Roland
St-Onge
[Translation]:—The
appeal
of
Les
Immeubles
Roussin
Ltée
came
before
me
on
May
11,1982
in
Quebec
City,
Province
of
Quebec.
The
case
involved
real
estate
transactions
that
occurred
during
the
1976
and
1977
taxation
years.
In
1976
the
appellant
disposed
of
an
apartment
building,
the
Chanoine-
Scott
property,
and
realized
a
profit
of
$5,615.
The
following
year,
it
disposed
of
the
Lavoisier
warehouse
and
realized
a
profit
of
$423,864.66.
The
appellant
contended
that
the
profit
earned
from
the
disposition
of
these
properties
constituted
a
capital
gain
and
not
an
operating
profit.
The
respondent
claimed
the
opposite
and
assessed
the
appellant
on
the
basis
of
the
presumed
facts,
which
are
contained
in
paragraph
21
of
the
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
and
which
read
as
follows:
[Translation]
21.
In
its
assessment
of
the
appellant
for
the
1976
and
1977
taxation
years,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
relied
on
the
following
presumptions
of
fact,
inter
alia
:
(a)
The
appellant
was
incorporated
on
October
16,
1964
and
since
that
time
has
always
carried
on
business
in
the
construction
field
and
as
a
real
estate
agent;
(b)
On
February
19,
1973
the
appellant
purchased
a
parcel
of
land
from
the
Frères
des
Ecoles
Chrétiennes
and
constructed
thereon
in
the
same
year
a
warehouse
located
on
rue
Lavoisier
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“the
Lavoisier
property”);
(c)
From
June
1,
1973
to
May
1,
1976
the
appellant
leased
a
portion
of
the
Lavoisier
property
to
Alex
Coulombe
Quebec
Ltée;
(d)
On
May
31,
1977
the
appellant
offered
to
sell
the
Lavoisier
property
for
the
price
of
$960,000
and
on
June
9,
1977,
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
agreed
to
purchase
the
said
property
for
the
sum
of
$950,000;
(e)
The
appellant
thus
realized
a
profit
of
$423,864.66
in
1977
from
the
sale
of
the
Lavoisier
property;
(f)
On
February
26,
1976,
the
appellant
also
sold
a
property
known
as
the
Chanoine
Scott
building
for
the
price
of
$42,000
to
Jean-Louis
Ouellet;
(g)
Some
months
earlier
on
September
29,
1975,
the
appellant
authorized
the
Royal
Trust
to
sell
the
Chanoine
Scott
property;
(h)
The
appellant
thus
earned
a
profit
of
$5,615
in
1976
from
the
sale
of
the
Chanoine
Scott
property;
(i)
At
the
time
of
the
acquisition
of
the
above-mentioned
properties,
the
appellant’s
letters
patent
provided
for
the
following
objects,
inter
alia:
(a)
To
purchase,
lease
or
otherwise
acquire,
own,
manage,
improve
or
contribute
to
the
improvement
of
all
manner
of
real
estate,
and
sell,
mortgage
or
otherwise
dispose
of
such
properties;
to
purchase
and
sell
mortgages;
(b)
To
purchase
building
sites,
prepare
them
for
construction,
subdivide
them
into
lots
and
improve
and
develop
them
in
all
ways;
to
purchase,
lease,
construct
or
otherwise
acquire,
own
and
on
the
properties
owned
or
managed
by
the
company
such
assets
and
rights
as
would
facilitate
the
provision
of
water,
gas,
electricity,
energy,
lighting,
heating
and
sewage
and
drainage
systems;
to
carry
on
any
business
that
would
further
the
attainment
of
these
ends;
(c)
To
carry
on
general
contracting
operations
in
construction,
demolition
and
building
repairs
of
all
kinds;
(j)
During
and
previous
to
the
years
at
issue,
the
appellant
owned
several
apartment
buildings,
warehouses
and
shopping
centres;
(k)
Since
it
was
incorporated,
the
appellant
has
engaged
in
large-scale
buying
and
selling
of
real
estate;
(l)
During
previous
years,
the
appellant
earned
substantial
profits
from
the
sale
of
real
estate;
(m)
In
its
tax
returns
for
the
previous
years,
the
appellant
reported
these
profits
from
the
sale
of
real
estate
as
business
income;
accordingly,
for
the
1972,1973
and
1974
taxation
years,
the
appellant
reported
the
following
amounts
as
income
from
the
sale
of
properties:
1972
|
—
|
$861,313
|
1973
|
—
|
$342,000
|
1974
|
—
|
$
2,800
|
(n)
Moreover,
the
appellant
also
effected
other
real
estate
transactions
before
1972,
the
proceeds
of
which
it
also
reported
as
business
income
in
its
income
tax
returns
for
the
relevant
taxation
years;
(o)
The
appellant
had
acquired
a
good
knowledge
of
the
area
of
real
estate
transactions;
(p)
Prior
to
1976
and
1977,
as
the
result
of
numerous
real
estate
transactions,
the
appellant
had
accumulated
extensive
experience
in
the
real
estate
field;
(q)
The
appellant
undertook
the
purchase
of
the
said
properties
as
well
as
the
construction
of
the
Lavoisier
warehouse
within
the
overall
framework
of
a
business
whose
function
was
to
generate
profits,
and
the
profitable
resale
of
these
buildings
—
where
the
opportunity
presented
itself
—
was
another
way
of
achieving
those
ends;
(r)
Upon
purchasing
the
said
properties,
the
appellant
had
the
secondary
if
not
primary
intention
of
realizing
a
profit
on
the
sale
of
the
said
properties;
(s)
The
appellant’s
purchase
and
disposition
of
the
Chanoine
Scott
and
Lavoisier
properties
constitute
an
integral
part
of
the
operation
of
the
appellant’s
business;
(t)
For
the
appellant,
the
profitable
resale
of
the
above-mentioned
properties
was
a
method
of
attaining
its
objectives
within
the
framework
of
a
company
whose
goal
was
the
maximization
of
profits;
The
appellant’s
arguments
are
clearly
stated
in
paragraphs
1
to
25
of
the
notice
of
appeal,
which
read
as
follows:
Notice
of
Appeal
1.
The
appellant
hereby
gives
notice
of
appeal
from
the
reassessments
dated
March
19,
1979
and
bearing
the
numbers
286838
and
286839;
the
said
reassessments
were
issued
by
the
respondent
for
the
1976
and
1977
taxation
years
and
were
confirmed
by
the
respondent
by
means
of
a
notice
of
confirmation
from
the
Minister
dated
January
25,
1980.
In
these
reassessments,
the
respondent
included
in
the
computation
of
the
appellant’s
income
$5,615
and
$423,864.66
for
1976
and
1977
respectively,
as
profits
arising
from
the
disposition
of
the
property
situated
at
833,
rue
Chanoine-Scott
and
the
Lavoisier
warehouse.
Statement
of
Facts
LAVOISIER
WAREHOUSE
2.
The
appellant
acquired
lot
423-4
from
Henri
Giguère
on
February
26,
1973
and
lot
427-2
from
the
Frères
des
Ecoles
Chrétiennes
de
Québec
on
February
19,
1973
with
a
view
to
building
thereon
a
warehouse
for
leasing
and
investment
purposes
(the
said
lots
being
referred
to
hereinafter
as
“the
land”).
3.
This
land
is
adjacent
to
the
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
bottling
plant,
the
latter
being
a
distributor
of
Pepsi
and
7-Up
products
in
particular.
4.
The
construction
of
the
warehouse
on
the
above
land
was
completed
near
the
end
of
May
1973.
5.
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
leased
20.12
per
cent
of
the
surface
area
of
the
warehouse
under
a
three-year
lease
that
expired
on
May
31,
1976.
6.
The
warehouse
was
leased
from
the
outset
and
in
1976
the
yield
exceeded
57.61
per
cent.
7.
In
building
the
Lavoisier
warehouse,
it
was
the
appellant’s
intention
to
build
several
other
warehouses
on
adjoining
lands
and,
in
fact,
it
now
owns
about
fifteen
warehouses;
all
are
held
for
investment
and
leasing
purposes
and,
in
fulfillment
of
the
appellant’s
aims,
all
are
leased.
8.
Gross
rental
income
in
1977
amounted
to
$1,598,736,
against
$6,094,543
spent
in
acquiring
the
properties.
9.
The
appellant
received
several
purchase
offers
from
agents
or
other
persons
but
consistently
declined
to
sell.
10.
The
appellant
did
not
in
any
way
solicit,
announce
or
advertise
the
sale
of
the
warehouse,
which
was
not,
moreover,
for
sale.
11.
In
March
1975,
the
principal
shareholders
of
the
appellant
incorporated
under
the
name
of
Roussin
et
Frères
Inc
to
handle
the
construction
of
the
appellant’s
warehouses.
12.
To
confirm
its
line
of
business,
the
appellant
obtained
supplementary
letters
patent
dated
December
2,
1975
under
which
the
sole
object
of
the
company
was
to
acquire
properties
for
investment
purposes
and
to
lease
and
manage
such
properties
(photocopy
of
supplementary
letters
patent
attached
as
Exhibit
A-1).
13.
On
October
19,
1976,
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
offered
to
purchase
the
warehouse
from
the
appellant
for
$900,000.
As
the
warehouse
had
cost
$526,135
according
to
the
respondent’s
figures,
the
resulting
capital
gain
would
have
been
$373,865,
but
the
apellant
did
not
even
discuss
the
price
and
gave
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
a
categorical
“no”.
A
photocopy
of
the
purchase
option
is
attached
hereto
as
Exhibit
A-2.
14.
Subsequently,
the
appellant
made
no
effort
to
communicate
anything
to
or
solicit
anything
from
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée,
but
the
latter
was
persistent
in
its
efforts.
15.
In
order
to
discourage
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée,
the
appellant
set
an
asking
price
of
$1,000,000
In
the
hope
that
by
asking
such
a
price,
it
would
dissuade
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
from
buying
since
the
price
was
double
the
construction
cost
of
the
warehouse.
16.
In
spite
of
all
that,
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
came
back
in
about
April
of
1977
and
offered
the
sum
of
$950,000
for
the
warehouse.
17.
So
attractive
was
the
offer
that
the
appellant
could
not
refuse
as
it
was
in
a
position
to
invest
the
proceeds
of
the
sale.
The
appellant
did
just
that,
investing
the
said
proceeds
in
a
new
warehouse
situated
at
3260
John
Molson
which
is
leased
and
which
it
holds
for
investment
purposes.
Thus
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
were
reinvested
in
a
similar
property.
18.
This
is
the
only
warehouse
sold
by
the
appellant
since
the
company
was
founded;
moreover,
it
included
in
the
computation
of
its
income
for
1977
a
taxable
capital
gain
of
$211,932.33
resulting
from
the
disposition
of
this
warehouse.
SIX-UNIT
APARTMENT
BUILDING,
RUE
CHANOINE-SCOTT
19.
In
1964
the
appellant
acquired
a
piece
of
land
on
rue
Chanoine-Scott
with
the
intention
of
fixing
up
on
it
an
old
six-unit
apartment
building
situated
nearby,
which
was
moved
to
the
said
land
in
1964.
20.
Since
that
time,
the
appellant
has
rented
the
six
apartments
and
has
derived
rental
income
therefrom.
21.
The
appellant
never
put
the
apartment
building
up
for
sale
or
engaged
in
any
soliciting
or
advertising
to
that
end.
22.
In
1976
it
received
an
unsolicited
offer
of
purchase
from
Jean-Louis
Ouellet,
who
was
represented
by
an
agent
unknown
to
the
appellant.
23.
In
view
of
the
offer
made;
and
whereas
this
small
apartment
building
was
isolated
from
the
appellant’s
other
apartment
buildings;
and
whereas
it
was
not
profitable
to
keep
one
superintendent
for
only
six
apartments
and
thus
impossible
to
have
a
superintendent
on
the
premises,
and
whereas
major
repairs
to
the
building
were
a
constant
necessity
and
the
appellant
was
earning
a
smaller
return
on
this
apartment
building
than
on
its
warehouses,
the
appellant
finally
agreed
to
sell,
thereby
realizing
a
modest
capital
gain
of
$5,615.
24.
On
the
basis
of
the
fair
market
value
on
valuation
day
of
the
land
and
the
building,
the
appellant
included
in
the
computation
of
its
income
for
the
1976
taxation
year
a
taxable
capital
gain
of
$982.50
resulting
from
the
disposition
of
this
apartment
building.
Supporting
arguments
25.
The
appellant
contended
that
the
profit
earned
from
the
disposition
of
the
warehouse
and
the
apartment
building
constitutes
a
capital
gain
and
not
an
operating
profit.
The
following
witnesses
testified
at
the
hearing:
1.
Roger
Bernard,
industrial
director
in
charge
of
expansion
for
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée;
2.
Bruno
Roussin,
rental
agent
for
the
appellant
company;
3.
Maurice
Roussin,
president
of
the
appellant
company.
The
testimony
of
the
above
witnesses
confirmed
all
the
allegations
contained
in
the
notice
of
appeal,
with
the
exception
of
the
amount
of
$1,000,000
in
paragraph
15,
which
should
read
$960,000.
Mr
Bernard
was
most
categorical.
He
did
everything,
including
vacating
the
leased
premises,
so
that
his
employer
could
purchase
the
Lavoisier
warehouse
at
the
best
possible
price,
but
the
Roussin
brothers
consistently
refused.
Finally,
since
they
had
never
wished
to
mention
a
price,
he
asked
them
to
submit
an
offer
of
sale
in
writing.
Then,
on
May
31,
1977,
Bruno
Roussin
drew
up
an
offer
of
$960,000
using
a
model
from
the
local
real
estate
board.
On
the
basis
that
there
was
no
real
estate
agent
to
negotiate
this
transaction,
Mr
Bernard
submitted
a
final
price
of
$950,000,
an
amount
he
had
always
recommended
to
his
employer,
Mr
Alex
Coulombe,
as
a
purchase
price.
Mr
Bruno
Roussin
corroborated
Mr
Bernard’s
testimony;
the
appellant
never
sought
to
sell
its
Lavoisier
warehouse.
On
the
contrary,
following
the
departure
of
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée,
he
first
of
all
leased
to
Can-Van
for
four
months
with
an
option;
then
on
April
13,
1977,
he
leased
fifty
per
cent
of
the
space
that
had
already
been
occupied
by
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
to
Gilles
Murray
Ltée
for
five
years
with
an
option
for
a
further
five
years.
The
appellant
even
spent
as
much
as
$20,000
to
subdivide
the
space.
He
further
testified
that
the
appellant
owned
some
15
industrial
buildings
and
774
apartments,
all
for
rental
purposes,
that
it
had
never
offered
these
properties
for
sale
but
only
to
rent
and
that,
as
a
result,
it
had
never
had
recourse
to
a
real
estate
agent.
Mr
Maurice
Roussin
corroborated
Roger
Bernard’s
testimony.
He
stated
that
the
appellant
had
been
incorporated
in
order
to
purchase
land
and
construct
buildings
on
such
land
for
rental
purposes
and
that
on
occasion,
the
appellant
had
sold
property
and
each
time
had
reported
the
profits
as
operating
income.
The
appellant
had
never
operated
as
a
real
estate
agent
and
always
maintained
these
buildings
situate
in
the
city
of
Ste-Foy
for
purposes
of
rental
income.
He
filed
under
Exhibit
A-10
an
advertisement
in
which
the
company
billed
itself
as
specializing
in
leases,
mostly
three-
to
five-year
leases
with
ten-year
options.
Also
filed
were
statements
of
income
and
expenses:
Exhibit
A-11:
Buildings
owned
by
appellant
—
1977
—
Income
—
$272,000.
Exhibit
A-12:
Warehouses
—
1979-
gross
income
—
$7,185,000
—
—
net
income
—
$2,785,000.
He
explained
that
the
income
from
the
warehouses
was
much
greater
than
that
from
the
apartments
and
that
they
represented
60%
of
the
invested
capital;
he
further
explained
that
in
1975,
a
very
active
year,
supplementary
letters
patent
had
been
obtained
in
order
to
confirm
what
had
become
a
reality,
namely,
their
vocation
as
leasing
specialists,
and
that
a
new
company,
Roussin
&
Frères
Ltée,
was
being
set
up
for
the
sole
purpose
of
going
into
the
construction
business.
During
1975
and
subsequent
years,
les
Immeubles
Roussin
Ltée
did
not
undertake
the
construction
of
any
buildings.
He
closed
his
testimony
by
saying
that
in
view
of
his
infirmity,
he
had
always
wanted
to
become
a
building
owner
and
draw
rental
income,
that
his
company
has
never
been
in
financial
difficulty,
that
it
had
never
advertised
its
buildings
for
sale
or
had
recourse
to
agents
and
that
it
had
never
considered
selling
its
Lavoisier
warehouse.
The
appellant
has
owned
the
apartment
building
for
12
years;
it
never
looked
for
a
buyer
and
sold
the
building
for
the
simple
reason
that
it
was
no
longer
profitable.
Consequently,
this
transaction
does
not
constitute
an
operating
profit.
As
for
the
Lavoisier
warehouse,
the
land
was
acquired
and
the
warehouse
built
and
leased
in
1973.
In
1975,
the
appellant
acquired
a
new
vocation
by
obtaining
supplementary
letters
patent
under
which
the
sole
purpose
of
the
company
was
the
acquisition
of
properties
for
investment
purposes.
On
October
19,
1976,
ten
months
later,
the
appellant
received
a
purchase
offer
of
$900,000
that
it
declined;
then
six
months
later,
Alex
Coulombe
Ltée
came
back
with
a
new
offer
of
1950,000.
This
offer
was
so
attractive
that
it
could
not
be
refused.
In
fact,
the
offer
amounted
to
almost
double
the
acquisition
price.
Even
if
the
appellant,
as
the
respondent
has
contended,
reported
business
income
arising
out
of
the
sale
of
properties
during
the
years
previous
to
1975,
that
does
not
mean
that
it
never
had
the
intention
of
keeping
certain
properties
for
investment
purposes,
since
it
does
in
fact
own
about
15
warehouses,
all
of
which
are
held
for
investment
purposes;
in
1977,
these
properties
yielded
a
gross
rental
income
of
$1,598,736,
as
compared
with
an
initial
purchase
price
of
over
$6,000,000.
The
appellant
had
never
previously
sold
any
warehouses,
but
an
offer
that
amounts
to
double
the
initial
purchase
price
and
comes
after
only
four
years
of
ownership
is
an
offer
that
cannot
be
refused.
I
was
impressed
by
the
testimony
of
the
Roussin
brothers,
and
I
have
no
reason
not
to
believe
them.
When
they
believed
that
their
company
was
earning
operating
profits,
they
reported
them
as
such.
Today,
they
believe
that
the
two
transactions
under
appeal
give
rise
to
capital
gains
and
the
Board
must
believe
them.
In
any
event,
the
established
facts
clearly
show
that
they
were
correct.
Consequently,
the
appeal
is
allowed.
Appeal
allowed.