Guy
Tremblay:—This
case
was
heard
in
Montreal,
Quebec
on
November
3,
1980.
The
case
was
taken
under
advisement
on
January
15,
1981
when
the
documents
concerning
this
case
were
received
by
the
Board.
1.
The
Point
at
Issue
The
point
at
issue
is
whether
during
the
years
1970
to
1974
inclusively
the
appellant
company
was
associated
with
the
following
companies:
Canadian
Technical
Tape
Ltd,
Lenalco
Holdings
Inc
and
Technical
Products
(Cornwall)
Ltd.
2.
The
Burden
of
Proof
2.01
The
burden
is
on
the
appellant
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
assessments
are
incorrect.
This
burden
of
proof
results
particularly
from
several
judicial
decisions,
including
the
judgment
delivered
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
2.02
In
the
same
judgment
the
Court
decided
that
the
assumed
facts
on
which
the
respondent
based
the
assessments
or
reassessment
are
also
deemed
to
be
correct.
In
the
present
case
the
assumed
facts
are
described
in
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
as
follows:
8.
In
assessing
the
Appellant
for
the
1971
to
1974
taxation
years,
the
Respondent
relied
on
the
following
assumptions
of
facts:
(a)
During
the
1970
to
1974
taxation
years,
the
registered
holders
of
the
issued
capital
of
Lenalco
Holdings
Inc,
Canadian
Technical
Tape
Ltd,
Technical
Products
(Cornwall)
Ltd
and
the
Appellant
was
as
follows:
Technical
Lenalco
Canadian
W
Ralston
&
Co
Products
Inc
Tape
Ltd
Ltd
Ltd
Voting
Common
Common
Preferred
Common
Common
shares
shares
shares
shares
shares
Leonard
Cohen
1048
1
49
1
Alice
Cohen
1050
1
49
Louis
Cohen
1
1
David
Lack
2
1
1
1
Peter
Lack
50
Claire
Schecter
50
1
In
trust
for
Nosh
H
Cohen
350
Aren
Jeffrey
350
Paul
Joseph
Cohen
350
Louis
B
Cohen
350
Lenalco
Holdings
Inc
1016
Canadian
Technical
Tape
Ltd
997
3500
1020
100
100
1000
(b)
During
these
years,
Lenalco
Holdings
Inc
was
controlled
by
the
group
(hereinafter
called
the
Cohen
group),
composed
of
Alice
Cohen,
Leonard
Cohen,
Louis
Cohen
and
David
Lack;
(c)
During
these
years,
Canadian
Technical
Tape
Ltd
was
controlled
by
Lenalco
Holdings
Inc;
(d)
During
these
years,
Technical
Products
(Cornwall)
Ltd
was
controlled
by
Canadian
Technical
Tape
Ltd;
(e)
During
these
years,
the
Cohen
group
held
all
the
Appellant’s
issued
common
shares
(100)
and
each
member
of
this
group
was
an
officer
and
a
director
of
the
Appellant;
(f)
During
these
years,
Mr
Peter
Lack
and
Mrs
Claire
Schecter
held
the
Appellant’s
voting
preferred
shares
as
nominees
on
behalf
of
the
Cohen
group;
(g)
Mr
Peter
Lack
acquired
the
Appellant’s
preferred
shares
from
Mrs
Gilda
Mostovitch
when
she
left
her
employment
as
Mr
David
Lack’s
secretary
in
1964;
(h)
Mrs
Gilda
Mostovitch
and
Mr
Peter
Lack
did
not
pay
anything
for
these
preferred
shares;
(i)
Mrs
Claire
Schecter
acquired
the
Appellant’s
preferred
shares
in
1962
while
she
was
Mr
David
Lack’s
secretary
and
did
not
pay
anything
for
these
preferred
shares;
she
was
still
Mr
David
Lack’s
secretary
during
the
1970
to
1974
taxation
years;
(j)
Mrs
Claire
Schecter
and
Mrs
Gilda
Mostovitch
acquired
those
preferred
shares
as
nominees
on
behalf
of
the
Cohen
group
in
1962
pursuant
to
a
plan
of
re-organization
conceived
by
the
Cohen
group
to
artificially
relinquish
control;
(k)
During
the
1970
to
1974
taxation
years,
the
Cohen
group
controlled
the
Appellant
by
way
of
the
voting
rights
attached
to
the
preferred
shares
held
by
Mr
Peter
Lack
and
Mrs
Claire
Schecter
acting
as
nominees
on
its
behalf;
(l)
The
Appellant’s
preferred
shares
held
by
Mr
Peter
Lack
and
Mrs
Claire
Schecter
carried
the
right
to
a
fixed
cumulative
preferred
dividend
at
a
rate
of
8%
per
annum
and
the
right
to
repayment
of
capital
in
priority
to
the
common
shares
in
case
of
liquidation,
dissolution,
winding-up,
bankruptcy
or
other
distribution
of
the
assets
of
the
Appellant;
(m)
The
Appellant’s
preferred
shares
held
by
Mr
Peter
Lack
and
Mrs
Claire
Schecter,
did
not
carry
rights
as
to
further
participation
in
the
Appellant’s
profits
and
assets;
(n)
The
Cohen
group
holding
the
issued
common
shares
was
entitled
to
hold
the
surplus
profits
on
a
distribution
by
way
of
dividends
after
the
payment
of
the
fixed
cumulative
dividend
to
the
preferred
shareholders
and
to
hold
the
surplus
after
return
of
capital
and
payment
of
the
8%
dividends
to
the
preferred
shareholders
in
the
case
of
liquidation,
dissolution
or
winding-up;
(o)
The
preferred
shares
held
by
Mr
Peter
Lack
and
Mrs
Claire
Schecter
were
redeemable
at
any
time
pursuant
to
a
resolution
of
the
Board
of
Directors
upon
a
30-day
notice
to
the
preferred
shareholders;
(p)
Under
by
law
XI-(B),
the
directors
could,
by
resolution
at
any
time
and
at
their
whole
discretion,
allot
the
whole
or
any
parts
of
the
authorized
and
unissued
stock
of
the
Appellant;
(q)
The
Cohen
group
controlled
the
Appellant
by
reason
of
the
extraordinary
rights
vested
in
the
Appellant
directors
and
the
restrictions
attached
to
the
preferred
shares.
3.
The
Facts
3.01
The
nature
of
the
business
of
the
appellant
company
as
declared
in
the
income
tax
return
is
“Manufacturers
of
Plastic
&
Allied
Products”.
3.02
It
was
admitted
at
the
beginning
of
the
trial
that:
(a)
the
three
companies
Canadian
Technical
Tape
Ltd,
Lenalco
Holdings
Inc
and
Technical
Products
(Cornwall)
Ltd
are
associated;
(b)
the
point
in
dispute
is
whether
the
appellant
company
is
associated
with
those
three
companies;
(c)
the
assumptions
of
fact
given
in
subparagraph
8(a)
of
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
(quoted
above
in
para
2.02)
well
described
the
reality;
(d)
Alice
Cohen
is
Leonard
Cohen’s
wife
and
Louis
Cohen
is
Leonard
Cohen’s
brother;
(e)
“the
contest
is
about
subparagraphs
‘F’,
‘G’,
‘H’,
‘l’,
and
‘J’”
of
section
8
of
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
(Mr
Vineberg,
counsel
for
the
appellant,
SN
p
11,
lines
19
and
20).
3.03
By
mutual
consent,
a
letter
dated
January
11,
1977
written
by
Mr
Vineberg
to
the
respondent
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-1.
This
exhibit
includes
a
document
issued
on
September
21,
1962
by
the
Secretariat
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
approving
a
By-law
No
XXII
of
the
appellant
converting
500
common
shares
into
500
preferred
shares
in
conformity
with
article
45
of
the
Companies
Act
of
the
Province
of
Quebec.
It
was
admitted
that
the
preferred
shares
were
legally
and
validly
issued.
3.04
By
mutual
consent,
a
letter
dated
October
9,
1975
addressed
to
the
respondent
and
signed
by
Barry
Clamen
was
also
filed
as
Exhibit
R-1.
One
part
of
this
document
discussed
the
application
of
the
Oakfield
case
(see
para
4.03.6.1)
on
the
possibility
of
invoking
section
247
of
the
Act.
The
testimony
of
Mr
Clamen
also
is
to
that
effect
(SN
p
140).
3.05
Testimony
of
Peter
Robert
Lack
3.05.1
Mr
Peter
Robert
Lack
(39
years
old),
attorney,
testified
that
on
November
30,
1964
he
made
out
a
$500
cheque
to
the
order
of
Gilda
Mosto-
vitch
(Exhibit
A-2).
On
the
reverse
side
of
the
cheque
is
written:
“Re:
fifty
(50)
times
ten
dollars
(x
$10)
par
value
—
or
par
preferred
shares
of
W
Ralston
Co
(Canada)
Ltd”.
It
is
endorsed
by
Gilda
Mostovitch.
The
said
50
preferred
shares
were
filed
as
Exhibit
A-3.
It
is
signed
by
Mr
Lack
and
Mrs
Gilda
Mostovitch
(SN
p
22).
3.05.2
Referring
to
the
allegation
8(h)
of
the
respondent
in
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal,
the
witness
said
he
was
never
questioned
by
anyone
from
the
Income
Tax
Department
about
the
payment
of
these
shares
or
in
connection
with
the
appellant
(SN
p
24).
3.05.3
Mr
Lack
affirmed
he
had
never
had
any
agreement
(verbal
or
written)
with
Mr
or
Mrs
Leonard
Cohen
or
with
Mr
Louis
Cohen
about
these
preferred
shares,
or
to
the
effect
that
he
had
to
act
as
a
nominee
on
behalf
of
one
of
those
persons
(SN
pp
25,
26).
He
also
said
he
never
received
a
guaranty
from
a
member
of
the
Cohen
family
that
he
could
get
back
his
money
on
these
preferred
shares.
3.05.4
He
received
$40
per
year
as
dividends
and
reported
them
each
year
to
the
Income
Tax
Department.
He
showed
his
income
tax
returns
to
the
Board
and
a
T-5
slip
issued
by
the
appellant
for
the
year
1972
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-4.
3.05.5
Mr
Peter
Lack
is
the
son
of
David
Lack
but
he
is
not
related
to
any
members
of
the
Cohen
Family.
3.05.6
A
letter
sent
by
Gilda
Mostovitch
to
the
appellant
for
the
attention
of
David
Lack
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-5.
It
is
a
letter
of
subscription
for
50
preferred
shares,
saying
a
$500
cheque
is
enclosed.
3.05.7
The
witness
said
that
Claire
Schecter
(the
owner
of
the
other
50
preferred
shares
of
the
appellant
company)
was
his
father’s
secretary
for
a
number
of
years.
She
has
been
living
in
Hong
Kong
since
1977.
Gilda
Mostovitch
was
also
a
former
secretary
of
Peter
Lack’s
father
for
6
years.
In
1964
the
latter
got
married
and
moved
to
the
United
States.
3.05.8
Under
cross-examination,
the
witness
said
he
was
a
law
student
when
he
bought
the
appellant’s
preferred
shares
in
1964.
“Gilda
had
told
me
that
she
was
getting
married
and
was
leaving
the
province
of
Quebec,
and
she
asked
me
to
purchase
her
shares
in
Ralston,
and
I
agreed
to
that
and
I
issued
the
cheque
to
her”
(SN
p
37).
3.05.9
The
sum
of
$500
was
money
he
had
earned
during
his
5
or
6
former
summer
vacations
($45
per
week).
He
then
had
two
bank
accounts:
one
with
the
Bank
of
Montreal
and
another
with
the
Royal
Bank
of
Canada.
Thus
he
had
investment
income.
He
affirmed
that
his
father
had
not
given
him
the
$500
to
buy
the
said
shares
(SN
pp
45,
46).
3.06
Leonard
Cohen’s
Testimony
3.06.1
Mr
Leonard
Cohen,
an
industrialist
and
shareholder
of
the
appellant,
testified
that:
(a)
two
letters,
one
from
Gilda
Mostovitch
dated
September
26,
1962
(Exhibit
A-5)
and
another
one
from
Claire
Schecter
dated
September
26,
1962
(Exhibit
A-6)
addressed
to
the
appellant
(each
transferring
a
cheque
of
$500
to
pay
for
50
voting
preferred
shares
of
the
appellant)
are
records
of
the
company;
(b)
the
money
used
for
these
payments
was
not
given
or
reimbursed
by
him
or
by
his
wife;
(c)
he
(or
his
wife)
had
no
agreement
of
any
kind
(verbal
or
written)
with
Miss
Mostovitch,
Mrs
Schecter
and
Mr
Peter
Lack.
There
was
no
discussion
and
no
attempt
to
show
how
they
would
vote
their
shares;
(d)
he
(or
his
wife)
did
not
guarantee
to
buy
the
shares
back;
(e)
the
employees
of
the
respondent
never
asked
him
questions
about
the
said
preferred
shares;
(f)
the
shareholders
of
the
appellant
on
January
4,
1972
were
Claire
Schecter,
Peter
Lack,
Leonard
Cohen,
Alice
Cohen,
Louis
Cohen
and
David
Lack.
The
latter
four
were
elected
directors
on
the
above
date
for
that
year;
(g)
there
was
no
agreement
of
any
kind
that
Miss
Mostovitch,
Mrs
Schecter
and
Mr
Peter
Lack
be
his
agents
and
his
nominees
to
hold
the
shares;
(h)
he
and
his
wife
are
not
related
to
Miss
Mostovitch,
Mrs
Schecter,
David
Lack
and
Peter
Lack.
3.06.2
By-law
No
22
of
the
appellant
company,
creating
preferred
shares
from
existing
shares,
was
filed
as
Exhibit
A-7.
This
by-law
was
approved
by
the
Government
of
Quebec
on
October
3,
1962.
3.06.3
In
cross-examination,
Mr
Leonard
Cohen
testified
that:
(a)
Canadian
Technical
Tape
was
incorporated
in
1950,
its
main
object
being
manufacture
of
pressure
sensitive
tapes;
(b)
in
1950
he
then
owned
50%
of
the
shares
of
the
said
company,
the
other
50%
being
owned
by
Americans.
In
1957,
he
acquired
control
of
Canadian
Technical
Tape;
(c)
the
appellant
company
was
incorporated
in
January
1955.
Then
the
shareholders
were
David
Lack,
Pearl
Auerbach
(Mr
Lack’s
secretary),
Baruch
Pollack
(an
advocate
working
for
Mr
Lack)
and
Leonard
Cohen;
(d)
the
letters
patent
filed
as
Exhibit
R-2
were
those
of
the
appellant;
(e)
the
appellant
was
“set
up
to
manufacture
extruded
polyethylene
film”
(garbage
bags,
wrapping,
etc.).
3.06.4
The
respondent
filed
as
Exhibit
R-3
the
appellant’s
returns
for
the
years
1960,
1961
and
1962.
Those
returns
indicated
that
Canadian
Technical
Tape
Ltd
is
an
associated
company.
The
two
companies
have
the
same
directors
and
officers
(the
three
Cohens
and
David
Lack).
Their
head
office
is
located
at
the
same
address.
3.06.5
The
witness,
after
studying
the
financial
statements
of
1962,
said
that
in
that
year
the
appellant
had
enough
money
to
operate
and
did
not
require
capital.
To
explain
the
issue
of
By-law
No
22
concerning
the
500
voting
preferred
shares
at
$10
each,
he
first
said
that:
it
was
done
on
the
basis
of
professional
counsel
(SN
p
104).
Did
somebody
bring
up
the
question
of
income
tax
in
relation
to
this?
A
I
can’t
specifically
remember,
but
everything
that
happens
in
business
has
a
relationship
to
income
tax.
I
would
say
that
as
a
statement.
Q
It
is
an
important
aspect.
A
It’s
a
very
important
aspect.
(SN
p
107)
Q
Logically,
if
you
issued
preferred
shares,
would
you
not
issue
them
to
members
of
your
family?
A
the
only
.
.
.
1
think
at
the
time,
the
only
immediate
members
of
my
family
were
my
wife
and
myself
who
were
principals,
there
was
nobody
else
of
any
great
significance
in
my
family.
Q
Why
didn't
you
take
preferred
shares?
A
As
I
say,
l
.
.
.
Q
Was
this
done
for
tax
purposes?
A
It’s
a
difficult
question
to
answer
.
.
.
Q
Well,
is
there
a
reason
why
you
created
those
shares
other
than
tax
reasons?
A
I
don’t
know
whether
I
can
answer
you
that
directly
—
you
know
—
everything
that
one
does
in
business
today
—
you
have
the
two
(2)
facets:
one
is
the
operations,
and
the
other
is
the
financial,
if
you
want,
and
it
is
very
complex,
especially
to
a
person
such
as
myself,
and
I
do
depend
upon
professional
counsel.
I
don’t
have
time
frankly
to
—
most
of
this
I
don’t
understand
as
to
what
is
happening
anyway.
I’m
involved
in
operations
..
.
Q
Yes,
I
can
very
well
understand
that,
Mr
Cohen,
but
you
know,
you
were
issuing
special
types
of
shares
.
.
.
A
Yes.
Q
.
..
voting
power
.
.
.
A
Yes.
Q
These
shares
could
vote
at
a
meeting
.
.
.
A
Yes.
Q
.
.
.
and
did
you
know
at
the
time
that
fifty
percent
(50%)
of
the
voting
rights
in
the
shares
would
go
to
other
people
than
yourself
.
.
.
A
Yes.
Q
.
.
.
and
members
of
your
family?
.
.
.
A
Yes.
Q
You
knew
that?
A
Yes.
(SN
pp
107-109)
3.06.6
As
Exhibit
R-4,
the
respondent
filed
By-law
No
1
which
was
adopted
on
January
7,
1955.
A
part
of
article
XII
(a)
of
this
By-law
reads
as
follows:
No
transfer
of
shares
shall
be
made
without
the
consent
of
the
Directors
and
no
share
shall
in
any
event
be
transferable
until
all
previous
calls
thereon
have
been
fully
paid
in.
Mr
Cohen
said
that
he
presumed
that
he
had
approved
the
transfer
of
shares
to
Peter
Lack.
3.06.7
In
cross-examination,
the
witness
also
testified
about
Miss
Mosto-
vitch’s
and
Claire
Schecter’s
way
of
voting:
Q
In
Mr
Lack’s
office.
You’ve
testified
to
the
effect
that
you
had
no
agreement
or,
written
or
otherwise
with
either
Gilda
Mostovitch
and
Claire
Schecter?
.
.
.
A
Yes
Sir.
Q
.
.
.
concerning
the
way
that
the
shares
would
be
voted,
or
the
way,
the
way
that
they
would
handle
the
shares,
and
you
said
that
your
wife
didn’t
either.
How
can
you
speak
for
your
wife,
or
did
you
ask
her,
or
whatever?
A
No
but
my
wife
will
trust
my
judgment
the
way
I
would
trust
the
judgment
of
.
.
.
Q
.
.
.
Mr
Lack?
A
.
.
.
Mr
Lack,
or
Mr
Usher,
yes.
Q
So
that
therefore,
Mr
Lack
told
you
that
there
shouldn’t
be
any
problem
—
is
that
what
we
can
assume?
A
I
think
it’s
a
fair
assumption.
Q
A
fair
assumption
—
there
would
be
no
problem
with
these
preferred
shares?
.
.
.
A
That's
right.
Q
.
.
.
that
you
would
continue
on
as
before?
...
A
Yes
Sir.
Q
..
.
there
would
be
no
problem.
(SN
pp
119,
120)
3.07
Testimony
of
Mr
Markus
Bonzee
Mr
Bonzee,
who
has
been
Chief
Accountant
for
the
appellant
since
1955,
testified
that:
(a)
in
1962
the
records
(Exhibit
A-8)
of
the
company
showed
that
Gilda
Mostovitch
and
Claire
Schecter
paid
$500
each
for
50
preferred
shares
bearing
8%
interest.
Payments
were
made
by
cheques
(SN
p
129);
(b)
according
to
records
(Exhibit
A-9)
payments
of
$40
interest
were
paid
to
the
owners
of
the
preferred
shares;
(c)
nobody
from
the
Income
Tax
Department
approached
him
to
ask
him
whether
the
shares
were
paid
for
or
not
paid
for
(SN
p
130).
4.
Law
—
Cases
at
Law
—
Analysis
4.01
Law
The
main
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
involved
in
the
present
case
are
paragraph
39(4)(b),
subsection
39(5)
and
paragraph
139(5d)(b)
of
the
former
Act
and
amendments
and
paragraphs
251
(5)(b),
256(1)(b)
and
subsection
256(2)
of
the
1972
Act
and
amendments.
The
provisions
of
the
new
Act
(which
are
similar
to
those
of
the
former
Act)
read
as
follows:
251.
(5)
Control
by
related
groups,
options,
etc.
For
the
purposes
of
subsection
(2)
and
section
256,
(b)
a
person
who
had
a
right
under
a
contract,
in
equity
or
otherwise,
either
immediately
or
in
the
future
and
either
absolutely
or
contingently,
to,
or
to
acquire,
shares
in
a
corporation,
or
to
control
the
voting
rights
of
shares
in
a
corporation,
shall,
except
where
the
contract
provided
that
the
right
is
not
exercisable
until
the
death
of
an
individual
designated
therein,
be
deemed
to
have
had
the
same
position
in
relation
to
the
control
of
the
corporation
as
if
he
owned
the
shares;
and
256.
(1)
Associated
corporations.
For
the
purpose
of
this
Act
one
corporation
is
associated
with
another
in
a
taxation
year
if
at
any
time
in
the
year,
(b)
both
of
the
corporations
were
controlled
by
the
same
person
or
group
of
persons.
(2)
Idem.
When
two
corporations
are
associated,
or
are
deemed
by
this
subsection
to
be
associated,
with
the
same
corporation
at
the
same
time,
they
shall,
for
the
purpose
of
this
Act,
be
deemed
to
be
associated
with
each
other.
4.02
Cases
at
Law
Counsel
for
both
parties
referred
the
Board
to
the
following
cases
at
law:
1.
Anglo-BC
Distributors
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1970]
CTC
138;
70
DTC
6105;
2.
Lou’s
Service
(Sault)
Limited
v
MNR,
[1967]
CTC
315;
67
DTC
5201;
3.
Aaron’s
Ladies
Apparel
Limited
et
al
v
MNR,
[1966]
CTC
330;
66
DTC
5244;
4.
MNR
v
Dworkin
Furs
(Pembroke)
Limited
et
al,
[1967]
CTC
50;
67
DTC
5035;
5.
Alpine
Drywall
&
Decorating
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1966]
CTC
359;
66
DTC
5263;
6.
Oakfield
Developments
(Toronto)
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1971]
CTC
283;
71
DTC
5175;
7.
M
F
Esson
&
Sons
Limited
v
MNR,
[1966]
CTC
439;
66
DTC
5303;
8.
Les
Magasins
Continental
Ltée
v
HMQ,
[1978]
CTC
688;
78
DTC
6557;
[1981]
CTC
428,
79
DTC
5213;
9.
Ghimpelman
v
Bercovici,
[1957]
SCR
128;
10.
Marc
Beauchamp
v
Les
Contenants
Sanitaires
C
S
Inc
et
al,
[1979]
C
CS
414;
11.
Pillsbury
Canada
Limited
v
MNR,
19
Tax
ABC
431;
58
DTC
428;
12.
Conway
Estate
v
MNR,
[1965]
CTC
283;
65
DTC
5169;
13.
Buckerfield’s
Limited
et
al
v
MNR,
[1964]
CTC
504;
64
DTC
5301;
14.
British-American
Tobacco
Co
Ltd
v
IRC,
29
TC
49;
15.
MNR
v
Wright’s
Canadian
Ropes
Ltd,
[1947]
CTC
1;
2
DTC
927;
16.
Dominion
Fibre
Drum
Corp
v
MNR,
40
Tax
ABC
79;
66
DTC
46;
17.
Regal
Wholesale
Ltd
v
HMQ,
[1976]
CTC
272;
76
DTC
6146;
18.
Vina-Rug
(Canada)
Limited
v
MNR,
[1968]
CTC
1;
68
DTC
5021.
4.03
Analysis
4.03.1
First,
it
is
clear
to
everybody
that
the
basis
of
the
reassessment
is
not
subsection
247(2)
of
the
new
Act
or
138A(2)
of
the
former
Act.
The
provision
is
used
only
if
the
Minister
so
directs.
In
the
present
case
there
is
no
direction
from
the
Minister.
Even
if
there
was
discussion
between
the
representatives
of
the
parties
in
October
1975
(Exhibit
R-1)
concerning
the
possibility
of
invoking
subsection
247(2),
in
fact
the
said
provision
was
not
the
basis
of
the
assessments
issued
on
April
30,
1976.
this
clearly
appears
from
the
“Notification
by
the
Minister’
dated
February
25,
1977
in
answer
to
the
Notice
of
Objection.
In
this
notification
the
Minister
refers
to
paragraph
39(4)(b)
and
subsection
39(5)
of
the
old
Act
and
paragraph
256(1)(b)
and
subsection
256(2)
of
the
new
Act.
It
cannot
be
said
in
the
present
case,
as
contended
by
the
appellant,
that
there
is
an
alternative
plea.
The
quotation
of
the
Conway
case
(supra)
“The
onus
of
supporting
the
assessment
under
the
alternative
plea
was
accordingly
not
on
the
appellant,
but
on
the
Minister”
has
no
application
in
the
present
case.
4.03.2
The
appellant
has
admitted
most
of
the
assumptions
of
fact
of
the
respondent
“the
contest
is
about
subparagraphs
‘F’,
‘G’,
‘H’,
‘l’,
and
‘J’”
of
section
8
of
the
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
said
Mr
Vineberg
(para
3.02(e)).
Those
subparagraphs
assumed
that
Peter
Lack,
Gilda
Mostovitch
and
Claire
Schecter
were
nominees
on
behalf
of
the
Cohen
group.
The
preponderance
of
the
evidence
is
that
they
are
not
nominees
on
behalf
of
the
Cohen
group.
The
uncontradicted
testimonies,
most
of
them
confirmed
by
document,
indeed
are
to
the
effect
that:
(a)
Miss
Gilda
Mostovitch
and
Claire
Schecter
had
personally
bought
the
preferred
shares
from
the
appellant
(paras
3.06.1(a)
and
3.07(a));
(b)
Peter
Lack
had
bought
from
Miss
Gilda
Mostovitch
and
paid
for
them
with
his
own
money
(paras
3.05.1,
3.05.6
and
3.05.9,
Exhibits
A-2
and
A-5);
(c)
the
owners
of
the
preferred
shares
had
received
every
year
the
eight
percent
interest
(paras
3.05.4,
3.07(b)
and
Exhibit
A-4);
(d)
there
was
no
agreement
to
the
effect
that
the
owners
of
the
preferred
shares
had
acted
as
nominees
of
the
Cohen
family,
or
that
they
had
received
a
guaranty
from
a
member
of
the
Cohen
family
to
buy
the
shares
back
(paras
3.05.3
and
3.06.1(b),
(c)
and
(d));
and,
(e)
nobody
from
the
Income
Tax
Department
had
approached
the
witnesses
and
asked
them
questions
about
the
preferred
shares
(paras
3.05.2,
3.06.1(e)
and
3.07.1(c)).
4.03.3
On
the
one
hand,
it
is
true
that
the
preponderance
of
the
evidence
is
to
the
effect
that
the
issuance
of
the
preferred
shares
in
1962
and
the
reorganization
of
the
company
had
a
relationship
to
income
tax
and
certainly
to
pay
less
income
tax
(para
3.06.5).
On
the
other
hand,
the
reassessments
are
based
on
paragraph
39(4)(b)
of
the
former
Act
and
paragraph
256(1)
(b)
of
the
new
Act
and
not
on
the
tax
evasion
provision
in
particular
subsection
138A(2)
of
the
former
Act
nor
on
subsection
247(2)
of
the
new
Act.
In
these
latter
provisions
indeed,
one
of
the
main
reasons
for
the
separate
existence
of
the
companies
was:
“to
reduce
the
amount
of
taxes
that
would
otherwise
be
payable
under
this
Act”.
This
requirement
or
reason
is
not
provided
in
subsections
39(4)
and
256(1).
Therefore
the
principle
of
Lord
Atkin
still
stands.
A
taxpayer
may
arrange
his
business
to
pay
the
least
possible
tax.
4.03.4
It
is
clear
to
the
Board
that
if
the
preponderance
of
the
evidence
had
been
that
the
owners
of
the
preferred
shares
were
nominees
for
the
Cohen
group,
the
appeal
would
have
been
dismissed
on
the
basis
that
the
Cohen
group
would
have
the
actual
control
of
the
appellant
company.
4.03.5
Now
the
problem
is
whether,
considering
the
balance
of
the
evidence,
(admissions,
testimonies
and
by-laws)
the
Cohen
group
legally
or
actually
had
the
control
of
the
appellant
company
during
the
years
involved.
4.03.6
Respondent’s
arguments
4.03.6.1
Oakfield
case
In
fact,
the
respondent
based
his
arguments
on
the
Oakfield
case
(supra)
given
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
It
is
useful
to
refer
to
the
facts
summarized
as
follows:
The
appellant
company
(under
its
original
name)
was
assessed
for
its
two
fiscal
periods
ending
in
1963
on
the
basis
that
it
was
associated
with
42
other
companies.
The
Minister
took
the
position
that
the
same
group
of
persons
(the
“inside
group”)
controlled
all
the
companies,
since
the
large
majority
of
the
common
shares
of
each
of
the
43
companies
was
held
by
the
same
five
corporate
shareholders.
In
1960,
in
view
of
the
impending
enactment
by
Parliament
of
an
amendment
to
section
39(4)
of
the
Act,
the
appellant
(and
the
42
other
companies)
sought
to
increase
its
capital
by
issuing
voting
preferred
shares
equal
in
number
to
the
common
shares
outstanding,
which
preferred
shares
were
to
be
issued
to
persons
who
were
strangers
in
the
tax
sense
to
the
holders
of
the
common
shares.
This
was
to
be
done
in
the
belief
that
the
inside
group
would
no
longer
be
in
control
of
the
companies
since
it
would
no
longer
have
majority
voting
power.
Supplementary
letters
patent
were
sought
on
December
20,
1960
to
authorize
the
issue
of
voting,
non-participating,
cumulative,
redeemable
preferred
shares,
and
the
directors,
acting
on
the
assurance
that
the
letters
patent
would
be
made
effective
from
that
date,
proceeded
on
December
21,
1960
to
issue
and
allot
the
shares,
although
the
letters
patent
were
not
finally
issued
until
February
15,
1961.
(The
letters,
when
issued,
were
made
effective
from
December
20,
1960.)
When
the
shares
were
issued,
the
principal
shareholder
of
the
companies
making
up
the
inside
group
personally
guaranteed
to
the
preferred
shareholders
a
return
of
the
money
invested
by
them
and
also
guaranteed
the
payment
of
the
dividend.
The
Exchequer
Court
(69
DTC
5175)
upheld
the
Minister’s
assessment
of
the
appellant
company
as
an
associated
corporation,
ruling
that
the
inside
group
never
lost
control
of
the
company.
This
ruling
was
based
on
the
finding
that
no
preferred
shares
were
validly
issued
by
the
company
on
December
21,
1960
since
its
capital
stock
did
not
include
such
shares
until
the
supplementary
letters
patent
were
issued
at
a
later
date.
The
company
appealed
this
decision
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
Held:
The
appeal
was
dismissed.
The
appellant
company
had
been
properly
assessed
as
an
associated
corporation.
The
inside
group
(the
common
shareholders)
controlled
the
company
within
the
meaning
of
section
39(4)(b)
even
if
the
preferred
shares
were
validly
issued.
The
inside
group
controlled
50
per
cent
of
the
voting
power
through
their
ownership
of
the
common
shares.
They
were
entitled
to
all
the
surplus
profits
on
a
distribution
by
way
of
dividend
after
the
payment
of
the
fixed
cumulative
dividend
to
the
preferred
shareholders.
On
a
winding-up
of
the
company,
they
were
entitled
to
all
of
the
surplus
after
return
of
capital
and
the
payment
of
a
10
per
cent
premium
to
the
preferred
shareholders.
Their
voting
power
was
sufficient
to
authorize
the
surrender
of
the
company’s
letters
patent.
These
circumstances
were
sufficient
to
vest
control
in
the
inside
group
even
though
the
owners
of
non-participating
preferred
shares
held
the
remaining
50
per
cent
of
the
voting
power.
According
to
the
respondent
the
facts
in
the
Oakfield
case
are
substantially
the
same
as
in
the
present
case.
Therefore,
the
conclusion
must
be
the
same.
4.03.6.2
The
present
case
can
be
distinguished
from
the
Oakfield
case
on
some
points:
(a)
The
Cohen
group
did
not
guarantee
to
the
preferred
shareholders
a
return
of
the
moneys
invested
in
the
purchase
of
the
shares.
The
owners
of
the
preferred
shares
were
not
nominees
on
behalf
of
the
Cohen
group;
(b)
the
preferred
shares
were
legally
and
validly
issued
on
that
aspect
(para
3.03).
In
the
Oakfield
case,
it
is
necessary
to
quote
the
judgment
in
fine:
Cattanach
J,
in
the
Exchequer
Court
arrived
at
the
same
result
but
on
different
grounds.
He
held
that
the
Minister
was
not
precluded
from
establishing
that
the
supplementary
letters
patent
bore
a
date
antecedent
to
their
actual
issue
on
the
authority
of
Letain
v
Conwest
Exploration
Ltd
(1961)
SCR
98,
and
they
were
not
in
fact
issued
until
February
15,
1961.
It
followed
that
no
preference
shares
were
validly
issued
by
Polestar
on
December
21,
1960,
as
the
capital
stock
of
Polestar
did
not
include
such
stock
at
that
time,
and
the
common
shareholders
never
lost
control
of
the
company.
It
is
unnecessary
to
deal
with
these
grounds
in
view
of
my
opinion
that
there
was
sufficient
control
even
if
the
preferred
shares
were
validly
issued.
(c)
it
is
my
opinion
that
the
voting
power
of
the
Cohen
group
(50%
of
the
voting
shares)
was
not
sufficient
to
authorize
the
redemption
of
the
preferred
shares
by
the
company.
Two-thirds
of
the
voting
shares
were
required.
On
this
point,
the
Board
shares
the
opinion
of
Mr
Barry
Clamen
(Exhibit
R-1,
para
3.04).
4.03.6.3
In
fact,
it
seems
that
the
only
points
which
are
common
with
the
Oakfield
case
are
the
common
shareholders
(the
Cohen
group):
They
were
entitled
to
all
the
surplus
profits
on
a
distribution
by
way
of
dividend
after
the
payment
of
the
fixed
cumulative
dividend
to
the
preferred
shareholders.
On
a
winding-up
of
Polestar,
(let
us
say
of
Ralston,
the
appellant)
they
were
entitled
to
all
of
the
surplus
after
return
of
capital
and
the
payment
of
a
10
per
cent
premium
to
the
preferred
shareholders.
Is
it
sufficient
to
say
that
the
Cohen
group
controls
the
company?
I
cannot
sustain
this
conclusion.
There
remains,
however,
a
last
point
which
was
pointed
out
by
the
respondent.
4.03.6.4
The
respondent
referred
to
the
provision
Xl(b)
of
By-law
No
1
of
the
appellant
(Exhibit
R-4).
It
reads
as
follows:
(b)
The
Directors
may
from
time
to
time
allot
the
whole
or
any
parts
of
the
authorized
and
unissued
stock
of
the
Company
to
such
person
or
persons,
corporation
or
corporations
as
they
shall
by
resolution
determine.
The
respondent
contends
that,
as
there
remain
400
unissued
common
shares
and
400
preferred
shares,
it
is
possible
for
the
directors
(the
Cohen
group)
to
acquire
part
or
all
of
those
shares
and
therefore
they
can,
at
any
time
in
the
future,
control
the
company.
The
respondent
referred
in
the
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
to
paragraph
139(5d)(b)
of
the
former
Act
which
is
similar
to
paragraph
251
(5)(b)
of
the
new
Act.
It
is
quoted
in
paragraph
4.01.
It
is
stipulated
at
the
beginning
of
this
provision:
For
the
purposes
of
subsection
2
and
section
256.
We
know
that
subsection
256(2)
(also
quoted
in
para
4.01)
is
the
main
one
involved
in
the
present
case.
This
paragraph
139(5d)(b)
was
found
not
applicable
in
the
Distillers
Corporation
—
Seagrams
Limited
case,
[1980]
CTC
2737;
80
DTC
1649.
In
the
said
case,
the
question
was
to
determine
whether
the
British
company
was
a
“subsidiary
controlled
corporation”
of
the
appellant
company;
it
was
not
a
question
of
an
associated
company
as
in
the
present
case.
The
said
disposition
139(5d)(b)
must
apply
only
to
the
concept
of
associated
company
and
at
arm’s
length
transaction.
4.03.6.5
The
point
is
whether
in
virtue
of
this
provision
the
common
shareholders,
directors
in
1962,
were
“deemed
to
have
had
the
same
position
in
relation
to
the
control
of
the
corporation
as
if
they
owned
the
shares”.
At
first
glance,
it
seems
that
the
answer
must
be
given
in
the
affirmative.
The
common
shareholders
indeed
are
the
directors
of
the
appellant
company.
Therefore
they
may
allot
to
themselves
the
whole
or
any
parts
of
unissued
shares.
In
that
sense
one
can
say
they
have
a
right
to
acquire.
However,
the
cited
by-law
says
that
the
director
may
allot
the
said
unissued
stocks
“to
such
person
or
persons,
corporation
or
corporations
as
they
shall
by
resolution
determine”.
Therefore
the
unissued
stock
of
the
company
may
be
allotted
to
every
individual
and
every
company
in
the
world.
Everybody
in
the
world
in
fact
has
the
same
right.
It
is
the
Board’s
opinion
that
the
word
“right”
contemplated
in
paragraph
251
(5)(b)
is
not
a
right
which
the
person
in
question
holds
in
common
with
all
the
others
in
the
world.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
matter
is
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment
in
accordance
with
the
above
Reasons
for
Judgment.
Appeal
allowed.