D
E
Taylor
[ORALLY]:—This
is
an
appeal
from
Muriel
Anne
McGuire
with
respect
to
her
1979
and
1980
income
tax
returns.
The
manner
at
issue,
which
has
a
direct
bearing
on
the
1979
year
and
has
a
subsidiary
bearing
on
the
1980
year
by
virtue
of
the
general
averaging
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
is
the
receipt
by
the
appellant
of
an
amount
of
$4,000
which,
it
is
alleged
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
has
to
be
taxed
under
paragraph
56(1
)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
allowance
or
other
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis.
It
is
the
position
of
the
appellant
that
the
amount
is
a
lump
sum
payment
and
not
so
taxable.
The
history
of
the
matter,
very
briefly,
is
(reading
from
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal):
The
Appellant
and
her
spouse
were
living
separate
and
apart
at
all
relevant
times
and,
by
court
order
dated
May
15,
1974
Stephen
William
McGuire
was
ordered
to
pay
the
Appellant
the
sum
of
$15
per
week
for
the
support
and
maintenance
of
the
child
of
their
marriage.
By
court
order
dated
November
18,
1974
Stephen
William
McGuire
was
ordered
to
pay
the
Appellant
the
sum
of
$15
per
week
for
the
support
and
maintenance
of
the
child
of
their
marriage.
Stephen
William
McGuire
did
not
comply
with
the
terms
of
either
order.
Pursuant
to
Minutes
of
Settlement
negotiated
between
the
Appellant
and
Stephen
William
McGuire,
the
Appeallant
received
$4,000
in
respect
of
child
support
arrears.
And
I
emphasize
the
fact
that
the
term
“pursuant
to
Minutes
of
Settlement”
is
that
used
by
the
Minister
in
his
reply.
The
minutes
of
settlement
(Exhibit
A-4),
along
with
various
other
documents
which
deal
with
this
matter,
have
been
provided
to
the
Board,
and
I
read
the
critical
paragraph,
at
least
critical
as
it
pertains
to
this
appeal
in
my
opinion.
(In
this
case,
in
the
order
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Ontario,
the
respondent
is
Stephen
William
McGuire.)
The
Respondent
shall
pay
to
the
Petitioner
a
lump
sum
in
the
amount
of
FIVE
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
($5,000)
of
which
FOUR
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
($4,000)
shall
be
payable
on
or
before
June
15th,
1979
and
ONE
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
($1,000)
shall
be
payable
on
June
1,
AD
1980,
and
such
payment
shall
be
in
full
and
final
settlement
of
any
arrears
and
any
future
support
in
connection
with
the
child,
Loren
Christine
McGuire,
born
March
25,
1967.
In
addition
to
the
court
documents,
certain
correspondence
between
the
solicitors
for
the
two
parties
during
their
separation
and
divorce
was
filed
with
the
Board.
There
is
some
indication
in
that
correspondence
that
the
basis
of
negotiations
between
the
appellant
and
her
ex-husband
was
related
to
an
attempt
to
receive
payment
for
the
arrears
indicated
and
$15
per
week
in
the
previous
court
orders.
It
has
not
been
shown
to
my
satisfaction
in
the
proceedings
today
that
the
amount
in
question,
the
$4,000,
can
be
divorced
from
its
very
likely
relationship
to
the
arrears
in
question.
It
has
been
the
position
of
the
Minister,
as
it
has
been
the
case
in
other
similar
matters,
that
arrears
of
alimony
or
allowance
for
maintenance
or
support
such
as
this,
even
if
paid
in
a
lump
sum,
are
nevertheless
taxable
in
the
hands
of
the
recipient
when
received
under
paragraph
56(1
)(c)
of
the
Act.
Previous
decisions
of
the
Board,
specifically
Sills
[1980]
CTC
2500;
80.
DTC
1436,
and
Bourdeau
[1981]
CTC
2440;
81
DTC
379,
have
touched
on
this
point
and
a
recent
decision
of
Pisony
[1982]
CTC
2012;
82
DTC
1023,
also
in
some
way
dealt
with
the
same
issue,
but
from
the
reverse
side.
It
is
noted
that
the
decision
in
Sills
(supra)
is
under
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court
and
the
decision
in
Pisony,
to
which
reference
has
been
made,
is
also
under
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court.
On
the
evidence
and
argument
presented
today
I
am
not
persuaded
that
there
is
any
reason
to
change
the
views
expressed
by
the
Board
in
Sills
and
in
Bourdeau
which
have
been
referenced.
I
do
note,
however,
that
counsel
for
the
respondent
has
brought
to
the
attention
of
the
Board
a.
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
decision
Jack
Cewe
Ltd
v
Jorgenson,
[1980]
CTC
314;
80
DTC
6233,
in
which
the
Supreme
Court
gave
serious
consideration
to
whether
or
not,
in
that
matter,
the
damages
at
issue
flowed
out
of
the
contract
of
employment.
Counsel
for
the
Minister
has
indicated
that
following
that
line
of
reasoning,
one
might
quite
logically
deduce
that
the
payments
at
issue
here
today
also
flowed
from
the
original
court
orders
which
have
been
referenced.
I
would
point
out
that
in
no
way
am
I
minimizing
the
potential
that
such
a
viewpoint
may
be
correct
and
the
decision
in
Cewe
Ltd,
in
the
final
analysis,
may
have
a
bearing
upon
this
matter.
I
do,
however,
point
out
that
the
wording
of
the
comments
of
the
Justices
are
as
follows:
“I
fail
to
see
how
they
can
be
said
not
to
be
paid
as
a
benefit
under
the
contract.”
I
would
merely
note
that
the
matter
at
issue
there
was
whether
or
not
a
benefit
had
been
received
by
the
appellant
—
not
whether
an
allowance
had
been
received
by
the
appellant.
I
make
those
comments
because
this
is
very
clearly
a
matter
which
may
have
some
parallel
reasoning
and
I
want
it
understood
that
I
have
tried
to
take
it
into
account
as
much
as
is
possible.
Under
the
circumstances,
basing
my
decision
on
the
earlier
judgments
of
the
Board
in
Sills,
Bourdeau
and
Pisony,
and
recognizing
that
two
of
them
are
under
appeal,
I
do
not
believe
that
I
have
any
alternative
to
allowing
the
appeal.
And,
in
my
view,
it
has
not
been
made
clear
to
me
that
payments
of
alimony,
or
allowance
for
maintenance
paid
in
a
manner
other
than
precisely
according
to
the
contract,
are
income.
Under
the
circumstances
of
this
appeal
the
$4,000
at
issue
here
cannot
be
said
to
have
been
payable
pursuant
to
either
one
of
the
original
court
orders
which
have
been
filed
with
the
Board.
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
entire
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed.