The
Chairman
[TRANSLATION]:—This
appeal
by
Construction
Sylvain
Ltée
is
from
an
assessment
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
the
taxation
year
1979.
The
point
for
decision
in
the
case
at
bar
is
the
fair
market
value
of
the
appellant’s
inventory
on
December
31,
1979.
The
applicable
rule
of
law
is
to
be
found
in
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
which
reads
as
follows:
Sec
10
Valuation
of
inventory
property
(1)
For
the
purpose
of
computing
income
from
a
business,
the
property
described
in
an
inventory
shall
be
valued
at
its
cost
to
the
taxpayer
or
its
fair
market
value,
whichever
is
lower,
or
in
such
other
manner
as
may
be
permitted
by
regulation.
Summary
of
Facts
In
September
1977
the
appellant
had
purchased
for
residential
construction
about
150
square
arpents
of
land,
which
was
part
of
lot
120
and
lots
122,
125
and
130
of
the
cadastre
of
the
parish
of
Varennes,
Quebec,
for
the
sum
of
$505,000,
or
$3,366
an
arpent.
On
December
22,
1978
Bill
90
to
Preserve
Agricultural
Land
(included
in
the
record)
was
adopted
by
the
National
Assembly
of
Quebec
retroactive
to
November
9,
1978.
This
law
created
a
provisional
plan
for
the
establishment
of
green
zones
in
the
province
of
Quebec.
The
appellant’s
lands,
which
are
the
subject
of
this
appeal,
were
provisionally
declared
an
agricultural
zone
by
the
law.
The
commission
de
protection
de
territoire
agricole
[agricultural
land
preservation
commission]
created
under
Bill
90
had
a
period
of
six
months,
commencing
June
19,1979,
to
hear
objections
made
to
the
provisional
plan
before
making
the
agricultural
zoning
provided
for
in
Bill
90
final
and
permanent.
As
no
final
decision
had
yet
been
made
by
the
said
Commission
at
the
end
of
1979,
the
appellant
in
its
1979
tax
return
reduced
the
value
of
the
land
purchased
for
construction
in
1977
by
$455,222,
giving
it
only
the
market
value
of
agricultural
land,
which
it
estimated
as
$450
an
arpent
in
the
Varennes
area.
By
notice
of
assessment,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
rejected
the
reduction
in
value
of
$455,222
and
included
it
in
calculating
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
taxation
year
1979.
The
appellant’s
representative
maintained
that
as
long
as
Bill
90
was
in
effect,
the
land
which
is
the
subject
of
this
appeal
could
only
be
used
for
agricultural
purposes.
In
the
appellant’s
submission,
its
fair
market
value
could
be
no
different
from
that
of
agricultural
land
in
the
area,
that
is
$450
an
arpent.
He
concluded
that
the
fair
market
value
of
the
land
at
December
31,
1979
was
$450
an
arpent,
and
in
accordance
with
subsection
10(1)
of
the
Act,
this
value
was
used
in
preparing
the
tax
return
for
1979.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued,
first,
that
the
appellant
had
not
succeeded
in
discharging
the
burden
of
showing
that
the
fair
market
value
of
the
land
at
December
31,
1979
was
$450
an
arpent.
Second,
she
argued
that
the
plans
imposing
green
zones
under
Bill
90
to
Preserve
Agricultural
Land
were
only
provisional,
their
application
to
the
appellant’s
land
was
uncertain
and
it
was
too
early
at
this
time
to
conclude
that
their
market
value
would
only
be
that
of
agricultural
land.
She
concluded
that
the
only
value
which
could
be
applied
was
that
of
the
purchase
price,
namely
$3,366
an
arpent,
which
she
considered
was
below
the
fair
market
value
of
the
land
immediately
before
Bill
90
came
into
effect.
This
case
creates
a
precedent
in
a
taxation
matter.
So
far
as
I
know,
this
type
of
problem
has
never
been
raised
in
connection
with
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Issue
The
facts
are
not
in
dispute
and
the
issue
is
solely
as
to
the
market
value
which
should
be
assigned
to
the
appellant’s
land
at
December
31,
1979
for
the
purpose
of
subsection
10(1)
of
the
Act.
Submissions
The
appellant
was
represented
by
Mr
Roméo
Cadieux,
a
chartered
appraiser,
and
by
Mr
R
Brunelle,
CA.
Mr
Carieux
filed
as
Exhibit
A-1
a
general
appraisal
report,
covering
appraisal
of
lots
located
at
St-Antoine
and
at
Varennes,
including
appraisal
of
the
appellant’s
land,
the
subject
of
this
appeal.
In
his
report,
Mr
Cadieux
indicated
that
the
said
lots
are
located
in
the
town
of
Varennes
near
residential
development.
However,
under
Bill
90
designating
the
appellant’s
land
as
an
agricultural
zone,
and
in
view
of
the
fact
that
the
land
could
have
no
market
value
other
than
as
agricultural
land,
Mr
Cadieux
had
made
an
analysis
of
several
sales
of
land
in
Varennes,
St-Antoine
and
Verchères
zoned
as
agricultural,
and
come
to
the
conclusion
that
throughout
the
region
agricultural
land
had
a
market
value
of
about
$450
an
arpent,
which
he
had
assigned
to
the
appellant’s
land.
It
is
clear
from
reading
the
appraisal
report
and
from
his
testimony
that
Mr
Cadieux
only
attempted
to
determine
a
market
value
for
agricultural
land
in
the
area,
without
making
any
adjustment
to
take
into
account
the
special
circumstances
in
which
the
subject
land
was
placed
on
December
31,
1979.
In
order
to
explain
the
special
position
in
which
the
subject
land
was
placed
on
December
31,
1979,
namely
the
provisonal
agricultural
zoning
which
was
then
applicable
to
it,
counsel
for
the
respondent
called
Mrs
Luce
Doucet,
registrar
of
the
town
of
Varennes.
It
appeared
from
her
testimony
that
a
part
of
lot
120
and
lots
122,
125
and
130
had
been
zoned
as
residential
by
the
municipality
of
Varennes
in
1960.
Consulting
engineers
had
prepared
plans
for
the
residential
expansion
of
Varennes
in
1976.
On
September
6,
1977
the
municipality
adopted
municipal
by-law
134,
providing
in
a
zoning
plan
for
the
residential
expansion
of
the
town
of
Varennes,
including
the
subject
land
(Exhibit
1-1).
By-law
134
was
ratified
in
1978
by
by-law
170,
in
accordance
with
new
plans
for
the
execution
of
work
to
extend
municipal
services.
The
subject
land
was
contained
in
zone
3
of
these
plans
(Exhibit
I-2).
It
was
alleged
by
the
respondent,
and
not
disputed
by
the
appellant,
that
the
by-law
to
instal
municipal
services
was
drafted
at
the
request
of
the
appellant,
among
others.
Authorization
was
obtained
from
the
Commission
de
protection
de
l’environnement
[environmental
protection
commission],
and
the
by-law
was
adopted
by
the
council
on
November
9,
1978.
Mrs
Doucet
stated
that
in
spite
of
Bill
90,
which
had
come
into
effect
on
December
22,
1978,
the
municipality
applied
for
a
loan
authorization
which
was
granted
in
three
stages
in
1978,
1979
and
1981,
and
the
municipality
carried
out
the
work
contemplated
in
the
Varennes
residential
expansion
plans.
As
appears
in
Exhibit
1-3,
this
work
was
done
by
the
municipality
in
the
green
zone
of
the
provisional
plan
prepared
under
Bill
90.
On
June
19,
1979
the
Commission
de
protection
du
territoire
agricole
sent
the
municipality
a
notice
to
negotiate
for
the
purpose
of
arriving
at
an
agreement
on
zoning
of
the
land
in
Varennes
provisionally
zoned
as
agricultural.
Following
meetings
and
discussions
with
citizens
and
organizations
in
Varennes,
a
brief
was
prepared
for
submission
to
the
municipal
council
and
the
Commission
(Exhibit
I-4).
The
municipality
also
had
a
brief
prepared
by
the
firm
of
Somer,
covering
the
town
planning
projects
as
a
whole
(Exhibit
I-5).
The
subject
land
was
referred
to
in
the
Somer
brief
as
module
1.3
of
the
town
of
Varennes.
The
first
meeting
between
the
municipality
and
the
Commission
de
protection
des
terres
agricoles
took
place
on
December
18,
1979
and
the
Commission
submitted
a
preliminary
proposal
to
the
municipality,
indicating
the
permanent
zone.
At
a
hearing
with
the
Commission
on
February
8,
1980,
the
town
of
Varennes
made
a
counter-proposal.
On
February
18,
1980
the
Commission
gave
its
decision,
by
which
the
subject
land
(module
1.3),
among
others,
was
treated
as
a
white
zone,
that
is
excluded
from
the
agricultural
zone.
On
February
21,
1980
the
municipality
adopted
a
resolution
rejecting
the
Commission’s
decision,
and
asked
the
Commission
also
to
de-zone
certain
other
areas
in
the
town
of
Varennes
to
be
used
for
medium
and
heavy
industry,
as
well
as
certain
residential
sectors
located
along
the
St
Lawrence.
The
latter
requests
by
the
municipality
were
not
approved,
but
the
decision
of
the
Commission
on
February
18,
1980
was
upheld,
and
the
appellant’s
land
was
confirmed
as
a
white
zone.
In
her
testimony,
Mrs
Doucet
stated
—
and
this
is
admitted
by
the
appellant
—
that
no
residential
development
would
have
been
possible
in
Varennes
if
the
provisional
plan,
made
under
Bill
90,
had
not
been
amended
to
make
the
zoning
of
the
appellant’s
land
non-agricultural.
As
as
second
witness,
counsel
for
the
respondent
called
Mr
Lionel
Duguay,
a
Chartered
appraiser
for
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
who
had
prepared
a
narrative
report
on
the
market
value
of
the
subject
land
dated
December
31,
1978
and
December
31,
1979
(Exhibit
I-7).
In
his
report
Mr
Duguay
included
certain
copies
of
correspondence
and
certain
basic
information
obtained
from
the
Varennes
municipal
officers,
which
he
had
used
in
arriving
at
his
opinion
as
to
the
market
value
of
the
subject
land
in
1977
and
1978.
In
his
appraisal
Mr
Duguay,
while
aware
of
the
scope
of
Bill
90
and
the
fact
that
the
subject
land
had
provisionally
been
zoned
as
agricultural,
took
into
account
everything
which
had
occurred
before
Bill
90
came
into
effect
and
which
directly
affected
the
subject
land.
Residential
expansion
plans
which
had
existed
since
1958,
the
outlining
of
municipal
services
in
1975,
the
obtaining
of
authorization
for
loans
to
perform
work
on
municipal
services,
construction
projects
which
were
under
way
in
1978
and
1979,
the
extension
of
boulevard
Gauthier
and
the
fact
that
a
residential
extension
of
Varennes
was
only
possible
in
the
direction
of
the
subject
land
led
Mr
Du-
guay
to
conclude
there
was
a
strong
possibility
that
the
provisional
agricultural
zoning
of
the
appellant’s
land
would
again
become
a
white
zone.
According
to
Mr
Duguay,
the
potential
for
a
better
use
of
this
land,
which
could
be
realized
by
a
possible
change
in
its
zoning,
existed
on
December
31,
1979,
and
should
be
regarded
as
just
as
important
as
the
provisional
agricultural
zoning
which
existed
at
the
time.
It
was
admitted
that
agricultural
land
in
the
Varennes
area
could
then
obtain
between
$450
and
$800
an
arpent,
but
Mr
Duguay
did
not
agree
that
the
appellant’s
land
was
only
valuable
as
agricultural
land,
even
during
the
period
of
provisional
zoning.
Like
Mr
Cadieux,
Mr
Duguay
could
find
no
sale
of
land
comparable
to
that
of
the
appellant
after
Bill
90
came
into
effect.
Both
appraisers
agreed
it
was
better
for
the
appellant
to
wait
until
a
decree
of
the
Commission
de
protection
du
territoire
agricole
had
fixed
the
zoning
of
the
land
permanently,
before
considering
whether
to
sell
it.
In
fact,
all
transactions
in
this
type
of
land
were
suspended
and
the
market
completely
ceased
to
exist
during
the
provisional
period.
For
the
purposes
of
his
study,
Mr
Duguay
found
five
transactions
of
comparable
land
which
had
occurred
before
Bill
90
came
into
effect.
In
these
transactions,
the
persons
interested
in
purchasing
the
land
were
building
developers,
not
farmers,
and
the
prices
paid
were
between
$3,000
and
$7,360
an
arpent.
In
his
report
Mr
Duguay
considered
that
the
sum
of
$3,366
paid
by
the
appellant
for
the
land
in
1977
was
within
the
market
limits
and
reflected
its
market
value
at
that
time.
Both
appraisers
agreed
that
the
effect
of
Bill
90
was
to
freeze
values,
and
that
the
value
of
land
had
neither
increased
nor
decreased
during
the
provisional
zoning
period.
Mr
Duguay
maintained
that
the
market
value
of
the
land
had
held
steady
at
no
less
than
$3,366
an
arpent
during
this
period
and
represented
its
fair
market
value
on
December
31,
1979.
In
his
argument,
Mr
Cadieux
maintained
that
when
Bill
90
came
into
effect
and
the
appellant’s
land
was
designated
as
part
of
the
green
zone,
since
the
use
of
this
land
was
limited
to
agricultural
purposes
the
only
value
that
could
be
assigned
to
it
was
that
of
agricultural
land,
which
he
had
valued
in
his
report
at
$450
an
arpent.
Though
it
was
clear
that
Bill
90
contained
provisional
information
and
the
zoning
of
the
appellant’s
land
could
subsequently
be
changed
by
a
decision
of
the
Commission,
Mr
Cadieux
stated
several
times
that
he
was
not
required
to
interpret
the
Act
but
to
apply
it
as
it
stood
in
December
1979.
It
is
in
light
of
this
that
Mr
Cadieux
valued
the
land
by
assigning
to
it
a
value
given
to
agricultural
land,
without
taking
into
account
the
existence
of
a
potential
for
other
use.
To
indicate
that
he
could
not,
as
an
appraiser,
adise
a
client
to
pay
more
than
the
market
value
of
agricultural
land
for
land
zoned
as
agricultural,
Mr
Cadieux
noted
that
his
client
(the
appellant)
had
paid
$2,700
an
arpent
for
lots
284
and
285.
These
lots
had
also
been
zoned
as
agricultural
in
the
provisional
plan,
and
as
the
Commission
had
not
yet
changed
the
zoning
to
permit
the
land
to
be
used
for
non-agricultural
purposes,
the
appellant
was
stuck
with
land
having
a
present
market
value
of
$450
an
arpent
which
was
well
below
its
purchase
price.
He
concluded
that
even
if
this
was
a
transitional
period,
the
only
certain
market
value
of
the
appellant’s
land
is
its
unadjusted
agricultural
value,
for
as
long
as
the
agricultural
zoning
is
in
force.
However,
in
answer
to
a
question
from
counsel
for
the
respondent,
Mr
Cadieux
admitted
that
there
was
a
difference
between
transitional
and
permanent
zoning.
He
admitted
that
the
subject
lands
had
potential
but
said
that
adjusting
for
this
potential
was
very
difficult,
if
not
impossible,
and
that
in
view
of
Bill
90
the
only
market
value
which
could
be
determined
at
December
31,
1979
was
the
market
value
of
agricultural
land;
and
that
he
could
not
arrive
at
any
other
market
value
as
long
as
the
zoning
change
remained
only
a
hypothesis
and
a
vague
possibility
In
his
cross-examination
of
Mr
Duguay,
Mr
Brunelle
also
sought
by
his
questions
to
indicate
that
no
other
market
value
than
that
of
agricultural
land
could
be
assigned
to
the
subject
land
as
long
as
the
Commission
had
not
changed
the
provisional
agricultural
zoning.
However,
he
was
not
able
to
cause
Mr
Duguay
to
contradict
himself
or
to
shake
his
statements.
Conclusion
As
counsel
for
the
respondent
pointed
out,
the
circumstances
in
which
the
fair
market
value
of
the
subject
land
must
be
determined
for
tax
purposes
are
clearly
unusual
for
the
Tax
Review
Board.
When
Bill
90
came
into
effect,
directing
that
the
appellant’s
land
was
provisionally
included
in
the
agricultural
zone,
it
created
a
period
of
uncertainty
as
to
the
best
use
of
the
subject
land
and
made
the
appraisal
methods
ordinarily
accepted
and
used
by
appraisers
impracticable.
It
clearly
is
not
easy
in
the
absence
of
comparable
sales
to
calculate
positively
the
fair
market
value
of
the
appellant’s
land
during
this
transitional
period.
It
is
easier
to
regard
the
problem
from
a
negative
standpoint,
and
decide
what
was
not
the
fair
value
of
the
land
on
December
31,
1979.
At
that
date
the
market
value
could
not
have
been
the
amount
calculated
in
accordance
with
appraisal
methods
based
on
the
assumption
that
the
use
of
the
land
for
residential
purposes
had
in
fact
been
accepted.
Similarly,
the
fair
market
value
of
the
land
on
December
31,
1979
could
not,
in
the
circumstances,
despite
its
being
zoned
provisionally
as
agricultural,
be
regarded
merely
as
agricultural
land.
Although
these
hypothetical
amounts
might
reflect
the
market
value
of
the
land
in
the
event
that
one
or
other
of
the
two
possibilities
involved
in
the
eventual
decision
of
the
Commission
occurred,
these
estimates
of
value
are
both
premature:
they
have
no
basis
in
fact,
and
in
my
opinion
cannot
be
accepted
as
the
fair
market
value
of
the
appellant’s
land
on
December
31,
1979.
However,
it
is
possible
that
its
value
on
December
31,
1979
lies
somewhere
between
these
two
extremes.
It
was
admitted
that
the
appellant
paid
and
the
seller
accepted
an
amount
of
$3,366
an
arpent
for
the
said
land.
In
the
absence
of
any
contrary
evidence,
this
amount
represents
the
market
value
of
the
land
in
1977,
the
year
it
was
purchased.
The
evidence
showed
not
only
that
the
land
had
been
declared
a
residential
zone
by
the
municipality
long
before,
but
that
the
only
possible
residential
expansion
for
the
town
of
Varennes
was
in
the
direction
of
the
appellant’s
land
and
included
it.
In
addition,
the
municipal
services
requested
by
the
appellant
on
this
land
were
under
way,
so
that
the
market
value
of
the
land
immediately
before
Bill
90
came
into
effect
had
not
decreased
since
1977,
and
on
December
31,
1979
was
at
least
$3,366
an
arpent.
This
is
the
only
concrete
amount
and
the
only
actual
market
value
of
the
subject
land
which
was
established
by
the
facts.
This
amount
of
$3,366
an
arpent,
which
exists
independently
of
whichever
of
the
two
hypotheses
is
realized,
as
a
result
of
the
introduction
of
Bill
90
regarding
the
possible
future
use
of
this
land,
provides
a
general
confirmation
of
the
level
of
its
market
value
before
the
bill
came
into
effect.
The
appellant
was
not
able
to
establish
that
$3,366
an
arpent
was
not
still
the
fair
market
value,
even
during
the
transitional
period,
and
its
appraisal
of
$450
an
arpent
is
unacceptable
since
it
is
based
only
on
a
presumption
or
possibility
that
the
Commission
pour
la
protection
du
territoire
agricole
will
decide
to
make
permanent
the
agricultural
zoning
which,
on
December
31,
1979,
was
only
provisional.
In
her
argument,
counsel
for
the
respondent
cited
two
decisions
of
the
Bureau
de
Revision
de
l'évaluation
forestière
du
Québec
[forestry
appraisal
review
office
of
Quebec]
(included
in
the
record).
These
are
Susann
Olkin
v
Ville
de
Longueuil,
heard
at
Montreal
on
November
15,
1979,
and
Les
placements
Claire-France
Ltée
et
al
v
Ville
de
Boucherville,
heard
at
Montreal
on
March
27,
1980.
Although
in
both
cases
the
decision
turned
on
the
municipal
valuation
and
not
on
the
appraisal
for
tax
purposes,
the
circumstances
and
facts
are
identical
to
those
of
the
case
at
bar.
Very
briefly,
land
had
been
purchased
for
speculation
at
high
prices,
and
was
recorded
in
the
municipal
valuation
roll
accordingly.
As
in
the
case
at
bar,
the
coming
into
effect
of
Bill
90
had
provisionally
limited
the
use
of
this
land
to
agricultural
purposes.
The
complainants
in
both
cases
submitted
that
their
agriculturally-zoned
land
had
lost
much
of
its
value
and
asked
that
its
valuation
on
the
municipal
roll
be
considerably
reduced.
The
complainants
admitted
that
the
agricultural
zoning
was
only
provisional
and
that
the
value
of
the
land
depended
on
the
use
assigned
to
it
by
the
Commission
protectrice
du
territoire
agricole,
once
the
transitional
period
was
over.
In
the
reasons
in
Susann
Olkin
(supra),
Mr
Paul
Blier,
President
of
the
Bureau
de
l’Evaluation
foncière
of
Quebec,
stated
at
pp
3
and
4:
The
present
situation
accordingly
offers
two
possibilities.
The
first
is
that
the
lot
under
consideration
will
be
excluded
from
the
permanent
agricultural
zone,
and
its
speculative
value
will
increase
on
account
of
the
reduction
in
the
number
and
size
of
lots
available
for
development.
The
second
is
that
the
lot
under
consideration
will
continue
to
be
within
the
agricultural
zone
and
that
its
value
will
decrease
to
the
level
of
the
market
for
agricultural
land.
The
Bureau
cannot
presume
that
the
lot
under
consideration
will
be
either
included
or
excluded.
To
make
such
a
presumption
would
be
to
go
beyond
the
evidence
presented,
since
by
its
own
admission
complainant
has
taken
no
action
with
the
Commission
or
the
municipal
authorities
in
an
attempt
to
ensure
that
its
lot
is
excluded
from
the
permanent
agricultural
zone.
In
the
circumstances,
in
view
of
the
transitional
and
provisional
situation
that
prevails,
the
total
absence
of
a
market
and
the
refusal
to
sell
at
a
price
lower
than
the
municipal
valuation,
when
the
permanent
agricultural
zone
has
not
yet
been
created,
the
Bureau
could
not
rest
its
decision
to
reduce
the
valuation
of
the
lot
under
consideration
merely
on
presumptions
and
hypotheses.
The
true
value
of
a
piece
of
real
property
cannot
be
established
by
presumptions
or
hypotheses,
unless
such
presumptions
and
hypotheses
are
supported
by
specific
facts
showing
a
change
in
attitude
by
sellers
and
buyers,
one
which
clearly
indicates
that
the
true
value
of
the
real
property
has
been
affected
by
the
current
situation,
which
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Act
to
preserve
agricultural
land
we
can
only
regard
as
provisional.
Intervening
at
this
stage
and
modifying
the
valuation
before
knowing
the
outcome
of
action
which
the
complainant
itself
would
have
to
take,
knowing
the
position
of
the
municipal
authorities
and
the
conclusions
which
the
members
of
the
Commission
de
protection
du
territoire
agricole
may
draw
therefrom,
would
be
a
step
that
could
in
no
way
be
justified
by
the
need
to
determine
the
true
value
of
the
real
property
under
consideration.
That
true
value,
which
is
the
only
one
the
Bureau
is
authorized
to
determine,
could
only
be
subjective,
since
the
facts
presented
in
evidence
provide
no
basis
for
arriving
at
it
with
a
minimum
degree
of
certainty.
In
Les
Placements
Claire-France
Ltée
et
al
v
Ville
de
Boucherville
(supra),
Mr
Maurice
Bergevin,
Ing,
CA,
who
presided
over
the
hearing
of
the
Bureau
de
Révision
de
l’évaluation
foncière
of
Quebec,
cited
in
extenso
the
statements
of
Mr
Blier
in
Susann
Olkin,
and
concluded
by
stating,
at
pp
8
and
9:
For
these
reasons,
the
Bureau
shares
the
view
taken
by
Mr
Paul
Blier
in
the
aforesaid
case
that
intervening
at
this
stage
would
be
premature.
The
Bureau
is
especially
convinced
that
it
would
be
premature
to
intervene
at
this
stage
since
the
expert
witness
for
complainants,
Mr
Van
Der
Meerschen,
stated
that
speculation
has
ceased,
that
the
market
is
dead,
that
we
are
in
a
period
of
transition,
that
for
the
moment
no
one
is
making
any
move,
and
that
the
values
as
stated
would
be
valid
if
the
land
was
excluded
from
the
permanent
agricultural
zone.
The
Bureau
is
accordingly
of
the
view
that
complainants
did
not
discharge
the
burden
on
them
to
show
that
the
value
of
the
land
under
consideration
was
affected
by
the
filing
of
the
provisional
plan.
The
evidence
submitted
by
complainants
was
to
the
effect
that
if
the
zoning
is
made
permanent
the
value
of
the
land
will
be
that
of
agricultural
land,
whereas
if
the
land
is
excluded
from
the
permanent
zone
it
will
be
worth
at
least
the
value
stated.
The
municipal
value
of
the
land
before
Bill
90
came
into
effect
was
upheld
in
both
cases.
Although
the
Board
is
not
bound
by
the
decisions
of
the
Bureau
de
Révision
de
l’évaluation
municipale
foncière
of
Quebec,
it
certainly
should
not
ignore
them.
In
my
view,
the
observations
made
in
the
two
cases
cited
are
very
relevant
and
the
decisions
are
correct.
In
deciding
the
case
at
bar
I
have
no
hesitation
in
accepting
the
rule
embodied
in
these
decisions.
I
conclude
that
the
appellant
has
not
established
that
the
true
value
of
the
land
at
December
31,
1979
was
$450
an
arpent,
and
has
not
discharged
the
burden
upon
it
of
showing
that
the
market
value
of
the
land
on
December
31,
1979
was
not
at
least
the
purchase
price,
namely
$505,000.
The
respondent
did
noterr
in
his
application
of
subsection
10(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
appeal
should
accordingly
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.