarding
the
20-unit
complex.
(e)
The
appellants
looked
at
the
financial
statements
of
the
former
owner
and
were
Satisfied
with
the
rental
profits.
However,
the
witness
did
not
remember
the
quantum
of
the
said
profits.
The
appellants
did
not
ask
their
accountant
how
much
money
they
were
going
to
make
(S
N
page
27,
lines
21
and
22).
(f)
They
saw
the
buildings
from
the
outside
and
they
bought
the
properties
without
seeing
the
interior
—“.
..
that
was
the
biggest
mistake
we
made.”
(S
N
page
21,
lines
23
and
24).
In
fact,
they
relied
on
the
opinion
of
Mr
Asset,
the
real
estate
salesman.
(g)
Pursuant
to
the
1975
financial
statement
(May
31,
1975)
of
Deenbar
Investments
(Exhibit
R-2),
the
gross
rental
income
was
$64,961.08
and
the
total
expenses
were
$69,929.95
(including
the
mortgage
interest
of
$28,994.88
and
the
depreciation
of
$16,039.50).
(h)
The
witness
said
that
personally
he
did
not
list
the
subject
property
with
any
real
estate
company.
However,
he
did
not
know
if
any
of
his
partners
had.
(S
N
page
37,
lines
22
to
27).
(i)
Mahadeen
Brothers
Limited
purchased
a
three-storey
shopping
plaza
for
$54,000
or
$53,000
in
1978.
They
were
approached
by
a
salesman
of
Royal
Trust
Company.
They
had
difficulties
with
the
air-conditioning
system.
It
was
to
cost
$12,000
to
change
it.
When
they
bought
the
plaza,
it
was
vacant.
It
was
vacant
when
they
sold
it
and
is
still
vacant
in
1982.
3.09
Mr
Rafaat
Mahadeen,
the
second
appellant,
testified
that:
(a)
The
subject
property
was
7
to
9
years
old
in
1974.
(b)
They
figured
ten
percent
of
the
rent:
Q.
Did
you
think
that
it
would
prove
to
be
an
economical
investment?
A.
Well,
at
that
particular
time,
sir,
we
figured,
like,
ten
per
cent,
if
we
net
ten
per
cent
of
the
rent,
but
we
didn’t
take
into
consideration,
like,
the
gross
and
the
expense,
but
we
figured
if
we
bought
it,
like,
at
$17,500
and
we
are
renting
it
for
$185
this
is
ten
per
cent.
(S
N
page
43,
lines
17
to
24).
(c)
At
the
time
of
the
purchase
they
did
not
speak
of
reselling,
but
of
having
a
rental
income.
3.10
Concerning
the
sale
of
the
subject
property,
Mrs
Goose,
the
purchaser
said
that:
(a)
In
October
1974,
a
real
estate
broker
approached
her
about
the
subject
property.
I
knew
the
property
was
built,
I
knew
the
builder
when
he
built
and
I
liked
it
because
the
style
is
European,
built
like
in
France
with
the
balconies
and
everything
and
I
just
made
up
my
mind
that
that
is
what
I
wanted,
like,
when
everything
is
right
I
could
buy
it.
(S
N
page
50,
lines
22
to
27).
(b)
She
never
met
and
did
not
know
of
the
appellants.
(c)
She
never
saw
a
listing
agreement
indicating
that
the
property
was
for
sale.
(d)
She
did
not
inspect
the
inside
of
the
units
before
the
purchase.
(e)
She
had
the
financial
statements
of
the
owners
concerning
the
property,
but
she:
.
..
never
even
counted
it
because
the
proposition
was
I
liked
to
buy
and
I
was
looking
for
profit
and
I
was
not
looking
for
loss,
I
wanted
to
buy
this
property.
(S
N
pages
53
and
54).
4.
Law
—
Cases
at
Law
—
Analysis
4.01
Law
The
main
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
involved
in
the
present
case
are
section
3
and
subsections
9(1)
and
248(1)
(definition
of
“business”).
The
latter
reads
as
follows:
248.
Definitions.
(1)
In
this
Act,
“Business”.—“business”
includes
a
profession,
calling,
trade,
manufacture
or
undertaking
of
any
kind
whatever
and
includes
an
adventure
or
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade
but
does
not
include
an
office
or
employment;
4.02
Cases
at
Law
The
cases
at
law
to
which
the
counsel
for
the
parties
referred
are
as
follows:
1.
Paul
Racine,
Amédée
Demers
and
François
Nolin
v
MNR,
[1965]
CTC
150;
65
DTC
5098;
2.
GA
Lorenzon
et
al
v
MNR,
[1981]
CTC
2592;
81
DTC
479;
3.
William
Moldowan
v
HMQ,
[1977]
CTC
310;
77
DTC
5213;
4.
Regal
Heights
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1960]
CTC
384;
60
DTC
1270;
5.
Morev
Investments
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1972]
CTC
513;
72
DTC
6421.
4.03
Analysis
4.03.1
Many
times
the
courts
emphasized
the
different
factors
involved
in
a
case
of
this
nature
to
determine
whether
the
profit
of
the
transaction
must
be
treated
as
an
income
or
capital
gain:
intention,
relation
of
transaction
to
taxpayer’s
business,
nature
of
transaction
and
assets
involved,
number
and
frequency
of
transactions,
period
of
ownership.
The
intention
is
determinative.
The
other
factors
are
useful
to
determine
the
intention.
4.03.2
The
declared
intention
of
the
appellants
in
purchasing
the
subject
property
is
obviously
in
favor
of
the
thesis
in
their
testimony
(see
paragraphs
3.03,
3.08(c)).
However,
such
testimony
or
even
a
declared
intention
in
a
contract
is
not
conclusive.
The
short
period
of
ownership
of
the
subject
property
(less
than
12
months,
see
paragraph
3.01)
is
rather
in
favor
of
the
respondent’s
thesis.
The
respondent’s
counsel
emphasized
the
fact
that
the
subject
property
was
a
loss-producing
property
(see
paragraph
3.08(g)).
How
could
it
be
purchased
as
an
investment?
The
appellants
did
not
inspect
the
property;
they
only
looked
at
the
financial
statements.
They
relied
on
the
opinion
of
the
real
estate
salesman
(see
paragraphs
3.08(e)
and
(f)).
Mrs
Goose
did
not
inspect
the
subject
property
either.
She
bought
it
because
she
liked
it:
the
style
was
European
and
she
knew
the
builder
(see
paragraph
3.10(a)).
It
seems
that
for
some
people
it
is
not
a
must
to
inspect
a
building
before
purchasing
it.
Those
persons
ordinarily
have
no
experience
in
that
kind
of
transaction.
Such
was
the
case
for
the
appellants
in
1974.
4.03.3
Some
elements
seem
to
confirm
the
declared
intention
of
the
appellants.
A
building
is
not
a
commodity.
By
its
nature
it
is
an
investment.
Moreover,
the
properties
were
purchased
to
replace
the
investment
made
in
1969
in
a
hotel
which
burned
in
1973.
They
used
the
indemnity
to
purchase
the
subject
property.
The
evidence
given
about
the
problem
of
the
roof
is
clear
(see
paragraph
3.05).
The
appellants
alleged
it
was
one
of
the
reasons
for
selling.
They
bought
two
properties
and
they
sold
one
when
they
received
the
offer
for
$19,500
per
unit.
They
had
purchased
it
for
$16,500
per
unit.
There
was
no
listing
agreement.
They
still
owned
the
other
property.
The
Board
thinks
that
the
preponderance
of
the
evidence
is
in
favor
of
the
appellants’
thesis.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
above
reasons
for
judgment.
Appeals
allowed.