The
Chairman
[TRANSLATION]:—The
appeal
of
Mr
Léopold
Toulouse
is
from
a
reassessment
dated
August
7,
1980
which
has
the
effect
of
adding
to
the
appellant’s
income,
as
business
income
for
1976,
a
profit
in
the
amount
of
$71,786
from
the
sale
of
a
piece
of
land
situated
on
Boulevard
Dagenais,
City
of
Laval,
Quebec.
In
his
notice
of
appeal,
the
appellant
contended
that
the
land
in
question
was
a
capital
property
and
that
the
profit
realized
on
the
sale
was
a
Capital
gain.
As
this
case
turns
principally
on
facts,
the
facts
as
outlined
in
the
notice
of
appeal
and
the
presumptions
on
which
the
respondent
relied
in
preparing
his
assessment
are
reproduced
here
in
extenso,
as
they
appeared
in
the
amended
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal:
(Translation)
(Notice
of
Appeal)
THE
FACTS
1.
The
appellant
is
the
principal
shareholder
of
Toulouse
Construction
Inc
(hereinafter
called
the
“Company”).
2.
The
Company’s
warehouse-workshop
occupied
one
half
of
a
building
situated
at
2921
Boulevard
Dagenais,
Laval,
built
by
the
Company
in
1967.
3.
The
other
half
of
the
building
was
leased
to
Acier
Profile
SBB
Inc
(hereinafter
called
the
“Tenant”).
4.
At
the
beginning
of
1976,
the
Tenant
advised
the
appellant
that
it
needed
more
space
for
its
operations
and
offered
to
purchase
the
building
it
was
leasing.
5.
The
appellant
began
to
look
for
a
piece
of
land
on
which
to
build
a
new
warehouse-workshop
and
thereby
free
the
building
on
Boulevard
Dagenais
for
the
use
of
his
Tenant.
6.
In
March
1976,
the
appellant
acquired
a
piece
of
land
in
the
immediate
vicinity
in
order
to
build
thereon
a
new
workshop
for
his
company
and
to
build
on
the
same
site
other
warehouse-workshops
for
leasing
purposes.
7.
The
appellant
at
this
time
already
owned
several
rental
properties,
all
of
which
were
held
under
long-term
leases.
8.
The
land
acquired
in
March
1976
was
zoned
for
commercial
use
and
was
bounded
on
two
sides
by
land
zoned
for
industrial
use.
The
appellant
anticipated
no
difficulty
in
obtaining,
if
necessary,
a
minor
change
in
the
zoning
plan.
9.
Once
his
offer
of
purchase
was
accepted,
the
appellant
approached
a
member
of
the
Executive
Committee
of
the
City
of
Laval
to
determine
whether
the
construction
of
his
workshop
would
require
changes
in
the
zoning
plan.
The
appellant
was
advised
that
this
would
be
the
case,
and
to
expect
that
such
changes
would
not
be
made
without
first
being
subject
to
a
number
of
studies.
The
appellant
was
disappointed
with
this
response
from
the
municipal
official,
since
his
Company
had
to
find
a
space
quickly
so
as
to
enable
his
Tenant
to
occupy
the
building
on
Boulevard
Dagenais.
10.
The
appellant
was
then
told
for
the
first
time
that
a
group
of
promoters
wished
to
build
a
shopping
centre
on
the
adjacent
property
and
that
these
promoters
might
well
offer
him
twice
the
price
he
had
paid.
11.
The
appellant
was
approached
by
the
shopping
centre
promoters
and,
realizing
that
he
could
lose
a
tenant
and
that
the
price
offered
was
irresistible,
agreed
to
sell
the
land
for
a
price
that
represented
more
than
twice
the
amount
he
had
agreed
to
pay
to
purchase
it.
The
sale
price
was
to
be
paid
to
him
in
two
annual
instalments.
12.
The
appellant
then
began
to
search
for
another
property
on
which
to
build
the
warehouse-workshop
for
his
company.
After
much
fruitless
negotiation
over
the
acquisition
of
a
piece
of
land
in
Laval,
the
appellant
went
to
inspect
lots
located
in
the
industrial
park
of
St-Eustache,
a
municipality
located
on
the
north
shore
of
the
St
Lawrence
River.
13.
As
the
appellant
wished
to
keep
his
place
of
business
in
the
City
of
Laval,
he
approached
his
tenant
with
an
offer
to
lease
it
the
new
building
to
be
constructed
by
his
company
in
the
above-mentioned
industrial
park.
14.
Since
this
arrangement
was
satisfactory
to
the
tenant,
the
appellant
acquired
a
piece
of
land
in
the
St-Eustache
industrial
park
and
commenced
construction
of
the
building
for
his
tenant
in
December
1976.
15.
In
a
notice
of
reassessment
dated
September
8,
1978,
the
respondent
included
the
proceeds
of
the
land
sale
in
the
computation
of
the
appellant’s
business
income.
In
the
same
assessment,
the
respondent
added
a
sum
of
$30,133
as
additional
remuneration.
16.
A
notice
of
objection
was
duly
prepared
on
November
6,
1978.
17.
On
May
20,
1980,
the
respondent
sent
the
appellant
a
notice
bearing
the
number
TLA
7
in
which
he
appeared
to
indicate
that
the
additional
remuneration
of
$30,133
would
be
deducted
from
the
appellant’s
income
for
1976
and
that
the
proceeds
from
the
land
sale
would
constitute
a
business
profit.
18.
The
appellant
was
advised
orally
by
his
attorney
that
he
would
receive
a
new
notice
of
assessment
dated
August
7,
1980
accompanied
by
the
notice
bearing
the
number
TLA
7
and
confirming
the
information
contained
in
notice
TLA
7
of
May
20,
1980.
(Amended
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal)
(A)
STATEMENT
OF
FACTS:
9.
In
assessing
the
appellant
for
the
1976
taxation
year,
the
Respondent
relied
on,
inter
alia,
the
following
presumptions
of
fact:
(a)
The
Appellant
is
the
president
and
principal
shareholder
of
“Toulouse
Construction
Inc”;
(b)
Through
his
company,
“Toulouse
Construction
Inc”,
the
Appellant
was
involved
on
a
frequent
and
regular
basis
in
the
construction
and
leasing
of
building,
and
possessed
considerable
experience
in
this
area;
(c)
With
a
view
to
acquiring
a
property
situated
on
Boulevard
Dagenais
in
the
City
of
Laval,
the
Appellant
submitted
two
offers
of
purchase
to
Mrs
Yvette
Vanier,
one
on
March
4
and
the
other
on
March
10,
1976;
each
offer
was
valid
until
the
following
day;
(d)
On
March
11,
1976,
Mrs
Vanier
agreed
to
sell
the
said
land
to
the
Appellant
for
$62,054;
(e)
During
the
same
period,
an
oral
agreement
was
reached
between
Mr
Claude
Thomas,
president
of
“Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée”
and
the
Appellant
under
which
the
latter
would
transfer
this
land
to
that
company
for
$136,000;
(f)
This
oral
agreement
was
confirmed
by
an
offer
of
sale
drafted
by
the
Appellant
and
dated
March
16,
1976:
(g)
At
that
particular
period,
“Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée”
was
anxious
to
acquire
this
land
in
order
to
build
a
shopping
centre
on
it;
(h)
It
was
never
the
Appellant’s
intention
to
keep
the
said
land
in
order
to
build
on
it;
(i)
The
Appellant
was
aware
that
the
zoning
regulation
was
unfavourable
to
his
alleged
relocation
project,
since
this
land
was
designated
for
commercial
and
not
industrial
use;
(j)
Although
the
alleged
relocation
project
involved
enormous
costs,
the
Appellant
did
not
carry
out
any
preliminary
study
prior
to
the
acquisition
of
the
land;
(k)
One
of
the
principal
motives
prompting
the
Appellant
to
acquire
this
land
was
purely
speculative
in
nature,
namely,
the
opportunity
to
resell
the
land
at
a
profit;
(l)
This
offer
emerged
on
the
very
day
that
the
Appellant’s
offer
to
purchase
was
accepted;
the
Appellant
then
made
an
offer
to
sell
the
land
to
“Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée”
for
a
price
amounting
to
more
than
double
the
amount
he
himself
had
just
agreed
to
pay
for
the
purchase
of
the
same
land;
(m)
The
profitable
resale
of
this
land
constituted
the
realization
of
the
Appellant’s
purely
speculative
intention
and
was
not
the
result
of
sheer
coincidence;
(n)
Subsequent
to
the
sale
of
this
land,
the
Appellant
acquired
a
piece
of
land
that
enabled
him
to
carry
out
the
relocation
project
without
any
difficulty;
(o)
When
computing
his
income
for
1976,
the
Appellant
reported
a
capital
gain
on
the
profit
earned
from
this
real
estate
transaction;
(p)
In
his
notice
of
assessment
dated
August
7,
1980,
the
Respondent
taxed
the
profit
earned
as
though
it
were
business
income,
thereby
increasing
the
Appellant’s
taxable
income
for
the
1976
taxation
year;
The
facts
as
outlined
in
the
appellant’s
submission
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
and
so
pleaded
before
the
Board
and
contained
in
part
in
the
notice
of
appeal
were
corroborated
by
the
following
witnesses:
(1)
Mr
Raymond
Fortin
who
was
a
municipal
councillor
in
1976
and
a
member
of
the
Executive
Council
of
the
City
of
Laval;
(2)
Mr
Claude
Thomas,
a
real
estate
agent
during
the
taxation
year
in
question
and
president
of
Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée,
who
participated
in
the
transaction
at
issue
in
this
appeal;
(3)
Mr
Victor
Bellavance,
a
businessman
and
owner
of
Acier
Profile
SBB
Inc,
the
tenant
during
the
period
in
question,
which
occupied
one-half
of
the
appellant’s
warehouse-workshop
situated
at
2921
Boulevard
Dagenais.
In
the
course
of
his
cross-examination,
counsel
for
the
respondent
failed
to
discredit
or
weaken
the
testimony
of
these
three
witnesses
or
of
the
appellant.
The
arguments
upon
which
the
respondent
based
his
assessment
may
be
summarized
as
follows:
(a)
It
was
never
the
appellant’s
intention
to
keep
the
land
acquired
from
Mrs
Yvette
Vanier
on
March
11,
1976
in
order
to
construct
thereon
a
building;
(b)
The
acquisition
of
the
said
land
was
speculative
and
one
of
the
chief
motives
prompting
the
appellant
to
buy
the
land
was
the
prospect
of
reselling
it
at
a
profit.
The
issue
therefore
turns
exclusively
on
the
appellant’s
intention
at
the
very
moment
he
acquired
the
land
that
is
the
subject
of
this
appeal.
It
goes
without
saying
that
the
appellant’s
statement
as
to
his
intention
to
acquire
the
land
for
the
purpose
of
building
a
warehouse-workshop
must
be
borne
out
by
the
facts
and
the
circumstances
prevailing
at
the
moment
of
the
pur-
chase.
Moreover,
for
the
appellant
to
win
his
case,
there
can
be
no
question
of
his
entertaining
at
the
time
of
the
purchase
any
notion
of
acquiring
the
land
in
order
to
resell
it
should
he
fail
to
achieve
his
initial
aim.
It
is
in
this
perspective
that
the
facts
and
circumstances
prevailing
from
March
4
to
March
11,
1976,
that
is,
the
period
during
which
the
appellant
purchased
the
land
from
Mrs
Vanier,
must
be
considered.
The
respondent
has,
moreover,
admitted
that
the
appellant
was
not
in
the
business
of
buying
and
reselling
land,
but
that
his
company
was
concerned
exclusively
with
the
construction
and
long-term
leasing
of
warehouseworkshops.
I
have
no
reason
not
to
accept
the
testimony,
during
examination-in-chief
or
cross-examination,
of
Mr
Bellavance,
who
stated
that
his
company
was
in
the
process
of
expanding
and
that
his
operations
required
double
the
amount
of
space
he
was
then
occupying.
In
fact,
some
months
after
the
transaction
at
issue
in
this
appeal,
Mr
Bellavance
leased
from
the
appellant
a
warehouse
and
workshop
in
St-Eustache.
Mr
Vanier’s
land
was
in
the
immediate
vicinity
of
the
appellant’s
business
and
adjoined
land
zoned
for
industrial
use
on
two
sides.
The
appellant
foresaw
no
difficulty
in
obtaining
a
change
in
the
zoning
plan.
Moreover,
Mr
Fortin
testified
that
the
change
could
have
been
made
within
a
normal
period
of
time.
From
these
facts,
it
is
reasonable
to
conclude
that
the
appellant
had
valid
grounds
for
acquiring
a
piece
of
land
located
near
his
place
of
business
and
for
which
the
zoning
status
could
probably
have
been
altered
to
allow
the
construction
of
one
or
more
warehouse-workshops
for
his
use,
enabling
him
to
sell
his
building
on
Boulevard
Dagenais
to
his
tenant
Mr
Bellavance
The
appellant
submitted
two
offers
to
Mrs
Vanier,
one
on
March
4
and
the
other
on
March
10,
1976.
Mrs
Vanier
agreed
on
March
11,
1976
to
sell
the
land
to
the
appellant.
The
evidence
indicates
that
it
was
only
after
the
offer
of
purchase
was
accepted
by
Mrs
Vanier,
on
March
11,
1976,
that
the
appellant
contacted
Mr
Fortin
regarding
the
zoning
of
the
land.
Only
then
did
the
appellant
learn
from
Mr
Fortin
that,
notwithstanding
that
it
would
have
been
possible
to
alter
the
zoning
status
of
the
newly
acquired
land,
he
could
obtain
double
the
purchase
price
for
the
said
land
since
a
group
of
businessmen
were
in
the
process
of
buying
up
properties
in
the
vicinity
of
his
land.
Mr
Fortin
was
himself
in
the
process
of
selling
them
one
of
his
own
properties.
According
to
the
latter’s
testimony,
Mr
Thomas,
who
represented
the
group
of
businessmen,
met
with
the
appellant,
after
March
11,
and
made
an
offer
to
purchase,
without,
however,
informing
him
that
the
intended
project
was
a
shopping
centre
and
was
to
be
built
by
Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée.
The
respondent’s
main
contention
to
the
effect
that
an
oral
agreement
was
reached
between
the
appellant
and
Mr
Thomas
between
March
4
and
March
11,
is
groundless.
There
is
nothing
in
the
evidence
that
would
permit
such
a
conclusion.
On
the
contrary,
it
seems
clear
from
the
testimony
of
Mr
Fortin
and
Mr
Thomas
that
the
discussions
and
negotiations
concerning
the
shopping
centre
project
were
held
confidentially
and
had
not
yet
been
made
public
at
the
time
in
question.
The
argument
that
the
appellant
had
extensive
experience
in
the
real
estate
field
and
that
he
had
knowledge
of
the
shopping
centre
project
—
and
was
even
in
possession
of
a
verbal
offer
to
purchase
from
Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée
—
is
pure
conjecture
and
is
not,
in
my
opinion,
supported
in
any
way
by
the
evidence.
In
her
notes
and
the
authorities
she
cited,
counsel
for
the
respondent
has
emphasized
that
the
courts,
in
examining
the
facts
and
circumstances
surrounding
a
transaction,
consider
certain
indications
that
sometimes
aid
in
determining
the
nature
of
the
transaction.
In
this
instance,
counsel
for
the
respondent
has
noted
the
following:
(1)
the
preliminary
steps
and
the
financing
of
the
transaction;
(2)
the
period
of
ownership
of
the
property;
(3)
an
unsolicited
offer.
It
appears
obvious
to
me
that
not
one
of
these
indications
is
a
determining
factor
in
itself
and
that
the
question
whether
the
affair
at
hand
was
a
commercial
transaction
would
best
be
answered
through
a
consideration
of
all
the
data
viewed
as
a
whole.
In
my
opinion,
the
three
indications
cited
by
the
respondent
do
not
apply
to
the
facts
of
the
matter
before
us
and
do
not
support
his
contentions
in
any
way,
any
more
than
the
case
law
cited
by
counsel
for
the
respondent.
Even
though
the
rulings
in
the
cases
cited
are
based
on
the
application
of
one
or
other
of
these
three
indications,
the
facts
are
essentially
different
from
those
of
the
present
appeal.
With
regard
to
the
steps
taken
prior
to
the
purchase
of
the
land,
it
is
true
that
the
appellant
did
not
make
application
for
a
zoning
change
until
after
the
land
was
purchased.
However,
since
two
properties
adjacent
to
that
of
the
appellant
were
zoned
for
industrial
use,
there
was
no
reason
to
anticipate
any
difficulty
in
obtaining
similar
zoning
status
for
the
appellant’s
property.
In
fact,
Mr
Fortin
indicated
that,
in
principle,
the
zoning
change
presented
no
problem
and
could,
subsequent
to
a
review
of
the
application,
be
granted
after
a
waiting
period
of
a
few
months.
The
fact
that
the
appellant
purchased
the
land
before
obtaining
a
zoning
change
does
not,
in
the
circumstances,
constitute
sufficient
evidence
to
warrant
a
conclusion
on
my
part
that
the
appellant
did
not,
on
purchasing
the
property,
intend
to
build
a
warehouse-workshop
on
it,
but
had
acquired
it
for
the
purpose
of
reselling
it.
The
evidence
would
indicate
that
the
appellant,
who
was
at
this
time
the
owner
of
a
number
of
other
warehouse-workshops,
faced
no
obstacles
with
regard
to
the
financing
of
another
warehouse-workshop
on
Mrs
Vanier’s
property
for
his
own
use,
which
was
his
immediate
purpose
at
the
time
of
the
purchase.
Nor
is
the
fact
that
the
appellant
did
not
turn
to
the
banks
or
loan
companies
in
order
to
finance
his
project
sufficient
to
warrant
a
conclusion
that
the
appellant
intended
to
resell
the
land
and
not
to
build
a
warehouse
on
it.
The
appellant
resold
the
property
five
days
after
buying
it.
Such
a
brief
period
of
ownership
could
well
be,
in
certain
circumstances,
a
determining
factor,
but
in
the
case
at
bar
the
testimony
of
Mr
Fortin
and
Mr
Thomas
indicated
that,
unknown
to
the
appellant,
Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée
needed
to
acquire
Mrs
Vanier’s
property
in
order
to
go
through
with
their
shopping
centre
project.
Thus,
without
having
in
any
way
solicited
an
offer,
and
once
he
was
made
aware
of
the
scope
of
the
project,
the
appellant
accepted
the
first
offer
made
by
Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée.
Remarks
made
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
concerning
the
third
indication
(“an
unsolicited
offer”)
suggested
that
this
indication
is
probably
less
of
a
determining
factor
than
the
acceptance
of
such
an
offer
by
a
taxpayer.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
courts
give
very
serious
consideration
to
the
reasons
that
lead
to
the
acceptance
of
even
an
unsolicited
offer.
None
the
less,
in
this
case,
the
appellant,
very
soon
after
acquiring
the
Vanier
property,
was
informed
by
Mr
Fortin
that
he
could
resell
the
land
for
twice
the
purchase
price.
In
the
course
of
the
week
that
followed,
the
appellant
was
offered
such
an
amount
by
Mr
Thomas.
In
the
circumstances,
I
am
at
a
loss
to
understand
how
and
why
the
appellant
could
logically
have
refused
such
an
offer.
That
the
appellant
accepted
it
does
not,
in
my
opinion,
indicate
that,
when
he
acquired
the
land,
he
intended
to
resell
it
at
a
profit.
The
judgment
in
this
matter
is
founded
chiefly
on
the
testimony
of
Messrs
Fortin,
Thomas
and
Bellavance,
as
well
as
that
of
the
appellant.
Whether
or
not
we
are
dealing
with
a
coincidence,
the
evidence
adduced
has
not
been
contradicted.
The
appellant
and
Mr
Bellavance
have
established
the
existence
of
a
valid
reason
for
the
acquisition
by
the
appellant
of
a
piece
of
land
in
order
to
construct
a
warehouse-workshop
for
his
own
use.
The
testimony
of
Mr
Fortin
and
Mr
Thomas
corroborated
the
appellant’s
testimony
and
established
that
the
appellant
had
no
knowledge
of
the
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée
project
on
or
before
March
11,
1976.
No
other
valid
evidence
or
indication
has
been
advanced
that
would
permit
the
conclusion
that
the
appellant,
at
the
time
of
his
purchase
of
the
Vanier
property,
intended
to
resell
it
to
Les
Immeubles
Carrefour
Ltée
or
any
other
purchaser.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
the
property
sold
in
1976
by
the
appellant
was
a
capital
property
and
the
profit
realized
was
a
capital
gain.
Appeal
allowed.