The
Assistant
Chairman:—To
the
reported
income
of
the
appellant
for
the
1974
taxation
year,
was
added
a
dividend
in
the
amount
of
$237,405
paid
to
him
by
The
Hamilton
Tiger-Cat
Football
Club
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
“Football
Club”).
The
appellant
being
of
the
view
that
that
dividend
was
the
income
and
property
of
his
holding
company,
Pine
Hollow
Holdings
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“Pine
Hollow”),
objected
to
the
assessment
and,
following
confirmation
thereof
by
the
respondent,
appealed
to
this
Board.
While
evidence
was
given
by
Mr
DeGroote
and
Mr
Ralph
Sazio,
then
the
president
of
the
Football
Club,
there
really
was
no
dispute
as
to
the
facts
of
the
case.
The
appellant
had
shareholdings
in
many
companies.
To
act
as
a
holding
company
for
some
of
his
interests,
on
the
advice
of
his
lawyers
and
accountants,
he
caused
to
be
incorporated
Pine
Hollow,
of
which
he
was
the
sole
shareholder
and
director.
By
agreement
dated
March
20,
1973,
Mr
DeGroote
purchased
all
of
the
shares
of
the
Football
Club
from
the
then
shareholders.
There
were
terms
and
conditions
attached
to
that
agreement,
none
of
which
is
relevant
to
this
issue.
Shortly
thereafter,
the
appellant
sold
15%
of
the
said
shares
to
the
parties
from
whom
he
had
acquired
shares.
In
addition,
a
little
later,
a
small
percentage
was
sold
to
other
people.
Mr
DeGroote
became
the
registered
owner
in
the
books
of
the
Football
Club
to
the
extent
of
his
share
ownership.
Later
(in
1973)
the
appellant
personally
entered
into
a
formal
agreement
with
a
Mr
Trottier
to
sell
him
3,000
shares
of
the
Football
Club
and
orally
agreed
in
the
same
year
with
another
gentleman
to
sell
him
a
few
shares.
No
shares
were
transferred
pursuant
to
either
of
these
agreements.
Following
the
incorporation
of
Pine
Hollow,
the
appellant,
on
January
10,
1974,
entered
into
an
agreement
with
it
to
sell
to
it
all
the
shares
of
the
Football
Club
which
he
owned.
The
shares
were
not
transferred
on
that
day
and,
in
fact,
they
were
not
registered
in
the
name
of
Pine
Hollow
until
October
or
November,
1974.
The
reason
for
this
was,
first
of
all,
that
since
the
Football
Club
was
in
the
Eastern
Conference
of
the
Canadian
Football
League,
that
transfer
had
to
be
approved
by
that
organization.
Following
that
approval,
the
transfer
still
had
to
be
further
approved
by
the
Canadian
Football
League.
As
Mr
Sazio
explained,
this
took
time
and
it
wasn't
until
late
1974
that
full
approval
was
given.
Mr
Sazio
further
explained
that
the
Football
Club
usually
had
a
meeting
at
the
end
of
each
month.
The
financial
position
of
the
Football
Club
for
a
particular
year
(calendar
year)
could
not
be
ascertained
until
after
the
Grey
Cup
game
when
the
Football
Club
would
be
advised
of
its
share
of
the
proceeds
of
that
contest.
It
then
took
the
Football
Club
accountants
some
time
to
prepare
the
books
and
records
for
presentation
to
the
directors.
There
was
a
Football
Club
Director’s
Meeting
on
February
28,
1974.
At
that
meeting
a
motion
was
approved.
It
read
as
follows:
It
was
revolved
that
the
company
elects
to
pay
a
dividend
of
$21
per
common
share
to
the
shareholders
of
record
on
December
29,
1973
and
payable
March
4,
1974.
Immediately
following
that
motion,
the
Minute
contained
the
following:
Cash
Position
—
Mr
Gibson
advised
the
meeting
that
the
above
actions
may
cause
a
short
cash
position
at
times
throughout
the
year.
Mr
DeGroote
said
that
he
would
make
arrangements
with
the
Toronto-Dominion
Bank
to
meet
this
situation
should
it
arise.
It
is
noted
that
Mr
DeGroote
was
in
attendance
at
that
meeting
as
was
Mr
Sazio,
who
was
the
Chairman.
As
to
the
date
for
the
“shareholders
of
record”,
Mr
Sazio
could
offer
no
explanation
except
that
basically,
since
he
had
been
with
the
Football
Club
(about
30
years),
virtually
always
the
last
working
day
of
the
year
for
which
the
dividend
was
being
declared
(if
a
profit
in
that
year)
was
used
as
the
date
of
“record”.
As
mentioned,
by
agreement
of
January
10,
1974,
the
appellant
sold
all
the
shares
he
then
had
in
the
Football
Club
to
Pine
Hollow.
It
was
stated
in
evidence
that
there
was
good
and
valuable
consideration
for
the
sale
and
that
statement
was
in
no
way
disputed.
The
document
says
“on
this
date
sell”.
It
also
contained
clause
3,
which
reads
as
follows:
3.
DeGroote
and
Pine
Hollow
agree
that
the
shares
shall
remain
registered
in
the
name
of
DeGroote
for
the
beneficial
owner
thereof,
Pine
Hollow;
that
DeGroote
will
execute
a
declaration
of
trust
declaring
that
he
is
holding
the
said
shares
in
trust
for
Pine
Hollow;
further
that
Pine
Hollow
is
the
beneficial
holder
thereof
and
that
all
monies
or
payments
received
by
DeGroote
by
virtue
of
the
said
shares
being
registered
in
his
name
shall
be
for
the
account
of
Pine
Hollow
to
the
exclusion
of
DeGroote.
DeGroote
further
covenants
and
agrees
that
he
will
deal
with
the
shares
only
upon
the
instructions
of
Pine
Hollow
and
that
in
so
far
as
he
is
legally
entitled
so
to
do
he
will
carry
out
and
fulfil
any
and
all
instructions
given
to
him
by
Pine
Hollow
pertaining
to
any
or
all
matters
relating
to
the
said
shares
and
without
restricting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing,
the
sale,
pledge,
hypothecation
of
such
shares,
and
DeGroote
further
covenants
and
agrees
that
he
will
vote
such
shares
in
accordance
with
any
instructions
which
might
be
given
to
him
by
Pine
Hollow.
Concurrently
the
appellant
signed
a
declaration
of
trust,
which
reads
as
follows:
I,
MICHAEL
GEORGE
DEGROOTE
hereby
declare
that
I
have
this
day
sold
8,500
common
shares
without
par
value
of
the
capital
stock
of
Hamilton
Tiger-Cats
Football
Club
Limited
to
Pine
Hollow
Holdings
Limited
and
further
that
by
agreement
between
me
and
Pine
Hollow
Holdings
Limited
said
shares
shall
remain
registered
in
my
name.
I
further
declare
that
as
of
this
day
I
have
no
beneficial
interest
therein
and
that
I
am
holding
said
shares
in
trust
for
the
beneficial
owner
thereof,
Pine
Hollow
Holdings
Limited.
I
undertake
to
deal
with
such
shares
only
upon
instructions
received
by
me
from
Pine
Hollow
Holdings
Limited.
I
further
acknowledge
and
agree,
direct
and
declare
that
all
dividends
or
any
other
payments
of
any
nature
or
kind
received
by
me
by
virtue
of
the
fact
that
said
shares
are
registered
in
my
name
shall
be
for
the
account
of
Pine
Hollow
Holdings
Limited
to
the
absolute
exclusion
of
myself.
I
further
agree
that
I
will
follow
and
carry
out
all
legal
instructions
given
to
me
by
the
owner
of
such
shares,
Pine
Hollow
Holdings
Limited
as
same
may
pertain
to
any
and/or
all
dealings
with
said
shares.
The
appellant’s
position,
shortly
stated,
is:
(a)
The
date
of
record
is
for
company
purposes
only.
(To
whom
does
it
write
and
send
the
cheque?)
(b)
On
the
signing
of
the
agreement
on
January
10,
1974,
anything
that
the
appellant
would
receive
from
those
Football
Club
shares
from
that
date
forward
was
not
only
the
property
of
but
also
the
income
of
Pine
Hollow,
and
the
trust
agreement
of
the
same
date
supports
that
position.
(When
he
received
the
dividend
cheque,
he
could
only
deal
with
it
as
trustee.)
It
should
be
mentioned
that
the
cheque
paying
the
dividend
was
made
payable
to
Mr
DeGroote
and
he
turned
it
over
to
Pine
Hollow.
The
Crown’s
submission
was
that
the
date
of
“shareholder
of
record”
was
determinative
of
the
issue
and,
since
the
appellant
was
the
shareholder
of
record
on
December
29,
1973,
then
the
dividend
cheque
was
his
and
no
other
person’s
and
so
it
was
his
income.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
relied
first
of
all
on
the
Business
Corporations
Act
of
Ontario,
RSO
1970,
c
53,
section
75(1),
which
reads
as
follows:
Subject
to
sections
106
and
112,
the
issuer
or
the
indenture
trustee
may
treat
the
registered
holder
as
the
person
entitled
to
receive
notice
of
and
to
vote
at
meetings
of
the
security
holders
and
to
receive
any
payment
in
respect
of
the
security
and
otherwise
to
exercise
all
the
rights
and
powers
of
an
owner.
His
submission
continues
that
the
sole
purpose
of
that
subsection
is
for
the
protection
of
the
payor
—
if
it
has
paid
that
person
the
dividend
then,
in
so
far
as
it
is
concerned,
the
dividend
has
been
paid
properly.
Reliance
was
also
placed
on
the
cases
of
Black
et
al
v
Homersham,
[1874-80]
All
ER
207;
and
In
re
Wimbush,
Richards
v
Wimbush
et
al,
[1940]
1
Ch
92.
Counsel
submitted
that,
once
the
shares
have
been
purchased,
all
things
flowing
from
the
company
following
the
purchase
go
to
the
now
shareholder.
Counsel
for
the
Crown
referred
to
a
number
of
cases,
but
the
most
relevant
one
is
the
case
of
Victor
A
Pylypchuk
v
MNR,
17
Tax
ABC
337;
57
DTC
375,
a
decision
of
Mr
Fisher
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board.
In
1943,
the
appellant
and
others
purchased
shares
of
a
limited
company
from
certain
people.
The
agreement
reflecting
the
purchase
stated
in
part:
The
Vendors
shall
be
entitled
as
their
own
property
to
...
all
accounts
or
bills
received
by
the
Company
or
owing
to
the
Company,
as
at
August
31,
1943.
In
1950
the
company
received
a
sum
from
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
with
respect
to
excess
profit
tax,
a
portion
of
which
the
parties
(the
vendor
and
purchaser
of
the
shares)
agreed
was
due
with
respect
to
a
period
prior
to
August
31,
1943.
The
directors
of
the
company,
on
December
31,
1951,
declared
a
dividend
payable
to
the
shareholders
of
record
on
August
30,
1943,
(they
were
the
vendors
of
the
shares
to
the
now
shareholders)
which
dividend
related
in
part
to
the
payment
in
1950
from
the
Department
of
National
Revenue.
By
this
dividend
declaration,
no
dividend
was
payable
to
the
current
shareholders.
The
Minister
assessed
the
appellant
on
the
basis
that
he
received
a
benefit
by
the
company
paying
the
dividend
to
an
old
shareholder
and
so
relieving
the
appellant
of
an
obligation.
Mr
Fisher
allowed
the
appeal
saying
there
was
no
benefit
as
the
amount
of
the
dividend
was
“a
bill
or
account
receivable”
on
or
before
August
31,
1943,
and
so,
was
the
property
of
the
vendor
of
the
shares.
In
the
instant
appeal,
there
was
no
suggestion
that
the
dividend
was
the
property
of
the
appellant
because,
at
the
time
of
declaration
and
payment
of
the
dividend,
the
appellant
not
only
owned
but
was
also
the
registered
owner
of
the
same
shares.
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
date
of
the
“shareholder
of
record”
is
more
important
than
giving
the
name
and
address
of
the
person
to
whom
the
dividend
cheque
should
be
sent.
I
believe
it
does
that,
but
it
also
indicates
who
is
the
owner
of
that
dividend,
subject
to
any
pre-existing
terms.
As
pointed
out
previously,
it
must
be
remembered
that
the
appellant
was
at
the
meeting
when
the
dividend
was
declared
and
the
date
for
“shareholder
of
record”
was
set.
There
was
no
notation
on
the
minute
of
any
dissent
from
the
resolution.
The
appellant
could
easily
have
requested
the
day
of
say,
January
20,
1974,
to
be
the
date
of
the
“shareholder
of
record”.
Had
this
happened,
it
could
be
that
the
sales
agreement
and
trust
declaration
would
have
made
him
a
bare
trustee
and
so
the
dividend
would
not
have
the
character
of
income
to
him.
Judgment
will
go
dismissing
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.