Guy
Tremblay:—This
case
was
heard
in
Edmonton,
Alberta,
on
March
1,
1982.
1.
The
Point
at
Issue
The
point
at
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
company,
a
general
contractor
engaged
in
building
construction,
is
correct
in
the
computation
of
its
income
for
its
1977
taxation
year
in
claiming
an
amount
of
$95,003.08
as
accounts
payable.
The
respondent
disallowed
the
deduction
on
the
basis
that
the
said
amount
was
in
respect
of
15%
holdback
amounts
deducted
from
payments
to
subcontractors
conditional
upon
the
issuance
of
an
engineer’s
or
architect’s
certificate
of
completion.
2.
The
Burden
of
Proof
2.01
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessment
is
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
results
particularly
by
from
several
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
delivered
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
2.02
In
the
same
judgment,
the
Court
decided
that
the
assumed
facts
on
which
the
respondent
based
the
assessment
or
reassessment
are
also
deemed
to
be
correct.
In
the
present
case,
the
assumed
facts
are
described
in
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
as
follows:
6.
In
so
reassessing
the
Appellant’s
1977
taxation
year,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
assumed,
inter
alia:
(a)
that
the
Appellant
regularly
withheld
15%
of
invoice
amounts
from
payments
made
to
subcontractors
and
the
total
of
such
holdback
amounts
payable
at
the
end
of
the
1977
fiscal
period
was
$95,003.08;
(b)
that
payment
of
each
holdback
amount
was
conditional
on
the
Appellant
receiving
the
related
holdback
receivable
from
the
developer
upon
the
issuance
of
an
engineer’s
or
architect’s
certificate
of
completion;
(c)
that
in
computing
its
1977
income
for
tax
purposes,
the
Appellant
included
holdback
payable
amounts
of
$95,003.08
in
expenses
but
excluded
the
related
holdback
receivable
amounts
from
income;
and
(d)
that
the
costs
in
the
amount
of
$95,003.08
were
not
properly
deductible
in
computing
the
Appellant’s
income
as
of
December
31,
1977.
3.
The
Facts
3.01
The
appellant
corporation
is
a
general
contractor
engaged
in
building
construction.
It
is
located
in
the
City
of
Lacombe,
Alberta.
3.02
Mr
Jack
Ellis,
president
of
the
appellant
company,
was
the
only
witness
in
this
case.
During
the
chief
examination
he
testified
that
(SN
pp
4
to
7):
(a)
he
had
been
personally
involved
in
the
construction
business
for
over
20
years;
(b)
during
the
1977
taxation
year
the
appellant
worked
for
a
developer;
(c)
he
admitted
subparagraph
(a)
of
the
assumed
facts;
(d)
the
holdback
amounts
were
to
purchase
material
and
services;
(e)
the
appellant
company,
according
to
normal
business
practice,
paid
the
subcontractors
when
it
received
the
money
from
the
developer.
This
practice
was
based
on
a
lack
of
funds;
(f)
the
term
of
the
invoice
of
the
subcontractors
was
for
a
thirty-day
period;
and,
(g)
the
payment
was
not
dependent
on
the
issuance
of
an
architect’s
or
engineer’s
certificate
(SN
p
5).
3.03
Mr
Ellis,
during
cross-examination,
testified
as
follows
on
the
following
points
(SN
pp
7
to
11):
(a)
the
appellant
company
had
been
incorporated
for
about
40
years;
(b)
he
recognized
his
signature
on
three
purchase
orders
given
by
the
appellant
to
suppliers
(Exhibit
R-1,
nos
1332,
1395
and
1396).
On
those
three
purchase
orders,
one
can
read
the
following
details:
No
1332
No
1395
No
1396
Date:
October
4,
1976
September
30/76
September
30,
1976
Supplier’s
name:
Border
Paving
Ltd
Bonnybrooke
Steel
C
Beckett
Company
Ltd
Limited
Reference
to
Lacombe
Sr
Citizens
Lacombe
Senior
Cit-
Ext
to
Senior
building
contract:
Home
|
izens
Apartments
|
Citizens
Apts
|
Reference
to
the
|
|
Estimate
of
the
|
|
Supplier:
|
August
31,
1976
|
September
2/76
|
Sept
3/76
|
Material
Service:
|
Asphalt
paving
of
|
Supply
and
fabrica-
Labour
and
material
|
|
the
parking
lot
|
tion
of
structural
|
to
complete
|
|
steel
|
stucco
|
Amount:
|
$3,718
|
$6,700
|
$9,643
|
Terms
and
conditions:
“Invoice
within
30
Days
of
Receipt
of
Goods
or
Services
All
Invoices
in
Duplicate”
(c)
despite
the
fact
that
those
purchase
orders
were
dated
in
1976,
they
were
representative
of
those
issued
and
they
are
similar
to
the
year
involved;
(d)
he
explained
his
understanding
of
the
purpose
for
the
holdbacks:
Well,
as
I
explained
before
the
main
reason
is
just
strictly
cash
flow
and
probably
the
prime
reason
is
to
ensure
that
the
sub-contractor
gets
the
work
done.
When
you
pay
somebody
and
it’s
not
done,
well
then
it’s
tough
to
get
the
work
cleaned
up.
Even
when
the
work
is
completed
you
can’t
get
paid
for
it
until
you
get
that
final
certificate.
It
is
strictly
a
case
of
economics
why
you
don’t
pay
them,
and
you
never
get
any
problem
with
it
so
I
assume
it
is
common
practice
in
the
construction
industry
but
you
don’t
go
around
asking
the
other
contractors
this
type
of
question.
(SN
p
10)
(e)
during
the
1977
taxation
year,
he
had
to
complete
three
jobs
for
developers.
3.04
In
re-examination,
Mr
Ellis
testified
on
the
following
points:
(a)
“If
the
work
was
completed
within
30
days,
yes,
they
(the
subcontractors)
would
have
been
paid”;
(b)
the
15%
was
withheld
“until
such
time
as
we
received
our
holdback
payment
from
the
owner”
(SN
p
12);
and,
(c)
according
to
him
he
“had
no
legal
right
to
withhold
the
money
from
them”.
“There
is
nothing
in
writing
that
says
we
are
allowed
to
do
that’,
but
he
explained
that
there
is
a
verbal
agreement
which
applies
to
all
construction.
4.
Law
—
Case
at
Law
—
Analysis
4.01
Law
The
main
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
involved
in
the
present
case
are
paragraphs
18(1
)(a)
and
(e)
and
20(1
)(n).
They
shall
be
quoted
if
necessary
during
the
Analysis.
The
agents
for
both
parties
also
referred
to
the
Alberta
Builders’
Lien
Act
(1970),
c
14)
as
amended
by
“The
Builders’
Lien
Amendment
Act,
1972’’
(chapter
102)
and
to
the
Alberta
Public
Works
Act.
The
appropriate
provisions
shall
be
quoted
if
necessary
during
the
Analysis.
4.02
Case
at
Law
The
respondent
referred
to:
J
L
Guay
Ltée
v
MNR
[1969]
Tax
ABC
691;
69
DTC
490,
(Tax
Appeal
Board);
[1971]
CTC
686;
71
DTC
5423,
(Federal
Court-Trial
Division);
[1973]
CTC
506;
73
DTC
5373,
(Federal
Court
of
Appeal);
and,
[1975]
CTC
97;
75
DTC
5094,
(Supreme
Court
of
Canada).
The
company
appealed
unsuccessfully
to
all
the
above
tribunals.
The
facts
and
the
decision
are
well
described
in
71
DTC
5423:
The
appellant
company
was
a
building
contractor
with
several
outstanding
contracts
with
subcontractors.
The
terms
of
the
standard
contract
provided,
inter
alia,
that
the
company
could
withhold
10%
of
the
amount
due
under
the
contract
until
the
work
was
completed.
This
amount
then
became
payable
at
the
end
of
35
days
after
a
certificate
of
acceptance
was
issued
by
the
architects
and
engineers
to
the
effect
that
the
work
was
completed
in
accordance
with
the
contract.
For
its
1965
taxation
year,
the
appellant
(which
computed
its
income
on
the
accrual
basis)
deducted
over
$277,000
as
holdbacks
on
contracts
awarded
to
subcontractors.
The
Minister
refused
to
allow
the
deduction
on
the
basis
that
the
amounts
were
neither
due
nor
payable
during
the
company’s
1965
year.
Held:
The
appeal
was
dismissed.
The
deduction
was
properly
disallowed
by
the
Minister.
It
was
far
from
certain
that
the
amounts
of
the
holdbacks
would
be
paid
in
full
to
the
subcontractors.
It
should
not
be
forgotten
that
the
purpose
of
the
provision
permitting
withholding
a
percentage
of
the
subcontract
price
was
to
ensure
the
payment
of
any
damages
the
owner
or
the
prime
contractor
might
incur
from
the
subcontractor’s
failure
to
perform
the
work
or
his
faulty
performance
of
it.
Thus,
the
amounts
withheld
were
not
only
uncertain
as
to
quantum
if
partial
damages
resulted
but
would
no
longer
be
even
due
or
payable
if
damages
exceeded
the
amounts
withheld.
While
the
holdbacks
could
be
set
up
as
a
reserve,
for
the
appellant’s
own
accounting
purposes,
to
provide
for
payment
of
a
demand
which
was
contingent
or
conditional,
the
deduction
of
such
a
reserve
was
prohibited
by
section
12(1)(e)
of
the
Act.
Moreover,
there
was
another
reason
for
dismissing
the
appeal.
The
Court
stated
that
the
deduction
of
the
holdbacks
by
the
appellant
in
1965
was
contrary
to
the
rule
that
an
expenditure
may
only
be
deducted
from
income
for
the
period
in
which
it
was
made.
4.02
Analysis
4.03.1
The
crux
of
the
matter
is
whether
the
$95,003.08
(the
quantum
of
which
is
not
in
dispute)
is
an
account
payable
or
not.
If
it
is
an
account
payable
it
is
deductible.
Indeed,
it
was
“incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business”
(paragraph
18(1
)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act),
and
it
is
clear
from
the
evidence
and
not
in
dispute,
that
the
expense
was
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
income
from
business
(paras
3.02(b)
and
(c)
and
3.03(a),
(b)
and
(c)).
4.03.2
The
deciding
criterion
is
whether
an
account
is
payable
when
the
involved
amount
is
legally
due
and
payable,
and
therefore
the
debtor
might
be
sued
and
condemned
to
pay.
This
principle
was
explained
in
J
L
Guay
Ltée
(supra)
and
in
John
Colford
Contracting
Co
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1960]
CTC
178;
60
DTC
1131,
a
case
which
is
referred
to
in
J
L
Guay
Ltée.
4.03.3
Pursuant
to
the
evidence
there
is
no
written
agreement
concerning
the
obligation
to
withhold
the
15%
(para
3.04(c)).
Therefore,
the
taxpayer
did
not
have
to
retain
it
until
the
issuance
of
an
engineer’s
or
architect’s
certificate
of
completion.
Consequently,
it
seems
that
the
account
was
payable
and
that
the
appeal
should
be
allowed.
However,
Mr
Ellis
said
that
there
was
a
“verbal
agreement
which
applies
to
all
construction”
(para
3.04(c))
.
.
you
never
get
any
problem
with
it
so
I
assume
it
is
common
practice
in
the
construction
industry
but
you
don’t
go
around
asking
the
other
contractors
this
type
of
question”.
4.03.4
Is
a
verbal
agreement
sufficient
in
the
present
circumstances
to
bind
the
parties?
Moreover,
it
is
important
to
check
whether
there
is
a
legal
obligation
to
the
same
effect
as
a
written
agreement
coming
from
an
Act
of
the
Government
of
the
Province
of
Alberta.
4.03.5
Builders’
Lien
Act
There
is
no
statutory
requirement
to
withhold
the
15%
from
a
subcontractor
in
the
Builders’
Lien
Act
of
the
Province
of
Alberta.
The
Builders’
Lien
Act
simply
sets
out
the
directions
to
follow
and
to
protect
somebody
against
improper
claims
as
an
owner
or
contractor.
4.03.6
Public
Works
Act
The
Public
Works
Act
of
the
Province
of
Alberta
applies
only
when
the
work
is
done
at
the
expense
of
the
Crown.
There
is
no
evidence
before
the
Board
that
the
construction
done
by
the
appellant
was
at
the
expense
of
the
Crown
and
therefore
was
“public
works”.
Any
practice
based
on
a
section
of
the
said
Act
and
applying
to
public
works
is
therefore
not
pertinent
to
the
instant
case.
The
appellant,
in
his
written
submissions,
tried
to
prove
a
practice
based
on
a
section
of
the
Public
Works
Act.
in
fact,
such
evidence
out
of
Court
could
not
be
accepted.
Even
if
it
were
accepted
it
could
not
be
applied
in
the
present
case
as
explained
above.
4.03.7
Verbal
Agreement
The
disadvantage
of
a
verbal
agreement
ordinarily
comes
from
the
difficulty
In
proving
the
said
verbal
agreement.
Once
it
is
proven,
however,
the
parties
involved
are
bound
as
if
it
had
been
a
written
agreement.
In
the
instant
case,
the
evidence
given
by
the
appellant
himself
concerning
the
verbal
agreement
is
more
than
clear,
the
15%
holdback
is
even
a
practice,
a
custom.
The
Board
could
not
see
why,
before
a
civil
court,
such
evidence
would
not
be
admitted
if
the
appellant
had
been
sued
by
a
subcontractor
with
a
view
to
collecting
the
15%
holdback.
The
legal
action
would
be
dismissed
and
the
amount
claimed
indeed
would
not
be
payable.
4.03.8
As
the
deciding
criterion
explained
above
(para
4.03.2)
cannot
apply
in
the
instant
case
because
the
appellant
would
not
be
condemned
to
pay,
therefore
the
amount
of
$95,003.08
was
not
accounts
payable.
The
reassessment
must
be
maintained.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
dismissed
in
accordance
with
the
above
reasons
for
judgment.
Appeal
dismissed.