M
J
Bonner:—The
appellants
appeal
from
assessments
of
income
tax
for
their
1977
taxation
years.
They
were
members
of
a
partnership
named
Ronto
Development
Company
(hereinafter
called
“Ronto”).
In
the
partnership
financial
statements
the
gain
realized
on
the
sale
in
that
taxation
year
of
a
parcel
of
land
at
Brantford,
Ontario,
was
treated
as
being
in
part
income
and
in
part
on
capital
account.
The
statements
were
prepared
on
the
theory
that
the
portion
of
the
gain
which
was
on
capital
account
was
equal
to
that
portion
of
the
land
which
the
appellants
say
they
intended
to
develop
and
retain
as
a
source
of
rental
income.
The
Minister,
on
assessment,
treated
the
entire
gain
as
income.
The
pleadings
of
the
Cuttyco
appeal
raise
a
second
issue
as
to
the
deductibility
of
an
amount
paid
by
it
for
an
option
to
purchase
land,
which
amount
was
subsequently
forfeited.
The
parties
agreed
that
this
appellant
is
entitled
to
deduct
$25,000
as
an
allowable
capital
loss.
This
agreement
will
be
reflected
in
the
final
judgment.
The
partnership
was
formed
in
1971
with
a
view
to
buying
serviced
lots,
building
houses
thereon
and
selling
them.
In
1973
there
was
a
change
of
direction.
Alan
Solomon,
president
of
one
of
the
corporate
partners,
was
the
only
witness
called
by
the
appellants.
He
testified
that
the
partners
decided
that
it
was
undesirable
to
continue
to
be
dependent
upon
developers
as
a
source
of
building
lots
and
to
forego
the
profits
from
the
land
development
side
of
the
housing
industry.
Further,
it
was
decided
to
re-invest
profits
in
revenue-producing
properties.
It
was
envisaged
that
the
land
necessary
for
high
density
residential
development
and
for
commercial
development
(both
being
potential
generators
of
rental
income)
might
be
secured
in
the
course
of
the
subdivision
and
development
of
large
blocks
of
land
into
areas
having
varying
but
compatible
uses.
Mr
Solomon
testified
that
the
low
density
residential
component
of
a
large
block
so
developed
would
normally
be
built
on
and
sold
off
first,
that
the
part
to
be
used
for
higher
density
housing
would
be
built
on
next,
and
that,
finally,
business
tenants
could
be
attracted
to
the
part
reserved
for
commercial
development
by
the
population
resident
in
the
area
as
a
result
of
the
prior
activities.
With
the
expanded
operations
in
mind
Ronto
hired
a
planner.
It
bought
three
hundred
and
thirty-eight
acres
adjacent
to
the
Brantford
city
limits
under
agreements
dated
in
September
of
1973.
Mr
Solomon
testified
that
when
the
agreements
were
entered
into
the
partners
intended
to
develop
approximately
two-thirds
of
the
land
in
lots
for
the
erection
of
houses
to
be
sold
and
the
remaining
one-third
as
a
mobile
home
park
to
be
retained
with
a
view
to
leasing
the
mobile
home
spaces.
The
partnership
was
unable
to
secure
the
rezoning
necessary
for
such
a
development.
There
was,
he
said,
among
municipalities
in
Ontario,
a
considerable
hostility
to
mobile
home
park
developments.
The
partners
were
well
aware
of
that
hostility.
Mr
Solomon
felt
that
it
would
be
an
“uphill
battle
to
get
that
land
use”.
After
making
a
very
tentative
effort
to
secure
the
necessary
municipal
support
for
rezoning
permitting
a
development
which
included
an
area
to
be
used
as
a
mobile
home
park,
and
after
encountering
opposition
from
the
municipality,
the
development
efforts
made
by
Ronto
changed
course.
The
partnership
sought
and
ultimately
secured
the
many
approvals
necessary
to
develop
the
land
in
areas
for
single
family
dwellings,
higher
density
residential
uses
and
commercial
uses.
Mr
Solomon
explained
that
although
the
partnership
could
have
fought
the
city
in
the
Ontario
Municipal
Board
in
an
attempt
to
secure
approval
of
the
mobile
home
park
concept,
there
were
“trade-offs”
involved.
The
profitability
of
development
of
a
type
acceptable
to
the
municipality,
the
speed
of
development
attainable
with
municipal
cooperation,
the
profitability
of
development
of
the
type
preferred
by
the
developer
and
the
delays
attendant
on
fighting
or
persuading
the
municipality
all
had
to
be
considered
and
weighed.
The
agreements
to
purchase
called
for
closing
on
the
earlier
of
two
dates,
namely
60
days
after
fulfillment
or
waiver
of
certain
conditions
precedent
to
the
appellants’
obligation
to
close
or
September
18,
1974.
The
conditions
in
question,
which
were
inserted
for
the
benefit
of
the
appellants,
and
which
could
be
waived
by
them,
included
the
securing
of
Official
Plan
amendments,
rezoning
and
site
plan
and
development
agreements,
all
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
appellants.
None
of
the
conditions
was
satisfied
before
June.
1974,
when
the
transactions
were
closed.
Long
before
then
the
appellants
had
abandoned
their
attempt
to
develop
any
part
of
the
lands
as
a
mobile
home
park.
The
appellants’
intention
to
develop
a
mobile
home
park
or,
more
accurately,
their
desire
to
do
so
cannot
be
said
to
have
existed
at
the
time
they
became
bound
to
complete
the
purchase.
Before
closing
they
had
made
considerable
progress
toward
securing
the
requisite
approvals
for
a
more
conventional
mixed
use
development.
It
was
argued
that
the
intention
to
use
parts
of
the
development,
as
revised
in
accordance
with
municipal
dictates,
for
the
erection
of
revenue-producing
buildings
stamped
a
part
of
the
gain
with
the
character
of
capital.
The
sale
of
the
entire
development
which
gave
rise
to
the
profit
in
issue
was
said
to
be
the
result
of
unforeseen
circumstances.
One
of
the
partners
was
a
corporation,
the
shares
of
which
were
owned
by
a
Mr
Todgham.
The
capital
needed
to
carry
on
the
development
process
was
obtained
by
bank
loans
made
to
a
large
measure
on
the
strength
of
Mr
Todgham’s
personal
guarantee.
In
August
or
September
of
1975
Mr
Todgham
became
ill.
In
December
of
1975
he
died.
His
estate
was
reluctant
to
participate
further
in
the
development
process.
It
was
difficult
to
finance
the
development
without
Mr
Todgham’s
guarantee.
It
is
not
at
all
clear
on
the
evidence
that
the
sale
of
blocks
of
land
which,
as
a
result
of
the
development
process,
were
formed
and
were
rezoned
for
uses
suitable
for
renting
was
not
envisaged
as
a
possibility
from
the
outset.
First,
in
an
application
made
in
February
of
1976
to
the
Province
of
Ontario
for
exemption
from
tax
under
the
Land
Speculation
Tax
Act
with
respect
to
the
then
proposed
sale
of
the
entire
subdivision,
E
A
Goodman,
solicitor
for
Ronto,
stated:
Prior
to
the
death
of
Mr
Todgham,
Ronto
was
proceeding
to
develop
the
lands
in
question
with
a
view
to
selling
the
same
to
builders
as
lots.
Secondly,
a
decision
to
sell
the
entire
property
was,
according
to
Document
16
of
Exhibit
R-1,
made
as
early
as
September
1,
1975.
That
decision
was
quite
possibly
made
in
response
to
an
offer
to
buy
the
entire
property.
That
offer
was
made
in
August
or
September
of
1975
by
George
Wimpey
Canada
Limited.
Even
if
the
decision
then
made
was
not
final,
it
does
not
appear
that
Wimpey
was
warned
not
to
covet
any
blocks
suitable
as
sites
for
rental
buildings.
Thirdly,
Mr
Solomon
testified
at
a
public
enquiry
that
the
intention
of
Ronto
in
purchasing
the
land
was
to
develop
all
of
the
land
in
blocks,*
to
build
for
resale
on
some
of
the
blocks
and
to
sell
the
balance
to
other
builders.
He
admitted
on
cross-examination
that
his
earlier
evidence
had
been
correct.
The
evidence
does
not
warrant
a
conclusion
that,
at
the
time
the
conditions
precedent
to
Ronto’s
obligation
to
complete
the
purchases
ceased
to
operate,
there
existed
a
firm
intention,
later
frustrated
by
Mr
Todgham’s
death,
to
retain
any
part
of
the
land
for
investment
purposes.
A
desire
to
do
so
if
possible
or
convenient
may
have
existed.
Desire
is
not
intention.
It
was
not
shown
that
any
portion
or
percentage
of
the
land
was
dedicated
to
an
investment
purpose.
There
was
no
evidence,
for
example
that
any
part
of
the
cost
of
the
development
was
capitalized
because
it
was
regarded,
at
the
time,
as
a
cost
of
development
of
land
acquired
as
and
intended
to
be
held
as
a
Capital
asset.
This
is,
therefore,
a
case
in
which
the
partnership
whose
ordinary
business
included
the
development
of
land
for
resale,
developed
land
and
earned
a
profit
on
its
resale.
Such
a
profit
is
plainly
income.
The
appeals
of
S
Donnenfield
Construction
Limited
and
Aldido
Associates
Limited
must
therefore
fail.
The
appeal
of
The
Cuttyco
Corporation
Limited
succeeds
only
to
the
extent
of
the
agreement
previously
mentioned.
Appeal
of
The
Cuttyco
Corporation
Ltd
allowed
in
part.
Other
appeals
dismissed.